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ABSTRACT 
I examine the value relevance of earnings measures based on generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) relative to non -GAAP earnings measures using six 
earnings measures: I/B/E/S earnings; Standard & Poor ' s Core earnings; cash earnings; 
cash f lows f rom operations; earnings f rom operations adjusted to exclude special items; 
and income before extraordinary items. I adopt the Ohison (1995; 1999) valuation 
model to test value relevance and a cumulative abnormal returns model to test the 
information content of these alternative earnings measures. Prior studies consistently 
show n o n - G A A P earnings are significantly more value relevant than G A A P earnings 
(Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Brown and Sivakumar . 2003; 
Albring et al., 2010) and that information risk is priced by investors (Easley and 
O ' H a r a . 2004). Therefore , factors that impact on information risk, such as, information 
asymmetry , earnings quality and conservatism, may affect the value relevance of G A A P 
and n o n - G A A P earnings. However , prior studies do not examine the impact of these 
factors on the relative and incremental value relevance G A A P versus non -GAAP 
earnings. I separately control and test for the impact of information asymmetry , 
earnings quality and conservatism on the comparative value relevance of G A A P and 
n o n - G A A P earnings. 
Furthermore, I argue that f i rm size may impact on the value relevance of G A A P and 
n o n - G A A P earnings. In addition, industry may have an effect on the value relevance of 
earnings, particularly for f i rms in the financial sector because of their capital structure 
and regulatory environment . However , prior studies do not investigate the impact of 
financial and non-financial f i rms and of size on the value relevance and informativeness 
of G A A P and non -GAAP earnings. I consider these issues by separately analysing 
samples of f inancial , non-financial , S & P 500 and non-S&P 500 f i rms. 
Prior studies generally present evidence f rom before the G F C and there is no published 
research on the value relevance of these earnings metrics that examine the impact of the 
G F C . Therefore , I examine the impact of the G F C on the value relevance of G A A P and 
n o n - G A A P earnings measures before, during and after the G F C . Additionally, prior 
research focuses on G A A P earnings and pro forma or I/B/E/S earnings. As mentioned 
above , I use six earnings measures. 
My sample is drawn from US publicly traded f irms between 2002 and 2012. M y results 
indicate that G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant and that non-GAAP 
earnings are not consistently more value relevant than G A A P earnings. I f ind evidence 
that information asymmetry, earnings quality and conservatism are systematically 
related to the comparative value relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. I also 
f ind that sample selection impacts on the f indings. In addit ion, investors shift their 
emphasis on G A A P and non-GAAP earnings over time as a consequence of the G F C 
and investors generally place greater emphasis on the book value of equity in pricing 
shares. M y f indings highlight the fluid nature of the relative emphasis investors place on 
alternative earnings measures. They provide insights on the impact of information 
asymmetry, earnings quality and conservatism, and of the G F C on the emphasis 
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There is much research on the information content and value relevance of earnings 
measures based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) relative to non-
G A A P measures. Prior research (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al.. 2003; 
Doyle et al., 2003; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004) finds that non-GAAP earnings (e.g., 
street, pro forma or l/B/E/S earnings) are significantly more value relevant and 
informative relative to GAAP earnings. However, much of this evidence is based on 
samples f rom before 2006, i.e., before the global financial crisis (GFC). Albring el at. 
(2010) covers the period 2002 to 2007 in their study, which includes the beginning of 
the GFC. However, they did not investigate the impact of the GFC in their study. In 
another recent study, Wieland et al. (2013) examine the value relevance of Standard & 
Poor 's (S&P) Core Earnings metric after controlling for mandated recognition of stock 
option expense in the income statement effective from 2005. While their sample 
comprises data f rom 2001 to 2009, they only test the impact of the GFC in their study 
by controlling for goodwill impairment. Consequently, these studies do not investigate 
the impact of the GFC on the value relevance or informativeness of non-GAAP earnings 
relative to G A A P earnings. To the best of my knowledge, there is no research on the 
value relevance of these earnings metrics post-2006 that specifically addresses the GFC 
and its impact. This is somewhat surprising given that during this period, there is 
increased focus on the reliability of earnings information. 
Furthermore, the GFC created a climate of volatility and uncertainty in the capital 
markets, which may impact on how investors perceive the credibility and value 
relevance of earnings, and the sources from which they are produced. Figure 1.1 shows 
the daily Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX), a 
commonly used measure of investor sentiment and market volatility, over the period 
f rom January 2002 to December 2012.' There is a steep increase in the index around the 
middle of 2007 and a subsequent decrease to late 2008. This marked movement in VIX 
corresponds to the peak of the GFC. 
' The data for Figure 1.1 is publicly avai lable f rom the Ch icago Board Opt ions Exchange webs i te . 
Figure 1.1: Daily Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index over 
the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2012 
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Importantly, the relative uncertainty and volatility due to the G F C have strong 
implications on investors' information risk and how they manage this risk. Specifically, 
this impact on information risk means the relative emphasis investors place on G A A P 
and non-GAAP earnings may vary between low and high levels of factors that affect 
information risk, such as information asymmetry, earnings quality and conservatism. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, there are no studies that specifically control for 
the level of information asymmetry, earnings quality or conservatism when examining 
the comparative value relevance and informativeness of G A A P and non-GAAP 
earnings. 
Prior to the GFC , there were concerns with pro forma earnings, specifically with the 
quality of the information and the potential for it to be biased given management's 
vested interests. This led to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) instituting 
regulations limiting the use of non-GAAP earnings metrics (Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2001; Securities and Exchange Commission, 2002). Nevertheless, security 
analysts tracking services (e.g., I/B/E/S and First Call) and credit rating agencies (e.g., 
Moody's and Standard & Poor's) continue to produce their own earnings measures. 
Given the greater scrutiny of non-GAAP earnings since 2002 and the impact of the 
G F C , an impor t an t research ques t ion is: D o inves tors con t inue to p lace g rea te r va lue 
r e l e v a n c e on n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s re la t ive to G A A P e a r n i n g s ? 
G e n e r a l l y , p r o f o r m a e a r n i n g s are p roduced by f i r m s to s u p p l e m e n t their repor ted 
G A A P e a r n i n g s , wh i l e s treet and l /B /E/S ea rn ings are p roduced by ana lys t s . N o n -
G A A P e a r n i n g s are genera l ly more se lec t ive than G A A P e a r n i n g s in that "o the r non-
o p e r a t i n g " i tems are exc luded and these ea rn ings are a rgued to bet ter r epresen t 
c o n t i n u i n g p e r f o r m a n c e . B o w e n et al. ( 2 0 0 5 ) provide e v i d e n c e that f i r m s tend to p lace 
grea te r re la t ive e m p h a s i s on pro f o r m a ea rn ings w h e n they have less va lue re levant 
G A A P e a r n i n g s . Bha t t acha rya et al. ( 2003) es t imate that whi le only a small p ropor t ion 
of f i r m s repor t any pro f o r m a or n o n - G A A P f i g u r e s be tween 1998 and 2 0 0 0 , the 
n u m b e r of f i r m s do ing so increased dur ing this pe r iod . In a subsequen t s tudy , 
B h a t t a c h a r y a el al. ( 2007) report an increase in pro f o r m a repor t ing f r o m 1998 until 
2001 f o l l o w e d by a d r ama t i c d rop in the third quar te r of 2 0 0 2 co inc id ing with the 
e n a c t m e n t of the S a r b a n e s - O x l e y Act ( S O X ) in Ju ly 2 0 0 2 . Doyle etal. ( 2 0 0 3 ) sugges t 
that the m a r k e t m a y mispr i ce s tock or be mis led by pro f o r m a ea rn ings , whi l e J o h n s o n 
and S c h w a r t z (2005) repor t resul ts that do not suppor t this v i ew . 
T h e s e s tud ies f o c u s pr imar i ly on ea rn ings m e a s u r e s p roduced e i ther by the f i r m ( G A A P 
and pro f o r m a ea rn ings ) o r secur i ty ana lys t s (street and I /B/E/S ea rn ings ) . O n the o the r 
h a n d , credi t ra t ing a g e n c i e s such as S tandard & P o o r ' s ( S & P ) a l so provide a l te rna t ive 
i n f o r m a t i o n to capi tal m a r k e t s . T h e credi t ra t ings issued by these agenc ies are ex t r eme ly 
impor t an t as they represen t an independen t eva lua t ion of f i r m s ' de fau l t r isks ( G r a h a m 
and H a r v e y , 2 0 0 1 : G r a y et al.. 2006) . Credi t rat ing agenc ies a lso p roduce their own 
a l t e rna t ive m e a s u r e s of ea rn ings . It is conce ivab l e that ea rn ings m e a s u r e s p roduced by 
c red i t ra t ing agenc i e s are va lue re levant g iven the role of credi t agenc i e s in f inanc ia l 
m a r k e t s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , there have been c o n c e r n s that credi t rat ing agenc i e s bear s t rong 
respons ib i l i ty f o r con t r ibu t ing to the s u b p r i m e crisis t h rough be ing lax in the ra t ings of 
s o m e s t ruc tu red f i n a n c e p roduc t s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , it is ques t ionab le w h e t h e r credi t ra t ing 
a g e n c i e s are unbiased .^ M e a s u r e s of ea rn ings by credi t agenc i e s , h o w e v e r , have 
rece ived little a t ten t ion in the G A A P vs Street l i tera ture . 
- T h e l i t e r a t u r e s u g g e s t s t ha i c r e d i t r a t i n g a g e n c i e s m a y i n l l a t e r a t i n g s , h o w e v e r , u n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , 
r c " u l a t i o n s ( S t o l p e r . 2 0 0 9 ) a n d r e p u t a t i o n a l e f f e c t s ( M a t h i s el al.. 2 0 0 9 ) m a y p r o v i d e i n c e n t i v e s f o r 
a o e n c i c s to a s s i g n c o r r e c t r a t i n g s . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , B o l t o n et al. ( 2 0 1 2 ) d e i n o n s t r a t e tha t a m o n o p o l y is 
g e n e r a l l y m o r e e f f i c i e n t t h a n a d u o p o l y in i n d u c i n g h i g h e r r a t i n g s q u a l i t y a s t h e l a t t e r p r o v i d e m o r e 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r a n i s s u e r t o s h o p f o r a g o o d r a t i n g . 
In addition, prior studies use different samples of f i rms, e.g., f i rms of somewhat similar 
size (e.g., only S & P 500 f irms) and f i rms f rom different industries that meet data 
requirements (e.g., all f i rms with available data, or f i rms with pro forma disclosures) 
and limit the alternative earnings measures used (e.g., most studies compare I/B/E/S 
earnings to G A A P earnings but do not consider other alternative earnings measures on a 
systematic and comprehensive basis such as cash f lows, nor do they consider these 
alternative earnings measures collectively) which is not conducive to making a direct 
comparison of their f indings. For example . Brown and Sivakumar (2003) investigate the 
value relevance of G A A P and I/B/E/S earnings and use quarterly data for all f i rms f rom 
1989 to 1997. However , they do not separately test nor control for industry or f i rm size. 
Similarly, Wieland et al. (2013) use a sample of all f i rms f rom 2001 to 2009, albeit with 
annual data. Furthermore, the period of their study does not allow for a detailed 
examination of the longer terms effects of the G F C , i.e., the effects after the G F C . 
Albring et al. (2010) examine the value relevance of G A A P and S & P ' s Core Earnings 
only on large f i rms, i.e., f i rms included in the S & P 500 index ( S & P 500) but do not 
consider f i rms not included in the S & P 500 index. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) and 
Bowen et al. (2005) only use f i rms that actually released pro forma reports in their 
studies, which limits the generalizability of their f indings. Consequent ly , the impact that 
f i rm size and industry may have on the value relevance of G A A P and these alternative 
n o n - G A A P earnings and the effects of the G F C remains relatively unexamined. 
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF MY STUDY 
My study examines the impact of the G F C on the value relevance and informativeness 
of G A A P earnings and several measures of non -GAAP earnings. It differs f rom prior 
studies in several aspects. First, prior studies that investigate the relative or incremental 
value relevance of G A A P versus non-GAAP earnings do not examine the impact of 
information asymmetry , earnings quality or conservatism on these earnings metrics. I 
argue that because these factors impact on investors ' information risk, different levels of 
information asymmetry, earnings quality and conservatism may impact on the 
comparat ive value relevance of G A A P and non -GAAP earnings to investors, 
particularly in an economic environment that is relatively uncertain and volatile. Since 
prior studies have not examined whether these factors impact on the value relevance of 
earnings measures, the current study addresses an important gap in the literature. 
Easley and O 'Hara (2004) demonstrate that information asymmetry is a non-
diversifiable risic factor . Therefore , investors ' level of information risk should impact on 
the value relevance of the different earnings measures, i.e., the extent to which an 
earnings measure mitigates their information risk. Furthermore, there is relatively 
greater uncertainty and volatility in the market during the GFC and post -GFC periods as 
is evident f rom the C B O E Volatility Index in Figure 1.1. Such conditions indicate the 
potential for significant information asymmetry in the market. Such an economic 
environment can exacerbate mis-valuation of assets and this may provide greater 
incentives for managers to disclose private information. While managers have 
incentives to bias these disclosures, the presence of regulation may mitigate this bias. 
G A A P mandated reporting of accounting earnings, and also regulations prescribing 
acceptable voluntary disclosures (e.g.. Securities and Exchange Commiss ion , 2001; 
Securities and Exchange Commiss ion , 2002), ensure that there is a minimum level of 
disclosure as well as a certain level of credibility and reliability. There is evidence in the 
literature on both mandatory and voluntary disclosures indicating that these disclosures 
are value relevant and have information content . 'Al ternat ively, investors may seek 
information f rom other parties, such as, security analysts and credit rating agencies. 
However , they are also subject to similar moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
While this information is relevant, they remain unaudited. As a consequence, mandated 
G A A P earnings may play a role if investors are seeking credible and reliable 
information in a trade off with relevant information. Therefore, the credibility and 
reliability of financial information impact on the extent to which investors find G A A P 
and non -GAAP earnings value relevant. However, prior studies on the comparative 
value relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings do not examine the impact of 
information asymmetry. My study addresses this gap in the literature. 
Prior research on earnings quality generally focuses on G A A P and pro forma earnings." 
However , there are few studies that specifically investigate the comparative earnings 
quality of street earnings with G A A P earnings. For example, Gu and Chen (2004) find 
evidence that street earnings are of higher quality than G A A P earnings and conclude 
that items included in street earnings more closely resemble permanent earnings while 
items excluded more closely resemble transitory earnings. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) 
find that pro forma earnings are more persistent and more informative than G A A P 
' Beyer el at. (2010) provide a recent review of the l i leralure. 
" T h e l i terature on earn ings quali ty is extensive and D e c h o w et al. (2010) provide a comprehens ive 
rev iew. Never the less , these s tudies pr imari ly focus on G A A P earnings . 
earnings, which suggests that these measures of earnings are more persistent than 
G A A P earnings. T o the extent that more persistent earnings reflect higher earnings 
quali ty, there is some evidence that certain n o n - G A A P earnings are of higher quality 
relative to G A A P earnings. However , prior research does not control for exposure to 
earnings quality and the impact that different levels of earnings quality may have on the 
comparative value relevance of G A A P and non -GAAP earnings. Several measures that 
proxy for earnings quality have been proposed in the literature, which include abnormal 
accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Jones, 1991), stock returns (Ecker et al.. 2006) 
and unexpected audit fees (Hribar e? a/ . , 2014). However , not all measures of earnings 
quality are suitable for my study. For example, measures that use only abnormal 
accruals are unsuitable because I include earning measures such as I/B/E/S earnings and 
cash f low f rom operations. Security analysts are not consistent when adjust ing for 
accruals to determine earnings recorded by I/B/E/S and cash f lows do not include 
accruals. Therefore , using abnormal accruals as a proxy of earnings quality result with 
an inconsistent measure of earnings quality across alternative earnings metrics that 
include I/B/E/S earnings, S & P Core Earnings and cash f lows f rom operations. 
Consequent ly , I use a stock returns measure of exposure to low quality earnings, 
proposed by Ecker et al. (2006), to proxy for exposure to earnings quality. I argue that a 
measure that captures investors' perceptions of earnings quality and their sensitivity to 
poor quality earnings will impact on the value relevance of alternative measures of 
earnings that are perceived to be more credible or more reliable. Addit ionally, this 
measure does not require explicit identification of adjustments performed by analysts in 
I/B/E/S earnings. Other advantages of this measure include fewer sampling restrictions 
and that it can be linked directly to the quarterly earnings announcement date in my 
sample to capture investors ' perception of earnings quality at that t ime. My study 
contributes to the literature by providing insights on the effect of exposure to earnings 
quality on the comparative value relevance of G A A P and non -GAAP earnings. 
As discussed above, security analysts and credit rating agencies face different 
incentives. Credit rating agencies have stronger incentives to be conservative, relative to 
equity analysts, as their products are used to assess credit risks (Tang, 2009; Batta and 
Muslu, 2010). On the other hand, there are incentives for managers to be conservative in 
their reporting choices to minimise agency costs and litigation risk. Given the G F C and 
its impact on the financial markets , investors ' perceptions of information risk and 
conservatism may impact on the relative emphasis they place on alternative measures of 
earnings. This provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects of conservatism on 
the value relevance of alternative earnings measures and the effects of the G F C . As 
noted previously, prior studies examining the value relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP 
earnings do not control for the level of conservatism. Givo ly and Hayn (2000) report an 
increase of conservative financial reporting over the period from 1950 to 1998. Lobo 
and Zhou (2006) f ind that post-SOX, f irms are more conservative in their financial 
reporting. More recently. Watts and Z u o (2012) report that during the G F C more 
conservative firms perform better, i.e., experience less negative returns than less 
conservative firms during the G F C . These f indings suggest that the level of 
conservatism may be value relevant and may impact on the emphasis investors place on 
alternative earnings measures. My study contributes to the literature by providing 
insights into the Impact that conservatism may have on the value relevance of G A A P 
and non-GAAP earnings. In my study, I control for both unconditional and conditional 
conservatism. 
Second, I examine the comparative value relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings 
using four alternative samples: (1) firms included in the financial sector; (2) firms not 
included in the financial sector; (3) firms included in the S&P 500 index; and (4) f irms 
not included in the S & P 500 index. A key trigger of the G F C was the crisis in the 
financial sector where the quality and reliability of financial information has since been 
shown to be questionable. This trigger in the financial sector also indicates that 
investors' emphasis on earnings is likely to be different to other industries, which 
subsequently experienced the impact of the G F C . Watts and Zuo (2012, p. 11) suggest 
that "a salient feature of the global financial crisis is a loss of liquidity in the banking 
system," which adversely affected firms as banks restricted lending. This implies that 
the loss of liquidity affected the financial sector initially and the non-financial sector 
subsequently. Therefore, examining the value relevance and informativeness of G A A P 
and non-GAAP earnings on firms included, or excluded, from the financial sector 
separately may provide further insights on the relative emphasis investors place on these 
earnings. I expect to find different results between firms in the financial sector and firms 
not in the financial sector. Therefore, my study contributes to the literature by 
investigating separately f irms included in the financial sector and firms not included in 
the financial sector; this has been largely unexamined in the literature. 
My study is not restricted to f irms included in the S & P 500. In addition to financial and 
non-financial f irms, I also separately examine the comparative value relevance of 
G A A P and non -GAAP earnings on large and small f i rms. Albring et al. (2010) study 
large f i rms; however , they did not investigate small f i rms. Large f i rms, by virtue of size, 
generally have more publicly available information relative to small f i rms , which may 
impact how investors value the different measures of earnings. For example , large f i rms 
tend to have more analysts fol lowing them and more media coverage. In contrast , there 
may be limited alternative sources of information for smaller f i rms, which may impact 
the reliance and relevance that investors place on G A A P earnings, a mandated source of 
information irrespective of size. Therefore , I expect to find different results fo r large 
and small f i rms. No other study investigates the impact of f i rm size on the value 
relevance and informativeness of G A A P and non -GAAP earnings in the pre- and post-
G F C periods. My study aims to fill this gap and contribute to the literature. 
Third, my study investigates whether the G F C had an impact on the value relevance of 
G A A P earnings relative to non -GAAP earnings. The G F C offers a unique opportunity 
to investigate how investors may manage the trade-offs between the reliability of G A A P 
earnings and non -GAAP earnings. Research conducted before the G F C generally f inds 
that non-GAAP earnings are significantly more value relevant and informative relative 
to G A A P earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan. 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Doyle et al., 
2003; Lougee and Marquardt , 2004), However , the increased uncertainty and volatility 
in capital markets during and after the peak of the G F C suggest that investors may not 
only be seeking better quality information but also more reliable and credible 
information, which are the stated advantages of financial statements prepared using 
G A A P . Specifically, there is a potential for significant information asymmetry in the 
market during the G F C , which would lead to increased information risk. Investors have 
incentives to seek information f rom alternative sources to mitigate information risk. 
These alternative sources include financial information f rom security analysts , credit 
rating agencies and mandated financial reporting. Notwithstanding that this information 
may be biased, i.e.. analysts, credit rating agencies and managers have incentives to 
disclose private information. Consequently the relative emphasis that investors place on 
these different measures of earnings may be affected by the extreme condit ions during 
the GFC relative to the pre-GFC period. Also, as the peak of the G F C passes, investors ' 
relative emphasis on earnings may change as the market becomes more settled. As 
noted previously, the market prices information risk. As a consequence, investors may 
place greater emphasis on G A A P earnings in periods of uncertainty. Furthermore, 
annually reported G A A P earnings (filed with the SEC in lO-K annual reports) are 
subject to an audit, which provides reasonable assurance that they are fairly presented in 
accordance with the G A A P reporting framework (Public Company Account ing 
Oversight Board, 1988; Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Al though quarterly G A A P 
based financial statements (filed with the SEC in 10-Q quarterly reports) are not 
required to be audited, at a m i n imum , quarterly G A A P financial statements must be 
reviewed, which provides limited assurance that the quarterly financial information is 
fairly presented in conformity with G A A P (Public Company Account ing Oversight 
Board. 2002; Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Non-GAAP earnings reported by 
alternative sources do not have the same requirements to be audited or reviewed, 
therefore, no assurance is provided on non-GAAP earnings. Therefore, I investigate 
whether there is a shift in investor focus from non-GAAP to G A A P earnings during and 
after the peak of the G F C . No prior research has investigated the value relevance of 
G A A P and non-GAAP earnings in the post-GFC period relative to the pre-GFC period. 
Final ly, my study adopts a more comprehensive approach to investigate the comparative 
value relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. Prior studies generally use a single 
measure of G A A P earnings to compare with street earnings, typically I/B/E/S earnings. 
In this study, I compare several alternative measures of earnings. These earnings 
measures include two alternative measures of G A A P earnings (earnings from operations 
adjusted to exclude special items and income before extraordinary items, which are used 
separately in prior studies), I/B/E/S earnings. Standard & Poor's core earnings, cash 
earnings and operating cash f lows. 1 explicitly test the value relevance of these 
measures and provide a more comprehensive examination of their comparative value 
relevance. Therefore, another contribution of my study is to further examine the value 
relevance of earnings measures published by a credible third party such as a credit 
rating agency. A credit rating agency is in a unique position as an information provider 
in that it not only produces an alternative measure of earnings but it also issues credit 
ratings for f irms. Credit rating agencies, unlike analysts, are more concerned with f irms' 
going concern positions than analysts. These credit ratings signal f irms' credit 
worthiness and have implications for f irms' future performance and their management 
of debt. As such, credit rating agencies are likely to be more conservative and more risk 
averse than analysts (Batta and Mus lu , 2010) and. therefore, are likely to measure 
earnings more conservatively than managers. In 2001, Standard & Poor's proposed its 
core earnings measure as an alternative to G A A P earnings. Their core earnings 
represents a measure favoured by the credit agency. Furthermore, it al lows a 
comparison against alternative measures of earnings as the method of measuring core 
earnings is defined explicitly (Blitzer et al., 2002). 
1.3 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The rest of this thesis is organised as fo l lows. In Chapter 2, 1 present the background 
and review of the literature, and the research design of the study. It explains the 
empirical models to test the value relevance and information content of alternative 
earnings measures. I discuss the theoretical f ramework and the choice and specification 
of the variables I include in the models . Chapter 2 also provides an overview of the 
literature in the three areas of information asymmetry , earnings quality and 
conservatism and details the underlying theoretical f ramework and research method to 
examine their impact on the value relevance of G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings. 
Finally, it explains the sample selection and data collection process. In Chapter 3, I 
present the results of the Ohison (1995; 1999) valuation model to test the value 
relevance of the alternative earnings measures. In Chapter 4, I present the results of the 
Cumulat ive Abnormal Returns (CAR) model to test the information content of the 
alternative earnings measures. I discuss the results of each model in their respective 
chapter. In Chapters 5 through 7 , 1 present the results for the examination of the impact 
of information asymmetry , earnings quality and conservatism on the value relevance of 
the alternative earnings measures, respectively. They provide the results of the analyses 
and discussion of the f indings. In Chapter 8, the final chapter . I summarise the thesis 
and presents my conclusions. It highlights the significant research f indings of the study 
and its contribution to the literature. I also identify the limitations of the study and 
potential opportunities for future research. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
T h i s c h a p t e r de sc r ibe s the b a c k g r o u n d and presen ts the l i tera ture rev iew f o r th is s tudy . 
It a l so de sc r ibe s the research des ign and iden t i f ies the research ques t ions I a d d r e s s . In 
Sec t ion 2 .2 , I d i s cuss the b a c k g r o u n d of my s tudy and review the l i terature on the key 
a reas , wh ich are the va lue r e l evance and i n f o r m a t i v e n e s s of G A A P and n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s and the impac t of the G F C . I d i scuss the role of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y , 
e a r n i n g s qua l i ty and c o n s e r v a t i s m and their impac t on the va lue r e l evance of these 
a l t e rna t ive m e a s u r e s of ea rn ings in the w a k e of the G F C . I a l so iden t i fy the research 
q u e s t i o n s of my s tudy and p rov ide an o v e r v i e w of my research des ign . Sec t ion 2 .3 
de sc r ibe s the empi r i ca l m o d e l s used in my s tudy . My base mode l is the O h i s o n (1995 ; 
1999) va lua t ion m o d e l , which m e a s u r e s the va lue r e l evance of e a r n i n g s . O t h e r 
empi r i ca l m o d e l s I use inc lude a c u m u l a t i v e a b n o r m a l re tu rns ( C A R ) mode l to m e a s u r e 
e a r n i n g s i n f o r m a t i v e n e s s , an i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y index to m e a s u r e i n fo rma t ion 
a s y m m e t r y ( M a s k a r a and M u l l i n e a u x , 2 0 1 1 ) , e - l oad ing to m e a s u r e ea rn ings qual i ty 
( E c k e r et al., 2 0 0 6 ) , and condi t iona l conse rva t i sm and uncondi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m 
m o d e l s to m e a s u r e c o n s e r v a t i s m ( B a s u , 1997; Beave r and R y a n . 2005 ) . Sec t ion 2 .4 
e x p l a i n s the par t i t ion ing of the s a m p l e per iod into three per iod w i n d o w s to e x a m i n e the 
i m p a c t of the G F C . T h e three w i n d o w s are p r e - G F C , G F C and p o s t - G F C . Sec t ion 2.5 
e x p l a i n s the s a m p l e se lec t ion . M y s a m p l e c o m p r i s e s publ ic ly t raded f i r m s o v e r the 
per iod 2 0 0 2 to 2 0 1 2 and the requi red data are ob ta ined f r o m C o m p u s t a t , l / B / E / S , and 
C R S P . 
2.2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.2.1 GAAP and Non-GAAP Earnings 
It is well d o c u m e n t e d that s tock pr ices are c lose ly re la ted to e a r n i n g s p e r f o r m a n c e , and 
that e a r n i n g s are genera l ly super io r in exp la in ing s tock pr ices re la t ive to cash f l o w s 
( D e c h o w , 1994; S loan , 1996) . F u r t h e r m o r e , there is inc reas ing ly grea te r e m p h a s i s on 
non - t r ans i t o ry e a r n i n g s as a m o r e i n f o r m a t i v e m e a s u r e of e a r n i n g s p e r f o r m a n c e . In this 
r e g a r d , research s h o w s that n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s are genera l ly m o r e va lue 
relevant than G A A P earnings measures (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and 
Sivakuinar, 2003; Bowen et al., 2005; Lougee and Marquardt , 2004). More recently, 
Defond and Hung (2003) argue that cash f lows are incrementally useful and 
complement value relevant information contained in earnings. Their results suggest that 
cash f low forecasts are value relevant and provide market participants with an 
alternative source of information relative to earnings. Furthermore, cash f lows are 
potentially less subjective than earnings due to the impact of accruals on earnings. 
Studies investigating the value-relevance and informativeness of alternative earnings 
metrics to G A A P earnings generally focus on l/B/E/S earnings and pro forma earnings. 
More recently, however, researchers (Albring et al., 2010; Batta and Muslu, 2010; 
Wieland et al., 2013) have begun to investigate measures of earnings published by 
credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies, similar to stockbrokers, financial analysts 
and the financial press, represent alternative sources of information used by 
stakeholders. Prior studies show that these sources provide information that is value 
relevant (Best and Zhang. 1993). 
The trade-off between relevance and reliability, however , is an issue when a variety of 
information sources exist and when credible information (e.g., audited annual reports) is 
not available immediately. Atiase et al. (2005) show that while investors have a 
preference for reliability, it is possible that they may also seek relevant information 
f rom alternative credible sources that is not as reliable as audited financial information. 
Best and Zhang (1993, p. 1508) argue "that parties other than banks also perform 
evaluation and monitoring roles". Therefore , investors may seek information f rom other 
providers such as credit rating agencies that perform evaluation and monitoring roles 
(Vassalou and Xing, 2003). 
Results f rom the few studies on the value relevance of earnings measures produced by 
credit rating agencies are mixed. Albring et al. (2010) investigate the value relevance of 
Standard & Poor ' s core earnings measure. They find that core earnings are more value 
relevant than G A A P earnings. Wieland et al. (2013) report results that support this 
f inding. In contrast, Robinson et al. (2008, in Albring et al., 2010, p. 268) report that 
" S & P core earnings are not a more useful measure relative to G A A P earnings." Batta 
and Muslu (2010) find evidence of conservatism in the n o n - G A A P earnings published 
by the credit rating agency M o o d y ' s and that these earnings are informative about the 
credit risk of underlying f i rms. 
Firms can reduce information asymmetry confront ing investors through the voluntary 
disclosure of information. The obvious implication of this is that management has 
vested interests in the information disclosed and the information is likely to be biased. 
On the other hand, agency theory also suggests that management has incentives to 
provide quality information because high quality information leads to better rewards. 
Therefore , it is not surprising that over a period of time prior to 2002, there was a 
documented increase in the release of pro forma earnings by f i rms (Bhattacharya etal., 
2003). However , a number of significant corporate collapses in the early 2000s raised 
questions about the quality of reported earnings and performance information as 
disclosed by f i rms in their pro forma earnings releases. This led to the SEC issuing 
cautionary advice regarding the use of "pro forma" financial information in earnings 
releases (Securities and Exchange Commiss ion , 2001) and, in 2002. the SEC issued 
regulations on the use of non -GAAP earnings (Securities and Exchange Commiss ion , 
2002). In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) regulating financial reporting and 
corporate governance was enacted in the wake of the Enron scandal, which required 
higher standards of corporate governance. These regulatory changes mean that how 
corporate earnings are measured and disclosed are now under greater scrutiny. 
Prior studies on the information content of accounting earnings and cash f lows 
generally cover the period before 2002. Bhattacharya el al. (2003) reports an increase in 
pro forma earnings releases f rom 181 in 1998 to 695 in 2000. Since the SEC imposed 
new regulations on the use on non-GAAP earnings in 2002 (Securities and Exchange 
Commiss ion , 2002) , there has been a discernible shift away f rom pro forma earnings to 
a more conservative earnings metric that removes the effects of transitory earnings. This 
could be due to concerns about earnings management and managerial opportunism in 
respect to non -GAAP earnings. As f i rms may provide additional disclosures via pro 
forma earnings, these disclosures may be a tool for f i rms to influence stakeholders ' 
perceptions of f irm performance. Bowen et al. (2005) investigate the emphasis f i rms 
place on pro forma and G A A P earnings within quarterly press releases in the period 
2001-2002 and find evidence that f i rms tend to place greater relative emphasis on pro 
fo rma earnings when they have less value relevant G A A P earnings. They also observe a 
shift in emphasis away f rom pro forma earnings between 2001 and 2002. Bhattacharya 
et al. (2007) find an increase in pro forma reporting f rom 1998 until 2001, but it 
decreased after 2001. There was a dramatic drop in the third quarter of 2002 coinciding 
with the enactment of SOX, which requires an explicit reconciliation between pro forma 
and G A A P earnings, in July of that year. Johnson and Schwartz (2005) f ind that 
investors, on average, do not appear to be misled by pro forma f igures . This is 
consistent with Lougee and Marquardt (2004), who find that pro fo rma earnings have 
relative and incremental information content when G A A P earnings informat iveness is 
low in their sample of f i rms that release pro forma earnings f rom 1997 to 1999. 
Unsurprisingly, they also find that f i rms emphasise the metric that portrays f i rm 
performance more favourably. 
Interestingly, the f indings of Bowen et al. (2005) that the level of emphas is on pro 
forma earnings decreased and the level of emphasis on G A A P earnings increased in 
2002 relative to 2001 coincided with the greater scrutiny by the SEC fol lowing several 
corporate and accounting scandals. From a stock market perspective, their results show 
that pro forma earnings are value relevant. While there is some indication of value 
relevance in respect to emphasis on G A A P earnings, the results are weak. 
The results f rom the various studies on pro forma earnings are consistent in showing 
that pro forma earnings and l/B/E/S earnings are more value relevant when compared to 
G A A P earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2003). While there has been a 
decline in pro forma earnings releases, there is evidence that there has been an increase 
in the quality of other exclusions, i.e., more transitory items, and a decrease in the 
quality of special items (Kolev et al.. 2008). This suggests earnings management may 
not necessarily have decreased, but rather managers have changed the way they manage 
earnings f rom managing accruals to managing real activities (Roychowdhury , 2006) and 
classification shifting (McVay, 2006). Furthermore, with the exception of Albring et al. 
(2010), these studies typically focus on only two primary sources of information -
information produced by analysts and management . Blitzer et al. (2002) argue that 
Standard & Poor ' s core earnings better represent permanent earnings. Whether this is so 
is an empirical question. 
Studies provide evidence that the implementation of SOX is a pivotal moment in 
regulatory reform causing a reversion to more conservative reporting and greater 
awareness of potential earnings management . Lobo and Zhou (2006) provide evidence 
that, pos t -SOX, f i rms are, on average, more conservative (using the conservat ism 
measure of Basu, 1997) in their financial reporting, i.e., f i rms are quicker to incorporate 
losses than gains when reporting earnings. They also report a significant reduction in 
discretionary accruals post-SOX relative to pre-SOX periods. Lobo and Zhou , however , 
did not test for value relevance. 
An alternative explanation for the move towards a more conservative measure of 
earnings and away f rom non-GAAP earnings measure may be that market participants 
are seeking more credible information (Lobo and Zhou , 2006: Marques, 2006). Credit 
rating agencies, with incentives to be conservative, may be this alternative source of 
information. The core earnings measures advocated by Standard & Poor ' s may be 
perceived to be more credible and value relevant relative to other non-GAAP earnings. 
It can be argued that this core earnings measure is also more conservative and more 
closely reflects permanent earnings as the adjustments include items that are typically 
included in special items as well as those that are not generally accounted for under 
G A A P . Furthermore, S & P explicitly detail what these adjustments are. Blitzer el al. 
(2002) specify the adjustments to G A A P earnings when computing core earnings, 
which is defined as focused 'on a company ' s ongoing operat ions. . . (and) should include 
all the revenues and costs associated with those operations and exclude revenues or 
costs that arise in other parts of the business, such as unrealised gains or losses f rom 
hedging activities ' (p. 5). Items such as employee stock option grant expense, 
restructuring charges f rom ongoing operations, and pension costs are included in 
comput ing core earnings. On the other hand, items such as goodwill impairment losses, 
gains/losses f rom asset sales, and unrealised gains/losses f rom hedging activities are 
specifically excluded f rom the computation of core earnings. Albring et al. (2010) 
report results consistent with this in their study of f i rms in the S & P 500 over the period 
2002 to 2007. Wieland etal. (2013) also report similar f inding after controlling for the 
implementation of FASB I23R, which requires that all employee stock option expense 
be recognised in the income statement effective f rom June 2005. Both studies find that 
Standard & Poor ' s core earnings are significantly more value relevant than G A A P 
earnings. Additionally Albring et al. (2010) also find that Standard & Poor 's core 
earnings are significantly more value relevant than I/B/E/S earnings. 
While prior studies indicate operating cash f lows are inferior to earnings in explaining 
stock prices, Dechow (1994) and Defond and Hung (2003) provide evidence that 
operat ing cash f lows are value relevant. These f indings suggest that cash f lows contain 
information that complement the information contained in earnings. As "cash f lows are 
potentially less subjective than accruals . . . ( they) help market participants assess f i rm 
viability by providing information about solvency and liquidity (Defond and Hung, 
2003, p. 75). Also, the complementary information in cash f lows is consistent with the 
evidence that investors may not comprehend fully the information presented in earnings 
and are subsequently surprised when non-recurring items recur in subsequent years, or 
when pro forma earnings miss earnings benchmarks (McVay, 2006; Lougee and 
Marquardt , 2004). If earnings measures that are less conservative than G A A P earnings 
can be used to mislead investors or are susceptible to earnings management , it is 
conceivable that more conservative earnings measures may have information content 
(Basu, 1997; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Ryan and Zarowin, 2003). 
At the extreme, cash f lows represent the most conservative measure of performance - it 
reflects objective evidence that the transaction has occurred and cash transfers 
completed. Nevertheless, it is possible that under an accrual accounting system, "if 
unrealized losses but not unrealized gains are recognized, then earnings is more 
conservative than cash f l ow" (Basu, 1997, p. 16). Additionally, an alternative 
performance measure such as cash f lows f rom operations, which is not subject to 
accruals manipulation, may also be value relevant as there is evidence that special i tems 
adjustments are related more with accruals than cash f lows and that managers may be 
manipulating real activities to meet earnings targets or to avoid reporting annual losses. 
In light of the G F C , I expect investors to seek increasingly more reliable and credible 
financial information. As mandatory G A A P earnings are required to comply with 
accounting regulations and to be audited, it is argued that they are more credible and 
reliable than non-GAAP earnings. Given the consistent f indings that some n o n - G A A P 
earnings, such as l/B/E/S earnings, are superior to G A A P , it is unlikely that investors 
will disregard this information in their valuation decision. Rather, investors seeking 
more reliable and credible information may place relatively greater emphasis on G A A P 
earnings. Therefore , if investors perceive G A A P earnings to be more credible and 
reliable, I expect to observe incremental value relevance in G A A P earnings in the G F C 
and post-GFC periods relative to the pre-GFC period. 
2.2.2 Information Asymmetry 
Prior studies on information asymmetry have investigated its impact on numerous 
corporate events including the issue of new equity (Dierkens, 1991), capital structure 
decisions (Bharath et al., 2009) , disclosure quality (Heflin et al.. 2005), earnings quality 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2013) and credit ratings (Odders-White , 2005). The relation 
between information asymmetry and the adverse selection problem is well established 
in the market microstructure literature (O 'Hara , 1997; Stoil , 2000). The presence and 
actions (or Inactions) of better-informed traders In the market have signall ing 
implicat ions and may affect price formation (Easley and O 'Ha ra , 1992). Better-
informed traders will act strategically and choose to trade, or not trade, to profit from 
their Information advantage. Therefore, the level of Information asymmetry can be 
estimated using observed market data. In the literature, proxies for Information 
asymmetry are based on three cost components - order processing, inventory-holding 
and adverse selection costs. Proxies to measure these costs include bid-ask spreads, 
trading volume and asset returns. 
Stoll (2000) argues that friction, in a financial market setting. Is the price concession 
required for an immediate transaction. Therefore, the bid-ask spread represents one 
measure of friction. I.e., the price concession needed for the transaction to occur 
immediately. One view of the source of this spread Is that real economic resources are 
expended (real friction) to enable immediate transaction. The bid-ask spread essentially 
represents compensation required by the parties to the transaction. An alternative view 
assumes the presence of information asymmetry (Informational friction), informed 
traders will buy (sell) at the ask (bid) price if they have superior Information justifying a 
higher (lower) price. Therefore, informed traders will gain when the information 
becomes known subsequently. Consequently, uninformed traders "must pay a spread 
sufficient to compensate suppliers of Immediacy for losses to Informed Investors" 
(Stoll , 2000, p. 1482). It fol lows that If the source of the spread is informational friction 
and not real friction (I.e., due to asymmetric information and not expending real 
economic resources), improvements In disclosures will reduce this spread. Stoll (2000) 
argues that real friction directly affects asset prices, however. Informational friction 
redistributes wealth from the uninformed trader to the Informed trader. Higher 
information asymmetry increases the adverse selection risk for capital market 
participants. 
Based on prior studies, I define an environment of Information asymmetry as "where 
managers o f the firm know more about the f irm than the market" (Dierkens, 1991, p. 
182). Information asymmetry can lead to suboptimal contracting between parties to a 
transaction and misevaluation of assets. As managers have superior information and 
Incentives to not reduce information asymmetry, regulation can mitigate this problem 
by requiring managers to fully disclose private Information (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Conversely, managers also have Incentives to voluntarily disclose information and 
s igna l to s t a k e h o l d e r s in o r d e r to m i t i g a t e t h e p r o b l e m of m i s e v a l u a t i o n . N o t e tha t s u c h 
d i s c l o s u r e s tu rn p r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n in to p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h r e d u c e s the r i sk to 
u n i n f o r m e d i n v e s t o r s a n d l o w e r s t h e r i sk p r e m i u m r e q u i r e d by t h e s e i n v e s t o r s ; E a s l e y 
a n d O ' H a r a ( 2 0 0 4 ) d e m o n s t r a t e tha t i n v e s t o r s p r i c e i n f o r m a t i o n r i sk . 
In t h e c o n t e x t of m y s t u d y , t h e r e is r e l a t i ve ly g r e a t e r u n c e r t a i n t y a n d vo l a t i l i t y in t h e 
G F C a n d p o s t - G F C p e r i o d s r e l a t i ve t o t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d . B u s i n e s s c o n f i d e n c e is a l s o 
g e n e r a l l y l o w e r in the G F C a n d p o s t - G F C p e r i o d . S u c h c o n d i t i o n s i n d i c a t e t h e p o t e n t i a l 
f o r s i g n i f i c a n t i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y in the m a r k e t . S u c h an e c o n o m i c e n v i r o n m e n t 
c a n e x a c e r b a t e m i s v a l u a t i o n of a s s e t s a n d th i s m a y p r o v i d e g r e a t e r i n c e n t i v e s f o r 
m a n a g e r s to d i s c l o s e p r i va t e i n f o r m a t i o n . W h i l e m a n a g e r s h a v e i n c e n t i v e s t o b i a s t h e s e 
d i s c l o s u r e s , the p r e s e n c e of r e g u l a t i o n m a y m i t i g a t e t h i s b i a s . G A A P m a n d a t e d 
r e p o r t i n g of a c c o u n t i n g e a r n i n g s , a n d a l s o r e g u l a t i o n s p r e s c r i b i n g a c c e p t a b l e v o l u n t a r y 
d i s c l o s u r e s ( e . g . . S e c u r i t i e s a n d E x c h a n g e C o m m i s s i o n , 2 0 0 1 ; S e c u r i t i e s a n d E x c h a n g e 
C o m m i s s i o n , 2 0 0 2 ) , e n s u r e t h a t t h e r e is a m i n i m u m level of d i s c l o s u r e a s we l l a s a 
c e r t a i n level of c r e d i b i l i t y a n d r e l i ab i l i t y . T h e r e is e v i d e n c e in the l i t e r a tu re o n b o t h 
m a n d a t o r y a n d v o l u n t a r y d i s c l o s u r e s i n d i c a t i n g tha t t h e s e d i s c l o s u r e s a re v a l u e r e l e v a n t 
a n d h a v e i n f o r m a t i o n con ten t . ^ 
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e ro le of r e g u l a t i o n , t h e r e is a l s o a d e m a n d f o r i n f o r m a t i o n 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ( e . g . , a n a l y s t s a n d c red i t r a t i ng a g e n c i e s ) w h o a re a c t i v e l y e n g a g e d in 
r e d u c i n g i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y , i .e . , to " u n c o v e r m a n a g e r ' s s u p e r i o r i n f o r m a t i o n " 
( H e a l y a n d P a l e p u , 2 0 0 1 , p . 4 0 8 ) . A n a l y s t s t r a c k i n g s e r v i c e s ( e . g . , I / B / E / S ) a n d c r e d i t 
r a t i n g s a g e n c i e s ( e . g . . S t a n d a r d & P o o r ' s ) g e n e r a t e the i r o w n d e f i n i t i o n s a n d m e a s u r e s 
of e a r n i n g s t o m o r e c l o s e l y r e f l e c t a f i r m ' s p e r m a n e n t e a r n i n g s . P r i o r r e s e a r c h in t h i s 
a r e a r e p o r t s e v i d e n c e tha t n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s a re g e n e r a l l y m o r e v a l u e r e l e v a n t a n d 
i n f o r m a t i v e t h a n G A A P e a r n i n g s a n d a re a r g u e d t o r e d u c e i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y 
( B h a t t a c h a r y a et al., 2 0 0 3 ; B r a d s h a w a n d S l o a n , 2 0 0 2 ; L o u g e e a n d M a r q u a r d t , 2 0 0 4 ) . 
D u r i n g , a n d f o l l o w i n g , t h e G F C , it m a y be a r g u e d tha t the ro l e of s e c u r i t y a n a l y s t s a n d 
c r e d i t r a t i ng a g e n c i e s in the m a r k e t h a v e i n c r e a s e d s i g n i f i c a n c e a s s t a k e h o l d e r s s e e k 
i n f o r m a t i o n t o r e d u c e u n c e r t a i n t y . H o w e v e r , s e c u r i t y a n a l y s t s a n d c r e d i t r a t i n g a g e n c i e s 
a re s u b j e c t to m o r a l h a z a r d a n d a d v e r s e s e l e c t i o n p r o b l e m s a n d h a v e v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s in 
the level a n d t y p e of i n f o r m a t i o n t h e y d i s c l o s e t o the m a r k e t . T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e is a l s o a 
ro le f o r m a n d a t e d d i s c l o s u r e s of e a r n i n g s b a s e d o n G A A P , w h i c h p r o v i d e c r e d i b l e a n d 
' For a review of the literature, see Healy and Palepu (2001) and Beyer et al. (2010). 
reliable information. If investors are seeking credible and reliable information to reduce 
information risk, they may place greater emphasis on G A A P earnings when information 
asymmetry is comparatively high. If so, I expect a positive relationship between 
information asymmetry and G A A P earnings. 
2.2.2.1 Measures of Information Asymmetry 
Prior studies employ a variety of measures of information asymmetry . These include 
market microstructure measures of information asymmetry that are designed to capture 
adverse selection risk (Bhattacharya et al., 2013: Huang and Stoll, 1996). That is, agents 
( informed traders, managers) have an informational advantage over the market. 
Therefore , measures of information asymmetry , such as bid-ask spreads and trading 
volume, proxy for adverse selection costs (i.e., the market ' s perception of the agents ' 
informational advantage). However , these proxies are not without problems. Bollen et 
al. (2004, p. 103) note that " . . . the intuition underlying why adverse selection may be an 
important determinant of spread is clear, | bu t | the selection of an accurate measure of 
adverse selection costs is not." Bharath et al. (2009) argue that measures estimated with 
high f requency trade and quote data, or where there is scarce availability of this data, 
potentially limits the use of these measures. On the other hand, Easley and O 'Hara 
(1992) suggest that an absence, or lack, of trades also conveys information to the 
market , which is that there is no new information. 
Other measures of information asymmetry include analysts ' forecast errors, standard 
deviation of forecasts , dispersion of analyst opinion, normalised forecast error, and 
volatility in abnormal returns around earnings announcement (Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999; Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Maskara and Mull ineaux, 2011; 
Bharath et al., 2009; Dierkens, 1991). 
Firms with higher levels of information asymmetry are expected to have larger analysts ' 
forecast errors and higher levels of standard deviation, which suggest a lack of 
agreement among analysts and are indicative of a lack of information about the f i rm. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) suggest that larger forecast errors for some 
f i rms may be due to earnings that are more volatile and correlated with f irm risk, i.e., 
the forecast errors may not necessarily be due to higher levels of information 
asymmetry . Consequent ly , an alternative measure of information asymmetry is the 
normalised forecast error, which controls for the correlation between earnings volatility 
and forecast errors. Normalised forecast error is defined as the ratio of the earnings 
forecast error to the earnings volatility of the f i rm. Other measures of information 
asymmetry include volatility in abnormal returns around earnings announcement and 
residual volatility in daily stock returns. 
There is no consensus on the optimal measure of information asymmetry. Prior studies 
have highlighted weaknesses of market microstructure proxies of information 
asymmetry (Bharath et al.. 2009; Bollen et al., 2004; Easley and O 'Hara , 2004). Other 
measures, such as analysts' forecast errors suffer f rom errors in variables problem, 
where forecast earnings are measured using a different metric to actual earnings (Cohen 
et al., 2007). More recent studies have formed composite indices based on common 
information asymmetry benchmarks, or adverse selection variables to avoid problems of 
using a single measure. Bharath et al. (2009) create a composite index based on market 
microstructure measures of information asymmetry to investigate the impact of 
information asymmetry on capital structure decisions. They conclude that their index 
performs well after controlling for other information asymmetry measures including 
size, tangibility of assets, and f i rms ' sources of funding. 
Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) investigate self-selection bias in bank loan 
announcement studies using a composite index based on six commonly used 
information asymmetry measures. Their measures include market microstructure (e.g., 
bid-ask spreads) and non-market microstructure (e.g., analysts" forecast errors, f i rm 
age) measures. In untabulated results, Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) report that their 
composite index performs marginally stronger than using bid-ask spread, trade and 
quotes database measure, or private information (PIN) measures of information 
asymmetry. I adopt their composite index measure of information asymmetry in my 
study. 
2.2.3 Earnings Quality 
The literature that examines the quality of reported earnings is extensive and continues 
to grow. Over the past two decades, there have been several reviews of this literature 
(Fields et al., 2001; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). More recently Dechow et al. (2010) 
provide a comprehensive review of the earnings quality literature. Additionally, DeFond 
(2010) provides further insights that complement Dechow etal. (2010). While much of 
the research focuses on earnings management and its impact on the quality of reported 
earnings, studies also investigate the quality of reported earnings in equity valuation, the 
characteristics of earnings quality and proxies that measure earnings quality. 
There are a few studies, however , that specifically investigate the comparative earnings 
quality of street earnings with G A A P earnings. Gu and Chen (2004) investigate the 
relative persistence of nonrecurring items included and excluded by analysts when 
comput ing street earnings. Their sample is drawn f rom First Call , an alternative security 
analyst tracking service to l/B/E/S, and covers the period 1990-2002. They find 
evidence that street earnings are of higher quality than G A A P earnings and conclude 
that items included in street earnings more closely resemble permanent earnings while 
items excluded more closely resemble transitory earnings. Nevertheless, they also find 
evidence that excluded items still have some value relevance and persistence, indicating 
that the market reaction to these items may be incomplete. Bhattacharya el al. (2003) 
investigate the relative informativeness and permanence of pro forma and G A A P 
earnings. They examine f i rms that release pro forma disclosures over the period 1998 to 
2000 and find that pro forma earnings are more persistent and more informative than 
G A A P earnings. These results suggest that pro forma and analysts ' measures of 
earnings are more persistent than G A A P earnings. To the extent that more persistent 
earnings reflect higher earnings quality, there is some evidence that certain non-GAAP 
earnings are of higher quality relative to G A A P earnings. 
There is some evidence to suggest that in a time of crisis, investors become more 
focused on the quality of earnings (Francis et al., 2013: Mitton, 2002). Furthermore, 
investors ' demand for reliable and credible information in an uncertain economic 
environment suggests that they that may also become more focused on G A A P earnings 
in comparison to when the economy is not in crisis. The fundamental characteristics of 
G A A P that make G A A P earnings credible and reliable, e.g., the requirement to be 
audited and conservatism, remain. Investors seeking reliable and credible information 
because of the economic conditions of the GFC may shift , or increase their focus , to 
G A A P earnings when G A A P earnings quality is high. Therefore . I expect to find G A A P 
earnings to be incrementally value relevant in the GFC and post-GFC periods relative to 
the pre-GFC period when G A A P earnings quality is high. Furthermore, when G A A P 
earnings quality is low, it may also be value relevant to investors as low earnings 
quality may proxy for information risk. Therefore . I expect low earnings quality to be 
negatively associated with f i rm value. 
The definition of earnings quality, however, is broad and is predicated by the research 
question and the context of a study. Measures in the literature that proxy for earnings 
quality include accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Jones, 1991), stock returns (Ecker 
et al., 2006) and unexpected audit fees (Hribar et al., 2014). It is unlikely, however , that 
there is a measure of earnings quality that is superior to all other measure, nor is there a 
measure that is suitable for all research settings (Dechow et al., 2010; Ecker et al., 
2006). 
2.2.3.1 Measures of Earnings Quality 
In the context of my study, I investigate whether the G F C and earnings quality impact 
on the value relevance of G A A P and non -GAAP earnings. I define earnings quality as 
the extent to which accruals map into cash f lows (Bhattacharya et al., 2013; Ecker et al., 
2006). There are, however, several measures of earnings quality proposed in the 
literature. 
A common proxy of earnings quality is the measure of discretionary or abnormal 
accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Jones, 1991). This approach poses two problems 
in relation to my study. First, it requires a f i rm ' s accruals as input into the accruals 
model . In the case of l /B/E/S, the actual adjustment to accruals to obtain the earnings 
measure is ambiguous , as noted in Section 2.3.1 below. Second, operating cash f lows , 
by definit ion, does not include accruals. Therefore , this approach cannot be applied 
consistently across all measures of G A A P and non -GAAP earnings and it will not lead 
to a meaningful comparison of the impact of earnings quality on the value relevance of 
the alternative earnings metrics. 
Hribar et al. (2014) propose an alternative approach to measuring earnings quality. 
They use unexplained audit fees as a proxy for earnings quality; the unexplained audit 
fee is estimated f rom an audit fee model. However , the audit fee model is incomplete by 
design, i.e., they deliberately exclude measures of accounting quality, to capture 
accounting quality and its association with audit fee in the mode l ' s residuals. They 
argue that "a positive association between unexplained audit fees (UAF) and low 
quality accounting information will exist in the cross-section of f i rms, based on the 
endogeneity of audit fees with respect to accounting quali ty" (Hribar et al., 2014, p. 
507). When confronted with low accounting quality (i.e., relatively high inherent risk), 
auditors will increase the scope of their audit resulting with higher audit fees . Af ter 
controlling for factors that affect audit fees but are unrelated to accounting quali ty, 
Hribar et al. (2014) report that U A F is positively related to other empirical measures of 
accounting quality found in the literature. 
In my study, 1 use quarterly data in my sample. General ly, quarterly earnings are 
unaudited. The use of an annual audit fees model will be a noisy measure of earnings 
quality for quarterly observations. Also, as earnings measures f rom security analysts 
tracking services and credit rating agencies are not subjected to the audit process, this 
approach does not measure the earnings quality of these measures of earnings. 
Ecker el al. (2006, p. 750) , building on the work of Francis et al. (2005), propose a 
novel approach to measuring earnings quality that is returns-based, which is the 
".. .slope coefficient f rom a regression of a f i r m ' s daily excess returns in year T on a 
factor-mimicking portfolio capturing earnings quality". First, they map current accruals 
into last year, current and next year cash f lows , consistent with Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) , and obtain a measure of accruals quality. Adopting a factor-mimicking portfolio 
approach (Fama and French, 1993; Francis etal., 2005), they create an accruals quality 
factor-mimicking portfolio, which they denote as AQfactor , using daily returns to 
estimate the asset-pricing regressions. This portfolio approach essentially generates a 
measure of accruals quality that is t ime-specific, i.e., a daily measure of accruals 
quality. Then , AQfactor is added as an independent variable in the one-factor and three-
factor regressions of a f i rm ' s daily excess returns. Ecker et al. (2006) argue the 
AQfac tor coeff icient , which they term the e-loading, in these regressions captures 
investors ' perceptions of earnings quality exposure in the same way that the beta f rom 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) captures exposure to market risk. The e-
loading is inversely related to earnings quality. They perform additional tests, including 
a construct validity analysis, that suggest their results are robust. While they measure 
the e-loading over a year , their analysis indicates that it can also be measured over 
quarterly intervals. 
Of the various measures of earnings quality discussed above, the returns-based 
approach, or e- loading, offers several advantages in the context of my study. First, my 
comparison of the value relevance of the alternative earnings metrics focuses on a 
measure of total earnings, which are the net earnings that are argued to represent 
recurring earnings. My study does not address discretionary or abnormal accruals, or the 
quality of these accruals. I do, however , recognise that the composition of these 
alternative earnings metrics are different , that is, the adjustments to obtain G A A P and 
n o n - G A A P earnings are not identical. Therefore , a measure that captures investors ' 
perceptions of earnings quality is appropriate for my study. Specifically, investors ' 
perceptions of earnings quality and their sensitivity to poor quality earnings will impact 
on the value relevance of alternative measures of earnings that are perceived to be more 
credible or more reliable. ' 
Second, e-loading imposes fewer sampling restrictions; it only requires suff icient 
observations of returns data to compute . Ecker e? al. (2006) demonstrate that e- loading 
can be calculated and reliably capture earnings quality over quarterly intervals with 45 
daily returns. Therefore , my tests are not constrained by using annual measures on 
quarterly earnings data. 
Finally, e-loading is estimated based on t ime-specific measure of AQfac tor . Therefore , 
the AQfactor can be linked directly to the quarterly earnings announcement date in my 
sample to capture investors ' perception of earnings quality at that t ime. 
Note that e-loading is estimated based on AQfactor , which is a measure of accruals 
quality based on G A A P earnings. Therefore , consistent with my arguments in the 
previous section, I expect a shift in investors ' emphasis towards G A A P earnings 
between the pre-GFC period and the GFC and post -GFC period when e-loading is low 
(i.e., low exposure to low quality earnings, which indicates high earnings quality). 
Conversely, when e-loading is high (i.e., high exposure to low quality earnings, which 
indicates low earnings quality), I expect G A A P earnings to be negatively associated 
with f irm value, as investors may penalise the f irm for increased information risk. 
2.2.4 Conservatism 
Conservatism is an important accounting concept in financial reporting. There is, 
however , no authoritative definition of conservatism (Givoly et al., 2007). A textbook 
definition generally suggests asymmetric treatment of accounting for transactions where 
doubts and several possible reporting alternatives exist. An alternative definit ion of 
conservatism is that the book value of assets (or net assets) is understated relative to 
their market value. 
The literature on conservatism identifies two types of conservat ism - unconditional 
conservatism and conditional conservatism. Unconditional conservat ism is "an 
accounting bias toward reporting low book values of stockholder equi ty" and 
conditional conservatism is "conditional on f i rms experiencing contemporaneous 
economic losses" (Ball and Shivakumar , 2005, p. 89). This suggests that, in the latter. 
Francis et al. (2005) f ind that poorer accrua ls qual i ty , as used by Kcker el al. ( 2006) , is assoc ia ted with 
larger cost of equity and that the marke t prices accrual qual i ty . 
c o n s e r v a t i s m is cond i t i oned by the s ign of the i n c o m e e f f e c t ( i .e. , t ime ly recogn i t ion of 
a loss) and that the re is an a s y m m e t r i c t r ea tmen t in the r ecogn i t ion of losses and ga ins 
in the i n c o m e s t a t e m e n t . 
A s the e c o n o m i c charac te r i s t i cs of the G F C inc lude volat i l i ty and uncer ta in ty in relat ion 
to asse t v a l u e s , it o f f e r s a un ique oppor tun i ty to e x a m i n e the e f f e c t s of c o n s e r v a t i s m on 
the va lue r e l evance of a l te rna t ive ea rn ings m e a s u r e s and the e f f e c t s of the G F C . A s 
noted p r e v i o u s l y , mos t pr ior s tudies e x a m i n i n g the va lue r e l evance of G A A P and non-
G A A P e a r n i n g s use s a m p l e da ta f r o m be fo re 2 0 0 6 and d o not e x a m i n e the impac t of the 
G F C . 
W a t t s and Z u o (2012) e x a m i n e the e f f ec t s of conse rva t i sm on f i r m value du r ing the 
G F C f o r a s a m p l e of non- f inanc ia l US f i r m s . T h e y d e f i n e d the per iod f r o m I A u g u s t 
2 0 0 7 to 31 A u g u s t 2 0 0 9 as the cr is is per iod based on a b n o r m a l l y high 3 - m o n t h spread 
b e t w e e n the L o n d o n In te rbank O f f e r e d Rate ( L I B O R ) and an overn igh t indexed s w a p 
( O l S ) , w h i c h is an indica tor of bank de fau l t r isk. T h e y repor t that du r ing the G F C , the 
m a r k e t va lue of an ave rage f i r m fell by a round one - th i rd . T h e y a l so f ind that more 
c o n s e r v a t i v e f i r m s p e r f o r m bet ter , i.e., expe r i ence less negat ive re turns , than less 
c o n s e r v a t i v e f i r m s dur ing the G F C . T h e s e f i n d i n g s sugges t that the level of 
c o n s e r v a t i s m m a y be va lue re levant and m a y impac t on the e m p h a s i s inves tors p lace on 
a l t e rna t ive e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s . 
T h e r e is a l so e v i d e n c e that conse rva t i sm has increased o v e r t ime . G ivo ly and Hayn 
( 2 0 0 0 ) repor t an increase of conse rva t ive f inanc ia l repor t ing ove r the per iod f r o m 1950 
to 1998. T h e i r m e a s u r e s of conse rva t i sm inc lude " the level and rate of a c c u m u l a t i o n 
o v e r t i m e of nega t ive non -ope ra t i ng accrua ls ; m e a s u r e s based on the ea rn ings - re tu rn 
assoc ia t ion d u r i n g per iods of good and bad n e w s ; m e a s u r e s based on the t ime-se r ies 
p rope r t i e s of e a r n i n g s and cash f l o w s ; and the m a r k e t - t o - b o o k rat io (Givo ly and H a y n , 
2 0 0 0 p. 2 9 4 ) . L o b o and Z h o u (2006) a rgue that S O X s ign i f ican t ly c h a n g e s the potent ial 
legal l iabil i ty of m a n a g e r s f o r inaccura te f inanc ia l r epor t ing . T h e r e f o r e , m a n a g e r s are 
less l ikely to adop t agg re s s ive f inanc ia l repor t ing to mi t iga te the potent ial e x p o s u r e to 
legal l iabi l i ty a f t e r the imp lemen ta t i on of S O X . L o b o and Z h o u (2006) f ind that post-
S O X , f i r m s are m o r e conse rva t i ve in their f inanc ia l r epor t ing . 
T h e G F C resul ted in a per iod of re la t ively high uncer ta in ty and volat i l i ty l ead ing to 
d e c r e a s e d inves to r c o n f i d e n c e . U n d e r a g e n c y theory and in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y , there 
are i ncen t ives f o r m a n a g e r s to overs ta te the va lue of net asse ts in o rde r to m a x i m i s e 
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their welfare. Conversely, there are also incentives for managers to be conservat ive in 
their reporting choices to minimise agency costs and litigation risk (Francis ef a / . , 2 0 l 3 ; 
Watts and Zuo , 2012). Also, Watts (2003) argues that conservat ism, through its 
asymmetric treatment of gains and losses, may increase f i rm value as it limits 
managements ' opportunistic behaviour and offsets its bias.^ Francis et al. (2013) 
investigate the impact of conservatism on f i rm value during the G F C . They report 
results showing a strong positive association between conservatism and f i rm value. This 
suggests that conservatism may be value relevant. 
The conservatism principle has long influenced the practice of accounting (Basu, 1997). 
In Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAS) No. 2, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recognises a place for conservat ism, however , it 
argues that it "needs to be applied with care" (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
2008 para. 92). SFAS No. 2 was subsequently superseded by SFAS No. 8. While there 
is some debate over whether the conservatism principle contradicts the fundamenta l 
qualitative characteristic of fai thful representation in SFAS No. 8, the FASB states that 
this principle is not an aspect of faithful representation (Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, 2008 para. 92). Nevertheless, in SFAS No. 8, the Financial Account ing 
Standards Board (2010, p. 28) acknowledges the view that: 
...bias should not always he assumed to be undesirable, especially in 
circ umstances when bias, in their view, produces information that is more 
relevant to some users. Deliberately reflecting conservative estimates of 
assets, liabilities, income, or equity sometimes has been considered 
desirable to counteract the effects of some management estimates that have 
been perceived as excessively optimistic. 
Ultimately, compliance with G A A P means adhering to the overall requirements of 
G A A P and being subject to the penalties imposed for breaching these requirements . 
Security analysts and credit agencies, however , are not required to comply with G A A P 
when computing their alternative measures of earnings. In fact , it is argued that these 
alternative measures are superior because they are not constrained by G A A P 
requirements (e.g., Blitzer el al., 2002). 
' S o m e early s tudies report f ind ings that indicate a decl ine in the value re levance of ea rn ings over t ime . 
See Healy and Palepu (2001) for a review of these s tudies . A l so , Lev and Za rowin (1999) report resul ts 
that suggest conserva t ive accoun t ing for research and deve lopmen t expend i tu re are assoc ia ted with a 
greater decl ine in va lue re levance . More recent ly , h o w e v e r . Ba lachandran and M o h a n r a m (2011) report 
results that do not support these earl ier f ind ings . 
As one a im of G A A P and S O X is to improve the accuracy and credibi l i ty of f inancial 
repor t ing , investors may view the conservat ism principle embodied in G A A P earn ings 
as relatively more accurate and credible dur ing periods of uncertainty (Wat t s , 2003) . 
Spec i f ica l ly , Kothari et al. (2010 , p. 256) argue that "Condi t ional and uncondi t ional 
conserva t i sm signify a t rade-off under which relevant informat ion about m a n a g e m e n t 
ach ievemen t s is deemphas ized in order to provide a more prudent and reliable 
pe r fo rmance measure . External audit ing of f inancial report ing helps mit igate the trade-
o f f . " T h e r e f o r e , G A A P earnings may have incremental value relevance relative to non-
G A A P earnings in the G F C and pos t -GFC periods where there are relatively greater 
levels of uncertainty in the market . 
In the context of my s tudy, this ef fec t is also condi t ioned by n o n - G A A P earnings . Whi le 
manage r s may adhere to the conservat ism principle in report ing G A A P earnings , these 
earn ings may not be the most conservat ive , i.e., lowest value, earnings informat ion 
avai lable to investors . Genera l ly , I /B/E/S earnings and S & P core earnings produce 
lower values of earnings in compar i son to G A A P earnings due to the ad jus tmen t s in 
measur ing these n o n - G A A P earnings . Tha t is, these n o n - G A A P earnings measures 
exc lude non-recurr ing revenue and include recurring expenses even when these i tems 
may not be treated as such by a f i rm under G A A P . On the other hand , n o n - G A A P 
earn ings are not required to comply with G A A P , therefore , they may not be perceived 
to be as credible as G A A P - m a n d a t e d earnings . If n o n - G A A P earnings are lower than 
G A A P earnings and are value relevant , as prior s tudies suggests , then there may be a 
conf i rmat ion e f fec t where the level of conservat ism in G A A P earnings conf i rms 
investors ' expec ta t ion . In which case , I do not expect to f ind s ignif icant results for 
G A A P earnings . On the other hand , if investors f ind G A A P earnings to be more 
credible and rel iable, I expect G A A P earnings to be incremental ly value relevant and be 
associated with f i rm value even where it is less conservat ive in compar i son to non-
G A A P earnings . 
2.2.4.1 Measures of Conservatism 
Uncondi t ional conserva t i sm ref lects a bias in report ing low book values of assets . This 
is o f ten def ined as the d i f fe rence between the market value of net assets and the book 
value of net assets . Th i s measure of uncondit ional conserva t i sm is general ly stated as a 
ratio. A c o m m o n l y used measure of uncondit ional conserva t i sm is the f i r m ' s market to 
book ratio (Beaver and Ryan , 2000; Givoly and Hayn , 2000; Beatty et al., 2008; 
Roychowdhury and Watts , 2007). A larger ratio indicates more conservat ive 
accounting. 
Several measures of conditional conservatism have been proposed in the literature. 
These include the asymmetric t imeliness measure (Basu, 1997), accumulated accruals 
(Givoly and Hayn, 2000) , conservatism ratio (Callen et al., 2010) and C_Score (Khan 
and Watts , 2009). 
Basu (1997) models conditional conservatism as the t imeliness with which events with 
expected unfavourable outcomes (bad news) are recognised in earnings relative to 
events with favourable outcomes (good news). The type of news is identified through 
the sign of the returns for the period. That is, negative returns signify bad news and 
positive returns signify good news. Conditional conservatism means bad news is 
recognised on a timelier basis than good news. He uses a reverse regression model 
where earnings, deflated by beginning stock price is regressed on a dummy variable for 
negative stock returns, stock returns and the negative stock returns d u m m y variable 
interacted with the stock returns variable. Of interest is the coeff icient of the interaction 
term in the model . Often referred to as the asymmetr ic t imeliness coeff ic ient , it 
measures how timely bad news is recognised relative to good news. A positive 
coefficient indicates conditional conservatism, i.e., bad news is recognised on a timelier 
basis than good news. 
Givoly and Hayn (2000, p. 292) argue that a measure of conservatism is the " . . . s ign and 
magnitude of accumulated accruals over t ime." They contend that as accruals reverse 
over t ime, consistent negative accumulated accruals over a long period of t ime indicate 
conservatism. Furthermore, the accumulation rate of these negative accruals indicates 
the shift in the level of conservatism. 
Callen et al. (2010) develop the conservatism ratio, which is a market measure . This 
measure is defined as the " . . . r a t io of unexpected current earnings to total earnings 
news" (Callen el al., 2010, p. 155). They argue that the more unexpected earnings, 
which they refer to as news shock, are recognised in current earnings, the more 
conservative is the f i rm. This is based on the premise that the news shock is a market 
revision of expected future cash f lows in response to the news. Furthermore, as this 
ratio is expected to be closer to one when the news shock is negative than when the 
news shock is positive, it is consistent with the notion of asymmetr ic treatment of gains 
and losses in Basu (1997). 
K h a n a n d W a t t s ( 2 0 0 9 ) c o n s t r u c t a c o n s e r v a t i s m m e a s u r e , w h i c h t h e y r e f e r to a s 
C _ S c o r e . w h i c h is b a s e d o n the a s y m m e t r i c t i m e l i n e s s m e a s u r e of B a s u ( 1 9 9 7 ) . T h e y 
a r g u e , h o w e v e r , tha t t h e a s y m m e t r i c t i m e l i n e s s m e a s u r e ( the c o e f f i c i e n t of t h e 
i n t e r a c t i o n in B a s u ' s m o d e l ) is a " . . . l i n e a r f u n c t i o n of f i r m - s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e a c h 
y e a r " ( K h a n a n d W a t t s , 2 0 0 9 , p . 136) . T h e f i r m - s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h e y i n c l u d e in 
t h e m e a s u r e of C _ S c o r e are s i z e , m a r k e t - t o - b o o k r a t io , s i ze a n d l e v e r a g e . W h i l e 
C _ S c o r e p u r p o r t s to m e a s u r e c o n s e r v a t i s m at a f i r m - s p e c i f i c l e v e l , its use in t h e 
l i t e r a t u r e h a s b e e n r e l a t i ve ly l i m i t e d . 
B a s u ( 1 9 9 7 ) c o n t i n u e s to be the m o s t w i d e l y u sed m e a s u r e of t h o s e d i s c u s s e d above®. 
S o m e s t u d i e s , h o w e v e r , q u e s t i o n the va l id i ty of B a s u ' s a s y m m e t r i c t i m e l i n e s s m e a s u r e . 
D i e t r i c h etal. ( 2 0 0 7 ) a r g u e tha t the r e s e a r c h d e s i g n of B a s u ( 1 9 9 7 ) is w e a k a n d tha t the 
e c o n o m e t r i c p r o p e r t i e s of the m o d e l lead to subs t an t i a l b ias in the r e s u l t s , s u c h as w h e n 
e a r n i n g s i n f o r m a t i o n h a s an e f f e c t o n r e t u r n s . A l s o , P a t a t o u k a s a n d T h o m a s ( 2 0 1 1 ) 
c o n t e n d tha t the a s y m m e t r i c t i m e l i n e s s m e a s u r e is b i a sed d u e to w i t h i n - s a m p l e va r i a t i on 
in s c a l e - r e l a t e d e f f e c t s r e n d e r i n g the m e a s u r e u n r e l i a b l e . G i v o l y et al. ( 2 0 0 7 , p . 6 5 ) f i n d 
t h a t B a s u ' s m e a s u r e s u f f e r s f r o m m e a s u r e m e n t e r r o r s a n d tha t it is s e n s i t i v e t o f a c t o r s 
i n c l u d i n g " . . . d e g r e e of u n i f o r m i t y in the c o n t e n t of the n e w s d u r i n g the e x a m i n e d 
p e r i o d , t h e t y p e s of e v e n t s o c c u r r i n g in the p e r i o d , a n d f i r m s ' d i s c l o s u r e p o l i c i e s . " 
W h i l e t h e s e c r i t i c i s m s h a v e s o m e m e r i t , t h e y a p p l y p r i m a r i l y t o r e s e a r c h c o n t e x t s tha t 
i n v e s t i g a t e c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m u s i n g p o o l e d d a t a . T h a t i s , c o n s e r v a t i s m is no t 
m e a s u r e d at a f i r m - y e a r (or f i r m - q u a r t e r ) l e v e l , w i th the e x c e p t i o n of K h a n a n d W a t t s 
( 2 0 0 9 ) . R e c e n t l y , Bal l et al. ( 2 0 1 3 ) a d d r e s s t h e s e c r i t i c i s m s a n d p r o v i d e a l t e r n a t i v e 
e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h e s t o o v e r c o m e the w e a k n e s s in t h e B a s u m o d e l . 
T h e y i d e n t i f y tha t the b i a s is l a rge ly d u e t o c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l c o r r e l a t i o n s . T h e y s u g g e s t 
t h r e e a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h e s t o c o r r e c t f o r the b ias - a d d a con t ro l v a r i a b l e in t h e 
r e g r e s s i o n m o d e l to c o n t r o l f o r e x p e c t e d e a r n i n g s a n d e x p e c t e d r e t u r n s , u s e an a u t o -
r e g r e s s i v e e x p e c t a t i o n s m o d e l t o e s t i m a t e u n e x p e c t e d e a r n i n g s , a n d c o n t r o l f o r f i r m 
f i x e d e f f e c t s . T h e y f i r s t r e p l i c a t e the r e su l t s of p r i o r s t u d i e s r e p o r t i n g b ias in the B a s u 
m e a s u r e a n d t h e n d e m o n s t r a t e tha t t h e s e a p p r o a c h e s s u c c e s s f u l l y c o r r e c t f o r the 
r e p o r t e d b i a s e s . 
In the c o n t e x t of m y s t u d y , I r e q u i r e a f i r m - q u a r t e r m e a s u r e of c o n s e r v a t i s m . I use t h e 
m a r k e t - t o - b o o k ra t io a s a m e a s u r e of u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m at the f i r m l eve l . In 
* Ryan (2006) and Givoly etal. (2007) provide an extensive list of studies that use (Basu, 1997). 
relation to conditional conservatism, there is currently no reliable f i rm-specif ic measure 
of asymmetric t imel iness . ' (Ryan , 2006, p. 512) notes "(s)uch measures are currently 
not available and are desperately needed in order to address many research questions 
empirically". The various available measures of conservatism possess varying degrees 
of limitations. While the C_Score of Khan and Watts (2009) is a f i rm-year measure of 
conditional conservatism, it is also based on Basu (1997) and is subject to similar 
limitations of the asymmetric timeliness measure as discussed above. 
In the absence of a clear reliable measure of conditional conservatism, it is an arbitrary 
decision to select the measure to use. In my study, I adapt and use the asymmetric 
timeliness measure of Basu (1997). It remains a widely-used measure of conditional 
conservatism and an approach of estimating the model on a f i rm basis mitigates the 
cross-sectional bias identified in prior studies. The details of the estimation of this 
measure are discussed in Section 2.3.5. As an overview, I estimate the regression model 
for each firm in my sample using time series in order to derive a f i rm-specif ic measure 
of conservatism for each quarter. Also, this will remove the cross-sectional bias and is 
consistent with controlling for f irm fixed effect as suggested in Ball et al. (2013). 
2.2.5 Summary 
Extensive research has been conducted in the area of information asymmetry , earnings 
quality and conservatism. Several studies that review the development and issues 
addressed in these areas include Healy and Palepu (2001), Beyer et al. (2010) and 
Dechow et al. (2010). While the superiority of non-GAAP earnings over G A A P 
earnings is well-established in the literature, there are still gaps in the literature. 
Specifically, studies examining the value relevance and information content of G A A P 
earnings relative to non-GAAP earnings do not investigate the impact of information 
asymmetry, earnings quality or conservatism on these alternative earnings measures. 
Furthermore, the majority of these studies use data f rom before 2008 and do not 
examine the impact of the G F C . I aim to bridge this gap by examining these factors that 
have been largely ignored in the literature on the value relevance of G A A P and non-
G A A P earnings. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) is an exception that tests whether the 
information content of pro forma earnings is systematically associated with G A A P 
earnings informativeness. 
' Ryan (2006) provides a cr i t ique of ihe measures of condit ional conserva t i sm and app roaches to 
ove rcome the l imitat ions in these measures . 
This leads to the fol lowing research questions: 
RQl: What is the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the value 
relevance of GAAP and Non-GAAP earnings? 
RQIa: What is the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the information 
content of GAAP and Non-GAAP earnings? 
RQ2: What is the impact of information asymmetry on the comparative value 
relevance of GAAP and Non-GAAP earnings? 
RQ3: What is the impact of earnings quality on the comparative value 
relevance of GAAP and Non-GAAP earnings? 
RQ4: What is the impact of conservatism on the comparative value relevance 
of GAAP and Non-GAAP earnings? 
I will address RQl by sampling f i rms across the period before, during and after the 
G F C . There is a general consensus that the peak of the G F C occurred between 2007 to 
2008. Therefore , this period will be used to separate my sample between pre- and post-
G F C sub-periods. Consequently, I use three period windows in my analyses. 
Figure 2.1 provides an overview of my research design in relation to each research 
quest ion. I will use the valuation model f rom Ohlson (1995; 1999) to test the value 
relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings measures and address RQl. This is my 
base model . Additionally, I will separately test the information content of these 
alternative earnings measures by regressing short-window cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) on their earnings surprise to address RQIa. Finally. I will investigate separately 
the impact that information asymmetry (RQ2). earnings quality (RQ3) and conservatism 
(RQ4) have on the value relevance of the alternative earnings measures across the three 
sub-periods of my study. 
Figure 2.1: Overview of Research Design and Research Questions 
RQ! 
RQIa 
2.3 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
2.3.1 Value Relevance Model 
2.3.1.1 Base Model 
T o measure value re levance. I adopt the Ohison (1995: 1999) valuation model where 
f i rm value is a funct ion of book value of equity and earnings as my base mode l . This 
model can also include factors that are considered "as ' b a c k g r o u n d ' informat ion that 
inf luences value without violating the idea that account ing data provide kernel 
in format ion" (Ohison , 1999. p. 156). Consis tent with Brown and S ivakumar (2003) and 
Albr ing et al. (2010) , I adapt the model to include a n o n - G A A P and a G A A P measure 
of earnings to test the incremental value relevance of earnings . 
I investigate four n o n - G A A P measures of earnings . First, I use the earnings reported by 
analysts in l /B/E/S. T h o m s o n Reuters (2009 . p. 35) states that I /B/E/S earn ings per 
share is def ined as "the EPS that the contr ibut ing analyst considers to be that with which 
to value a security. This f igure may include or exclude certain i tems depend ing on the 
contr ibut ing ana lys t ' s specif ic mode l . " Whi le this defini t ion is amb iguous , the measure 
has been used extensively in prior studies and is understood to include adjus tments to 
reported profits for nonrecurring items. The computation of the measure, however , may 
not be consistent across f i rms. The second earnings measure 1 use is S & P ' s core 
earnings measure, which represents another alternative to G A A P earnings. Unlike 
I/B/E/S earnings, this measure is explicitly defined in Blitzer et al. (2002). The third 
n o n - G A A P measure of earnings is cash earnings, which is measured as net income 
before adjustments for depreciation and amortisation (i.e.. long term accruals). This is a 
measure commonly used in the financial press. This measure, unlike cash f lows f rom 
operat ions, does include the effects of certain accruals. Finally, I also examine cash 
f lows f rom operations. 
I also examine two different measures of G A A P earnings commonly used in prior 
studies - earnings f rom operations adjusted to exclude special items ( G A A P l ) and 
income before extraordinary items (GAAP2) . Both earnings measures are argued to 
represent earnings f rom continuing operations. G A A P l represents earnings adjusted to 
exclude the effects of special items and is a measure similar to I/B/E/S earnings and 
S & P core earnings. 
In summary , the test variables for earnings (all measured on a per share basis) are listed 
be low. ' "These variables include two differential variables to capture the incremental 
effects of G A A P earnings to non-GAAP earnings and represent the two G A A P earnings 
measures I use in my study. The tests variables are: 
IBES: Earnings reported by analysts in I/B/E/S. 
CORE: Core earnings reported by Standard & Poor 's . 
CE: Cash earnings, i.e., net income before adjustments for depreciation 
and amortisation. 
CP: Cash flow f rom operations. 
G A A P l : G A A P earnings f rom operations adjusted to exclude special items. 
GAAP2: G A A P income before extraordinary items. 
D I F F l : G A A P l minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings. 
DIFF2: G A A P 2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings. 
Price: Closing share price at earnings announcement date. 
I u s e " 1 / B / E / S " w h e n r e f e r r i n g to t h e a n a l y s i s t r a c k i n g s e r v i c e / i n s t i t u t i o n a n d " I B K S " w h e n r e f e r r i n g to 
t h e e a r n i n g s v a r i a b l e in m y s t u d y . 
As noted earlier in tiiis chapter , prior studies consistently find that n o n - G A A P earnings 
are superior to G A A P earnings. Therefore , investors are unlikely to disregard the 
information in n o n - G A A P earnings in their valuation decision. Of interest, however , is 
whether investors seeking more credible and reliable information find G A A P earnings 
to be incrementally value relevant. Consequent ly . I adopt the book value of equity and 
earnings regression model that is consistent with Brown and Sivakumar (2003) and 
Albring et al. (2010), which decomposes the earnings component of the model and 
allows a direct comparison of the incremental value relevance of G A A P earnings. 
Therefore , the general fo rms of the OLS regression models are: 
= + + MonGAAPE,, + fi-DIFFl,, + £,, 2. / 
P„=a, + P^BV,, + p.NonGAAPE, + li,DIFF2„ + £,, ^.2 
where P,, is the closing share price for f irm i at time t, BV„ is the book value of equity 
per share of f i rm i at t ime /, NonGAAPE,, is the n o n - G A A P earnings measure of interest 
fo r f i rm / at t ime r, DlFFl,, is G A A P I minus the n o n - G A A P earnings measure of 
interest for f i rm / at time t, DIFF2i, is G A A P 2 minus n o n - G A A P earnings measure of 
interest for f i rm / at time r. All variables are measured on a per share basis. The model 
provides direct empirical evidence of whether G A A P earnings have significant 
incremental value relevance over non -GAAP earnings. 
In each of these models , the coefficient yS, allows for a test of the comparat ive value 
relevance of the non -GAAP earnings measure of interest, i.e., IBES, C O R E , C E and 
CP. The coeff icient /?, tests the incremental value relevance of G A A P earnings relative 
to n o n - G A A P earnings, i.e., a statistically significant indicates that G A A P earnings 
have incremental value relevance. Furthermore, using n o n - G A A P earnings as the 
primary test variable in my models biases the results in favour of n o n - G A A P earnings 
and may bias against f inding significance for G A A P earnings. Converse ly , the strength 
of the evidence is greater if the results are significant for G A A P earnings. 
2.3.1.2 Main Effects and Interaction Terms Model 
I examine separately the impact of information asymmetry , earnings quality and 
conservatism to address RQ2, RQ3 and RQ4, respectively. That is, I investigate whether 
there are systematic differences in my results due to tiiese factors . The specific 
measures I use for each of these factors are discussed in detail below. 
In my analyses, I sort my sample into quintiies using the respective measures for 
information asymmetry , earnings quality and conservatism. However . I focus only on 
the extreme quintiies, i.e., I test my models on observations in my samples that are 
either in quintile I (low) or quintile 5 (high). If there are systematic differences in my 
results due to information asymmetry, earnings quality or conservatism, they are more 
likely to be evident in f i rms with extreme levels of these factors. 
In each separate analysis of information asymmetry , earnings quality and conservatism, 
I include additional control variables in my base model to investigate the impact of 
these factors. I include a dummy variable where I indicates f i rms in the high quintile 
and 0 indicates f i rms in the low quintile for each respective measure of information 
asymmetry , earnings quality and conservatism. Additionally, I include the interaction 
term between the dummy variable and my test variable for the book value of equity 
(BV) , non-GAAP earnings (NonGAAPE) and the incremental effect of G A A P earnings 
to n o n - G A A P earnings (DIFFI and DIFF2) in Equations 2.1 and 2.2. The general forms 
of the OLS regression models for information asymmetry, earnings quality and 
conservatism are: 
Information Asymmetry 
R =a„ + + p,NonGAAPE, + DIFFI,, + pJA„ + pJA * BV, ^ ^ 
+PJA* NonGAAPE, +P,IA* DIFFI, + e„ 
P.^ =a„+ p,BV, + p.NonGAAPE, + P,DIFF2„ + pJA, + P,IA * BV, ^ 4 
+PJA * NonGAAPE, + PJA* DIFF2, + e. 
Earnings Quality 
P.^ =a„ + P,BV, + P,NonGAAPE, + p,DIFFI, + p,EL„ + p,EL * BV, ^ 5 
' +P,EL * NonGAAPE, +P,EL* DIFFI, + £, 
P.^ =a„ + p,BV, + P.NonGAAPE, + p,DIFF2, + p,EL, + p,EL * BV, ^ 6 
+P^EL * NonGAAPE, + P^EL * DIFF2, + e. 
Conservatism 
P.^ = a„ + /3,BV„ + p,NonGAAPE„ + P.DIFFI,, + p.CON,, + pfON * BV., 2.7 
" +p^CON * NonGAAPE^, + P^CON * DIFFl,, + e,, 
P. = + p,BV„ + p.NonGAAPE,, + P,DIFF2„ + p,CON„ + pfON * BV„ 2.8 
+P,CON * NonGAAPE,, + p^CON * DIFF2,, + £,, 
where P,, is the closing share price for f irm / at time t, BV„ is the book value o f equity 
per share of f irm i at t ime t, NonGAAPE^, is the non-GAAP earnings measure of interest 
for f irm i at t ime DIFFI,, is G A A P l minus the non-GAAP earnings measure of 
interest for f irm / at t ime t, DIFF2i, is G A A P 2 minus non-GAAP earnings measure of 
interest for f irm i at t ime t, lA,, is the information asymmetry d ummy variable measure 
of interest for f irm / at time t. IA*BV^, is the interaction term of the information 
asymmetry dummy variable with the book value of equity per share for f i rm i at t ime r. 
IA*NonGAAPE„ is the interaction term of the information asymmetry d ummy variable 
with the non-GAAP earnings measure of interest for f irm i at t ime IA*DIFFIi, is the 
interaction term of the information asymmetry d ummy variable with D IFF I for f irm i at 
t ime t, IA*DIFF2j, is the interaction term of the information asymmetry d ummy variable 
with D IFF2 for f irm i at time r, EL,, is the earnings quality d ummy variable measure of 
interest for f irm i at t ime t, EL*BVi, is the interaction term of the earnings quality 
dummy variable with the book value of equity per share for f irm i at t ime t. 
EL*NonGAAPE„ is the interaction term of the earnings quality d ummy variable with the 
non-GAAP earnings measure of interest for f irm i at t ime ?, EL*DIFFIi, is the 
interaction term of the earnings quality dummy variable with D IFF I for f irm / at t ime 
EL*DIFF2i, is the interaction term of the earnings quality d ummy variable with D IFF2 
for f irm i at t ime t, CON,, is the conservatism dummy variable measure of interest for 
f irm (• at t ime t, CON*BVi, is the interaction term of the conservatism d u m m y variable 
with the book value of equity per share for f irm / at t ime t. CON*NonGAAPE„ is the 
interaction term of the conservatism dummy variable with the non-GAAP earnings 
measure of interest for f irm / at t ime i, CON*DIFFI,, is the interaction term of the 
conservatism dummy variable with D I F F I for f irm i at time ?, and CON*DIFF2i, is the 
interaction term of the conservatism dummy variable with D1FF2 for f irm ; at t ime t. 
As Equations 2.3 to 2.8 include interaction terms, the interpretation o f the unique effects 
o f the test variables is different to that o f the base model in Equations 2.1 and 2.2. The 
coefficients o f the main effects represent the base case, i.e., they measure the impact o f 
the test variables when the d u m m y variable, i.e., lA, EL or C O N , equals 0. The 
coeff ic ients of the interaction terms measure the marginal impact of the main test 
variables when the dummy variable is I. That is, the unique effect of BV, N o n G A A P E 
and DIFFl in Equation 2.3 is, ji\ + P^. jii + A and pi + Pi, respectively, when the 
d u m m y variable equals 1. Furthermore, if the coefficient of the interaction term, i.e., /J?. 
Pb or p], is positive (negative), it is interpreted as having a more positive (more 
negative) effect on share price for f irms where the dummy variable equals I. 
2.3.2 Information Content Model 
1 regress short-window cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) on earnings surprise 
measures based on each G A A P and non-GAAP earnings metrics to examine the 
information content of earnings. Each earnings surprise for each alternative earnings 
measure , is the difference between actual earnings and analysts" forecast earnings, 
which is consistent with prior studies ' measures of earnings surprise (Bhattacharya et 
al., 2003; Brown and Sivakuinar. 2003; Doyle et a!.. 2003; Marques, 2006). The general 
fo rms of the OLS regression models are: 
CAR, =a„+ p^ESNonGAAP. + p,ESGAAPI, + e, 2.9 
CAR, = a„ + P.ESNonGAAP, + p,ESGAAP2, + e. 2 K) 
where CAR^ is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns for f irm i over a three-
day window (t-l to ; + / ) centred around the earnings announcement date (/ = 0), 
ESNonGAAP, is the non -GAAP earnings surprise for f irm /, defined as the difference 
between the actual non -GAAP earnings measure of interest and the median consensus 
security analysts ' forecast of earnings scaled by the closing share price at t-7, 
ESGAAPli is the G A A P earnings surprise for f irm /, defined as the difference between 
the actual G A A P I earnings and the median consensus security analysts ' forecast of 
earnings scaled by the closing share price at t-7 and ESGAAP2i is the G A A P earnings 
surprise for f irm i, defined as the difference between the actual G A A P 2 earnings and the 
median consensus security analysts ' forecast of earnings scaled by the closing share 
price at t-7. All earnings are measured on a per share basis. 
Ideally, earnings surprise should be measured as the difference between actual and 
expected earnings for a particular earnings metric. However , forecasts fo r earnings 
metrics other than analysts ' earnings metric (e.g., I/B/E/S earnings) are generally not 
available. Using forecasts of I/B/E/S earnings to measure earnings surprise result with 
noisy measures and the classic errors in variables problems (Cohen et al., 2007) . 
Nevertheless, I/B/E/S earnings forecast is a proxy of information available to the market 
and an indication of investors ' earnings expectat ion. Prior studies are also subject to this 
limitation, which biases the results in favour of f inding significance in I/B/E/S earnings 
relative to other earnings metrics (Bradshaw, 2011). 
2.3.3 Information Asymmetry 
I adopt the approach of Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) and construct a composi te 
index based on six commonly used measures of information asymmetry . The six 
measures used to construct an Information Asymmetry Index (herein, lA Index) are: 
normalised analysts ' forecast errors, dispersion of analysts forecast , volatility of 
residual returns, volatility of abnormal returns around earnings announcements , f i rm 
age and bid-ask spreads. 
Noting the concerns identified in Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) regarding 
forecast errors and earnings volatility, I compute normalised forecast errors, which is 
defined as the ratio of analysts ' forecast error to the earnings volatility of the f i rm, to 
include in the lA Index. Analysts forecast errors is measured as the absolute di f ference 
between analysts ' forecast earnings and actual earnings, where forecast earnings are the 
median security analysts ' forecast in the month prior to the quarterly earnings 
announcement date. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the detrended 
quarterly earnings in the 12 quarters preceding the current fiscal quar te r . " 
Consistent with my Ohison models in Equations 2.1 and 2.2, I compute separate 
forecast errors for each n o n - G A A P earnings measure (i.e., IBES, C O R E , C E and CF). 
Each of these forecast error measure is then normalised as described above. There fo re , 
in constructing my lA Index, I use earnings-specif ic measures relevant to the non-
G A A P earnings of interest. For example , in examining I/B/E/S earnings, the normalised 
" Det rended ea rn ings are the residual ob ta ined f r o m regress ing ea rn ings on t ime . Th i s regress ion is 
repeated for each a l ternat ive ea rn ings measu re . 
forecast error is based on the difference between median analysts' forecast and actual 
I/B/E/S earnings. 
Dispersion of analysts' forecasts indicates a level of disagreement among analysts and a 
lack of available information about a f irm. Therefore, it is an indicator of information 
asymmetry. Dispersion of analysts' forecasts is defined as the standard deviation of the 
all earnings forecasts made in the month prior to quarterly earnings announcement and 
deflated by share price. 
A reaction to earnings announcements by the market indicates that the market is 
surprised by the f i rm's announcement. Therefore, a strong reaction suggests high 
information asymmetry for these firms because management has private information to 
release. Consistent with Dierkens (1991), I measure volatility of residual returns as the 
standard deviation of market-adjusted daily stock returns in the quarter preceding the 
earnings announcement. Volatil ity of abnormal returns around earnings announcements 
is defined as the standard deviation of three-day cumulative abnormal returns around 
quarterly earnings reports, and computed over all available quarterly earnings 
announcements in the 12 quarters preceding the current fiscal quarter. 
Firm age is measured as the number of months since share price data is first available 
on C R S P . Finally, I measure bid-ask spread as the average ratio of the difference 
between the daily bid and ask closing prices to the midpoint of the bid and ask closing 
prices. 
To construct the lA Index, first, I partition the sample into the three time periods of the 
study. For each sub-period (i.e., pre-GFC, G F C and post-GFC), I group firms into the 
quintile ranking for each of the six information asymmetry measures. Then, I calculate 
the mean quintile ranking of a f irm across all six information asymmetry measures. 
Final ly, this mean ranking is used to regroup firms into discrete quintiles, which is the 
lA Index. Firms in the higher (lower) quintiles indicate f irms with higher (lower) 
information asymmetry. 
1 examine the value relevance of the alternative earnings measures using my Ohison 
model for f irms in either the high or the low quintile of the information asymmetry 
index for each period w indow. Note that prior studies generally f ind non-GAAP 
earnings measures to be more value-relevant and informative relative to G A A P earnings 
measures, i.e., the market finds that non-GAAP earnings measures reduce information 
asymmetry. These studies, however, generally use data prior to the G F C or do not 
account for the impact of the GFC . Therefore, for the pre-GFC period, I expect to f ind 
firms with higher information asymmetry to be more strongly associated with non-
G A A P earnings. However, in the G F C and post-GFC periods, there is greater 
uncertainty and volatility relative to the pre-GFC period. This suggests greater 
information asymmetry and a stronger association of the value relevance of non-GAAP 
earnings and firms with higher information asymmetry. On the other hand, if firms are 
seeking more credible and reliable information in a period of crisis, 1 expect to find 
firms with higher information asymmetry to be more strongly associated with G A A P 
earnings. 
2.3.4 Earnings Quality 
I calculate e-loading using the approach described in Ecker et al. (2006). The notable 
difference in my study is I calculate e-loading on a quarterly basis consistent with my 
sample. 
First. I map current accruals to last quarter, current and next quarter cash f lows, 
fol lowing the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002): 
TCA^^ = Ki + <t>yfFO„_, + + + + ^v^, 2.11 
where: 
TCAj^ = ACA^^ - ACLj^ - AC ASH ^^ + ASTDEBT^, 
= total current accruals in quarter 
= f irmy's cash flow from operations in quarter f. 
NIBE-j = f i r m / s net income before extraordinary items in quarter r; 
L4, 
ACA,., 
= ACAj^ - ACL^, - ACASH^^ + ASTDEBT^^ - DEPN^^ 
= firm /"s total accruals in quarter r; 
= f i r m / s change in current assets between quarter t- \ and quarter r; 
^ C L j j - firm / s change in current liabilities between quarter r-l and 
quarter /; 
AC ASH = f i r m / s change in cash between quarter t-1 and quarter r; 
ASTDEBTjj = f i r m / s change in debt in current liabilities between quarter i-\ and 
quarter t\ 
DEPNj^ = f i r m / s depreciation and amortisation expense in quarter t\ 
AREVj j = f irm /"s change in revenues between quarter t-\ and quarter f, 
PPEjj = f i r m / s gross value of property, plant and equipment in quarter t. 
Al l variables are scaled by average assets. 
The procedure for calculating e-loading is described in detail in Ecker et a l . (2006). To 
summarise, they estimate Equation 2.11 annually and in industry cross sections using 
the 48 industry classifications in Fama and French (1997). A f i rm's accruals quality 
( A Q ) is measured as the f i rm's standard deviation of its residuals, from the above 
estimation, over the past five years. Using a dynamic portfolio technique that al lows for 
differences in fiscal period end dates, they form and assign firms to A Q deciles on the 
first day of each month, m , based on the f i rm's most recent value of A Q known prior to 
m ; f irms with the smallest (largest) A Q values are placed in the first (tenth) decile. 
Furthermore, they lag the A Q measure by three months. Then, they calculate the 
average daily return for each decile. The A Q factor-mimicking portfolio, AQfactor , 
equals the difference between the daily returns of the poorest A Q deciles (deciles 7-10) 
and the best A Q deciles (deciles 1-4). Therefore, as AQfactor is time-specific and not 
firm-specific, Ecker f / a / . (2006) argue that it can be correlated with the returns of any 
f irm to determine a f i rm's exposure to poor quality earnings. They add AQfactor as an 
independent variable and estimate its coefficient, the e-loading, using one-factor 
(superscript I f ) and three-factor (superscript 3f) asset pricing regressions: 
+ 2.12 
Ru - = ^Yr+Pji {Rm. - Rr,) + spMB,+h'/,HML,+ey,AQFacror, 2.13 
where: 
t = index for the number of trading days in period t; 
" = f i rmy 's return on day 
= the risk-free rate on day r; 
= the market return on day 
W B , = small-minus-big factor on day f, 
HML^ = high-minus-low book-to-market factor on day t. 
Equation 2.12 is based on the C A P M and Equation 2.13 controls for other factors 
known to affect returns, which are market risk premium, size and book-to-market ratio. 
In this study, I impose data requirements of at least 20 firms in the industry-year to 
estimate Equation 2.11 for each o f the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries and at 
least 45 daily returns to estimate Equations 2.12 and 2.13. These requirements are 
consistent with Ecker et al. (2006). Addi t iona l ly , 1 define the quarterly interval to 
calculate Equations 2.12 and 2.13 as the period between the previous quarterly earnings 
announcement date and the current quarterly earnings announcement date. This interval 
measures investors' contemporary perception of earnings quality exposure. 
As with information asymmetry, I examine the impact o f earnings quality on the value 
relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings by quintiles of e-loading and by my 
sample period windows. Specif ical ly, I assign firms into quintiles based on the f irms' e-
loading for each period window of my study. 
A high ( low) e-loading indicates strong (weak) sensitivity to poor quality earnings. Note 
that AQfactor is derived from earnings measured under G A A P . Therefore, investors' 
exposure to earnings quality is in relation to G A A P earnings. If investors perceive their 
exposure to poor quality earnings is h igh, they may be more likely to seek information 
from alternative sources. Addi t iona l ly , it is also likely that G A A P earnings will be 
comparatively less value relevant than non-GAAP earnings. Therefore, I expect to f ind 
non-GAAP earnings to be less value relevant when e-loading is low (i.e., low exposure 
to poor earnings quality) in comparison to when e-loading is high. 
2.3.5 Conservatism 
I use two measures o f conservatism common ly found in the literature to examine the 
impact conservatism on the value relevance o f G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. These 
two measures represent each of the two types of conservatism - uncondit ional and 
condit ional. I use market-to-book ratio to measure conditional conservatism and the 
asymmetric timeliness measure o f Basu (1997) to measure condit ional conservatism. 
The market- to-book ratio is generally defined as the market value of net assets to book 
value of net assets. Prior studies, however , have computed this ratio differently. For 
example , Givoly and Hayn (2000) use the market value of net assets to the book value 
of net assets to compute this ratio. On the other hand, Beatty et al. (2008) use the 
market value of total assets to the book value of total assets to compute this ratio. It is 
generally assumed and accepted that the book value of debt is equal to its fair value. 
Including or excluding debt, however, will impact on the ratio as the value of debt does 
not affect the numerator and the denominator equally. In the case of Beatty et al. 
(2008), it is appropriate to remove the effect of debt f rom the ratio as they investigate 
the association between conservatism and debt. Therefore , consistent with general 
convention and prior studies (Balachandran and Mohanram, 2011; Roychowdhury and 
Watts, 2007; Watts and Zuo, 2012), I measure the market-to-book ratio of a f irm as its 
market value of equity at the end of the fiscal quarter divided by the book value of 
equity at the end of the fiscal quarter. 
The Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure is the coefficient jij, estimated f rom the 
fol lowing model: 
X,, / = a „ + + + PfiR*R„ + e,, 2.14 
where X„ is G A A P earnings per share before extraordinary items of firm i in period t, 
Pj,_i is beginning of period share price of f irm /, D/?,, is a dummy variable that has a 
value of I if /?,,< 0 and 0 otherwise, and /?„ is stock returns. 
Basu (1997) estimates his model using annual data where returns are computed f rom 
nine months before the current fiscal year end to three months after the fiscal year end. 
(Dietrich et al., 2007) argue that the model estimates are biased because returns are 
affected by earnings information around the earnings announcement date. Ryan (2006) 
suggests fil tering returns to mitigate this bias, and compute returns over the fiscal year'^. 
Therefore , I compute cumulated daily returns in Equation 2.14 f rom the beginning of 
the fiscal quarter to the end of the fiscal quarter, consistent with Givoly et al. (2007) and 
Basu et al. (2001). I estimate the quarterly time-series regression model for each f i rm-
Basu (1997) also c o m p u t e d returns over the fiscal year lo exc lude the e f fec t s of earn ings announcemen t 
react ion in his speci f ica t ion test. The results for this test are similar to the main results . Givoly el al. 
(2007) and Basu etal. (2001) a lso tested their mode l s using returns compu ted over the fiscal per iod. Th is 
does not a f f ec t their main f ind ings . 
quarter in my sample over all quarterly observations for that firm in the previous 20 
quarters. This yields an estimated ji^ for each firm and fiscal quarter. 
2.4 PERIOD W I N D O W S 
To examine the impact of the GFC, 1 partition my sample into three sub-periods: pre-
GFC, GFC and post-GFC. The general consensus is that the GFC occurred during the 
period from 2007 to 2008, however, prior studies have defined the specific period 
differently. Erkens et al. (2012) define the GFC as the period between January 2007 to 
September 2008 in their investigation of the impact of corporate governance on the 
performance of financial firms. Watts and Zuo (2012) examine the effects of accounting 
conservatism on firm value during the GFC and define this period from August 2007 to 
August 2009. Francis et al. (2013) define the GFC as the period between October 2007 
and March 2009 in examining the association between conservatism and firm value 
during the crisis. In my study, I consider the GFC period to begin from July 2007 and to 
end in December 2008. This covers the period generally accepted as the peak of the 
GFC. For each period, I test my models on samples that consist of f irms included in the 
S(feP 500 versus firms that are not included in order to investigate the relative impact on 
large and small firms. Also, because a key trigger of the GFC stems from the financial 
sector, I test my models on firms that are classified under this sector using GICS (code 
40). 
2.5 PANEL DATA CONSIDERATIONS 
The sample is in the form of panel data and the assumptions of OLS regression may not 
hold. Furthermore, there is evidence that a pooled OLS approach can lead to biased 
standard errors when the sample is a panel data set (Petersen, 2009; Gow et al., 2010). 
Therefore, I adopt the approach in Petersen (2009) and cluster the standard errors on 
two dimensions - firm and time. Petersen (2009), however, argues that too few clusters 
on a dimension will produce biased results, even when the standard errors are clustered 
on the correct dimension. Gow et al. (2010) and Thompson (2010) warn that when the 
number of clusters is small, clustering on two dimensions will over-reject the null. 
Nevertheless, they demonstrate that their results are robust to cluster size as small as 
ten. An alternative approach in such instances is to cluster on one dimension. However, 
there are contrasting arguments on selecting the dimension to cluster. While it is 
c o m m o n , w h e n c l u s t e r i n g on a s i n g l e d i m e n s i o n , to c l u s t e r by f i r m s a n d c o n t r o l f o r f i r m 
e f f e c t s , T h o m p s o n ( 2 0 1 0 ) s u g g e s t s c l u s t e r i n g o n the d i m e n s i o n wi th f e w e r c l u s t e r s . 
In m y s a m p l e f o r t h e G F C p e r i o d , t h e n u m b e r of t i m e c l u s t e r s ( f i sca l q u a r t e r s ) is f e w e r 
t h a n t e n . W h e n c o n t r o l l i n g f o r d e p e n d e n c e on o n e d i m e n s i o n ( e i t h e r f i r m o r t i m e ) , it 
a s s u m e s i n d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e o t h e r d i m e n s i o n . In m y s t u d y , it is h i g h l y l ike ly tha t t h e r e 
a r e f i r m a n d t i m e e f f e c t s , g i v e n the n a t u r e of the G F C a n d its i m p a c t a c r o s s the 
e c o n o m y at a g i v e n p o i n t in t i m e . T h o m p s o n ( 2 0 1 0 ) d e m o n s t r a t e s tha t c l u s t e r i n g o n t h e 
d i m e n s i o n w i t h f e w e r c l u s t e r s r e su l t s in a g r e a t e r b ias r e d u c t i o n . A d d i t i o n a l l y , the 
n a t u r e of t h e G F C s u g g e s t s t h a t , of the t w o d i m e n s i o n s , the t i m e e f f e c t is l ike ly to be 
m o r e s i g n i f i c a n t t h a n the f i r m e f f e c t . T h e r e f o r e , I r e - e s t i m a t e the m o d e l s a n d c l u s t e r o n 
a s i n g l e d i m e n s i o n , t i m e , c o n s i s t e n t w i th T h o m p s o n ( 2 0 1 0 ) , a n d a l s o by f i r m as a 
r o b u s t n e s s t e s t . 
2.6 EVALUATING THE MODELS 
In e v a l u a t i n g t h e m o d e l s , the v a l u e of the e a r n i n g s c o e f f i c i e n t s a n d the i r s i g n i f i c a n c e 
p r o v i d e d i r e c t e v i d e n c e of the i r v a l u e r e l e v a n c e . P r io r s t u d i e s , w h i c h o f t e n e v a l u a t e t w o 
m o d e l s ( G A A P vs . I / B / E / S e a r n i n g s , o r l / B / E / S e a r n i n g s vs . P r o f o r m a e a r n i n g s ) , 
g e n e r a l l y re ly on t h e a p p r o a c h in V u o n g ( 1 9 8 9 ) f o r m o d e l s e l e c t i o n a n d tes t of 
s t a t i s t i ca l s i g n i f i c a n c e b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g m o d e l s . H o w e v e r , th i s tes t is no t a p p r o p r i a t e 
in m y s t u d y w h e r e t h e s a m p l e is a pane l da t a set a n d s t a n d a r d e r r o r s a re c l u s t e r e d , in 
w h i c h o b s e r v a t i o n s a r e c o r r e l a t e d a n d v io la te the i n d e p e n d e n t a n d i d e n t i c a l l y 
d i s t r i b u t e d ( i . i .d ) a s s u m p t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , I i n v e s t i g a t e 4 d i f f e r e n t p r i m a r y m e a s u r e s of 
e a r n i n g s a n d , w i t h i n e a c h p r i m a r y e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e I tes t t w o d i f f e r e n t m e a s u r e s of 
G A A P e a r n i n g s . E s s e n t i a l l y , I tes t e i g h t d i f f e r e n t m o d e l s . A c c o r d i n g l y , I use the 
B a y e s i a n I n f o r m a t i o n C r i t e r i o n ( B I C ) f o r m o d e l s e l e c t i o n a n d to e v a l u a t e t h e r e l a t i v e 
p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e s e m o d e l s . ' ^ A l o w e r v a l u e of B I C is p r e f e r a b l e a n d the m o d e l w i th 
the l o w e s t v a l u e of B I C is t h e bes t f i t t i n g m o d e l . B I C , h o w e v e r , d o e s no t i n d i c a t e if t h e 
m o d e l s a re s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m e a c h o t h e r . R a f t e r y ( 1 9 9 5 ) a r g u e s , h o w e v e r , tha t 
is p o s s i b l e , u s i n g the d i f f e r e n c e in B I C v a l u e s b e t w e e n m o d e l s , to d e r i v e an 
a p p r o x i m a t i o n tha t c o r r e s p o n d s to c o n v e n t i o n a l r v a l u e s . H e p r o p o s e s the f o l l o w i n g 
' ' The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is a method for assessing model fit that accounts for the 
nuiTiber of parameters and number of observations in the model. BIC is defined as BIC = 2*ln(likelihood) 
+ ln(N)*P , where N is the number of observations and P is the number of parameters in the model. As I 
cluster my model on two dimensions, firm and time, there are alternative measures of N that may be used 
in computing BIC. The value of BIC in my reported results is calculated using the total number of 
observations in the model. I also recalculate BIC using the number of firm cluster as N with similar 
results. 
c u t o f f s of m i n i m u m B I C d i f f e r e n c e to indica te the s t rength of the e v i d e n c e , w h e r e 0 is 
" w e a k " , 2 is " p o s i t i v e " , 6 is " s t r o n g " and 10 is " v e r y s t r o n g " . I use this a p p r o a c h to 
eva lua t e the s t rength of m y e v i d e n c e . 
2.7 SAMPLE SELECTION 
M y s a m p l e cons i s t s of ail U S publ ic ly t raded f i r m s f r o m C o m p u s t a t and l /B /E /S f o r 
w h i c h the requi red data i t ems are ava i lab le o v e r the per iod 2 0 0 2 to 2 0 1 2 . I s tart m y 
s a m p l e f r o m 2 0 0 2 b ecause this is the f i rs t yea r that the S & P core e a r n i n g s are ava i l ab le . 
I col lec t quar te r ly da ta fo r G A A P ea rn ings , cash ea rn ings and cash f l o w s f o r f i r m s wi th 
f i sca l yea r s e n d i n g in 2 0 0 2 to 2 0 1 2 f r o m C o m p u s t a t Unres t a t ed Quar t e r ly f i l e . ' " T h i s 
da ta f i l e , h o w e v e r , d o e s not inc lude unres ta ted S & P C o r e e a r n i n g s da ta . T h e r e f o r e , the 
S & P core ea rn ings data are co l lec ted f r o m C o m p u s t a t ' s F u n d a m e n t a l s Qua r t e r l y f i l e , 
wh ich inc ludes a d j u s t m e n t s f o r s u b s e q u e n t r e s t a t emen t s by f i r m s a f t e r the e a r n i n g s 
a n n o u n c e m e n t da te . T h e data will bias the resul ts aga ins t f i n d i n g s ign i f i cance in S & P 
C o r e ea rn ings rela t ive to o ther ea rn ings met r i cs . I a l so co l lec t the e a r n i n g s 
a n n o u n c e m e n t date f r o m C o m p u s t a t . I col lec t da ta fo r a n a l y s t s ' f o r e c a s t s and l /B /E /S 
e a r n i n g s f r o m l /B /E /S Detail His tory with A c t u a l s f i le . Share pr ice and re tu rns da ta are 
co l lec ted f r o m C R S P Daily S tock f i le . I a l so col lec t the da i ly r i sk - f ree rate , m a r k e t 
r e tu rns , S M B and H M L data f r o m C R S P . F ina l ly , f i r m age is co l lec ted f r o m C R S P and 
is m e a s u r e d f r o m the beg inn ing of w h e n s tock data is f i rs t ava i l ab le on C R P S 
T h e initial s a m p l e cons i s t s of 2 4 5 . 1 0 0 f i r m - q u a r t e r o b s e r v a t i o n s (7 .235 f i r m s ) a f t e r 
m a t c h i n g data f r o m l /B /E /S , C o m p u s t a t and C R S P data f i l e s f o r w h i c h the e a r n i n g s 
a n n o u n c e m e n t date is not mi s s ing . I impose data r e q u i r e m e n t s that f i r m s not have 
mis s ing va lues fo r var iab les in the va lue re levance base m o d e l s ( E q u a t i o n s 2.1 and 2 .2) 
and in fo rma t ion con ten t m o d e l s ( E q u a t i o n s 2 .9 and 2 . 1 0 ) . not h a v e a c h a n g e of f i sca l 
y e a r end and have a m i n i m u m n u m b e r of n o n - m i s s i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s of 2 0 f i r m - q u a r t e r s 
o v e r the s a m p l e per iod . A d d i t i o n a l l y , to ensure that my resul ts are not dr iven by 
e x t r e m e va lues , I restr ict my s a m p l e to o b s e r v a t i o n s that are wi th in t w o s tandard 
dev ia t ions f r o m the m e a n of m y var iab les of i n t e r e s t . " M y f ina l s a m p l e cons i s t s of 
7 3 , 1 7 9 f i r m - q u a r t e r obse rva t i ons ( 2 , 0 9 2 f i r m s ) . T h e r e are 3 9 , 4 6 9 f i r m - q u a r t e r 
T h e C o m p u s t a t U n r e s t a t e d Q u a r t e r l y f i l e c o n t a i n s a s f i r s t r e p o r t e d f i n a n c i a l d a t a , i . e . , b e f o r e s u b s e q u e n t 
r e s t a t e m e n t s b y f i r m s . T h e r e f o r e , the f i n a n c i a l d a t a in t h i s f i l e r e p r e s e n t t h e f i g u r e s d i s c l o s e d t o i n v e s t o r s 
o n t h e e a r n i n g s a n n o u n c e m e n t d a l e . 
" I a l s o r e l a x e d th i s c o n s t r a i n t t o i n c l u d e o b s e r v a t i o n s tha t a r e w i t h i n t w o a n d a ha l f s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s 
f r o m t h e m e a n o f m y v a r i a b l e s o f i n t e r e s t . The r e s u l t s u s i n g th i s s a t n p l e a r c s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r t o t h o s e 
r e p o r t e d in t h e m a i n t e x t . 
o b s e r v a t i o n s ( 2 . 0 9 2 f i r m s ) in the p r e - G F C ( 2 0 0 2 - 2 0 0 7 ) pe r iod , 10 ,340 f i r m - q u a r t e r 
o b s e r v a t i o n s (2 ,043 f i r m s ) in the G F C ( 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 8 ) per iod and 2 3 , 3 7 0 f i r m - q u a r t e r 
o b s e r v a t i o n s ( 1 , 9 0 0 f i r m s ) in the p o s t - G F C ( 2 0 0 9 - 2 0 1 2 ) pe r iod . 
T a b l e 2.1 p re sen t s the d is t r ibu t ion of my s a m p l e f o r the per iod 2 0 0 2 to 2 0 1 2 . 
Table 2.1: Distribution of Main Sample for the Period 2002 to 2012 
Firm Type 




Firm quar ters 
No. of f i rms 





4 1 6 
31,561 
1,771 




Firm quar ters 






4 1 9 
8 ,147 
1.665 
D e c e m b e r 2008 No. of quar ters 9 9 9 9 
Post-GFC 
Janua ry 2 0 0 9 
to 
Firm quar ters 






4 2 4 
17,8.18 
1.530 
D e c e m b e r 2012 No. of quar ters 16 16 16 16 
Firm quar ters 8..180 64 .799 15,633 57 .546 
Total No. of firms 242 1,850 4 9 0 1,808 
No . of quar ters 50 50 50 50 
2.8 SUMMARY 
In this c h a p t e r , I p resen t b a c k g r o u n d and l i terature rev iew fo r my s tudy . I es tabl i sh the 
c o n t e x t of my s tudy and d i scuss it in re la t ion to prior r e sea rch . Spec i f i ca l ly , I iden t i fy 
h o w m y s tudy f i l ls the g a p in the l i terature in respec t to e x a m i n i n g the impac t of the 
G F C on the va lue r e l evance of G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . 1 a lso iden t i fy f a c t o r s 
that m a y impac t on va lue r e l evance that have not been e x a m i n e d p rev ious ly in the 
c o n t e x t of the c o m p a r a t i v e va lue r e l evance of G A A P and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . T h e s e 
f a c t o r s inc lude i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y , e a r n i n g s qual i ty and c o n s e r v a t i s m . I iden t i fy the 
r e sea rch q u es t i o n s I a d d r e s s in m y s tudy . F ina l ly , 1 desc r ibe and d i scuss my research 
d e s i g n , i nc lud ing the empi r i ca l m o d e l s I use , the par t i t ion of my s a m p l e into three 
s a m p l e pe r iods to e x a m i n e the i m p a c t of the G F C , da ta col lec t ion and panel da ta 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and h o w I eva lua te my empi r ica l m o d e l s . 

CHAPTER 3 
OHLSON MODEL RESULTS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
I examine the impact of the GFC on the value relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP 
earnings to address RQ!. I partition my sample into three periods to test if there are 
systematic differences in the value relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings before, 
during and after the peak of the GFC. My base model is the Ohlson (1995; 1999) 
valuation model, which regresses price on book value of equity and earnings. 
In this chapter. I present the analyses and results of these tests. My main results of the 
Ohlson model show that non-GAAP earnings are significant and value relevant, 
however, this is not consistent across all models and samples. In contrast, prior studies 
find that l/B/E/S earnings consistently outperform, and are more value relevant than, 
G A A P earnings (Albring et al., 2010; Bhattacharya eT al., 2003; Brown and Sivakumar. 
2003). While G A A P earnings have incremental value relevance. I also find that this 
varies with the sample and test period. I expect investors to shift their emphasis to 
G A A P earnings during and after the GFC. however, this is only partly supported. There 
is evidence of a shift in the emphasis investors place on GAAP relative to non-GAAP 
earnings across the three periods of my study and that the GFC has an impact on the 
value relevance of these earnings measures. However, the shift in investors' emphasis is 
not consistent across all samples. The results also indicate that investors place greater 
emphasis on I/B/E/S earnings after the GFC in comparison to before the GFC. This 
suggests that the emphasis investors place on the alternative earnings measures are 
fluid: the evidence indicate that non-GAAP earnings are more significant in the post-
GFC period in comparison to the pre-GFC period. Furthermore, my results show that 
G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant in relation to non-GAAP earnings. 
Specifically, I find evidence that G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant in 
relation to I/B/E/S earnings in the pre-GFC period in the financial sector sample and in 
both the pre-GFC and GFC periods in the non-financial sector sample. Therefore, my 
results only provide moderate support of prior studies, which show I/B/E/S earnings to 
be superior and consistently more value relevant than G A A P earnings. 
3.2 UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
T o re i te ra te , the ma in test va r i ab les of tiie va lua t ion mode l in m y s tudy are: 
B V : B o o k value of c o m m o n equi ty 
I B E S : Ea rn ings repor ted by ana lys t s in I /B /E /S . 
C O R E : C o r e ea rn ings repor ted by S tandard & P o o r ' s . 
C E : Cash ea rn ings , i .e. , net i n c o m e b e f o r e a d j u s t m e n t s fo r dep rec i a t i on 
and amor t i s a t ion . 
C F : C a s h f l o w f r o m ope ra t i ons . 
G A A P I : G A A P e a r n i n g s f r o m ope ra t ions ad ju s t ed to e x c l u d e special i t ems . 
G A A P 2 : G A A P i n c o m e be fo re ex t r ao rd ina ry i t ems . 
D I F F l : G A A P I m i n u s the re levant n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . 
D I F F 2 : G A A P 2 m i n u s the re levant n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . 
Pr ice: C l o s i n g share pr ice at ea rn ings a n n o u n c e m e n t da te . 
T h e c o e f f i c i e n t of I B E S , C O R E , C E and C F a l l ows f o r a test of the c o m p a r a t i v e va lue 
r e l evance b e t w e e n each of these n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . T h e last t w o va r i ab le s , D I F F l 
and D1FF2 cap ture the incrementa l e f f e c t of the t w o m e a s u r e s of G A A P e a r n i n g s 
( G A A P I and G A A P 2 ) in the m o d e l . T h e r e f o r e , D I F F l and D I F F 2 test the inc rementa l 
va lue re levance of G A A P ea rn ings relat ive to the n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e tes ted in 
the m o d e l . In this chap te r , r e f e r ences to the va lue r e l evance of n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s 
deno te c o m p a r a t i v e va lue r e l evance be tween these ea rn ings , i .e. , I B E S , C O R E , C E and 
C F , and r e fe rences to D I F F l , D I F F 2 and G A A P e a r n i n g s d e n o t e inc rementa l va lue 
r e l evance be tween G A A P and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . 
T a b l e 3.1 p rov ides desc r ip t ive stat is t ics of the va r i ab les f o r all f i r m s in the s a m p l e . In 
Panel A , ac ross all n o n - G A A P m e a s u r e s fo r the f inanc ia l sec tor s a m p l e , m e a n do l la r 
e a r n i n g s per share range f r o m - 0 . 1 1 6 ( C F ) to 0 . 9 8 7 ( C E ) in the p r e - G F C pe r iod . O n 
a v e r a g e , I B E S is h igher than C O R E in each of the three pe r iods . D u r i n g the G F C , m e a n 
I B E S , C O R E and C E are relat ively lower than thei r p r e - G F C va lues . It a p p e a r s that 
C O R E is a re la t ively m o r e conse rva t i ve m e a s u r e of e a r n i n g s than I B E S . In both the pre-
and p o s t - G F C pe r iods , C F has the lowes t m e a n e a r n i n g s , w h i c h is cons i s t en t wi th cash 
f l o w s as the mos t conse rva t ive e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e . D u r i n g the G F C , h o w e v e r , C F has the 
h ighes t mean ea rn ings . T h i s m a y be d u e to s ign i f i can t w r i t e d o w n s of book va lues by 
f i r m s as a result of the G F C , wh ich has a re la t ive ly g rea te r impac t on accrua l a c c o u n t i n g 
e a r n i n g s than cash f l o w s . 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Panel A: Financial Sector Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 4^53; Firms = 242 I GFC: N = 1 3 4 ; Firms = 239 I Post-GFC: N = 2,893; Firms = 222) 
BV IBES CORE CE CF 
Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 28.940 28.637 28.010 0.829 0.338 0.457 0.755 0.120 0.417 0.987 0.085 0.604 -0.1 16 0.611 0.006 
sd 60.540 56.585 43.205 3.058 1.278 1.260 2.2.17 1.862 1.118 2.664 4.366 2.481 14.585 1 1.287 4.802 
Minimum -1.059 -24.323 -33.894 -94.600 -88.100 -20.400 -32.066 -89.412 -22.582 -31.441 -88.586 -27.527 -401.508 -212.642 -95.558 
25 pel 9720 10.744 10.424 0.248 0.160 0.100 0.192 0.078 0.050 0.289 0.111 0.116 -1.007 0.054 -0.713 
Median 16.927 18.223 18.470 0.470 0400 0.110 0.425 0.116 0.290 0.560 0.421 0.412 0.561 0.701 0.476 
75 pet 26.844 .TO. 182 32.057 0.870 0.826 0.730 0.806 0.721 0.703 1.005 0.862 0.851 1.375 1.197 1.070 
Maximum 798.546 803.917 586.588 15.400 27.000 12.910 .14.810 28.465 17..545 38.025 29.509 105.041 194.198 141.574 83.842 
GAAPI-IBES GAAP2-IBES GAAPl-CORE GAAP2-CORE GAAPl-CE 
Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 0.015 -0392 0.008 0.020 -0.411 0.029 0.090 -0.171 0.048 0.095 -0.195 0.069 -0.141 -0.118 -0.1.19 
sd 2.217 2.859 0.987 2.243 2.846 0.975 0.648 2.024 0.855 0.751 2.018 0.840 0.854 0.815 1.895 
Minimum -32.600 -50.700 -19.800 -32.569 -49.220 -12.785 -4.148 -17.050 -16.618 -12.879 -37.049 -9.601 -20.265 -8.518 -89.1 1 1 
25 pel -0.010 -0.150 -0.040 -0.015 -0.140 -0.024 0.001 -0.024 -0.004 0.001 -0.011 0.000 -0.144 -0.162 -0.171 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.()()() 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.021 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.01 1 0.016 -0.049 -0.061 -0.060 
75 pel 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.048 0.021 0.061 0.067 0.047 0.055 0.094 0.081 0.079 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 
Maximum 94.878 9.680 28.400 94.865 6.180 29.561 17.165 1 1.009 22.61 1 18.866 4.685 17.921 25.840 10.860 20.919 
GAAP2-CE GAAPI-CF GAAP2-CF Price 
Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
Mean -0.138 -0.160 -0.117 0.961 -0.684 0.458 0.966 -0.706 0.480 5 1.705 40.970 16.772 
sd 0.675 0.581 1.712 14.861 1 1.756 4.979 14.899 1 1.789 4.943 99.691 64.625 41.971 
Minimum -10.888 -8.5.15 -88.501 -181.798 -154.674 -81.442 -183.747 -153.624 -81.441 1.100 0.281 1.230 
25 pel -0.1 17 -0.125 -0.1.10 -0.798 -1.124 -0.7.14 -0.781 -I.I 13 -0.722 20.450 17.620 16.430 
Median -0.031 -0.035 -0.0.13 -0.171 -0.441 -0.241 -0.167 -0.407 -0.220 12.510 28.675 27.210 
75 pel 0.000 0.000 0.000 L4I7 0.158 1.118 1.468 0.329 1.142 47.160 41.020 42.610 
Maximum 25.751 2.996 16.215 412.308 150.842 101.148 41 1.833 150.894 101.415 1244.151 969.018 510.720 
Panel B: Non-Financial Sector Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 35^16; Firms = 1,850 I GFC: N = 9,106; Firms = 1^04 I Post-GFC: N = 20,477; Firms = 1,678) 
BV IBES CORE CE CF 
Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
M e a n 9 . 7 7 0 1 1 . 9 1 9 1 2 . 7 1 7 0 . 2 3 5 0 . 3 1 5 0 4 0 0 0 . 1 2 8 0 . 1 9 7 0 . 3 2 4 0 . 4 0 1 0 . 4 5 0 0 . 6 3 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 1 6 8 0 . 0 1 1 
sd 1 6 . 1 8 4 15 .835 16 .045 0 . 9 3 1 0 . 9 4 7 0 . 7 3 6 1 .392 1 .497 0 . 9 7 0 1 .547 1 .804 1 .239 2 . 6 2 5 2 . 8 8 8 2 . 6 4 5 
M i n i m u m - 3 3 3 . 7 8 0 -8 1 .807 - 9 1 . 4 1 9 - 3 3 . 3 0 0 - 2 6 . 4 0 0 - 2 4 . 0 0 0 - 5 9 . 1 9 4 - 5 9 . 8 4 7 - 4 1 . 6 9 1 - 5 3 . 6 7 7 - 5 9 . 3 6 3 - 4 1 . 5 4 9 - 9 3 . 2 6 2 - 8 2 . 5 6 1 - 7 9 . 3 6 4 
2 5 pe t 3 . 7 8 1 4 . 7 0 7 4 . 9 4 7 0 . 0 5 0 0 . 0 6 0 0 . 0 7 0 - 0 . 0 0 9 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 1 0 5 0 . 1 0 6 0 . 1 5 5 - 0 . 3 2 6 - 0 . 1 6 3 - 0 . 2 9 0 
M e d i a n 7 . 1 7 1 9 . 1 2 3 9 . 7 8 2 0 . 2 0 0 0 . 2 8 0 0 . 3 0 0 0 . 1 5 3 0 . 2 2 5 0 . 2 5 5 0 . 3 2 8 0 .431 0 . 4 9 0 0 . 1 9 2 0 . 3 3 2 0 . 3 1 3 
7 5 pe t 1 2 . 0 0 4 1 5 . 5 5 2 1 6 . 9 3 9 0 . 4 1 0 0 . 5 9 0 0 . 6 3 0 0 . 3 6 8 0 . 5 1 5 0 . 5 7 8 0 . 6 5 0 0 . 8 6 2 0 . 9 5 1 0 . 6 5 5 0 . 9 4 3 0 . 9 5 5 
M a x i m u m 6 4 7 . 4 0 8 3 6 3 . 8 7 3 3 5 8 . 2 9 6 3 0 . 2 9 0 1 5 . 2 6 0 13 .870 2 8 . 7 5 8 15 .264 18.221 3 5 . 1 5 6 15 .979 2 2 . 0 7 8 1 1 4 . 7 6 9 1 0 1 . 6 5 2 8 2 . 2 1 2 
GAAPl - lBES GAAP2-IBES GAAPl-CORE GAAP2-CORE GAAPl -CE 
Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
M e a t i - 0 . 0 2 6 - 0 . 0 5 0 - 0 . 0 3 8 - 0 . 0 7 4 - 0 . 1 6 3 -0 .091 0 . 0 8 1 0 . 0 6 8 0 . 0 3 7 0 . 0 3 3 - 0 . 0 4 5 - 0 . 0 1 6 - 0 . 1 9 2 - 0 . 1 8 5 - 0 . 2 6 9 
sd 0 . 8 0 9 1 .128 0 . 5 4 1 I . O i l 1 .389 0 . 7 9 3 0 . 4 5 5 0 . 3 5 5 0 . 3 8 8 0 . 5 1 3 0 . 7 1 3 0 . 4 2 2 0 . 8 7 9 0 . 9 4 7 0 . 7 4 4 
M i n i m u m - 5 2 . 7 9 5 - 5 4 . 9 9 5 - 3 7 . 3 9 7 - 5 2 . 6 6 4 - 5 4 . 8 4 7 - 3 8 . 2 9 1 - 9 . 3 0 5 - 8 . 6 5 5 - 1 8 . 1 9 1 - 4 3 . 2 8 6 - 1 6 . 8 0 2 - 1 6 . 8 3 6 - 5 4 . 4 5 4 - 1 7 . 9 9 4 - 1 9 . 2 9 3 
2 5 pet 0 . 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 2 0 - 0 . 0 2 0 - 0 . 0 2 0 - 0 . 0 5 3 - 0 . 0 6 7 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 4 - 0 . 2 5 4 - 0 . 3 2 7 - 0 . 3 5 3 
M e d i a n 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 2 3 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 1 6 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 - 0 . 1 1 3 - 0 . 1 4 0 - 0 . 1 6 8 
7 5 pet 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 6 9 0 . 0 5 6 0 . 0 3 8 0 . 0 4 8 0 . 0 2 6 0 . 0 0 6 - 0 . 0 3 8 - 0 . 0 4 5 - 0 . 0 6 2 
M a x i m u m 1 4 . 5 5 0 1 3 . 7 8 0 2 3 . 7 2 0 2 0 . 4 7 0 1 1 .839 2 3 . 6 1 4 4 7 . 6 2 7 7 . 2 9 4 2 9 . 1 7 1 15 .275 1 1 .998 13 .728 4 5 . 2 4 1 19.4.30 2 8 . 3 4 4 
GAAP2-CE GAAPl-CF GAAP2-CF Price 
Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
M e a n - 0 . 2 4 0 - 0 . 2 9 8 - 0 . 3 2 2 0 . 2 0 8 0 . 0 9 7 0 . 3 5 0 0 . 1 6 0 - 0 . 0 1 6 0 . 2 9 7 2 5 . 6 4 3 2 6 4 9 3 2 9 . 7 4 4 
sd 0 . 6 6 2 0 . 5 6 1 0 . 5 0 5 2 . 7 6 2 3 . 0 5 2 2 . 7 1 6 2 . 8 5 1 3 . 2 2 6 2 . 8 0 5 4 5 . 3 3 8 3 2 . 9 7 2 3 7 . 9 5 3 
M i n i m u m - 5 7 . 0 3 6 - 1 7 . 9 8 8 - 1 5 . 9 8 2 - 1 4 3 . 5 6 7 - 1 4 7 . 2 4 8 - 1 2 0 . 6 0 9 - 1 4 2 4 1 5 - 1 4 8 . 2 0 3 - 1 2 3 . 2 8 1 0 .241 0 . 1 2 0 0 . 3 2 0 
2 5 pe l - 0 . 2 6 9 - 0 . 3 5 0 - 0 . 3 7 8 - 0 . 3 7 9 - 0 . 5 3 8 -0 .531 -0 .41 1 - 0 . 5 9 8 - 0 . 5 8 7 1 1 .003 9 . 5 4 0 1 0 . 5 7 0 
M e d i a n - 0 . 1 2 9 - 0 . 1 6 6 - 0 . 1 9 4 - 0 . 0 7 1 - 0 . 1 3 3 -0 .1 18 - 0 . 0 8 0 - 0 . 1 4 9 - 0 . 1 3 0 1 9 . 2 9 0 19 .605 2 1 . 8 0 0 
7 5 pet - 0 . 0 5 1 - 0 . 0 6 9 - 0 . 0 8 6 0 . 3 7 2 0 . 2 4 5 0 4 5 0 0 . 3 6 4 0 . 2 4 0 0 . 4 4 4 3 1 . 2 2 0 3 4 . 5 9 0 3 8 . 2 3 0 
M a x i m u m 12 .922 2 . 9 1 6 4 . 3 0 2 1 0 6 . 2 2 2 8 9 . 9 8 1 8 1 . 2 3 4 1 0 6 . 2 2 2 8 9 . 9 8 0 8 1 . 2 8 7 2 4 1 1 . 8 0 7 8 1 7 . 9 9 0 9 0 6 . 9 3 0 
Panel C: S&P 500 Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 7 j>08; Firms = 416 I GFC; N = 2,193; Firms = 4191 Post-GFC: N = 5^32; Firms = 424) 
BV IBES C O R E CE C F 
Pre -GFC G F C Post -GFC Pre -GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post -GFC Pre -GFC G F C Pos t -GFC 
Mean 15.403 19.076 19.024 0.602 0.633 0.771 0.486 0.456 0.682 0.821 0.779 1.085 -0.039 0.412 0,070 
sci 34.959 37.001 21.385 1.387 1.537 0.923 1.563 1.774 1.000 1.895 2.521 : .386 8.854 8.541 3,981 
Minimum -9.745 -15.856 -40.459 -8.010 -28.200 -19.400 -49.327 -30.340 -22.582 -46.941 -54.747 -27.527 -401.508 -212.642 -95,558 
25 pet 5.973 7.626 8.366 0.230 0.340 0.3.54 0.151 0.254 0.276 0.338 0.438 0.492 -0.764 0.003 -0,653 
Median i 0.193 13.231 13.753 0.420 ().6()0 0.620 0.362 0.490 0..544 0.617 0.778 0.846 0.466 0.753 0,708 
75 pel 16.733 21.800 24.400 0.710 0.960 1.030 0.653 0.838 0.963 1.022 1.315 1.418 1.083 1.487 1,463 
Maximum 798.546 803.917 358.296 35.400 27.000 13.870 .34.810 28.465 13.875 38.025 29.509 22.078 394.398 143.574 43.704 
G A A P l - I B E S GAAP2-IBES G A A P l - C O R E GAAP2-CORE G A A P I - C E 
Pre -GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre -GFC G F C Pos t -GFC 
Mean -0.013 -0.106 -0.047 -0.082 -0.263 -0.100 0.102 0.071 0.043 0.033 -0.086 -0.010 -0.232 -0.252 -0.360 
sd 0.467 1.311 0.499 0.995 1.627 0.729 0.694 1.100 0.412 0.562 1.292 0.499 0.986 1,171 0.851 
Minimum -17.360 -33.600 -19.800 -46.160 -33.548 -12.785 -9.305 -31.460 -16.618 -26.545 -31.408 -9.603 -21.1 10 -17.994 -21.628 
25 pel -0.005 -0.050 -0.030 -0.039 -0.105 -0.103 0.005 0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.011 -0.336 -0,425 -0.456 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.033 0.028 0.009 0.023 0.01 1 0.000 -0.168 -0,202 -0.231 
75 pel 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.097 0.107 0.063 0.067 0.061 0.020 -0.056 -0,069 -0.095 
Maximum 14.550 9.680 10.880 20.470 6.180 29.563 47.627 9.683 10.267 11.165 2.335 17.921 45.241 19,430 11.528 
GAAP2-CE G A A P l - C F GAAP2-CF Price 
P re -GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC 
Mean -0.301 -0.409 -0.413 0.627 0.1 16 0.655 0.558 -0.041 0.602 39.903 43.930 48.257 
sd 0.577 0.821 0.667 9.008 8.520 3.992 9.059 8.623 4.037 62.398 49.799 48.839 
Minimum -16.021 -17.988 -15.982 -.383.798 -154.674 -63.178 -383.747 -153.624 -56.163 2.020 1.757 2.410 
25 pel -0.358 -0.461 -0.493 -0.522 -0.779 -0.685 -0.575 -0.853 -0.755 21.468 22.220 24.115 
Median -0.186 -0.239 -0.259 -0.124 -0.242 -0.218 -0.1,38 -0.268 -0.238 32.195 35.810 37.955 
75 pel -0.077 -0.113 -0.125 1.056 0.514 1.127 1.039 0.440 1.113 46.517 53.940 57.965 
Maximum 5.477 2.298 5.085 412..308 150.842 101.148 41 1.833 150.894 101.415 1244.351 969.038 718.950 
BV IBES CORE CE CF 
Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 10.942 12.525 13.241 0.224 0.233 0.294 0.123 0.116 0.228 0.375 0.306 0.485 -0.005 0.173 -0.008 
sd 22.804 20.608 21.948 1.326 1.399 0.749 1.498 1.972 1.002 1.651 2.187 1.442 4.087 2.999 2.618 
Minimum -333.780 -81.807 -91.419 -94.600 -88.300 -24.000 -59.194 -89.412 -41.691 -53.677 -88.586 -41.549 -169.713 -82.561 -77.397 
25 pet 3.671 4.573 4.633 0.035 0.030 0.0.30 -0.021 -0.025 -0.014 0.088 0.064 0.097 -0.317 -0.165 -0.288 
Median 7.208 9.053 9.572 0.180 0.220 0.221 0.139 0.177 0.184 0.294 0..343 0.374 0.171 0.287 0.254 
75 pet 12.450 15.959 16.895 0.380 0.500 0.500 0.342 0.443 0.468 0.592 0.728 0.779 0.627 0.85 1 0.815 
Maximum 647.408 445.256 586.588 30.290 15.260 12.910 28.758 15.264 18.221 35.156 15.979 105.041 205.628 101.652 83.842 
GAAPl-IBES GAAP2-IBES GAAPI-CORE GAAP2-CORE GAAPl-CE 
Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
Mean -0.024 -0.087 -0.028 -0.060 -0.174 -0.069 0.077 0.031 0.037 0.041 -0.056 -0.004 -0.175 -0.160 -0.220 
sd 1.157 1.487 0.646 1.254 1.636 0.844 0.409 0.666 0.488 0..540 0.859 0.492 0.846 0.856 0.995 
Minimum -52.795 -54.995 -37.397 -52.664 -54.847 -38.291 -5.901 -37.050 -18.191 -43.286 -37.049 -16.8.36 -54.454 -12.344 -89.111 
25 pet 0.000 -0.020 -0.020 -0.015 -0.047 -0.051 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.222 -0.271 -0.294 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.021 0.004 0.004 0.015 0.000 0.000 -0.093 -0.115 -0.132 
75 pet 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.063 0.042 0.0.14 0.048 0.023 0.009 -0.030 -0.034 -0.044 
Maximum 94.878 13.780 28.400 94.865 11.839 23.614 17.365 11.009 29.171 18.866 1 1.998 16.169 42.925 16.294 28 ..144 
GAAP2-CE GAAPl-CF GAAP2-CF Price 
Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
Mean -0.211 -0.247 -0.261 0.204 -0.026 0.273 0.168 -0.113 0.232 25.582 23.992 25.143 
sd 0.683 0.467 0.794 4.240 3.446 2.740 4.297 3.567 2.813 51.939 33.520 33.286 
Minimum -57.036 -9.858 -88.501 -192.828 -147.248 -120.609 -192.047- 148.203 - 123.281 0.241 0.120 0.320 
25 pet -0.232 -0.286 -0.306 -0.385 -0.557 -0.514 -0.409 -0.609 -0.553 10.170 8.590 8.950 
Median -0.103 -0.129 -0.148 -0.068 -0.1.34 -0.109 -0.075 -0.146 -0.120 17.990 17.530 18.480 
75 pet -0.038 -0.047 -0.058 0.363 0.224 0.421 0.357 0.214 0.425 29.060 30.500 32.640 
Maximum 25.751 2.996 16.215 152.713 89.981 80.417 161.881 89.980 80.417 2411.807 817.990 906.930 
T h e variables are def ined as fo l lows: BV = Book value of c o m m o n equity per share. IBES = I/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts . C O R E = S & P Core earnings per share. C E = 
Net income per share, af ter adding back depreciat ion and amort isat ion expenses . C P = Opera t ing cash f lows per share. G A A P l = Earnings per share f r o m operat ions adjus ted to exc lude the e f fec ts of 
special i tems reported under G A A P . G A A P 2 = Income before extraordinar> i tems per share reported under G A A P . Price = Share price at announcement dale . 
The mean difference in dollar earnings per share between G A A P and non-GAAP 
measures ranges from -0,143 ( G A A P I - C E ) to 0.966 (GAAP2-CF) in the pre-GFC 
period, -0.706 (GAAP2-CF) to -0.138 ( G A A P I - C E ) during the G F C , and -0.139 
( G A A P I - C E ) to 0.480 (GAAP2-CF) in the post-GFC period. In the pre- and post-GFC 
periods, mean G A A P earnings are comparatively higher than non-GAAP earnings, with 
the exception of C E . The results that mean G A A P earnings is generally higher than non-
G A A P earnings in the pre- and post-GFC periods is consistent with the adjustments 
under non-GAAP earnings that exclude non-recurring revenues and include recurring 
expenses. 
Dur ing the G F C , mean G A A P earnings are comparative lower than all non-GAAP 
earnings. An explanation is that f irms generally recognised significant mandated asset 
writedowns during the G F C , e.g., impairment of goodwil l . Compar ing across all 
periods, mean values of IBES , C O R E and C E decrease during the G F C but recover in 
the post G F C period. In contrast, the mean value of C F increases in the G F C period and 
decreases in the post-GFC period. 
interestingly, mean BV for financial firms remains relatively stable across the three 
periods. This is notable considering that the financial sector is argued to be the catalyst 
of the G F C and also the hardest hit by the G F C . Nevertheless, the decreasing standard 
deviation of BV over time suggests that the book value of equity are overstated before 
the G F C and that there was a subsequent correction resulting in book values that are 
closer to the mean. The standard deviation of IBES , C O R E , C E and C F also exhibit a 
similar pattern of decreasing over time. 
The mean share price (Price) at earnings announcement date is 551.705 in the pre-GFC 
period, $40,970 during the G F C and $36,772 in the post-GFC period. This suggests that 
financial f irms have not recovered their market values and that the market may still be 
concerned about the continuing effects of the G F C in the financial sector. 
Panel B show some contrasting results for the non-financial sector compared to the 
financial sector. Wi th the exception of CF , all other mean earnings continue to increase 
during the G F C and in the post-GFC period relative to the pre-GFC period. In all 
periods, however, it appears that C F is the most conservative measure of earnings. 
When compared to G A A P earnings, C F is lower, on average, in the pre-GFC period. 
G A A P earnings are also lower, on average, than IBES across the three periods. During 
the G F C , G A A P earnings are generally lower than non-GAAP earnings except for 
G A A P l - C O R E and G A A P l - C F . In the pos t -GFC period, however , G A A P earnings are 
higher, on average, than C O R E ( G A A P l - C O R E ) and C F ( G A A P l - C F and G A A P 2 -
CF) . Mean Price is comparatively increasing f rom period to period. 
Unlike financial f i rms , the mean BV for non-financial f i rms continues to increase f rom 
period to period and the standard deviations appear relatively stable. This highlights the 
different impact the G F C has on the two sectors, where the non-financial sector appears 
to continue to grow in book value and market value as evidenced by both the mean BV 
and mean Price continuing to increase over t ime. 
Panel C ( S & P 500) and Panel D (non-S&P 500) show results that are generally similar 
fo r all n o n - G A A P earnings. Mean values for all non -GAAP earnings appear to have 
recovered f rom the peak of the G F C and mean values in the post -GFC period are higher 
than the pre-GFC period. Also, the standard deviation has decreased f rom the pre-GFC 
period to the post -GFC period. 
Mean IBES continue to increase across the three periods. Mean C O R E and mean C E 
decline in the G F C period but recover in the post -GFC period. Mean CF, however , 
increases during the G F C and decreases in the post -GFC period. G A A P earnings are 
lower, on average, relative to IBES and C E across all periods while C F is lower than 
G A A P earnings only in the pre- and post -GFC periods for both samples. C O R E is lower 
than G A A P earnings in the pre-GFC period ( G A A P l - C O R E and G A A P 2 - C O R E ) but 
lower in the G F C and post -GFC periods only when compared to G A A P 2 . 
Mean BV and its standard deviation for both large and small f i rms exhibit similar 
patterns. The market value of large f i rms also continues to increase, on average, during 
the G F C and into the post-GFC period. On the other hand, the market value of small 
f i rms has recovered f rom the G F C but is yet to reach its pre-GFC level. 
General ly, the results show C O R E to be a relatively more conservative earnings 
measure than IBES across all sample and all periods. C O R E is relatively more 
conservative than G A A P earnings in the pre-GFC period across all samples , however , 
the results are mixed in the G F C and pos t -GFC periods, depending on the comparat ive 
G A A P measure. C F is the most conservative earnings measure relative to IBES, C O R E 
and CE in the pre- and post -GFC periods. 
Table 3.2 shows the correlations among the variables for each period of each sample. 
Table 3.2: Pearson Correlations Among Variables 
Panel A: Financial Sector Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 4^53; Firms = 242 I GFC: N = U 3 4 ; Firms = 239 I Post-GFC: N = 2,893; Firms = 222) 
Pre-GFC 












CE CF CF 
WES 0.574"" 
CORE 0.7I8"" 0.679"" 
CE 0.719'" 0.681"" 0.919"' 
CF -0.010 -0.018 -0.017 -0.035" 
GAAPI 0.752"' 0.692"" 0.961 ••• 0.950'" -0.040"" 
GAAP2 0.726'" 0.686""" 0.949""" 0.971"' -0.052"" 0.978'" 
GAAP!-WES 0.001 -0.649"' 0.077"" 0.062"" -0.017 0.099"' 0.085""" 
GAAP2-WES -0.015 -0.6.-18'"' 0.078""" 0.098""" -0.031' 0.091'" 0.123"" 0.976""" 
GAAPI-CORE 0.2.12"" 0.15.V" 0.01 1 0.252"' -0.087'"' 0.288'" 0.252""" 0.093""" 0.058"" 
GAAP2-CORE 0.154'" 0.144'" 0.017 0.328"' -0.116""" 0.227"" 0.333"' 0.041" 0.156'"' 0.761""" 
GAAPI-CE -0.185"" -0.2.W""" -0.238"" -0.520'"' -0.001 -0.228"" -0.352'"" 0.078""" -0.058"" 0.002 -0.40 r " 
GAAP2-CE -0.285'" -0.278'" -0.294"" -0.535"' -0.047" -0.312"" -0.316"" 0.055"" 0.045" -0.109"" -0.124"" 0.817""" 
GAAPI-CF 0.128"" 0.127"" 0.167"" 0.183"" -0.988""" 0.196"" 0.205"" 0.033" 0.045" O.l .W" 0.149"" -0.035" -0.003 
GAAP2-CF 0.126"" 0.127"" 0.167"" 0.189"' -0.987"'" 0.195"" 0.21 r " 0.031' 0.050" 0.125"" 0.166"" -0.055""" -0.004 0.999""' 
Price 0.895""' 0.6.11'" 0.774""' 0.806"" -0.001 0.813"" 0.799"" -0.013 -0.015 0.259""" 0.219"" -0.290""" -0..373"" 0.129"" 0.128"" 
GFC 












CE CF CF 
IBES -0.021 
CORE -0.035 0 . 8 4 3 ' " 
CE -0 .231" ' 0 . 7 8 1 ' " 0.900"" 
CF 0 . 1 2 3 ' " 0.032 0.021 0.089"" 
GAAPI -0 .282" ' 0 .763" ' 0.889""" 0.983"" 0 .088" 
GAAP2 -0 .281" ' 0 .773" ' 0 .893 ' " 0 . 9 9 2 ' " 0 .084" 0 .992 ' " 
GAAP!-IBES -0 .412" ' 0.032 0 .407 ' " 0 . 6 2 4 ' " 0 .099 ' " 0 .671" ' 0 .646" ' 
GAAP2-IBES -0 .419" ' 0.065" 0.434"'" 0.661""" 0 .095" ' 0.682""" 0 .683" ' 0 .979" ' 
GAAPI-CORE -0 .548 ' " 0.056' 0.033 0 .428" ' 0.150"" 0 .487 ' " 0 .461" ' 0.6X8"' 0 .660 ' " 
GAAP2 CORE -0 .557" ' 0 .101" ' 0.068" 0 .478" ' 0.145""" 0 .499" ' 0.509"" 0 .654" ' 0 .685" ' 0 .959 ' " 
GAAPI-CE -0 .291 ' " -0.048 -0.002 -0.028 -0.004 0.156""' 0.064" 0 .297" ' 0 .156 ' " 0.345"" 0.145"" 
GAAP2-CE -0 .434" ' 0 .090" 0.1 19 '" 0.127"" -0.025 0 .256" ' 0 .254 ' " 0 .292 ' " 0 .296" ' 0.331""" 0.336"" 0 .704" ' 
GAAPI-CF -0 .224" ' 0 .256" ' 0 . 3 1 4 ' " 0 . 2 8 4 ' " -0 .927 ' " 0 .292" ' 0 .292" ' 0 .157" ' 0 .165 ' " 0.039 0.048 0.062' 0 . 1 2 0 ' " 
GAAP2-CF -0 .225" ' 0.263"" 0.319"" 0 .291 ' " -0 .926" ' 0 .293" ' 0.300"" 0 .151 ' " 0 .168 ' " 0.031 0.055 0.028 0 . 1 2 1 ' " 0 . 9 9 9 ' " 
Price 0 . 9 1 0 ' " 0.032 0.002 -0.150""' 0.058" -0.209"* -0 .203" ' -0 .360" ' -0 .356 ' " -0.461"" -0.454"" -0..129""" -0 .435" ' -0 .134" ' - 0 . 132 ' " 
Posl-GFC 
GAAPI- GAAP2- GAAPI- GAAP2- GAAPI- GAAP2- GAAP!- GAAP2-
CF CF BV IBES CORE CE CF GAAP! GAAP2 IBES IBES CORE CORE CE CE 
WES 0 .376" ' 
CORE 0.389"" 0 .882" ' 
CE 0 .388" ' 0 .571 ' " 0 .668" ' 
CF 0.033 0 . 0 9 5 ' " 0 .090 ' " 0 .054" 
GAAPI 0 .439 ' " 0 .764" ' 0 .828" ' 0.646"" 0.040" 
GAAP2 0 .435" ' 0 .781 ' " 0 .843 ' " 0 .731 ' " 0.070"" 0 .889 ' " 
GAAPI IBES 0 .196 ' " -0 .099 ' " 0 .150" ' 0.267"" -0.059"" 0 .567" ' 0.373""" 
GAAP2-IBES 0 .210" ' -0.042' 0 .209" ' 0 .431" ' -0.010 0 .436" ' 0.591"" 0.726"" 
GAAPI-CORE 0 . 1 8 r " -0.001 -0 .068" ' 0 .119" ' -0 .068" ' 0 .503" ' 0.283"" 0 .777" ' 0.454""" 
GAAP2-CORE 0 . 1 9 7 ' " 0 .066" ' -0.004 0 .308" ' -0.011 0 .352" ' 0.535""" 0 .458" ' 0 .770" ' 0.632"" 
GAAPI-CE -0 .155" ' -0 .135 ' " - 0 . 2 1 0 - -0 .790" ' -0.038" -0.043* -0 .243" ' 0 .105 ' " -0 .215 ' " 0.247""" -0.121"" 
GAAP2-CE -0 .165" ' -0 .116" ' -0 .201" ' -0 .783" ' -0.014 -0.126"" -0 .148 '" -().()47" -0 .087" ' 0.085"" 0.041" 0 .924 ' " 
GAAPI-CF 0 . 1 0 2 ' " 0 .142" ' 0.166"" 0.146"" -0.952"" 0.267"" 0 .204" ' 0.230"" 0.143'"' 0.219"" 0.118""" 0.023 -0.025 
GAAP2-CF 0 .105 ' " 0.1.54"' 0 .178 ' " 0.179"" -0 .949 '" 0 .242" ' 0 .247" ' 0.175""" 0.196""" 0.155""" 0.180"" -0.040" -0.033 
Price 0 .829" ' 0 .468" ' ().467'" 0.412"" 0.021 0.502"" 0.496""' 0.176"" 0.189""" 0.172""" 0.188"" -0.136"" -0.145' 
0.989 
0 .133" 0.1.36 
Panel B: Non-Financial Sector Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 35^16 ; F i rms = 1,850 I G F C : N = 9,106; Firms = 1,804 I Post -GFC: N = 20,477; Fi rms = 1,678) 
Pre GFC 
















CORE -0.217"" 0 .722" ' 
CE -0.006 0 .667 '" 0 .836 '" 
CF 0.022"" 0 .101 '" 0 .103 '" 0 .137" ' 
GAAP! -0.1,'Sfi"" 0 .764" ' 0 .946" ' 0 .823" ' 0 .127" ' 
GAAP2 -0 .158" ' 0 .700 ' " 0 .933" ' 0 .904" ' 0 .103 '" 0 .901 '" 
GAAP! IBES -0 .477 '" 0 .034 '" 0 .636 '" 0 .508" ' 0.081"" 0 .670" ' 0 .590 '" 
GAAP2 IBES -0 .409" ' 0 .058" ' 0 .640 '" 0 .649" ' 0 .051 '" 0 .556" ' 0 .754" ' 0 .795" ' 
GAAPl-CORE 0.234" ' -O. lOl '" -0 .451 '" -0.289" ' 0 .033 '" -0.138" ' -0.372"' -0 .098 '" -0.427" ' 
GAAP2-C0RE 0 .153 ' " -0 .028" ' -0 .141 '" 0 .223" ' 0.003 -0.083"' 0 .224" ' -0.098" ' 0 .339" ' 0 .201" ' 
GAAPI-CE -0 .212 '" -0 .084" ' -0 .122" ' -0 .586" ' -0 .060 '" -0.022" ' -0 .305 '" 0.063" ' -0.350" ' 0.31 1 '" -0 .512" ' 
GAAP2-CE -0 .323" ' -0.064*" 0 .040" ' -0 .406 '" -0.1 OO"' 0.001 0.024" ' 0 .075" ' 0 .093" ' -0.1 19"' -0 .041" ' 0 .716 ' " 
GAAPI-CF -0 .092" ' 0 .251" ' 0 .331" ' 0 .244" ' -0 .893 '" 0 .333" ' 0 .311" ' 0 .228 '" 0 .204" ' -0.094'" -0.04()"' 0 .047" ' 0 .096 '" 
GAAP2-CF -0 .099" ' 0 .255 ' " 0 .368" ' 0 .322" ' -0 .870 '" 0 .330" ' 0 .401 '" 0 .219 '" 0 .327" ' -0.215" ' 0 .109 '" -0 .096" ' 0 .104 ' " 0 .977" ' 
Price 0 .761 ' " 0 .128 '" -0..W1'" -0 .125" ' -0.033" ' -0 .247 '" -0.225"' -0.531" ' -0 .433 '" 0 .239" ' 0 .195 '" -0 .134 '" -0 .190 '" -0 .081 '" -0 .082" ' 
GFC 
GAAPI- GAAP2- GAAPl- GAAP2- GAAPI- GAAP2- GAAPl-
CF BV IBES CORE CE CF GAAPI GAAP2 IBES IBES CORE CORE CE CE 
IBES 0 .252" ' 
CORE -0 .046 ' " 0 .630" ' 
CE 0 .115" ' 0 . 6 1 2 ' " 0 . 8 7 1 ' " 
CF 0 .070 ' " 0 .098" ' 0 .122" ' 0.108"" 
GAAPI 0.006 0 . 6 4 1 ' " 0.971"" 0 .852" ' 0.140"" 
GAAP2 -0 .049" ' 0 .593" ' 0 . 9 1 1 ' " 0.950"" 0 .091 ' " 0.876"" 
GAAPI-IBES -0 .204 ' " -0.005 0 .736" ' 0.595"" 0 .099" ' 0.764"" 0 .643" ' 
GAAP2-IBES -0 .233 ' " 0 . 0 5 4 ' " 0 .700" ' 0 .761" ' 0 .046" ' 0 .650" ' 0 .836" ' 0 .802 ' " 
GAAPI-CORE 0 .218" ' -0.007 -0 .197 ' " -0.148""" 0 .065" ' 0.041"" -0 .216 '" 0 .059 ' " -0 .263" ' 
GAAP2-C0RE -0.022' 0 . 1 1 0 ' " 0 .101 ' " 0 .467" ' -0.036""" 0 .077 ' " 0 .502 ' " 0.009 0.,548"' -0 .107" ' 
GAAPI-CE -0 .209 ' " -0 .173 ' " -0 .153" ' -0.584"" 0.011 -0 .072" ' -0 .451" ' 0.052'"" -0 .442 '" 0 .345" ' -0 .770 ' " 
GAAP2-CE -0 .519" ' -0 .149 ' " -0.004 -0 .298" ' -0.069"" -0 .049" ' 0.014 0 .061 ' " 0 .118 ' " -0 .188" ' 0 .040 ' " 0 .491" ' 
GAAPl-CF -0 .063 ' " 0 . 2 1 5 ' " 0 .352 ' " 0.308"" -0.879'"" 0 .349" ' 0 .336 ' " 0 .274" ' 0 .270" ' -0 .042" ' 0 .071 ' " -0 .045 ' " 0.041' 
GAAP2-CF -0 .089 ' " 0 .229" ' 0 .378" ' 0.41 1"" -0.847"" 0 .343" ' 0 .453" ' 0 .254 ' " 0 .405 ' " -0.173"" 0..301"' -0 .251 ' " 0.069' 




0 . 0 1 1 0.008 
Post- GFC 












CE CF CF 
IBES 0.553" ' 
CORE ( ) .420' " 0 .739" ' 
CE ( ) .532'" 0.685"" 0.85 1 "• 
CF 0.018" 0.118"" 0 .064 ' " 0.053"" 
GAAP! 0.482"" 0.788"" 0 .917" ' 0.806"" 0 .085" ' 
GAAP2 0.371" ' 0 .668" ' 0 .918" ' 0 .915" ' 0 .047" ' 0 .839 ' " 
GAAPl-IBES 0.028" ' -0.084"' 0 .479 ' " 0 .372" ' -0.024"' 0 .547" ' 0.449""" 
GAAP2-IBES -0.015" -0.030"" 0 .548 ' " 0.593"" -0.046"" 0.396"" 0.723"" 0 .681" ' 
GAAPI-CORE 0.039"" -0.069"' -0.430"' -0.309'" 0 .032" ' -0.034'"' -0.402"" 0.039""" -0.476"' 
GAAP2-C0RE -0.027'" -0.012 0.019" 0 .354" ' -0.027"' 0.010 0 4 1 4 " " 0 .033 ' " 0 .567" ' -0.026"" 
GAAPI-CE -0.318" ' -0.213" ' -0.337""' -0.716'" 0.012 -0.163'"' -0.535"' 0.025"" -0.522"' 0.474"" -0.577"" 
GAAP2-CE -0.521"" -0.271"" -0.150'" -0.523'" -0.029'" -0.206'" -0.134'" 0.034"'" 0 .071 ' " -0.091'" 0.005 0 .628" ' 
GAAPI-CF 0.138"" 0.139"" 0.234"" 0 .209 ' " -0.947"" 0 .240" ' 0.225""' 0 .200" ' 0 .173 ' " -0.042"" 0.029"" -0.064"' -0.038"" 
GAAP2-CF 0.124"" 0 .142 ' " 0 .289" ' 0.298"" -0.925'" 0 .239" ' 0.335"" 0.193""' 0 .319 ' " -0.183"" 0.182"" -0.215"' -0.023"' 0 .978" ' 
Price 0.681 ' " 0.700""' 0.504""' 0 .529" ' 0.03 I " " 0 .570 ' " 0.461"" -0.029'" -0.030'" 0.027" ' 0.006 -0.209"' -0.324"' 0 .153 ' " 0 .146 ' " 
Panel C: S&P 500 Sample (Pre -GFC: N = 7,908; F i rms = 416 I G F C : N = 2,193; Fi rms = 419 I Post-GFC: N = 5,532; Firms = 424) 
Pre-GFC 












CE CF CF 
IBES 0.899 '" 
CORE 0.768 '" 0 .862" ' 
CE 0.742" ' 0 .825" ' 0.913"" 
CF 0.001 -0.007 -0.021 -0.018 
GAAP! 0.854" ' 0 .944" ' 0.896""" 0.862" -0.031"" 
GAAP2 0.699"" 0 .806 '" 0.942"" 0.955" -0.028" 0.863"" 
GAAP! IBES -0.098" ' -0 .126 '" 0 .138 '" 0.148'" -0.073""" 0.208""" 0.206" ' 
GAAP2-IBES -0 .074 '" -0.035"" 0 .387" ' 0.461" -0.038""" 0.138"" 0.564" ' 0 .522 '" 
GAAPI-CORE 0.001 -0.028" -0.436""" -0.307" -0.014 0.009 -0.374'" 0.1 11"" -0.592"" 
GAAP2-CORE -0 .048 '" 0.008 0.033" 0.314" -0.025" 0.084""" 0.366" ' 0 .230 '" 0.606""" 0 .095" ' 
GAAPI-CE -0 .208" ' -0 .238" ' -0 .476" ' -0.691" -0.010 -0.230'" -0.605"" 0.012 -0.689"' 0 .604" ' -0.483""" 
GAAP2-CE -0.404"" -0 .366" ' -0.256" ' -0.506" -0.024" -0.323"" -0.228""" 0.112"" 0.125" ' -0.078"" 0.033"" 0.51 1 '" 
GAAPICF 0.133" ' 0 .154 '" 0.161""" 0.152"" -0.988"" 0.186 '" 0 .163" ' 0 .104" ' 0.059""" 0.016 0.038""" -0.026" -0.027" 
GAAP2-CF 0.129" ' 0 .156" ' 0 .195" ' 0.194" -0.983'" 0 .190 '" 0 .213 '" 0.109" ' 0 .142 '" -0.055""" 0 .093 '" -0 .102 '" -0.018 0 .996 '" 
Price 0.929" ' 0 .893" ' 0 .766" ' 0.716" -0.006 0.846" ' 0 .697" ' -0.106'" -0.069""" -0.010 -0.047" ' -0 .168 '" -0 .322 '" 0 .138 '" 0.1.35"' 
GFC 












CE CF CF 
WES - 0 . 0 8 I ' " 
CORE - 0 . 1 4 3 " ' 0 . 8 8 1 " • 
CE - 0 . 1 6 9 " ' 0 . 8 1 7 ' " 0 . 8 6 0 " ' 
CF 0 . 1 1 9 ' " 0 . 0 6 6 " 0 . 0 5 7 " 0 . 1 3 2 " ' 
GAAP! - 0 . 3 . 1 8 ' " 0 . 8 3 9 " ' 0 . 8 8 5 " * 0 . 8 8 6 " ' 0 . 1 4 4 ' " 
GAAP2 - 0 . . U 6 ' " 0 . 7 8 9 ' " 0 . 8 7 9 ' " 0 . 9 4 7 " ' 0 . 1 1 6 ' " 0 . 9 2 3 " " 
GAAPI-IBES - 0 . 4 9 8 " ' 0 . 2 9 8 ' " 0 . 5 1 9 ' " 0 . 5 9 5 " ' 0 . 1 7 5 " " 0 . 7 7 0 " ' 0 . 6 9 3 " ' 
GAAP2WES - 0 . 4 6 2 " " 0 . 2 8 5 ' " 0 . 5 3 9 ' " 0 . 7 0 5 ' " 0 . 1 1 9 " " " 0 . 6 4 7 " ' 0 . 8 1 4 " " 0 . 8 0 0 ' " 
GAAPI-CORE - 0 . 4 7 6 " ' 0 . 3 3 2 ' " 0 . 2 3 6 ' " 0 . 4 6 4 " " 0 . 2 0 9 ' " 0 . 6 6 1 " " " 0 . 5 1 1 " ' 0 . 7 7 0 " ' 0 . 4 8 3 " ' 
GAAP2C0RE - 0 . 4 8 3 " ' 0 . 3 3 9 " ' 0 . 3 5 3 ' " 0 . 6 8 0 " " 0 . 1 5 0 " ' 0 . 5 9 7 " " " 0 . 7 5 6 " " 0 . 6 4 9 " ' 0 . 8 5 9 " ' 0 . 6 7 8 " ' 
GAAPI-CE - 0 . . 1 0 1 ' " - 0 . 1 1 3 ' " - 0 . 1 1 3 ' " - 0 . 4 1 4 ' " - 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 5 5 " " - 0 . 2 2 8 " " 0 . 2 3 0 " ' - 0 . 2 4 8 " ' 0 . 2 9 8 " ' - 0 . 2 9 1 " " 
GAAP2-CE - 0 . 5 5 0 ' " - 0 . 0 7 2 ' " 0 . 0 7 7 " ' - 0 . 1 4 4 ' " - 0 . 0 4 5 " 0 . 1 3 2 " " " 0 . 1 8 1 " ' 0 . 3 1 6 " ' 0 . 3 5 0 " ' 0 . 1 5 2 " " " 0 . 2 4 9 " " " 0 . 5 6 8 " " " 
GAAPI-CF - 0 . 2 1 1 ' " 0 . 1 6 0 " ' 0 . 1 8 2 " ' 0 . 1 0 7 ' " - 0 . 9 6 4 ' " 0 . 1 2 6 " " " 0 . 1 3 3 " ' 0 . 0 3 3 0 . 0 5 5 " - 0 . 0 3 1 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 6 0 . 0 8 1 ' " 
GAAP2-CF - 0 . 2 2 0 " ' 0 . 1 6 7 " ' 0 . 2 0 3 ' " 0 . 1 4 8 ' " - 0 . 9 5 6 " " " 0 . 1 2 9 " " " 0 . 1 7 9 ' " 0 . 0 3 1 0 . 1 2 2 " ' - 0 . 0 5 7 " " 0 . 0 7 3 " " " - 0 . 0 6 6 " 0 . 0 9 8 ' " 0 . 9 9 4 " ' 
Price 0 . 8 , 5 0 ' " 0 . 1 0 1 ' " 0 . 0 2 7 0 . 0 1 4 0 . 0 3 6 - 0 . 1 4 2 " " " - 0 . 1 4 3 " " - 0 . 3 6 7 " ' - 0 . 3 1 9 " ' - 0 . 3 4 0 " " " - 0 . 3 1 8 ' " - 0 . 3 0 8 ' " - 0 . 4 8 5 " ' - 0 . 0 7 4 " ' - 0 . 0 7 8 ' " 
Post-GFC 












CE CF CF 
IBES 0 . 3 9 6 ' " 
CORE 0 . 3 4 4 " " 0 . 8 6 9 " " 
CE 0 . 5 l O " ' 0 . 7 3 1 " " 0 . 8 0 7 " ' 
CF 0 . 0 5 6 ' " 0 . 1 0 7 " " " 0 . 1 2 5 ' " 0 . 0 9 2 " 
GAAP! 0 . 3 0 3 " ' 0 . 8 8 5 " ' 0 . 9 2 3 " " " 0 . 7 8 9 " 0 . 1 2 4 " " 
GAAP2 0 . 2 9 3 ' " 0 . 7 6 2 " ' 0 . 8 9 5 " " 0 . 8 7 9 " 0 . 0 9 0 " " 0 . 8 5 9 " ' 
GAAPI-IBES - 0 . 0 8 4 " ' 0 . 0 4 5 " ' 0 . 3 6 9 " " 0 . 3 3 8 " 0 . 0 6 8 ' " " 0 . 5 0 5 " ' 0 . 4 3 1 • " 
GAAP2-IBES - 0 . 0 5 1 ' " - 0 . 0 9 5 ' " 0 . 2 7 6 " " " 0 . 4 2 6 " 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 2 0 1 ' " 0 . 5 7 2 ' " 0 . 6 0 5 " ' 
GAAPI-CORE - 0 . 0 5 0 " " 0 . 1 8 5 ' " - 0 . 0 3 4 " 0 . 0 8 8 " 0 . 0 1 8 0 . 3 5 4 " " ' 0 . 0 5 5 " " 0 . 4 1 5 ' " - 0 . 1 5 0 " ' 
GAAP2-CORE - 0 . 0 3 2 " - 0 . 0 3 0 ' 0 . 0 0 7 0 . . 3 5 7 ' " - 0 . 0 4 8 ' " 0 . 0 8 0 ' " ' 0 . 4 5 1 "•" 0 . 2 2 7 " " " 0 . 7 3 2 " " " 0 . 1 9 3 ' " 
GAAPI-CE - 0 . 4 5 1 " " - 0 . 0 8 0 " ' - 0 . 1 5 6 ' " - 0 . 6 3 7 " 0 . 0 0 6 - 0 . 0 3 0 " - 0 . 3 5 3 ' " 0 . 0 8 4 " " - 0 . 4 4 2 " ' 0 . 3 0 1 ' " - 0 . 4 8 0 ' " 
GAAP2-CE - 0 . 5 6 7 " " " - 0 . 2 3 8 " " - 0 . 1 7 3 " " - 0 . 6 0 0 " - 0 . 0 3 9 " " - 0 . 1 9 6 " " - 0 . 1 4 6 " " 0 . 0 2 1 0 . 0 7 7 " " " - 0 . 0 9 0 " " " 0 . 0 1 7 0 . 7 3 1 ' " 
GAAPI-CF 0 . 0 2 5 0 . 1 3 0 " " 0 . 1 2 2 " " " 0 . 1 1 9 " - 0 . 9 6 4 " " 0 . 1 4 4 " " 0 . 1 4 0 " " 0 . 0 6 8 " ' " 0 . 0 5 0 " " 0 . 0 7 7 " " 0 . 0 6 9 " " - 0 . 0 1 3 - 0 . 0 1 3 
GAAP2CF 0 . 0 2 6 0 . 1 0 6 " " ' 0 . 1 2 5 " " 0 . 1 5 3 " - 0 . 9 6 1 " " 0 . 1 1 6 ' " 0 . 1 8 8 " " 0 . 0 5 3 " ' 0 . 1 5 5 ' " - 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 1 7 2 " " - 0 . 1 0 3 ' " - 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 9 9 0 " ' 
Price 0 . 4 8 9 " " 0 . 6 9 9 ' " 0 . 6 4 4 " " " 0 . 6 1 0 " 0 . 0 4 4 " 0 . 6 0 8 ' " 0 . 5 6 8 ' " 0 . 0 0 9 - 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 0 1 5 - 0 . 0 1 5 - 0 . 2 2 8 " ' - 0 . 3 1 2 " ' 0 . 1 1 9 " " ' 0 . 1 1 5 " ' 
Panel D: Non-S&P 500 Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 31,561; Fi rms = 1,771 I G F C : N = 8,147; F i rms = 1,665 I Post-GFC: N = 17,838; Fi rms = 1,530) 
Pre-GFC 












CE CF CF 
IBES 0.260"" 
CORE -0 .051" ' 0 .613" ' 
CE 0.108" ' 0 .587" ' 0.841"* 
CF -O.OO.i 0 .033 '" 0.068"" 0.075"" 
GAAP! 0.043" ' 0 .647" ' 0 .962" ' 0 .859" ' 0 .064" ' 
GAAP2 0.029" ' 0 .620" ' 0 .936" ' 0 .910" ' 0 .045" ' 0.939"" 
GAAP I-IBES -0 .245" ' -0 .354" ' 0 .477" ' 0..381"" 0 .040" ' 0.485""" 0.441"" 
GAAP2-IBES -0 .240" ' -0 .305" ' 0 .488" ' 0 .484 '" 0 .019 '" 0.456""" 0.558"" 0.909""" 
GAAP I-CORE 0.337" ' -0.003 -0 .326" ' -0.101" ' -0.026""" -0.056""" -0.172""" -0 .066 '" -0.205"" 
GAAP2-CORE 0.223" ' 0 .046" ' -0 .137 '" 0.232"" -0.062'"" -0.023""" 0.220""' -0 .081 '" 0 .218" ' 0 .422" ' 
GAAPI-CE -0 .139" ' -0 .061 '" -0.028"" -0 .512 '" -0.039"" 0.000 -0.202" ' 0.070""" -0 .181 '" 0.103*" -0.492" ' 
GAAP2-CE -0 .198" ' -0 .037 '" 0.052"" -0.390" ' -0.082""" 0.016"" 0.026""" 0.062"" 0 .071 '" -0.137"" -0 .071 '" 0.787**" 
GAAPI-CF 0.019" ' 0 .184 '" 0.256"" 0.215"" -0.943""" 0.273""" 0.271"" 0.123"" 0 .134 '" 0.006 0.052"" 0.038"*" 0.084""" 
GAAP2-CF 0.015" 0 .188 '" 0 .267" ' 0.251"" -0.935"'" 0.272"" 0.31 1 '" 0.1 18"'" 0 .179 '" -0.036" ' 0.137"" -0.034""" 0.087"* 0.993**' 
Price 0.752" ' 0 .194 '" -0 .202" ' -0.018" -0.019""" -0.107" ' -0.099""" -0.354""" -0.325" ' 0.368"* 0.282""" -0.145"" -0.177*" -0.018" -0.017"" 
GFC 












CE CF CF 
IBES 0 .152 ' " 
CORE -0.012 0 .702" ' 
CE -0.049"* 0 .643" ' 0 .895" ' 
CF 0 .098" ' 0 .054 ' " 0 .080 ' " 0 .074 ' " 
GAAPl -0 .098 ' " 0 .662" ' 0 .943" ' 0 .920 ' " 0 .088" ' 
GAAP2 -0 .101" ' 0 .647" ' 0 .916 ' " {)9ir" 0 .068" ' 0 .937 ' " 
GAAPI-IBES -0 .273" ' -0 .058" ' 0 .596" ' 0 .622 ' " 0 .067" ' 0.709"" 0 .639" ' 
GAAP2-IBES -0.26.V" -0.007 0 .601 ' " 0 .732 ' " 0.043'"" 0 .662 ' " 0.758"" 0 .888 ' " 
GAAPl-CORE -0 .256 ' " -0 .109" ' -0.155'"' 0 .088 ' " 0.025" 0.182""" 0 .074 ' " 0. .M5'" 0 .190" ' 
GAAP2-CORE -0.226"" 0.004 -0.008 0.385"" -0.014 0.174"" 0.394"" 0 .227" ' 0.513""" 0 .539" ' 
GAAPl-CE -0 .102" ' -0 .109" ' -0 .102" ' -0.424""" 0.015 -0.036"" -0 .327" ' 0 .054" ' -0 .336" ' 0 .196 ' " -0.582"" 
GAAP2CE -0 .237 ' " -0 .037 ' " 0.019 -0.194""" -0.034"" -().()()6 0.020 0.026" 0 .057 ' " -0 .074" ' 0.006 0.482""" 
GAAPl-CE -0 .141" ' 0 .334" ' 0 .473 ' " 0.465""' -0.820"" 0.499""" 0 .480 ' " 0.350"" 0 .343 ' " 0.083""" 0.112""" -0.034"" 0.026" 
GAAP2-CF -0 .143 ' " 0..344"' 0 .484" ' 0.526""" -0.800""" 0.489""" 0..544"" 0.328""" 0 .420 ' " 0.024" 0.249""" -0.210""" 0.040"" 0.978"" 
Price 0 . 7 3 8 ' " 0 .197" ' -0 .036" -0.024" 0.022 -0 .085" ' -0.067"" -0 .298" ' -0.256"" -0 .146 '" -0.084"" -0.136"" -0.195"" -0.068"" -0 .058" ' 
Post-GFC 
GAAPI- GAAP2- GAAPI- GAAP2- GAAPI- GAAP2- GAAPI- GAAP2-
BV IBES CORE CE CF GAAPI GAAP2 IBES IBES CORE CORE CE CE CF CF 
IBES ().478'" 
CORE 0.381"" 0 .725 '" 
CE 0 .420 ' " 0 .600 '" 0 .773" ' 
CF 0.006 0 .116" ' 0 .045" ' 0 .035" ' 
GAAPI ().488"" 0 .721" ' 0 .875 '" 0 .729 '" 0 .042 '" 
GAAP2 0.390" ' 0 .661" ' 0.899"" 0.837"" 0.036'"" 0 .843" ' 
GAAP!-IBES 0.I44"" -0.129""" 0.41 1 ' " 0.346""" -0.075""" 0.595""" 0.439" ' 
GAAP2-IBES 0.096"'" -0.007 0.555"" 0 .582" ' -0.055" ' 0.483""" 0 .746 '" 0.699"" 
GAAP!-CORE 0.141"" -0 .124 '" -0 .397 '" -0.207"" -0.013 0 .098 '" -0.251'" 0.283"" -0.224"" 
GAAP2-CORE 0.115"" 0.034"" 0.018' 0.339"* -0.010 0.145"" 0 .454 '" 0 .167 '" 0 .575 '" 0 .236 '" 
GAAPI-CE -0.155""" -0.200""" -0 .307 '" -0.772"" -0.012 -0.127"" -0.430"" 0 .051 '" -0.394""" 0.390""" -0.356""" 
GAAP2-CE -0.210"" -0.154"" -0 .129 '" -0 .631 '" -0.014 -0.130"" -0.103" ' -0.007 -0.000 0.020" 0 .028" ' 0 .793" ' 
GAAPI-CF 0.159"" 0 .133 '" 0 .252" ' 0.212"" -0 . 94 r ' " 0.298 '" 0 .250" ' 0.272""" 0 .216 '" 0.(M5"' 0 .058 '" -0 .031" ' -0.03 1 '" 
GAAP2-CF 0.150"" 0 .157 '" 0 .318" ' 0.302"" -0.917"" 0.298"" 0.367""" 0 .245 '" 0 .350 '" -0.088"" 0.191""" -0.160" ' -0 .029 '" 0 .976" ' 
Price 0.762""" 0 .574" ' 0 .406" ' 0.41 1 '" 0.015 0.486"" 0 .401 '" 0.029"" 0.025"" 0.085""" 0.089" ' -0 .144 '" -0 .178 '" 0 .150" ' 0 .147 '" 
•p <0.05, " > < 0 . 0 1 , ' "• p < 0.001 
T h e var iables are def ined as fo l lows; BV = Book value of c o m m o n equity per share. IBES = I/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts . C O R E - S & P Core 
Net income per share , af ter adding back deprecia t ion and amort isat ion expenses . C F = Opera t ing cash f lows per share. G A A P I = Earnings per share f rom opera t ions ad jus ted 
special i tems reported under G A A P . G A A P 2 = Income before extraordinary i tems per share reported under G A A I ' . Price = Share price at announcemen t date . 
earnings per share. C E = 
to exc ludc the e f fec t s of 
T h e e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s are genera l ly h igh ly cor re la ted . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the d i f fe ren t i a l 
va r i ab les are a l so genera l ly highly cor re la ted wi th ea rn ings . T h e r e a re , h o w e v e r , s o m e 
in te res t ing excep t i ons . In Panel A , BV is nega t ive ly cor re la ted wi th all the e a r n i n g s 
m e a s u r e s excep t C F du r ing the G F C . In the p o s t - G F C pe r iod , h o w e v e r , BV is pos i t ive ly 
cor re la ted wi th e a r n i n g s excep t f o r G A A P l - C E and G A A P 2 - C E . W h i l e Price is 
s ign i f i can t ly cor re la ted wi th mos t e a r n i n g s var iab les ac ross all pe r iods , it is mos t h ighly 
cor re la ted wi th B V . S imi la r cor re la t ions are obse rved a m o n g the o the r s a m p l e s . BV is 
p r imar i ly nega t ive ly cor re la ted with the ea rn ings m e a s u r e s dur ing the G F C . A l s o , Price 
is genera l ly mos t h ighly cor re la ted with B V . 
3.3 MULTIVARIATE OLS REGRESSIONS 
In the t ab les p resen t ing the regress ion resul t s , the c o r r e s p o n d i n g N o n G A A P E m e a s u r e s 
in E q u a t i o n s 2.1 and 2 .2 are I B E S , C O R E , C E and C F . T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g D I F F 
m e a s u r e s are D I F F l and D I F F 2 f o r Equa t ion 2.1 (deno ted as Mode l 1 in tab les ) and 
Equa t ion 2 .2 (deno ted as Mode l 2 in tab les) , r espec t ive ly . 
A s d i scussed in C h a p t e r 2 , I eva lua te mode l p e r f o r m a n c e us ing B I C . Based on B I C , the 
mode l wi th the lowest B I C value is the best f i t t ing m o d e l . BIC va lues are repor ted in the 
t ab les wi th mode l e s t ima te s . F u r t h e r m o r e , us ing the d i f f e r e n c e s in B I C va lues be tween 
m o d e l s , Ra f t e ry (1995) p rov ides an app rox ima t ion of th is d i f f e r ence to conven t iona l t 
va lues . For c o m p a r a t i v e p u r p o s e s , I present the absolu te va lue of the d i f f e r e n c e s in B I C 
va lues in separa te tab les . C o u p l e d with the app rox ima t ion to t va lues f r o m Raf te ry 
( 1 9 9 5 ) , these d i f f e r e n c e s indicate the s t rength of the ev idence in relat ion to mode l 
p e r f o r m a n c e . 
T a b l e 3 .3 p resen t s a s u m m a r y of the t w o highes t ranked m o d e l s f o r all s a m p l e s and 
pe r iods that I test in th is sec t ion . T h e s u m m a r y s h o w s that the I B E S mode l s genera l ly 
o u t p e r f o r m o the r m o d e l s excep t in the f inancia l sec tor s a m p l e . 
Table 3.3: Summary of Two Highest Ranked Models for All Samples 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
M o d e l 1: P , = A„ + + / 3 , A ' O H G / 1 / 1 / ' £ + / L O / F F / , , + £ „ 
Model 2: P, = a„ + /J.BV + p,NonGAAPE^, + li,DIFF2„ + £„ 
IBES C O R E CE C F 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Financial 
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M o d e l s ranked I and 2 by their B I C are s h o w n . T h e abso lu te d i f f e r e n c e in B I C \ a l u e s b e t w e e n the mode l and the 
next l ower ranked model is s h o w n in pa ren theses . T h e d i f f e ren t g rades of e \ i denee c o r r e s p o n d i n g to m i n i m u m B I C 
d i f f e r e n c e acco rd ing to Raf te ry ( 1 9 9 5 ) are: 
M i n i m u m BIC D i f f e r e n c e of 0: W e a k 
M i n i m u m BIC D i f f e r e n c e of 2: Pos i t ive 
M i n i m u m B I C D i f f e r e n c e of 6: S t rong 
M i n i m u m B I C D i f f e r e n c e of 10; Very S t rong 
T h e dependen t \ a r i a b l e . P, is c lo s ing share pr ice at e a rn ings a n n o u n c e m e n t da te . T h e i n d e p e n d e n t va r i ab les are 
d e f i n e d as fo l l ows : BV = Book va lue of c o m m o n equi ty per share . N o n G A A P E represen t s the f o l l o w i n g va r iab les fo r 
I B E S , C O R E , C E and C F mode l s : I B E S = l /B /E /S ea rn ings per share a s c o m p u t e d by secur i ty ana lys t s . C O R E = 
S & P C o r e ea rn ings per share . C E = Net i n c o m e per share , a f t e r add ing back dep rec i a t ion and amor t i sa t ion e x p e n s e s . 
C F = O p e r a t i n g cash f l o w s per share . D I F F represen t s D I F F I in Mode l I and D1FE2 in Mode l 2. D l F F l = G A A P I 
m i n u s the re levant n o n - G A A P ea rn ings , w h e r e G A A P I is e a rn ings pe r share f r o m o p e r a t i o n s a d j u s t e d to e x c l u d e the 
e f f ec t s of special i t ems repor ted under G A A P . D I F F 2 = G A A P 2 m i n u s the re levant n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s , w h e r e 
G A A P 2 is i n c o m e b e f o r e ex t r ao rd ina ry i tems per share repor ted unde r G A A P . 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , in t h e f i n a n c i a l s a m p l e , it a p p e a r s t h a t i n v e s t o r s p l a c e r e l a t i v e l y l i t t le 
e m p h a s i s on I / B / E / S e a r n i n g s unt i l a f t e r the G F C , G e n e r a l l y , t h e r e s u l t s f o r t h e n o n -
f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r , the S & P 5 0 0 , a n d t h e n o n - S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e s a re c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r i o r 
s t u d i e s ( e . g . , B r a d s h a w a n d S l o a n , 2 0 0 2 ; B r o w n a n d S i v a k u m a r , 2 0 0 3 ) , w h i c h f i n d t h a t 
l / B / E / S e a r n i n g s a re m o r e v a l u e r e l e v a n t t h a n G A A P e a r n i n g s . H o w e v e r , m y r e s u l t s d o 
not support Albring et al. (2010), which find that S & P Core Earnings are more value 
relevant than I/B/E/S earnings. 
A summary of statistically significant key variables with a p = 0.05 or stronger is 
presented in Table 3.4. Overall , it highlights the impact of the G F C on the value 
relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. 
Table 3.4: S u m m a r y of Significant Key Variables for Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results by Sample , Period and Model 
Model I: P - a,, + /J^SV + /INonGAAPE^ + P.DIFFl^, + E„ 
Model 2: P = a„ + + jlNonGAAPE, + /J ,D/FF2„ + £„ 
Pane l A: F i n a n c i a l Sec tor S a m p l e 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV NonCiAAPF DIFF BV N o n G A A P F DIFF 
Pre G F C IBFS sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C O R F Slg Slg sig sig sig sig 
C F Slg Slg sig sig 
C F Slg Slg sig sig sig sig 
G F C IBFS sig sig sig sig 
C O R F sig sig sig 
C F .sig sig sig 
C F sig sig 
Post C;FC IBFS sig sig sig sig 
C O R F sig sig sig sig sig 
C F sig sig •sig .sig sig sig 
C F sig sig sig sig sig sig 
Pane l B: N o n - F i n a n c i a l Sec tor S a m p l e 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV N o n G A A P F DIFF BV N o n G A A P F DIFF 
Pre -GFC IBFS sig sig sig 
C O R E sig sig sig 
C F sig sig 
C F sig sig 
G F C IBFS sig sig sig sig sig 
C O R F sig sig sig 
C F sig sig 
C F sig sig 
Post G F C IBFS sig sig sig sig 
C O R F sig sig sig sig sig 
C F sig sig sig sig slg sig 
C F sig sig sig sig sig 
Panel C: S&P 500 Sample 
Independent Var iab les 
Mode l 1 Mode l 2 
B V N o n G A A P E D I F F B V N o n G A A P E t J IFF 
Pre-GFC I B E S sig sig sig sig 
C O R E sig sig sig sig sig 
C E sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C F sig sig sig sig sig sig 
G F C I B E S sig sig sig sig 
C O R E sig sig sig sig 
C E sig sig sig sig 
C F sig sig sig sig sig sig 
Post-GFC I B E S sig sig sig sig 
C O R E sig sig sig sig 
C E sig sig sig sig sig -sig 
C F sig sig sig sig sig sig 
Panel D: Non-S&P 500 Sample 
Independent Var iables 
Mode l 1 Mode l 2 
B V N o n G A A P E D I F F BV N o n G A A P E D I F F 
Pre-GFC I B E S sig sig 
C O R E sig sig sig 
C E sig sig 
C F sig sig 
G F C I B E S sig sig 
C O R E sig sig sig 
C E sig sig 
C F .sig sig 
Post-GFC I B E S sig sig sig sig 
C O R E sig sig 
C E sig sig 
C F sig sig 
sig indicates the \ ariabie is statistically significant and positive at p = 0.05 or stronger, sig (-) indicates the \ ariable is 
statistically significant and negative at p = 0.05 or stronger. The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at 
earnings announcement date. The independent variables are defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity 
per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for IBES, C O R E , CE and CE models: IBES = l/B/E/S 
earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per 
share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. CE = Operating cash flows per share. DIEE 
represents DIEEI in Model I and DIEE2 m Model 2, DIEEI = CiAAPI minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, 
where G A A P l is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of spccial items reported under 
GAAP , DIEE2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary 
items per share reported under GAAP . 
In the financial sector sample, it appears that there is a shift away from G A A P and non-
G A A P earnings in the G F C period as investors place greater emphasis on the book 
value of equity during the period of uncertainty. In the post-GFC period, however, 
investors switch their emphasis back to G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. In the non-
financial sector sample, it appears that investors generally place little emphasis on 
G A A P and non-GAAP earnings in the pre-GFC and G F C periods. However , in the 
post-GFC period, investors appear to place comparatively greater emphasis on both 
G A A P and non-GAAP earnings relative to the pre-GFC and G F C periods. The G F C 
a p p e a r s to have little impac t on the e m p h a s i s inves tors p lace on G A A P and n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s in the S & P 5 0 0 and n o n - S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e s . 
3.3.1 Financial Sector Sample 
T a b l e 3 .5 s h o w s the regress ion resul ts wi th c lus te red s tandard e r ro r s , on both f i r m and 
t i m e (f iscal qua r t e r s ) , f o r the f inanc ia l sector s a m p l e . All m o d e l s are s tat is t ical ly 
s ign i f i can t wi th an a d j u s t e d R^ rang ing be tween 0 . 8 4 6 0 to 0 . 8 5 5 6 in the p r e - G F C period 
(Pane l A ) , 0 . 8 3 1 0 to 0 . 8 3 5 6 in the G F C per iod (Panel B) and 0 . 7 1 0 0 to 0 . 7 1 8 0 in the 
p o s t - G F C per iod (Panel C) . ' " Panel A s h o w s the resul ts f o r the p r e - G F C per iod . All 
n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s are marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t . D I F F l and D I F F 2 f o r I B E S , C O R E and 
C F m o d e l s are a l so marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t . T h e resul ts show that G A A P e a r n i n g s have 
inc rementa l va lue r e l evance ove r I B E S , C O R E and C F . G A A P e a r n i n g s , h o w e v e r , d o 
not have inc rementa l va lue r e l evance ove r C E . 
In the G F C p e r i o d , on ly I B E S is s t rongly s ign i f ican t . D I F F l and D I F F 2 , h o w e v e r , are 
marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t in the C O R E and C E m o d e l s , r espec t ive ly . A s the s a m p l e size fo r 
th is per iod is re la t ively s m a l l , the resul ts shou ld be interpreted with cau t ion . 
In the p o s t - G F C pe r iod , all n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are s ign i f ican t f o r both Model 1 and 
M o d e l 2 . T h e level of s ign i f i cance fo r n o n - G A A P ea rn ings in this per iod is a lso 
s t ronge r in c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C per iod . D I F F l is marg ina l ly s ign i f ican t re la t ive 
to C O R E (at 0 . 0 5 ) . and both D I F F l and D I F F 2 are modera t e ly to s t rongly s ign i f ican t 
re la t ive to C E and C F ind ica t ing that G A A P ea rn ings have incrementa l va lue re levance 
o v e r these e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s , but not over I B E S . 
I les t f o r m u l l i c o l l i n e a r i t y u s i n g t h e v a r i a n c e i n f l a t i o n f a c t o r ( V I F ) a n d C o n d i t i o n I n d e x d u e t o the 
s i g n i f i c a n t c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s in t h e c o r r e l a t i o n s r e s u l t s . A c r o s s t h e s a m p l e s 
f o r I B E S , C O R E a n d C E , f o r al l p e r i o d s , t h e h i g h e s t m e a n V I F is 3 . 0 2 4 a n d t h e h i g h e s t C o n d i t i o n I n d e x 
is 4 . 0 9 2 s u g g e s t i n g tha t m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y is n o t a s i g n i f i c a n t p r o b l e m . F o r C F . h o w e v e r , t h e h i g h e s t m e a n 
V I F is 62.5.'59 a n d t h e h i g h e s t C o n d i t i o n I n d e x is I9 . .380 in t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d . W h i l e m e a n C o n d i t i o n 
I n d e x is w i t h i n the t o l e r a b l e l imi t of .10 ( B e l s l e y et al.. 1 9 8 0 ) , t h e V I F is r e l a t i v e l y h i g h a n d i n d i c a t e s 
p o t e n t i a l m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y p r o b l e m s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e su l t s f o r C F in t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d s h o u l d b e 
i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h c a u t i o n . T h e h i g h e s t m e a n V I F a n d C o n d i t i o n I n d e x f o r C F in the G F C a n d p o s t - G F C 
p e r i o d is 9 . 2 2 0 a n d 7 . 2 1 1 , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
7.3 
Table 3.5: Ohlson Model: Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression at Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 242 and Time cluster = 25; G F C : Firm cluster = 239 and 
Time cluster = 9; Post -GFC: Firm cluster = 222 and Time cluster = 16) 
Model 1: P = a,^ + ji^BV^ + li.NonGAAPE^^ + fiMIFF 
Model 2: P, = a„ + + llNonGAAPE^, + P,DIFF2„ + £„ 
Panel A: Pre -GFC Period 
IBES 
Model I Model 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 Model 2 
C E 
Model 1 Model 2 
C F 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.061"" 1.079""" 1.073""" 1 .099 ' " 1 .069" ' 1.077"" 1 .073 ' " 1 .093 ' " 
(3.43) (3.6.5) (3.48) (3.72) (3.89) (4.01) (3.49) (3.76) 
N o n G A A P E 14.210" 13.835' 13.578" 13.041" 12.869' 12..395' 13.946' 13..540' 
(2.27) (2.34) (2.19) (2.28) (2.42) (2.32) (2.27) (2.37) 
DIFH 12.110" 1 1.814" 16.058" 14.743' 0 .968 -1.302 13.818' 13..384' 
(2.33) (2.40) (2.12) (2.19) (0.25) (-0.23) (2.25) (2..36) 
Intercept 9.029"" 8.775'" 8 .957 ' 8.655" 8 . 2 0 2 " 8 . 1 1 1 " 9 .006 ' 8 .720 ' 
(2.60) (2.62) (2.46) (2.48) (2.71) (2.65) (2.56) (2.57) 
Ad j 0 .8479 0 .8500 0.8460 0.8481 0 .8556 0 .8556 0.8461 0.8485 
BIC 43234 43177 43287 43229 4.3013 4.TO12 4 3 2 8 4 4.3219 
BIG Rank 6 3 8 5 2 1 7 4 
Panel B: G F C Period 
IBES C O R E C E C F 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.049"" 1.0.54""' 1 .075" ' 1 .088" ' 1 .033" ' 1 .031" ' 1 .068 ' " 1.070"" 
(10.87) (10.83) (10.45) ( 1 0 5 9 ) (11.05) (I0..36) (11.67) (11.74) 
N o n G A A P E 0.998""" 0 . 9 7 6 " ' 0 .559 0.511 0.842 0 .959 ' 0 .517 0.590 
(4.28) (4.55) (1.30) (1.24) (1.77) (2.09) (0.97) (1.1.^) 
DIFF 0.373 0.613 1.739 2 .383 ' -5.0.^4' -5 .724 0.876 0.952 
(0.42) (0.64) (1.65) (2.48) (-2.28) (-1.27) (1.46) (1.62) 
Intercept 10.752"" 10 .720" ' 10 .419" ' 10.21 1 " ' 10 .609" ' 10 .447" ' 10 .668" ' 10 .638" ' 
(3.78) (3.76) (3..39) (3.40) (3.86) (3.80) (3.75) (3.75) 
A d j R ' 0 .8310 0 .8314 0 .8314 0.8331 0 .8356 0.8.341 0 .8344 0.8351 
BIC 11621 11618 11618 11605 11587 1 1598 1 1.588 11,583 
BIC Rank 8 6 6 5 2 4 3 1 
Panel C: Post-GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
B V 0 . 7 6 r " 0 . 7 6 4 " ' 0 . 7 6 4 ' " 0 . 7 6 7 ' " 0 . 7 6 6 " " 0 . 7 7 1 " ' 0 . 7 6 8 ' " 0 . 7 7 0 " " 
(9 .67 ) (9 .66 ) (9..36) ( 9 . 2 6 ) ( 8 . 6 9 ) (8 .82 ) (9 .19 ) (8 .97 ) 
N o n G A A P E 6 . 6 8 9 " " 6 . . S 4 2 ' " 5 . 9 4 6 " ' 5 . 8 0 7 " ' 4 . 9 4 6 ' " 4 7 1 3 " 4 . 8 4 5 " ' 4 .586"" 
(4 .10 ) (4 .47 ) (3 .80 ) ( 4 . 0 3 ) (3 .90 ) (3 .22 ) ( 3 . 8 2 ) (3 .15 ) 
D I F F 2 . 1 4 8 1.7.S9 2 . 5 1 5 ' 2 . 0 9 5 4 . 6 5 6 " ' 4 . 7 3 1 " 4 . 9 4 4 " ' 4 . 8 3 4 " " 
(1 .86 ) (1 .02 ) (2 .38 ) (0 .98 ) (5 .86 ) (3 .15 ) (4 .07 ) (3 .36 ) 
I n t e r cep t I2 . .383"" 12 .3 .14 ' " 1 2 . 7 6 2 " " 12 .722 ' " ' 1 2 . 9 8 9 ' " 1 2 . 9 0 7 " ' 1 2 . 9 6 4 " ' 1 2 . 9 0 0 ' " 
( , v87 ) (5 .78 ) ( 5 . 9 8 ) (5 .94 ) ( 6 . 0 6 ) (6 .09 ) (6 .12 ) (6 .13 ) 
A d j 0 . 7 1 8 0 0 . 7 1 7 3 0 . 7 1 4 3 0 . 7 1 3 6 0 . 7 1 1 1 0 . 7 1 0 0 0 . 7 1 1 1 0 . 7 1 0 2 
B I C 2 6 4 6 7 2 6 4 7 5 2 6 5 0 5 2 6 5 1 2 2 6 5 2 9 2 6 5 4 8 2 6 5 3 7 2 6 5 4 6 
B I C R a n k 1 2 3 4 5 8 6 7 
' p < 0.05, •• p < 0 . 0 1 , • " p < 0.001 
I statistics in parenthe.scs and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES, C O R E , CE and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
C F = Operating cash flows per share. DIFF represents DIFFI in Model 1 and DIFF2 in Model 2. DIFFl = G A A P I 
minus the rele\ant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P l is earnings per share from operations adjusted to e.xcludc the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. 
M o s t no t ab ly , the resul ts s h o w that inves tors are va lu ing the f i r m s p r edominan t ly on 
book va lue of equi ty - BV is h ighly s ign i f i can t across all mode l s and t ime per iods . T h e 
resul t s a l so s h o w s o m e e v i d e n c e of a shif t in inves to r s ' f o c u s on the d i f f e ren t m e a s u r e s 
of e a r n i n g s fo r f inanc ia l f i r m s . T h e r e is an increase in the level of s i gn i f i cance , f r o m 
marg ina l to s t rong , f o r I B E S and C O R E ea rn ings be tween pre- and p o s t - G F C . Of these 
t w o e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s , G A A P ea rn ings have incrementa l va lue re levance only in 
respec t to C O R E . Add i t i ona l l y , I B E S and C O R E ach ieve a mid to lower r ank ing based 
on B I C in the p r e - G F C per iod and i m p r o v e to t op rank ing in the p o s t - G F C per iod . 
W h i l e the resul t s d o not s h o w a genera l shif t in inves to r s ' e m p h a s i s to G A A P ea rn ings , 
it d o e s s h o w a c lear increase in inves to r s ' e m p h a s i s on n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . In the post-
G F C pe r iod , N o n G A A P E is m o d e r a t e l y to s t rongly s ign i f i can t ac ross all m o d e l s but it is 
on ly m a r g i n a l l y s ign i f i can t in the p r e - G F C per iod . H o w e v e r , it doe s not a p p e a r that 
i nves to r s are p lac ing m u c h e m p h a s i s on G A A P ea rn ings in the p o s t - G F C per iod relat ive 
to I B E S and C O R E ea rn ings . In the pre- and p o s t - G F C pe r iods , the B I C r ank ings 
sugges t that I B E S genera l ly ranked h igher than C O R E . 
T a b l e 3 .6 s h o w the d i f f e r e n c e in B I C be tween m o d e l s , wh ich indica tes how m u c h bet ter 
a mode l f i t is re la t ive to ano the r m o d e l . T h e resul ts genera l ly indicate that mode l 
p e r f o r m a n c e be tween the va r ious e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s is s t rong to very s t rong . In the 
G F C , both C E and C F o u t p e r f o r m the o the r m o d e l s . T h i s resul t is cons i s t en t with 
investors focusing on cash f lows during the GFC. Based on BIC, there is evidence that 
investors place greater emphasis on C F and CE before and during the GFC but place 
greater emphasis on IBES after the GFC. Overall, The differences in BIC, indicating the 
grade of evidence between the models, are generally strong to very strong. 
Table 3.6: Ohlson Model: Financial Sector Sample - Difference in BIC between 
Models 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
IBES CORE CE CF 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
IBES M o d e l 1 
M o d e l 2 
0 




M o d e l 1 
M o d e l 2 
M o d e l 1 
5.3 
-5 
- 2 2 1 
110 
5 2 
- 1 6 4 
0 
-.58 
- 2 7 4 
0 
- 2 1 6 0 
M o d e l 2 - 2 2 2 - 1 6 5 - 2 7 5 - 2 1 7 -1 0 
CF M o d e l 1 5 0 107 - 3 55 
271 2 7 2 0 
M o d e l 2 - 1 5 4 2 - 6 8 - 1 0 2 0 6 2 0 7 - 6 5 0 
IBES M o d e l 1 






M o d e l 1 
M o d e l 2 
M o d e l 1 
- 1 6 
- 3 4 
0 
- 1 3 
-31 
0 
- 1 3 
-31 
0 
- 1 8 0 
M o d e l 2 - 2 3 - 2 0 - 2 0 - 7 11 0 
CF M o d e l 1 - 3 3 - 3 0 -.30 - 1 7 1 - 1 0 0 
M o d e l 2 - 3 8 - 3 5 - 3 5 - 2 2 - 4 - 1 5 -5 0 
IBES M o d e l 1 






M o d e l 1 
M o d e l 2 












M o d e l 2 81 7 3 4 3 3 6 19 0 
CF M o d e l 1 7 0 6 2 3 2 2 5 8 -11 0 
M o d e l 2 7 9 71 41 3 4 17 -2 9 0 
The difference in BIC equals row model BIC less eolumn model BIC. A negalive figure indicates the row model is a 
better fit than the column model. The different grades of evidence corresponding to minimum BIC difference 
according to Raftery (I99.'i) are: 
Minimum BIC Difference of 0: Weak 
Minimum BIC Difference of 2: Positive 
Minimum BIC Difference of 6: Strong 
Minimum BIC Difference of 10: Very Strong 
3.3.2 Non-Financial Sector Sample 
Table 3.7 presents the results for the non-financial sector. All models are statistically 
significant with an adjusted R^ ranging between 0.5917 to 0.6152 in the pre-GFC period 
(Panel A) , 0.5266 to 0.5661 in the GFC period (Panel B) and 0.5141 to 0.6142 in the 
post-GFC period (Panel C).'^ In Panel A , all non-GAAP earnings are not statistically 
significant. D I F F l is moderately significant relative to IBES and D IFF2 is marginally 
significant relative to C O R E . 
Panel B shows the results for the G F C period. IBES is marginally significant. 
General ly, the pattern is similar to the pre-GFC period - D I F F l and D IFF2 are 
statistically significant relative to IBES and C O R E , respectively. The results indicate 
that G A A P has incremental value relevance over IBES and C O R E earnings. 
Post-GFC, all non-GAAP earnings measures are significant. Specifically, IBES is 
strongly significant but other non-GAAP earnings are only marginally significant. 
G A A P earnings are marginally to moderately significant relative to C O R E , C E and CF. 
However, G A A P earnings do not appear to have incremental value relevance relative to 
IBES in contrast to the pre-GFC and G F C periods. 
General ly, the results indicate a shift in the emphasis investors place on the different 
measures of earnings. Whi le the results are mixed, there is evidence that G A A P 
earnings have incremental value relevance over non-GAAP earnings. Furthermore, 
there is also a discernible shift in investors' emphasis on non-GAAP earnings. 
Specif ical ly, investors place greater emphasis on non-GAAP earnings in the post-GFC 
period relative to the pre-GFC period. 
Interestingly, the coefficient for D IFF l is negative and moderately significant in 
relation to IBES in the pre-GFC and G F C periods. This indicates lower values of D IFF l 
are associated with higher Price. As lower values of D IFF l indicate that G A A P 
earnings are generally closer to, or less than. non-GAAP earnings, investors appear to 
place greater emphasis on more conservative, i.e., lower value, measures of G A A P 
earnings in valuing the f i rm. 
The results show that the relative performance of the models depends on the G A A P 
earnings measure used. In the pre-GFC period, the IBES model using D IFF l (Model 1) 
performs better (ranked 1) than the IBES model using D IFF2 (Model 2, ranked 5) based 
on B IC . Interestingly, IBES is not significant in both these models but D I F F l is 
moderately significant and negative. 
" The highest mean V IF and Condi l ion Index in this sample are 8.755 and 7.09.1, respectively, indiealing 
that multicollinearlty is not a significant problem. 
Table 3.7: Ohison Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression at Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 1,850 and Time cluster = 25; G F C : Firm cluster = 1,804 
and Time cluster = 9; Post -GFC: Firm cluster = 1,678 and Time cluster = 16) 
Model 1: P = a„ + + l),NonGAAPE^, + PMIFFl., + 
Model 2: P = a„ + ji^BV, + ji^NonGAAPE^, + li,DIFF2., + 
Panel A: Pre -GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 Model 2 
C E 
Model 1 Model 2 
C F 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.841"" 1.970"" 2 .043"" 2 .021"" 2.087"'" 2.138""" 2.078""" 2 . 0 8 8 " ' 
(5.98) (7.33) (8.21) (8.06) (8.10) (7.89) (8.11) (8.02) 
NonCiAAPE 0.043 -0.361 -4 .574 -4.399 -4.722 -3.400 -5.176 -3 .984 
(0.01) (-0.06) (-1.05) (-1.16) (-1.07) (-0.97) (-1.20) (-1.13) 
DIFF -12 .161" -6.478 0 .494 5.834" -3 .634 0 .634 -4 .606 -3 .317 
(-2.98) (-1.71) (0.10) (2.03) (-0.67) (0.12) (-1 04) (-0.93) 
Intercept 7 . 3 2 5 " 5 . 9 9 8 " 6 .228 ' 6.265"" 6.448" 6.271"" 6 .304 ' 5 .776 ' 
(2.81) (2.61) (2.36) (2.59) (2.44) (2.63) (2.38) (2.39) 
A d j R- 0.6152 0 .5967 0 .5983 0.6025 0 .5963 0 .5933 0 .5969 0 .5917 
BIC 334978 336640 336497 336127 336671 336929 336615 337070 
BIC Rank 1 5 3 2 6 7 4 8 
Panel B: G F C Period 
IBES C O R E C E C F 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1 ..365"" 1.382"" 1.530"" 1.514"" 1.492""" 1.580""" 1.516"" 1 .523 ' " 
(7.10) (6.88) (7.29) (7.51) (7.14) (6.94) (7.42) (7.56) 
N o n G A A P E 6.1 18' 6.198" 0 .459 0.502 0.358 0.987 -0.031 0.437 
(2.01) (1.99) (0.21) (0.23) (0.16) (0.57) (-0.01) (0.25) 
DIFF - 3 . 5 7 6 " -1.643 -3 .929 2.767""" -0.953 4 .600 0 .586 1.074 
(-2.80) (-0.94) (-1.27) (3.76) (-0.38) (1.73) (0.26) (0.62) 
Intercept 8.1 19"" 7.802""" 8 . 4 3 4 ' " 8.477""" 8 .371"" 8.581""' 8 . 3 6 9 " ' 8.289""" 
(5.65) (5.64) (5.52) (5.51) (5.41) (6.04) (5.39) (5.33) 
Ad j R- 0.5661 0.5563 0 .5273 0 .5292 0 .5266 0 .5302 0.5281 0.5305 
BIC 81933 82138 82713 82677 82728 82658 82690 82643 
BIC Rank 1 2 7 5 8 4 6 3 
P a n e l C : P o s t - G F C P e r i o d 
I B E S C O R E C E C F 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
B V 1 . 0 0 2 ' " 1 .001"* 1 . 2 4 8 " ' 1 . 349"" 1 .260"" 1 . 4 2 7 ' " 1 . 2 5 1 ' " 1.398""" 
(4 .98 ) (4 .99 ) (-^.12) (6 .15 ) ( 4 . 8 2 ) (5..37) ( 5 . 1 1 ) (6 .78 ) 
N o n O A A P E 23.999'" 2 3 . 9 9 5 " ' 13.699" 10..347" 13.6.54" 8 .563" 13.600" 8.7.38" 
(6 .07 ) (6 .09 ) (2 .20 ) (2 .16 ) ( 2 . 1 8 ) (2 .44 ) ( 2 . 2 3 ) (2 .56) 
D I F F - 0 . 1 0 7 - 0 . 4 5 4 1 5 . 3 6 1 " 1 .466 14.2.38" 8 .602" 13.668" 10 .260 
( -0 .02 ) ( - 0 . 1 9 ) (2 .75 ) (0 .87 ) (2 .26 ) ( 2 . 4 4 ) ( 2 . 1 5 ) (1 .78 ) 
In t e rcep t 7 . 4 1 5 " 7 . 3 8 3 " 8.8.59"" 9.261""" 8 .950"" ' 9 . 5 0 3 ' " 8 . 9 0 0 " " 9 . 3 1 4 " ' 
( 3 .28 ) (3 .27 ) (3 .70 ) (3 .88 ) ( 3 . 9 2 ) (4 .95 ) ( 3 . 7 1 ) (3 .93 ) 
At l j 0 . 6141 0 . 6 1 4 2 0 . 5 4 0 0 0 . 5 2 1 7 0 . 5 3 9 9 0 . 5 1 4 3 0 . 5 3 9 8 0 .5141 
B I G 187.573 1 8 7 5 6 9 1 9 1 1 6 7 1 9 1 9 6 8 191175 1 9 2 2 8 0 1 9 1 1 7 9 192292 
B I C R a n k 2 1 3 6 4 7 5 8 
• p < 0 . 0 5 . " p < 0 . 0 l , " " p < 0 . 0 0 1 
I slalistics in parentheses and calculalcd with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable. P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. I'he independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonCjAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES, C O R E . CE and CF models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation e.\penses. 
CH = Operating cash flows per share. DIEE represents DIFEI in Model 1 and DIFH2 in Model 2. DIFEI = G A A P I 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPI is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIHF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. 
T h i s s u g g e s t s G A A P e a r n i n g s a r e v a l u e r e l e v a n t a n d t h a t i n v e s t o r s p l a c e r e l a t i v e l y 
g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s o n G A A P e a r n i n g s , w h i c h a r e g e n e r a l l y c l o s e r t o , o r l e s s t h a n , I B E S . 
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e C O R E m o d e l s u s i n g D I F F I a n d D I F F 2 ( r a n k e d 3 a n d 2 , 
r e s p e c t i v e l y ) p e r f o r m b e t t e r t h a n t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g C E a n d C F m o d e l s o v e r t h i s s a m e 
p e r i o d . D u r i n g t h e G F C , h o w e v e r , I B E S o u t p e r f o r m s a l l o t h e r m o d e l s . T h e m o d e l 
p e r f o r m a n c e o f C O R E d e t e r i o r a t e s in t h i s p e r i o d . I n t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , I B E S 
c o n t i n u e s t o o u t p e r f o r m a l l o t h e r m o d e l s . T h e r a n k i n g o f C O R E i m p r o v e s i n t h i s p e r i o d . 
A l s o , C O R E , C E a n d C F m o d e l s , u s i n g D I F F I , g e n e r a l l y p e r f o r m b e t t e r t h a n t h e 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g m o d e l s u s i n g D I F F 2 . T h i s r e s u l t s u g g e s t s t h a t i n v e s t o r s g i v e r e l a t i v e l y 
g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n t o r e c u r r i n g e a r n i n g s . N o t e t h a t D I F F I i s b a s e d o n G A A P e a r n i n g s 
f r o m o p e r a t i o n s a d j u s t e d t o e x c l u d e s p e c i a l i t e m s , i . e . , e a r n i n g s t h a t m o r e c l o s e l y r e f l e c t 
r e c u r r i n g e a r n i n g s . 
T a b l e 3 . 8 s h o w t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n B I C b e t w e e n m o d e l s , w h i c h i n d i c a t e h o w m u c h b e t t e r 
a m o d e l f i t i s r e l a t i v e t o a n o t h e r m o d e l . T h e r e s u l t s g e n e r a l l y i n d i c a t e t h a t m o d e l 
p e r f o r m a n c e b e t w e e n t h e v a r i o u s e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s i s s t r o n g t o v e r y s t r o n g . 
Table 3.8: Ohlson Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Difference in BIC 
between Models 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
IBES C O R E CE C F 























Model 2 1951 289 432 802 258 0 
C F 
Model 1 1637 -25 1 18 488 -56 -314 0 






G F C 










Model 1 795 590 15 51 0 
Model 2 725 520 -55 -19 -70 0 
C F 
Model 1 757 552 -23 13 -.38 32 0 























Model 2 4707 471 1 1113 312 1 105 0 
C F 
Model 1 3606 3610 12 -789 4 -1101 0 
Model 2 4719 4723 1 125 324 1 1 17 12 1113 0 
T h e d i f ference in BIC equals row model BIC less column model BIC. A negat ive f igure indicates the row model is a 
better fit than the co lumn model . T h e dif ferent grades of e \ i d e n c e corresponding to min imum BIC d i f fe rence 
according to Rafter> (1995) are: 
M i n i m u m BIC Dif fe rence of 0: Weak 
Min imum BIC Dif fe rence of 2: Posit ive 
Min imum BIC L^ifference of 6: Strong 
Min imum BIC Dif fe rence of 10: Very Strong 
3.3.3 S&P 500 Sample 
T h e r e s u l t s f o r f i r m s in the S & P 5 0 0 i n d e x a re p r e s e n t e d in T a b l e 3 . 9 . Al l m o d e l s a re 
s t a t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t w i t h an a d j u s t e d R^ r a n g i n g b e t w e e n 0 . 8 6 7 2 t o 0 . 8 8 0 4 in t h e p r e -
G F C p e r i o d ( P a n e l A ) , 0 . 7 4 6 7 t o 0 . 7 5 6 8 in t h e G F C p e r i o d ( P a n e l B ) a n d 0 . 4 3 6 7 t o 
0 . 5 4 5 8 in t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d ( P a n e l C ) . In t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d , al l n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s a r e m a r g i n a l l y t o m o d e r a t e l y s i g n i f i c a n t . G A A P e a r n i n g s d o no t h a v e 
i n c r e m e n t a l v a l u e r e l e v a n c e o v e r I B E S . H o w e v e r , G A A P e a r n i n g s h a v e i n c r e m e n t a l 
v a l u e r e l e v a n c e o v e r C O R E , C E a n d C F . 
Table 3.9: Ohlson Model: S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression at 
Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 416 and Time cluster = 25; GFC: Firm cluster = 419 and 
Time cluster = 9; Post-GFC: Firm cluster = 424 and Time cluster = 16) 
Model ! : / ; ,=«„+ + llNonGAAPE_ + jifilFFI^, + £„ 
Model 2: P = a„ + + jlNonGAAPE^^ + + £„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model I Model 2 
CORE 
Model I Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model I Model 2 
BV 1.171'" 1.167"' 1.362'" 1.480"" 1.365'" 1.590"' 1.363"' 1.541"" 
(5.23) (5.21) (8.91) (1171) (9.06) (18.41) (8.98) (16.64) 
NonGAAPE 13.616" 13.719" 8.605" 5.147" 8.907" 3.254" 8.582" 3.450' 
(2.56) (2.58) (2.72) (1.97) (2.77) (2.27) (2.86) (2..36) 
DIFF 0.454 -0.618 7.469' -1.208 1 1.229" 9.540"" 8.585" 3.477' 
(-0.35) (-1.33) (2.23) (-0.61) (2.78) (2.70) (2.77) (2.32) 
Intercepl 13.662"" 13.622'"' 13.974"" 14.641"" 14.170"' 15.609" 13.859"" 14.358""" 
(10.43) (10.30) (10.29) (10.03) (10..30) (10.39) (10.25) (9.84) 
Adj R- 0.8803 0.8804 0.8730 0.8694 0.8741 0.8700 0.8728 0.8672 
BIC 71062 71056 71532 71752 71463 71718 71533 71886 
BIC Rank 2 1 4 7 3 6 5 8 
Panel B: GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.174"'" 1.189"" 1.205"' 1.215"' 1.198""" 1.207'"' 1.245'" 1.247""' 
(12.88) (13.77) (13.47) (13.32) (17.10) (17.50) (17.55) (15.79) 
NonGAAFH 5.387'" 5.182" 4.000""' 3.677"' 3.512"" 3.354"" 3.434"" 3.13.5'" 
(3.31) (3.11) (3.60) (3.36) (3.45) (3.97) (4.43) (4.60) 
DIFF 0.689 1.355 2.402 2.743 1.423 1.998 4.024"' 3.698"' 
(0.62) (1.53) (1.31) (1.67) (1.10) (1.53) (5.37) (5.60) 
Intercepl 18.191"' 18.324"' 18.939"' 19.302"' 18.700*" 19.110"' I8.304'" 19.001'" 
(6.62) (6.67) (7.36) (7.93) (7.81) (8.49) (8.03) (8.59) 
Adj R' 0.7514 0.7526 0.7467 0.7481 0.7483 0.7482 0.7558 0.7568 
BIC 20331 20328 20379 20367 20365 20366 20299 20290 
BIC Rank 4 3 8 7 5 6 2 1 
Panel C: Post-GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
B V 0 . 5 7 6 " " 0 . 5 7 7 " 0.698""" 0 . 6 9 3 " " 0 .679"" 0 . 7 2 3 ' " ' 0 . 7 6 9 " " 0 .808"" ' 
( 3 . 3 3 ) ( 3 . 2 2 ) ( 4 . 3 8 ) ( 4 . 8 0 ) ( 3 . 0 9 ) ( 3 . 8 0 ) ( 3 . 6 2 ) ( 5 . 5 9 ) 
N o n G A A P E 3 1 . 7 1 2 " ' 3 1 . 9 9 7 " " 2 6 . 3 8 3 " ' 2 6 . 3 4 5 " " 23.584"" 20.299""" 2 2 . 8 9 2 " 20 .076 ' " " 
(4..34) ( 4 . 4 6 ) ( 3 . 9 6 ) ( 4 . 2 5 ) ( 3 . 0 0 ) ( 3 , 4 0 ) ( 2 . 9 0 ) (3,4,^) 
D I F F 0 . 3 4 0 3 . 8 6 0 5 . 7 9 6 - 0 . 8 4 8 19.045" 20 ,302"" ' 23 ,367"" 15.61.3' 
( 0 .09 ) ( 1 . 6 7 ) (0 .79 ) ( - 0 . 4 3 ) ( 2 . 3 9 ) ( 3 . 3 9 ) ( 2 . 8 5 ) ( 2 . 1 6 ) 
In t e rcep t 12 .8 .50 ' " 1 2 . 9 7 7 " " 16.734 '"" I 7 . I 0 5 ' " ' 16.610""" 18.9,34""" I 6 . 7 3 0 " " 1 9 . 2 6 1 " " 
( 4 . 7 6 ) (4 .98 ) (7 .14 ) ( 7 . 8 1 ) ( 6 . 4 6 ) ( 9 . 1 1 ) ( 6 . 4 2 ) (8 .47 ) 
A d j 0 . 5 4 2 5 0 . 5 4 5 8 0 . 4 9 8 0 0 . 4 9 5 7 0 . 4 7 7 4 0 . 4 3 9 2 0 . 4 7 3 9 0 , 4 3 6 7 
B I C 5 4 4 2 7 5 4 3 8 7 5 4 9 4 0 5 4 9 6 5 5 5 1 6 3 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 1 9 9 5 5 5 7 7 
B I C R a n k 2 1 3 4 5 7 6 8 
• p < 0.05, • > < 0 . 0 1 , " ' p < 0.001 
I statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. N o n G A A P E represents the fol lowing variables for 
IBES, C O R E , CE and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, af ter adding back depreciation and amortisation e.xpenses. 
CE = Operating cash fiows per share. DIEE represents DIEEI in Model I and DIFE2 in Model 2. DIEEI = G A A P I 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, w here G A A P I is earnings per share f rom operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIEF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under G A A P . 
D u r i n g the G F C , all e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s are s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t . A l s o , the level of 
stat ist ical s i gn i f i cance is s t ronge r in the G F C per iod re la t ive to the p r e - G F C per iod f o r 
the respec t ive e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s , G A A P e a r n i n g s d o not have inc remen ta l va lue 
r e l evance excep t in re la t ion to C F , w h e r e both D I F F l and D I F F 2 are s t rong ly 
s ign i f i can t . 
In the p o s t - G F C pe r iod , h o w e v e r , the pat tern rever t s and is s imi la r to the p r e - G F C 
per iod , a lbei t with n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s hav ing a s t ronge r level of s i g n i f i c a n c e in the 
p o s t - G F C pe r iod . T h i s resul t ind ica tes an increase in i nves to r s ' f o c u s on n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s a f t e r the G F C . D I F F l and D I F F 2 are s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t re la t ive to C E and 
C F , 
In t e r m s of mode l p e r f o r m a n c e , the B I C r ank ing s h o w s that the I B E S m o d e l s 
de te r io ra te in p e r f o r m a n c e b e t w e e n the p r e - G F C and the G F C pe r iods but i m p r o v e 
b e t w e e n the G F C and the p o s t - G F C pe r iods . T h e I B E S m o d e l s gene ra l ly o u t p e r f o r m the 
C O R E m o d e l s ac ros s all pe r iods . W h i l e C F is r anked re la t ive ly low in the p re - and pos t -
G F C p e r i o d s , it o u t p e r f o r m s all o the r m o d e l s in the G F C per iod , C O R E i m p r o v e s in 
r ank ing in the p o s t - G F C pe r iod . 
T a b l e 3 , 1 0 s h o w the d i f f e r e n c e in B I C b e t w e e n m o d e l s . T h e resul t s gene ra l ly ind ica te 
that mode l p e r f o r m a n c e b e t w e e n the va r ious e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s is ve ry s t rong . 
Table 3.10: Ohison Model: S&P 500 Sample - Difference in BIC between Models 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
IBES C O R E CE C F 






P re -GFC 
















Model 2 6.% 662 186 -.34 255 0 
C F 
Model 1 471 477 1 -219 70 -18.5 0 






G F C 
















Model 2 3.5 38 -13 -1 1 0 
C F Model 1 -32 -29 -80 -68 -66 -67 0 























Model 2 1126 1166 613 588 390 0 
C F 
Model 1 772 812 259 2.34 36 -3.54 0 
Model 2 1 l.iO 1190 6.37 612 414 24 378 0 
T h e d i f fe rence in BIC equals row model BIC less column model BIC. A negative f igure indicates the row model is a 
better fit than the column model . The dif ferent grades of evidence corresponding lo min imum BIC dif ference 
according lo Raftery (1995) are: 
Min imum BIC Dif fe rence of 0 
M i n i m u m BIC Dif fe rence of 2 




M i n i m u m BIC Dif ference of 10: Very Strong 
3.3.4 Non-S&P 500 Sample 
F o r f i r m s no t i n c l u d e d in the S & P 5 0 0 i n d e x . T a b l e 3 .11 Pane l A s h o w s G A A P 
e a r n i n g s ( D I F F 2 ) to be m a r g i n a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t o n l y r e l a t i ve to C O R E . N o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s a r e no t s t a t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t . Pane l B s h o w s s i m i l a r r e su l t s d u r i n g the G F C . 
e x c e p t t h a t D I F F 2 is s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i ve t o C O R E . In t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , the 
r e s u l t s in P a n e l C s h o w o n l y I B E S is s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t . G A A P e a r n i n g s d o not a p p e a r 
t o h a v e i n c r e m e n t a l v a l u e r e l e v a n c e . 
Table 3.11: Ohlson Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
at Earnings Announcement Date 
(Prc-GFC: Firm cluster = 1,771 and Time cluster = 25; GFC: Firm cluster = 1,665 
and Time cluster = 9; Post -GFC: Firm cluster = 1,530 and Time cluster = 16) 
Model I: P = a„ + /3,BV;, + p,NonCAAPE^^ + + £„ 
Model 2: P = a„ + /3,BV + p,NonGAAPE^^ + ft.DIFFZ^, + £„ 
Panel A: Pre -GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 Model 2 
C E 
Model 1 Model 2 
C F 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1 .638 ' " 1 .648" ' 1 .633" ' 1.643""" 1 .713 ' " 1.708""' 1.726""' 1 .720" ' 
(5.73) (5..58) (5.70) (5.80) (5.75) (5.46) (5.79) (5.61) 
NonGAAPK -2.507 -1.758 -4.81 1 -5 .250 -5.113 -4.091 -5 .184 -4.225 
(-0.53) (-0.38) (-1.02) (-1.21) (-1.05) (-0.92) (-1.07) (-0.95) 
DIFF -8.964 -6.826 10.355 9.651" -7.570 -6.017 -5.108 -4 .104 
(-1.66) (-1.43) (1.73) (2.09) (-1.23) (-0.95) (-1.05) (-0.94) 
Intercept 8 . 0 0 1 " 7 . 5 3 2 " 7.504"" 7 . 8 4 6 " 7 . 4 2 9 " 7 . 1 5 4 " 7 . 7 2 0 " 7 4 3 8 " 
(2.99) (2.79) (2.71) (2.92) (2.75) (2.63) (2.73) (2.63) 
Ad j 0.5988 0 .5887 0.5970 0.6011 0.5860 0.5800 0 .5844 0.5795 
BIC 310119 310897 310260 309933 311109 311558 311225 311598 
BIC Rank 2 4 3 1 5 7 6 8 
Panel B: G F C Period 
IBES C O R E CE C F 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1 .134" ' 1.149"" 1.218"" 1.232""" 1.188""" 1.194'"" 1 .207" ' 1.21 1 " ' 
(6.82) (6.78) (7.22) (7.37) (7.15) (7.08) (7.27) (7.30) 
N o n G A A P E 2.030 2.130 -0.350 -0.448 -0.265 0.127 -0.693 -0.387 
(1.04) (1.07) (-0.24) (-0.33) (-0.18) (0.09) (-0.49) (-0.29) 
DIFF -2.315 -1.423 2.145 3.394""" -2.686 -1.355 -0.133 0.192 
(-1.28) (-0.80) (1.51) (3.96) (-1.36) (-0.40) (-0.09) (0.15) 
Intercept 9 . 1 1 6 " ' 8 .860"" 8.715""" 8.806'"" 8 . 7 6 8 ' " 8 . 6 6 7 " ' 8 . 9 9 0 ' " 8 . 9 1 7 " ' 
(4.69) (4.56) (4.13) (4.24) ( 4 4 1 ) (4.71) ( 4 4 1 ) ( 4 4 1 ) 
A d j R= 0.5616 0.5563 0 .5469 0.5525 0.5485 0.5450 0.5472 0.5472 
BIC 73661 73758 73929 73829 73901 73964 73916 73915 
BIC Rank 1 2 7 3 4 8 6 5 
Panel C: Post-GFC Period 
IBES 
M o d e l I M o d e l 2 
CORE CE CF 
M o d e l I M o d e l 2 M o d e l I M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
B V 0 . 9 7 0 " " 0.965""" 1 . 0 4 9 " ' 1.076""" 1 . 0 4 1 " " 1.078""" 1 . 0 4 5 " ' 1.083""" 
(6..S3) ( 6 . 4 0 ) ( 5 . 5 6 ) ( 5 . 7 7 ) (5 .44 ) ( 5 . 5 6 ) ( 5 . 5 2 ) (5 .67 ) 
N o n G A A P B 1 1 . 7 5 1 " " 1 1 . 9 7 0 " " 5 . 4 2 8 4 . 5 0 9 5 . 3 4 6 3 . 6 1 6 5 . 4 3 5 3 . 6 9 3 
(4 .88 ) ( 5 . 0 8 ) ( 1 . 6 1 ) ( 1 . 6 1 ) (1 .62 ) (1 .75 ) ( 1 . 6 8 ) (1 .83 ) 
DIFK - 1 . 4 5 6 -1 Ml .1.595 0 . 3 3 9 4 . 7 1 3 3 .621 5 . 3 8 4 2 . 9 2 8 
(-0. .56) ( - 0 . 8 0 ) ( 1 . 3 0 ) ( 0 . 1 8 ) ( 1 . 3 4 ) (1 7 6 ) ( 1 . 6 4 ) ( 1 . 0 6 ) 
In t e rcep t 8.814""" 8 .76.1"" 9.875""" 9 . 8 7 0 " " 9.802""" 9 . 8 8 2 " ' 9 . 8 8 4 " ' 9 . 9 9 4 " " 
( 4 . 0 7 ) ( 4 . 0 4 ) ( 4 . 3 5 ) (4 .32 ) ( 4 . 2 9 ) (4 .32 ) ( 4 . 3 2 ) (4..34) 
A d j 0.6.^80 0.6.384 0 . 5 9 8 0 0.,S960 0 . 5 9 7 7 0..5932 0 . 5 9 7 3 0 . 5 9 3 0 
B I C L57.582 15756.1 1 5 9 4 4 9 1 5 9 5 3 9 159465 1 5 9 6 6 0 1 5 9 4 7 0 1 5 9 6 7 0 
B I C R a n k 2 1 3 6 4 7 5 8 
• p < ( ) . 0 5 , " p < 0 . 0 1 , " > < 0 . 0 0 1 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book \ a lue of common equity per share. NonCiAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES. C O R E , C E and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFF represents fJ lFFl in Model 1 and D1FF2 in Model 2. DIFFl = G A A P l 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P l is earnings per share from operations adjusted to e.xclude the 
effects of special items reported under G A A P . DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under G A A P . 
T h e s e resul ts s h o w that inves tors are p r e d o m i n a n t l y f o c u s e d on book value of equ i ty in 
the p r e - G F C and G F C pe r iod . A f t e r the G F C . h o w e v e r , it appea r s that inves to r s f i nd 
I B E S re la t ive ly m o r e va lue re levant than in the t w o p rev ious pe r iods . 
U s i n g B I C to a s sess m o d e l p e r f o r m a n c e , the resul ts show that the I B E S mode l i m p r o v e s 
in r ank ing f r o m b e t w e e n the p r e - G F C and G F C and con t inue to o u t p e r f o r m all o the r 
m o d e l s in p o s t - G F C . In con t r a s t , the r ank ing of C O R E genera l ly de te r io ra tes f r o m pre-
G F C to p o s t - G F C . All m o d e l s are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t wi th an ad ju s t ed R^ r ang ing 
b e t w e e n 0 . 5 7 9 5 to 0 .6011 in the p r e - G F C per iod (Panel A ) , 0 . 5 4 5 0 to 0 . 5 6 1 6 in the 
G F C per iod (Panel B) and 0 . 5 9 3 0 to 0 . 6 3 8 4 in the p o s t - G F C per iod (Panel C ) . 
T a b l e 3 .12 s h o w s the d i f f e r e n c e in B I C be tween m o d e l s , wh ich indicate h o w m u c h 
bet ter a mode l f i t is re la t ive to ano the r m o d e l . T h e resul ts genera l ly indica te that mode l 
p e r f o r m a n c e b e t w e e n the va r ious e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s is very s t rong . 
8.5 
Table 3.12: Ohlson Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample - Difference in BIC between 
Models 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
I B E S C O R E c i C F 























Model 2 1439 661 1298 1625 449 0 
CF 
Model 1 1106 328 965 1292 116 -333 0 

















Model 1 240 143 -28 72 0 
Model 2 303 206 35 135 63 0 
CF 
Model 1 255 158 -13 87 15 -48 0 























Model 2 2078 2097 211 121 195 0 
CF 
Model 1 1888 1907 21 -69 5 -190 0 
Model 2 2088 2107 221 131 205 10 200 0 
The diffcrcnce in B IC equals row model B IC less column model B IC . A negative figure indicates the row model is a 
better fit than the column model. The different grades of evidence corresponding to min imum B IC difference 
according to Raftery (1995) are; 
M in imum B IC Difference of 0: Weak 
M in imum B IC Difference of 2; Positive 
M in imum B IC Difference of 6: Strong 
M in imum B IC Difference of 10: Very Strong 
The choice o f test sample and test period impact on the results o f mode l per formance . 
Genera l ly , I B E S is more strongly s ignif icant in the post-GFC periods in compar i son to 
the pre-GFC and G F C periods for all samples . In the f inancia l sector samp le , the I B E S 
model improves its performance in the post-GFC period relative to the pre-GFC period. 
I B E S is not consistently more value relevant than other n o n - G A A P earnings across all 
periods. In the post-GFC per iod, however , the I B E S mode ls outperform all other 
mode ls . Genera l ly , the incremental va lue relevance o f G A A P earnings is statistically 
s igni f icant in the C E and C F mode ls o f the f inancia l sector samples . The results in the 
other samples are m ixed . 
3.4 DISCUSSION 
My results show mixed evidence indicating a shift in investors' emphasis between the 
alternative measures of earnings pre-GFC and post-GFC.'® Generally, the two different 
measures of G A A P earnings have a different impact on the results. O f the two G A A P 
earnings measures included in the models, G A A P I more closely resembles the IBES 
and C O R E earnings measures and should bias against f inding significance. 
My results do not show that investors f ind a particular non-GAAP earnings measure to 
be consistently more value relevant over G A A P or other non-GAAP earnings. Rather, 
investors' emphasis on non-GAAP earnings varies according to the time period and 
sample. 
In the financial sample, all non-GAAP earnings are marginally significant in the pre-
G F C period and G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant in relation to IBES , 
C O R E and CF . However, the best model based on B IC is C E , in which G A A P earnings 
do not have incremental value relevance. During the G F C , C E and C F models fill the 
top half of model ranking, suggesting that investors may be placing greater emphasis on 
cash-based figures. Notably, however, only C E is marginally significant. This change in 
emphasis is consistent with the argument that during the G F C . investors are concerned 
about the liquidity of financial f irms. 
Post-GFC, there is another change in emphasis as investors appear to move their focus 
away from cash-based figures. In this period, IBES and C O R E models are ranked in the 
top half of all models. Noting that IBES and C O R E are argued to better represent 
recurring earnings, it appears that investors are placing greater emphasis on the ability 
of financial firms to maintain recurring earnings. Addit ional ly , G A A P earnings appear 
to have incremental value relevance only in relation to C E and CF , although D IFF I is 
marginal ly significant in relation to C O R E . 
General ly, where D IFF I and D IFF2 are significant, the coefficients are positive, except 
for D IFF I in relation to C E (at p = 0.05) in the G F C period. The results indicate that 
'" The l ime cluster in the G F C period is small, which may lead to an over-rejection of the null when 
clustering on two dimensions (Oow el at., 2010; Thompson, 2010). In such a case, Thompson (2010. p. 5) 
suggests that it is appropriate to duster on the "less numerous dimension". Therefore, 1 re-estimated my 
models for the G F C period clustering only on time. As an additional test, I also re-estimated these models 
clustering on firms. The untabulated results for both one-way cluster, by time and by f irm, are 
substantially similar for all inodels and across all samples to the results reported in this chapter. 
investors positively value G A A P earnings in financial f i rms that are higher relative to 
n o n - G A A P earnings (i.e., DIFFI or DIFF2 is positive). 
The non-financial sample shows contrasting results. N o n - G A A P earnings are not 
significant in the pre-GFC and G F C periods except for IBES, which is marginally 
significant in the G F C period. IBES Model 1, C O R E Model 2 and C O R E Model 1 are 
ranked 1, 2, and 3, respectively, in the pre-GFC period. In the G F C , both IBES models 
are ranked highest and the C F Model 2 ranked third. G A A P earnings have incremental 
value relevance in relation to IBES and C O R E in both these periods. C O R E , which is 
ranked in the upper half of the models in the pre-GFC period, dropped in ranking to the 
lower half in the G F C period. Post -GFC, IBES continues to rank highly while C F 
dropped in ranking to the lower half of models . The results suggest a shift in investors ' 
focus to recurring earnings in the G F C and post -GFC periods. For non-financial f i rms, 
the focus on cash f lows in the G F C is not as evident as with financial f i rms. An 
explanation is that the significance of cash f lows to financial f i rms , in the G F C , is 
greater than its significance for non-financial f i rms. Nevertheless, pos t -GFC, it appears 
that investors generally place greater emphasis on recurring earnings rather than cash 
f lows. 
Interestingly, my results for the pre-GFC period do not support prior studies, such as 
Brown and Sivakumar (2003) - I find that G A A P earnings have incremental value 
relevance. Notably, D I F F I , in relation to IBES, is moderately significant and negative 
in the pre-GFC and G F C period. This indicates that investors find G A A P earnings, 
which are generally closer to, or less than, IBES incrementally value relevant. In 
comparison, G A A P earnings are not value relevant in relation to IBES in the pos t -GFC 
period, which is consistent with prior studies (Brown and Sivakumar , 2003). Also, the 
IBES models rank highest in this period. It appears that fo l lowing the G F C , investors 
are returning their focus to IBES. 
In the S & P 500 sample, the results shows a shift in investor emphasis f rom IBES in the 
pre-GFC period to C F in the G F C period and back to IBES in the pos t -GFC period. 
While all n o n - G A A P earnings are statistically significant in the pre-GFC period, G A A P 
earnings are incrementally value relevant only in relation to C O R E , CE and CF . This 
f inding is consistent with prior studies (Brown and Sivakumar , 2003; Albring et al., 
2010) that show IBES to be more value relevant than G A A P earnings. 
My sample of S & P 500 f i rms in the pre-GFC period covers a similar period and sample 
f i rms as Albring el al. (2010). My results, however, do not support their f indings that 
C O R E is more value relevant than IBES. An explanation for this is that 1 use quarterly 
data while Albring etal. (2010) use annual data. Another explanation is I use a different 
statistical approach that corrects for both cross-sectional and time-series dependence. 
Albring et al. (2010) estimate their model using Huber-White robust standard errors. 
Gow et al. (2010) show through their simulation results that this approach does not 
adequately correct for both cross-sectional and time-series dependence. 
In the G F C period for the S & P 500 sample, all non-GAAP earnings have generally 
increased in their level of significance. Notably, G A A P earnings is only incrementally 
value relevant in relation to CF. Further. C F models are ranked highest. These results 
suggests that investors are placing greater emphasis on cash f lows , however, unlike the 
sample of financial f i rms, C F models do not perform as well and are ranked in the 
bottom half of the models. IBES models are ranked immediately after CF, suggesting 
that investors are placing a relatively stronger emphasis on recurring earnings in 
comparison to C O R E and CE. In the post-GFC period. IBES remains highest ranked, 
however , this is fol lowed in rank by CORE. It appears that in this period, investors 
place greater emphasis on recurring earnings. G A A P earnings are not incrementally 
value relevant in relation to both IBES and C O R E but are incrementally value relevant 
in relation to C E and CF. 
In the non-S&P 500 sample, only IBES in the post-GFC period and DIFF2, in relation 
to C O R E in the pre-GFC and GFC periods, are statistically significant. There is limited 
evidence that G A A P earnings are value relevant in relation to small f i rms. My results 
are not directly comparable to prior studies as they do not separately test their models 
on small f i rms. In terms of model performance, IBES and C O R E models generally rank 
highly across all periods. 
Nevertheless, the results indicate that f irm size has an impact on the results in the G F C 
and pos t -GFC periods. Specifically, in the financial sector and non-financial sector 
samples , only IBES is value relevant in both samples during the GFC, but all non-
G A A P earnings are value relevant in the post-GFC period. In contrast, non -GAAP 
earnings are not value relevant both during and after the G F C in the non-S&P 500 
sample except IBES, which is value relevant in the post-GFC period. The results f rom 
the S & P 500 samples, however , show n o n - G A A P earnings are value relevant both 
during and after the G F C . 
General ly, my results show G A A P earnings to be value relevant. While the results of 
prior studies consistently show I/B/E/S earnings to be superior to G A A P earnings, my 
results only partially support these f indings. I find that the G A A P earnings measure 
used, the period and the sample can impact on the f indings. 
Interestingly, the results consistently show an increase in the value relevance of non-
G A A P earnings in the post-GFC period in comparison to the pre-GFC period. It appears 
that investors find BV to be highly value relevant and place relatively lower emphasis 
on non -GAAP earnings in the pre-GFC period. While investors continue to find BV 
highly value relevant after the G F C , the level of significance of n o n - G A A P earnings is 
also generally higher in the post-GFC period. The only exception to this is in the non 
S & P 500 sample, where only IBES is strongly significant but all other n o n - G A A P 
earnings are not significant. 
Table 3.13 presents a summary of model rankings based on BIC for all sample and 
models . In contrast to prior studies, I find that IBES is not consistently ranked as the 
best performing model across all the periods of my study. There is a shift in emphasis 
f rom IBES to C F in the G F C period in the financial and S & P 500 samples . The 
difference between my findings and prior studies can be attributed to prior studies in 
this area using samples f rom pre-2002, (e.g.. Brown and Sivakumar , 2003; Bhattacharya 
et al., 2003; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). Even so, my results are not consistent with 
Albring et al. (2010), who find S & P core earnings to be more value relevant than 
I/B/E/S earnings in their sample of large f i rms f rom 2002 to 2007. In my results for 
large f i rms, I find C O R E to be generally ranked lower than IBES. In my pre-GFC 
results, covering nearly the same period as Albring et al. (2010), I also f ind G A A P 
earnings to have incremental value relevance relative to IBES but not C O R E . While my 
sample includes S & P 500 f i rms, similar to Albring et al. (2010), 1 use quarterly data and 
my statistical model is different . This may explain the different results. Furthermore, in 
an additional test, I replicated Albring et al. (2010) using my S & P 500 sample for the 
pre-GFC period and the Huber-White correction to standard errors. I find IBES and 
C O R E are statistically significant at 0.001 and 0.05, respectively, and G A A P is not 
statistically significant. However , I do not f ind C O R E to be superior to IBES. My IBES 
result is consistent with Albring et al. (2010). Therefore , my different statistical 
approach partially explains the difference in our results. 
Table 3.13: Summary of BIC Ranking by Model and Sample 
IBES C O R E C E CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Financial 
- Pre -GFC 6 8 5 2 1 7 4 
- G F C 8 6 6 .I 2 4 3 1 
- Pos t -GFC 1 2 4 .1 8 6 7 
Non-Financia l 
- Pre -GFC 1 5 3 2 6 7 4 8 
- G F C 1 2 7 .S 8 4 6 3 
- Pos t -GFC 2 1 3 6 4 7 5 8 
S & P 500 
- Pre -GFC 2 1 4 7 3 6 5 8 
- G F C 4 8 7 6 2 1 
- Post -GFC 2 1 3 4 7 6 8 
N o n - S & P 5 0 0 
- Pre -GFC 2 4 3 1 5 7 6 8 
- G F C 1 2 7 3 4 8 6 
- Pos t -GFC 2 1 3 6 4 7 5 8 
The results in this chapter are generally consistent with investors shifting their focus in 
the different periods of my study. There is strong evidence particularly indicating a shift 
in focus to n o n - G A A P earnings after the GFC. While there is some evidence that lower 
(more conservative) values of G A A P earnings have incremental value relevance, it is 
not conclusive. Nevertheless, the results show that when DIFFl and D1FF2 are 
significant , the level of significance for non-GAAP earnings is generally equal to or less 
than the DIFF variables. I believe the G F C caused investors to be more aware and wary 
of non-mandated disclosures. An explanation for my findings may be that when 
investors find n o n - G A A P earnings informativeness to be low or uncertain, they place 
greater relative emphasis on G A A P earnings. 
3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter investigates the incremental value relevance of alternative measures of 
earnings to the US capital market. My study is driven by what 1 perceive to be gaps in 
the literature. Much of the literature in this area focuses on G A A P vs Street earnings, 
however , there has been little research comparing the value relevance of these measures 
with other alternative earnings measures collectively. Consequent ly , 1 focus on analyst-
computed earnings ( IBES), mandatory reported earnings ( G A A P and operating cash 
f low) , earnings computed by Standard & Poor ' s (CORE) and a measure commonly 
found in the financial press based on adjust ing G A A P earnings (cash earnings). 
The G F C offers an opportunity to examine its impact and the associated uncertainty and 
volatility it may have had on the emphasis investors place on alternative measures of 
earnings in valuation decisions. In relation to my research quest ion. RQ!. there is 
evidence that the G F C has an impact on the value relevance of both G A A P and non-
G A A P earnings. 
Of interest are the results that show BV is generally more value relevant than earnings 
information. I find investors are focused predominantly on the book value of equity and 
this information is relatively more value relevant than earnings information across the 
samples in the pre-GFC period. Between the G F C and post -GFC periods, I f ind results 
consistent with investors shifting their emphasis between G A A P and n o n - G A A P 
earnings and also increasing their focus on non -GAAP earnings. 
It is argued in the literature that I/B/E/S earnings are more value relevant than G A A P 
earnings because they better reflect non-transitory earnings, which is of greater interest 
to investors. My results only partly support this argument . When IBES models are 
highest ranked, G A A P earnings generally do not have incremental information content 
across all samples and periods, except in the non-financial sector sample in the pre-GFC 
and G F C periods. However . I find that the IBES model does not always rank higher 
than the other models I test, particularly in the G F C period. I f ind G A A P earnings have 
significant incremental value relevance relative to IBES that varies with the sample and 
test period. 
One explanation for my results may be the time period covered in my sample and my 
sample size. Many prior studies use samples f rom fiscal years before 2005 or use a 
relatively small sample (Lougee and Marquardt . 2004; Batta and Muslu . 2010). Another 
explanation may be that the emphasis investors place on alternative earnings measures 
has changed over t ime. Note that my sample period covers the reporting regime after the 
introduction of SOX and through the global financial crisis. In periods of uncertainty 
and financial turmoil , investors may trade off relevance for reliability (Lobo and Zhou . 
2006). G A A P earnings may be perceived to be more credible and reliable relative to 
I/B/E/S earnings. 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , o the r f a c t o r s such as the i n f o r m a t i o n con ten t of e a r n i n g s , i n f o r m a t i o n 
a s y m m e t r y , e a r n i n g s qual i ty and c o n s e r v a t i s m m a y impac t on the va lue r e l evance of 
these a l t e rna t ive e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s . I e x a m i n e these f a c t o r s in subsequen t chap te r s . 
M y s tudy con t r i bu t e s to the l i terature on the va lue r e l evance of a l te rna t ive e a r n i n g s 
me t r i c s . I a d d r e s s m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y the re la t ive p e r f o r m a n c e of six ea rn ing 
m e a s u r e s . M y resul t s shou ld be of interest to s tandard set ters and regu la to rs on the 
u s e f u l n e s s of G A A P e a r n i n g s rela t ive to o the r m e a s u r e s of ea rn ings . T h i s m a y have 
i m p l i c a t i o n s on c o n c e r n s r ega rd ing the r e l evance of G A A P in the capital m a r k e t s . M y 
resul t s sugges t that G A A P ea rn ings con t inue to play a role in capi tal marke t s . 

CHAPTER 4 
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS MODEL 
RESULTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
I examine the impact of the GFC on the informativeness of G A A P and non-GAAP 
earnings to address RQIa. Consistent with Chapter 3 ,1 use the same period windows to 
test for systematic differences in the information content of G A A P and non-GAAP 
earnings before, during and after the peak of the GFC. I use a Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR) model that regresses cumulative abnormal returns on the earnings 
surprise of non-GAAP earnings and the earnings surprise of G A A P earnings. 
This chapter shows the analyses and results of my tests. I find mixed results, which only 
partly supports prior studies that show I/B/E/S and S&P Core earnings are consistently 
more informative than G A A P earnings (Albring et at., 2010: Bhattacharya ei al.. 2003; 
Brown and Sivakumar, 2003). I also find that S&P Core earnings generally rank below 
I/B/E/S earnings. My results show the GAAP informativeness is sensitive to sample and 
time periods. My results do not show that investors find GAAP earnings more 
informative during the GFC as expected. Rather, there is evidence that investors shift 
their focus away from G A A P during the GFC but return to GAAP after the GFC in the 
non-S&P 500 and non-financial sector samples. Furthermore, the significance of GAAP 
earnings informativeness is generally higher in the post-GFC period in comparison to 
the pre-GFC period. 
4.2 UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
To reiterate, the test variables for my CAR model. Equations 2.9 and 2.10 in Chapter 2, 
ESNonGAAP: Non-GAAP earnings surprise for f irm, defined as the difference 
between the actual non-GAAP earnings measure of interest and 
the median consensus security analysts' forecast of earnings 
scaled by the closing share price at t-7. 
ESGAAPI : G A A P earnings surprise for f irm, defined as the difference 
between the actual GAAPI earnings and the median consensus 
9,5 
secur i ty a n a l y s t s ' f o r e c a s t of e a r n i n g s sca led by the c lo s ing sha re 
pr ice at t-7. 
E S G A A P 2 : G A A P e a r n i n g s su rpr i se f o r f i r m , d e f i n e d as the d i f f e r e n c e 
b e t w e e n the ac tua l G A A P 2 e a r n i n g s and the m e d i a n c o n s e n s u s 
secur i ty a n a l y s t s ' f o r e c a s t of e a r n i n g s sca led by the c l o s i n g sha re 
pr ice at t-7. 
C A R : the c u m u l a t i v e m a r k e t - a d j u s t e d a b n o r m a l r e tu rns f o r f i r m o v e r a 
t h r ee -day w i n d o w cen t r ed a r o u n d the e a r n i n g s a n n o u n c e m e n t 
da t e . 
T a b l e 4.1 p rov ides desc r ip t ive s ta t is t ics of the va r i ab l e s fo r all f i r m s in the s a m p l e . 
U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , m e a n C A R d u r i n g the G F C is l o w e r than in the p r e - G F C per iod a c r o s s 
all s a m p l e s and the larges t d e c r e a s e in m e a n C A R b e t w e e n these t w o p e r i o d s is in the 
f inanc ia l sec tor s a m p l e . N o t a b l y , m e a n C A R d u r i n g the G F C is nega t ive f o r f i nanc ia l 
f i r m s (Panel A ) but pos i t ive fo r the o the r s a m p l e s (Pane l s B , C and D) . T h i s is 
cons i s ten t wi th the nega t ive impac t of the G F C on the f inanc ia l s ec to r . 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Panel A: Financial Sector Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 4 ^ 5 3 ; Firms = 242 I G F C : N = 1^34; Firms = 239 I Post-GFC: N = 2,893; Firms = 222) 
E S I B E S E S C O R E E S C E E S C F 
Pre-GFC G F C Post -GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post -GFC Pre-GFC G F C P o s t - G F C 
Mean 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.018 -0.004 0.003 -0.019 0.001 -0.021 0.005 -0 .018 
sd 0.030 0.043 0.057 0.022 0.098 0.080 0.029 0.105 0.089 0.137 0 .146 0 .157 
Min imum -0.987 -0.536 -0.771 -0.702 -1.098 -1.225 -0.676 -1.088 -1.144 -1.596 -0.623 -1 .008 
25 pet 0 .000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.004 0,000 -0.011 -0.001 -0.059 -0.025 -0 .053 
Median 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.007 
73 pel 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.027 0.029 0 .026 
Maximum 0.070 0.245 0.961 0.069 0.420 0.831 0.291 0.261 0.998 1.197 1.199 1.434 
E S G A A P l E S G A A P 2 C A R 
Pre-GFC G F C Post -GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post -GFC 
Mean 0.000 -0.023 -0.004 -0.001 -0.023 -0.003 0.004 -0.004 0.000 
sd 0 .023 0.102 0.088 0.031 0.105 0.089 0.044 0.065 0.049 
Minimum -0.686 -1.089 -1.628 -0.987 -1.089 -1.324 -0.184 -0.183 -0.185 
25 pet -0.001 -0.013 -0.004 -0.001 -0.013 -0.004 -0.019 -0.041 -0.026 
Median 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.000 
75 pet 0 .003 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.027 0.034 0.026 
Maximum 0.239 0.422 0.943 0.123 0.425 0.946 0.178 0.182 0.183 
Panel B: Non-Financial Sector Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 35^16; Firms = 1,850 I GFC; N = 9,106; Firms = 1 ji04 I Post-GFC: N = 20,477; Firms = 1,678) 
ESIBES E S C O R E ESCE E S C F 
Pre -GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC 
Mean o.ooo -0.003 0.001 -0.006 -0.01 1 -0.004 0.008 -0.002 0.010 -0.008 -0.004 -0.013 
sd 0.016 0.042 0.022 0.036 0.076 0.(H8 0.053 0.1 16 0.065 0.093 0.1 1 1 0.101 
Minimum -1.278 -1.297 -1.194 -1.543 -1.817 -1.737 -1.456 -2.107 -1.700 -1.280 -1.462 -1.520 
25 pet 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.028 -0.021 -0.035 
Median 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 ().()()6 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.005 
75 pel 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.023 0.023 
Maximum 0..123 0.347 0.544 0.520 0.577 0.856 1.602 2.321 1.801 3.795 4.944 3.613 
E S G A A P l ESGAAP2 CAR 
Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC 
Mean -0.00: -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.018 -0.006 0.004 0.003 0.001 
sd 0.023 0.060 0.035 0.045 0.122 0.062 0.065 0.077 0.067 
Minimum -1.301 -1.694 -1.192 -1..501 -2.171 -1.750 -0.186 -0.186 -0.186 
25 pet -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.034 -0.049 -0.040 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 
75 pel 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.043 0.055 0.043 
Maximum 0.81 1 0.446 1.009 0.578 0.577 0.866 0.186 0.186 0.186 
Panel C: S&P 500 Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 7^08; Firms = 4161 GFC: N = 2,193; Firms = 4191 Post-GFC: N = 5^32; Firms = 424) 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF 
Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.009 -0.002 0.006 -0.001 0.008 -0.015 -0.009 -0.018 
sd 0.006 0.021 0.019 0.0.11 0.052 0.025 0.042 0.083 0.049 0.089 0.089 0.095 
Minimum -0.180 -0.257 -0.771 -1.446 -1.098 -0.908 -1.225 -1.55 1 -1.427 -1.280 -0.623 -0.675 
25 pet 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.00.1 -0.005 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.040 -0.022 -0.043 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.005 
75 pet 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.019 0.018 
Maximum 0.080 0.181 0.295 0.175 0.220 0.383 0.373 0.264 0.438 1.158 0.704 1.434 
ESGAAPl ESGAAP2 CAR 
Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
Mean 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.013 -0.004 0.005 0.002 0.000 
sd 0.014 0.049 0.031 0.039 0.084 0.049 0.053 0.066 0.054 
Minimum -0.298 -1.089 -1.628 -1 426 -1.605 -1.524 -0.184 -0.185 -0.185 
25 pel 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -().()04 -0.003 -0.026 -0.040 -0.032 
Median 0.()()() 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.002 -0.001 
75 pel 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.035 0.044 0.032 
Maximum 0.571 0.222 0.187 0.362 0.222 0.392 0.185 0.185 0.186 
Panel D: Non-S&P 500 Sample (Prc-GFC: N = 3 1 ^ 6 1 ; Firms = 1,771 I G F C : N = 8,147; Fi rms = 1,665 I Post-GFC: N = 17^38; Fi rms = 1,530) 
ESIBES E S C O R E ESCE E S C F 
Pre -GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre -GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre -GFC G F C Pos t -GFC 
Mean 0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 -0.013 -0.005 0.008 -0.005 0.009 -0.007 o.ooo -0.012 
sd 0.021 0.047 0.031 0.036 0.086 0.060 0.054 0.124 0.074 0.101 0.123 0.115 
Minimum -1.278 -1.297 -1.194 -1.543 -1.817 -1.737 -1.456 -2.107 -1.700 -1.596 -1.462 -1.520 
25 pel 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.028 -0.022 -0.036 
Median 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.005 
75 pet 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.021 0.026 0.026 
Maximum {).?,2?i 0.347 0.961 0.520 0.577 0.856 1.602 0.735 1.313 1.672 1.435 1.642 
E S G A A P l ESGAAP2 CAR 
Pre -GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post-GFC Pre-GFC G F C Post -GFC 
Mean -0.001 -0.009 -0.003 -0.004 -0.021 -0.006 0.004 0.002 0.002 
sd 0.025 0.071 0.049 0.045 0.130 0.071 0.066 0.078 0.069 
Mitiimum -I..W1 -1.694 -1.192 -1.501 -2.171 -1.750 -0.186 -0.186 -0.186 
25 pet -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.034 -0.051 -0.040 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ().()()3 0.003 0.001 
75 pet 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.043 0.055 0.043 
Maximum 0.81 1 0.446 1.009 0.578 0.577 0.946 0.186 0.186 0.186 
T h e variables are def ined as fo l lows: E S I B E S = IBES minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at 1-7. E S C O R E = C O R E minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at 1-7. E S C E = IBES 
minus Forecast and scaled by c los ing share price at t-7. E S C E = IBES minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at t-7. E S G A A P l = G A A P I minus Forecast and sealed by closing share price at t-
7 . E S G A A P 2 = G A A P 2 minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at t-7. C A R = Cumula t ive market -adjus ted abnormal returns over a three-day window centred a round the earnings 
announcemen t date . Forecast = I /B/E/S median consensus forcca.stcd earnings . 
T h e m e a n s of E S G A A P l a n d E S G A A P 2 a r e g e n e r a l l y l o w e r t h a n t h e m e a n s of o t h e r 
n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s s u r p r i s e . In t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d , t h e m a g n i t u d e of m e a n e a r n i n g s 
s u r p r i s e is g e n e r a l l y s m a l l e r r e l a t i v e t o the G F C p e r i o d a c r o s s all s a m p l e s e x c e p t f o r 
E S C E a n d E S C F . A l s o , m e a n E S I B E S , E S C O R E , E S C E , E S G A A P l a n d E S G A A P 2 a re 
n e g a t i v e in t h e G F C p e r i o d f o r ail s a m p l e s , e x c e p t f o r E S C F in t h e f i n a n c i a l a n d n o n -
S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e s . T h e r e su l t s i nd i ca t e tha t a n a l y s t s m a y be o p t i m i s t i c in the i r f o r e c a s t s 
d u r i n g t h e G F C . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , 1 /B/E/S ac tua l e a r n i n g s t end to be l e s s s u r p r i s i n g t h a n o t h e r e a r n i n g s 
m e a s u r e s , a s e v i d e n c e d by the g e n e r a l l y l o w e r a b s o l u t e v a l u e of E S I B E S . T h e d e g r e e of 
d i s p e r s i o n is a l s o g e n e r a l l y l o w e r f o r E S I B E S . B o t h of t h e s e a p p e a r t o be the c a s e 
a c r o s s all s a m p l e s . T h i s is e x p e c t e d a s bo th the ac tua l a n d f o r e c a s t m e a s u r e s of I / B / E / S 
e a r n i n g s a r e m e a s u r e d on a c o n s i s t e n t b a s i s . 
T h e c o r r e l a t i o n s a m o n g t h e v a r i a b l e s a re s h o w n in T a b l e 4 . 2 . Al l the e a r n i n g s s u r p r i s e 
v a r i a b l e s a r e g e n e r a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o r r e l a t e d a c r o s s all s a m p l e s a n d a c r o s s all t i m e 
p e r i o d s . N o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n s a re E S C F a n d E S C O R E , w h i c h a re no t s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
c o r r e l a t e d in the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r s a m p l e in the p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , in the S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e 
b o t h d u r i n g a n d a f t e r the G F C , a n d in the n o n - S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e a f t e r the G F C . C A R is 
g e n e r a l l y h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d wi th the e a r n i n g s s u r p r i s e v a r i a b l e in bo th t h e p re - a n d pos t -
G F C p e r i o d s in t h e f i n a n c i a l , n o n - f i n a n c i a l , a n d n o n - S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e s . D u r i n g the 
G F C , h o w e v e r , C A R is o n l y m a r g i n a l l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the e a r n i n g s s u r p r i s e v a r i a b l e s 
in t h e f i n a n c i a l s a m p l e , bu t h igh ly c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the e a r n i n g s s u r p r i s e v a r i a b l e s in t h e 
n o n - f i n a n c i a l a n d n o n - S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e s . In the S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e , C A R is g e n e r a l l y 
c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the e a r n i n g s s u r p r i s e v a r i a b l e d u r i n g a n d a f t e r the G F C , but less so in 
the p r e - G F C p e r i o d . 
Table 4.2: Pearson Correlations Among Variables 
Panel A: Financial Sector Sample (Pre-GFC; N = 4 ^ 5 3 ; Firms = 242 I GFC: N = 1^34; Firms = 239 
I Post-GFC: N = 2 ^ 9 3 ; Firms = 222) 
Pre-GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPl ESGAAPl 
ESCORE 0.495"' 
ESCE 0.560" ' 0.801"* 
ESCF -0.111"' -0.057"' -0.066"" 
ESGAAPl 0..578"" 0.867"" 0.735 '" -0.057"' 
ESGAAPl 0.627 '" 0 .823 '" 0 .923 '" -0.071"' 0.786'"' 
CAR 0.055" ' 0.086"" 0.080" ' 0.009 0.095" ' 0 .075" ' 
GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPI ESGAAP2 
ESCORE 0.561"" 
ESCE 0.609"" 0.936" ' 
ESCF -0 .137 '" -0.083" -0.083" 
ESGAAPI 0.573" ' 0 .955" ' 0 .934" ' -0.080" 
ESGAAP2 0.597 '" 0.946"" 0 .988" ' -0.083" 0.946"" 
CAR 0.056' 0.039 0.048 0.010 0.057" 0.057' 
Post-GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPI ESGAAPI 
ESCORE 0.578 '" 
ESCE 0.605 '" 0 .792 '" 
ESCF -0.1 I f " -0.026 -0.033 
ESGAAPI 0.586 '" 0 .860 '" 0 .785" ' -0.060" 
ESGAAPI 0.653 '" 0 .891 '" 0 .908" ' -0.072"" 0.867""" 
CAR 0.130" ' 0.152"" 0 .135 '" 0.037' 0.161""" 0 .149 '" 
Panel B: Non-Financial Sector Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 35^16 ; Firms = 1,850 1 G F C : N = 9,106; 
Firms = 1304 1 Post-GFC: N = 20,477; Firms = 1,678) 
Pre-GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPI ESGAAPI 
ESCORE 0.361" ' 
ESCE 0.279" ' 0 .595" ' 
ESCF 0.011" -0.078"" 0.073'"" 
ESGAAPI 0.471" ' 0.630'"" 0 .429" ' -0.006 
ESGAAPI 0.359"" 0.836" ' 0 .775 '" -0.052"" 0 .569" ' 
CAR 0.091"" 0 .049 '" 0.032""" 0.002 0 .062 '" 0 .041" ' 
GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPI ESGAAP2 
ESCORE 0.414 '" 
ESCE 0.394 '" 0 .648" ' 
ESCF -0.100'" -0.136"" -0.077" ' 
ESGAAPI 0.405"" 0.742"" 0 .509" ' -0 .122 '" 
ESGAAPI 0.422" ' 0.730""" 0.939""" -0.133'" 0 .570" ' 
CAR 0.054" ' 0.057"" 0 .045 '" 0.029" 0.040"" 0 .043" ' 
Post-GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPI ESGAAPI 
ESCORE 0.485 '" 
ESCE 0.376" ' 0 .703" ' 
ESCF 0.019" 0.018" 0 .045" ' 
ESGAAPI 0.439"" 0 .803 '" 0.572"" 0 .032" ' 
ESGAAPI 0.405 '" 0.831"" 0.892"" 0.010 0.665"" 
CAR 0.081 '" 0 .059" ' 0.049"" 0 .028" ' 0.071"" 0.050"" 
Panel C: S&P 500 Sample (Pre-GFC: N = 7,908; Fi rms = 416 I GFC: N = 2,193; Fi rms = 419 I Post-
G F C : N = 5,532; F i rms = 424) 
Pre GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPl ESGAAP2 
ESCORE 0328"" 
ESCE 0.245 '" 0 .638" ' 
ESCF -0.014 -0.076"' -0.052"" 
ESGAAPl 0.336 '" 0.387""" 0.312" ' -0.006 
ESGAAP2 0.284 '" 0 .832 '" 0.832"" -0.082'" 0.324"" 
CAR 0.140" ' 0.032" 0.001 0.005 0.066'"" 0.001 
GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPl ESGAAP2 
ESCORE 0.626 '" 
ESCE 0.457 '" 0.720""' 
ESCF -0.136"" -0.041 -0.043' 
ESGAAPl 0.602" ' 0.883""" 0 .686 '" -0.001 
ESGAAPl 0.485" ' 0.822"" 0.902"" -0.071"' 0121'" 
CAR 0.060" 0.061"" 0.035 0.055" 0.048' 0.043" 
Posl-GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPl ESGAAP2 
ESCORE 0.380" ' 
ESCE 0.301 '" 0.692""" 
ESCF -0.044" -0.016 -0.047'" 
ESGAAPl 0.532"" 0.780"" 0.538"" -0.036" 
ESGAAPl 0.335" ' 0.774""" 0.919"" -0.059"' 0 .588" ' 
CAR 0.063 '" 0.055" ' 0.034' 0.049"' 0.037" 0.037"" 
Panel D: Non-S&P 500 SampU ; (Pre-GFC: N = 31,561; Firms = 1,771 1 GFC: N = 8,147; Firms = 
1,665 I P o s t - G F C : N = : 17338; Firms = 1330) 
Pre-GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPl ESGAAPl 
ESCORE 0.372" ' 
ESCE 0.300"" 0.595" ' 
ESCF -0.016" -0.074"' 0 .079" ' 
ESGAAPl 0.490"" 0.682"" 0.460" ' -0.014" 
ESGAAP2 0.391"" 0.837"" 0.770"" -0.047""" 0.619"" 
CAR 0.081 '" 0 .054 '" 0.039" ' 0.002 0.064""" 0.050"" 
GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPl ESGAAP2 
ESCORE 0.428"" 
ESCE 0.424"" 0 .684" ' 
ESCF -0.104" ' -0.136"" -0.083" ' 
ESGAAPl 0.433"" 0 .789 '" 0.561" ' -0.128'" 
ESGAAPl 0.439" ' 0.744"" 0.951" ' -0.132'" 0.605"" 
CAR 0.053" ' 0 .052 '" 0.048"" 0.020 0.041"" 0.045"' 
Post-GFC 
ESIBES ESCORE ESCE ESCF ESGAAPI ESGAAP2 
ESCORE 0 . 5 1 4 " " 
ESCE 0 . 4 3 9 " " 0 . 7 2 4 " " 
ESCF - 0 . 0 1 6 " 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 3 9 " " 
ESGAAPI 0 . 4 9 0 " " ' 0 . 8 1 8 " " 0 . 6 2 6 " " 0 . 0 1 3 
ESGAAP2 0 . 4 6 9 " " 0 . 8 4 9 " " 0 . 8 9 1 " " 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 7 1 3 " " 
CAR 0 . 0 8 7 " " ' 0 . 0 7 3 " ' 0 . 0 6 1 " " 0 . 0 2 3 " 0 . 0 8 7 " " 0 . 0 6 4 " " ' 
T h e var iables are def ined as fo l lows: ESIBES = IBES minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at 1-1. 
E S C O R E = C O R E minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at t -7. E S C E = IBES minus Forecast and scaled 
by closing share price al t -7. E S C F = IBES minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at t -7. E S G A A P I = 
G A A P I minus Forecast and scaled by closing share price at t-7. E S G A A P 2 = G A A P 2 minus Forecast and scaled by 
closing share price at t-7. C A R = Cumula t ive marke t -ad jus ted abnormal return.s o\ 'er a three-day window centred 
around the earnings announcemen t date. Forecast = I/B/E/S median consensus forecasted earn ings . 
4.3 MULTIVARIATE OLS REGRESSIONS 
In T a b l e 4 . 4 t h r o u g h t o T a b l e 4 . 1 4 , t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g E S N o n G A A P m e a s u r e s in 
E q u a t i o n 2 . 9 ( d e n o t e d a s M o d e l 3 in t a b l e s ) a n d E q u a t i o n 2 . 1 0 ( d e n o t e d a s M o d e l 4 in 
t a b l e s ) a re E S I B E S . E S C O R E , E S C E a n d E S C F f o r t h e I B E S , C O R E , C E a n d C F 
m o d e l s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . " R e c a l l tha t I e v a l u a t e m o d e l p e r f o r m a n c e u s i n g B I C , w h e r e t h e 
l o w e s t v a l u e of B I C f o r a m o d e l i n d i c a t e s t h e bes t f i t t i n g m o d e l . A l s o , R a f t e r y ( 1 9 9 5 ) 
p r o v i d e s an a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o c o n v e n t i o n a l t v a l u e s u s i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e s in B I C v a l u e s 
b e t w e e n m o d e l s . In t h i s s e c t i o n , a s in C h a p t e r 3 , I p r e s e n t t h e a b s o l u t e v a l u e of 
d i f f e r e n c e s in B I C b e t w e e n the m o d e l s in s e p a r a t e t a b l e s . T h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s i n d i c a t e t h e 
s t r e n g t h of the e v i d e n c e f o r the r a n k i n g s of m o d e l p e r f o r m a n c e i n c l u d e d in t a b l e s w i t h 
t h e m o d e l e s t i m a t e s . 
T a b l e 4 . 3 p r e s e n t s a s u m m a r y of t h e t w o h i g h e s t r a n k e d m o d e l s f o r all s a m p l e s a n d s u b -
p e r i o d s tha t I t es t in t h i s s e c t i o n . T h i s s u m m a r y s h o w s tha t I B E S m o d e l s g e n e r a l l y 
o u t p e r f o r m o t h e r m o d e l s a c r o s s all s a m p l e s . 
" " S i m i l a r t o C h a p t e r 3 , I t es t f o r m u l l i c o l l i n c a r i t y u s i n g t h e v a r i a n c e i n l l a t i o n f a c t o r ( V I F ) a n d 
C o n d i t i o n Inde.x d u e to t h e s i g n i f i c a n t c o r r e l a t i o n b e l w c e n t h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s in u n r e p o r t e d 
c o r r e l a t i o n s r e s u l t s . A c r o s s all s a m p l e s a n d al l p e r i o d s , t h e h i g h e s t t n e a n V I F is 4 2 . 0 9 8 a n d t h e highe.s l 
C o n d i t i o n Inde.x is 13 .261 in r e l a t i o n to C E M o d e l 4 in t h e financial s a m p l e f o r t h e G F C p e r i o d . W h i l e 
m o s t o f t h e s e m e a n v a l u e s m a y he w i t h i n t o l e r a b l e l i m i t s , t h e r e s u l t s f o r C K s h o u l d b e i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h 
c a u t i o n . A l l o t h e r m e a n V I F a n d C o n d i t i o n I n d e x a r e u n d e r 12 a n d 7 , r e s p e c t i v e l y , s u g g e s t i n g tha t 
m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y is n o t a s i g n i f i c a n t p r o b l e m . 
Table 4.3: Summary of Two Highest Ranked Models for All Samples 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
M o d e l 3: CAR = a „ + P^ESNonGAAP + P^ESGAAPI^ + e 
M o d e l 4 : CAR = a„ + P^ESNoiiGAAP + P,ESGAAP2^ + £, 
I B E S C O R E C E C T 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
F i n a n c i a l 
P r c - G F C 
- G F C 
- P o s t - G F C 
I 
( I ) 
I 
( I ) 
I 
( I ) 
I 
( I ) 
2 
( 4 ) 
N o n - F i n a n c i a l 
P r e - G F r 1 
( 1 4 ) 
3 
( 1 5 3 ) 
G F C 1 1 1 
(1 ) ( 1 ) (1 ) 
- P o s t - G F C 1 
( 2 5 ) 
2 
( 2 4 ) 
S & P 5 0 0 
P r e - G F C 2 
( 1 3 0 ) 
1 
(1 ) 
- G F C 1 
(3 ) 
1 
( 3 ) 
- P o s t ( i F C 2 
( 1 ) 
1 
( 1 ) 
4 2 
N o n - S & P 5 0 0 
- P r e - G F C 1 
( 1 2 ) 
2 
( 8 6 ) 




- P o s t - G F C 1 
( 3 4 ) 
2 
(2 ) 
S & P 5 0 0 a n d N o n - F i n a n c i a l 
P r e - G F C 2 
( 1 2 7 ) 
1 
( 1 1 ) 




- P o s t - G F C 1 
( 1 1 ) 
2 
( 4 2 ) 
Mode l s ranked 1 and 2 by their BIC are shown. The absolute d i f ference in BIC values between the model and the 
next lower ranked model is shown in parentheses. The dif ferent grades of evidence corresponding to min imum BIC 
d i f fe rence according to Raftery (199.'i) are: 
Min imum BIC Dif ference of 0: Weak 
M i n i m u m BIC Dif fe rence of 2: Positive 
M i n i m u m BIC Dif fe rence of 6; Strong 
M i n i m u m BIC Dif fe rence of 10: Very Strong 
The dependent variable, C A R . is the cumulat ive market-adjusted abnormal returns over a three-day window centred 
around the earnings announcemen t date. E S N o n G A A P represents the fo l lowing variables for IBES, C O R E , C E and 
C F models : E S I B E S = IBES minus Forecast . E S C O R E = C O R E minus Forecast . E S C E = IBES minus Forecast . 
E S C F = IBES minus Forecast . E S G A A P represents E S G A A P l (Model 3) or E S G A A P 2 (Model 4) . E S G A A P l = 
G A A P l minus Forecast , where G A A P l is earnings per share f rom operat ions adjusted to exclude the effects of 
special i tems reported under G A A P . E S G A A P 2 = G A A P 2 minus Forecast , where G A A P 2 is income before 
extraordinary i tems per share reported under G A A P . Forecast = 1/B/E/S median consensus forecasted earnings. All 
earn ings minus forecast \ ariables are scaled by share price at t-7. 
W h e n cons ide red in c o n j u n c t i o n wi th T a b l e 3 .3 in C h a p t e r 3 , l /B /E /S e a r n i n g s a p p e a r to 
be re la t ively m o r e impor t an t to inves to r s than o the r n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . 
T a b l e 4 . 4 s h o w s the C A R mode l resul t s f o r f inanc ia l sec to r f i r m s . All m o d e l s are 
s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t in the pre- and p o s t - G F C pe r iods (Pane l s A and C) . In the G F C 
per iod , all m o d e l s are not s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t excep t fo r C E ( M o d e l 4).™ E S I B E S is 
not s ign i f i can t in all pe r iods . E S C O R E (Mode l 4 ) is marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t in both the 
p r e - G F C and G F C pe r iods . E S G A A P is marg ina l ly to m o d e r a t e l y s ign i f i can t in the 
I B E S . C O R E and C F m o d e l s in the p r e - G F C pe r iod . In the G F C and p o s t - G F C pe r iods , 
E S G A A P is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t in relat ion to I B E S . C E and C F . T h e s e resul ts s h o w 
that G A A P e a r n i n g s have inc rementa l i n fo rma t ion con ten t o v e r s o m e n o n - G A A P 
ea rn ings . It a l so s h o w s that whi l e G A A P e a r n i n g s d o not a p p e a r to be as i n f o r m a t i v e 
dur ing the G F C in relat ion to I B E S and C F , they are i n fo rma t ive be fo re and a f t e r the 
G F C , indica t ing a c h a n g e in i n v e s t o r ' s e m p h a s i s ove r the three sub - pe r iods . C F M o d e l 3 
is ranked highes t in both the pre- and p o s t - G F C per iods . 
T h e resul ts d o not indicate that cash f l o w s have in fo rma t ion con ten t in c o m p a r i s o n to 
G A A P ea rn ings . O n the o the r h a n d , both E S G A A P l and E S G A A P 2 are m o d e r a t e l y 
s ign i f i can t ind ica t ing that G A A P e a r n i n g s have inc rementa l i n fo rma t ion con ten t o v e r 
cash f l o w s in both the pre- and p o s t - G F C per iods . 
In t e rms of mode l p e r f o r m a n c e , the B I C rank ing in T a b l e 4 . 4 s h o w s that , f o r each non-
G A A P ea rn ings m o d e l . E S G A A P l p e r f o r m s bet ter than E S G A A P 2 in both the pre- and 
p o s t - G F C per iods . T h i s result sugges t s that inves tors genera l ly f ind G A A P I to be m o r e 
i n fo rma t ive than G A A P 2 . T h i s is cons i s ten t wi th the a r g u m e n t that because G A A P I 
m o r e c lose ly r e s e m b l e s I B E S and C O R E , it shou ld bet ter re f lec t r ecur r ing e a r n i n g s than 
G A A P 2 . 
™ In u n l a b u l a l e d r e s u l t s . I e x c l u d e f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r f i r m s t h a i a r e a l s o in t h e S & F ."iOO i n d e x . I f i n d 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r r e s u l t s . 
Table 4.4: CAR Model: Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
3-Day Window Centred around Earnings Announcement Date 
( P r e - G F C : F i r m c l u s t e r = 2 4 2 a n d T i m e c l u s t e r = 25; G F C : F i r m c l u s t e r = 2 3 9 a n d 
T i m e c l u s t e r = 9: P o s t - G F C : F i r m c l u s t e r = 2 2 2 a n d T i m e c l u s t e r = 16) 
M o d e l 3: CAR^ = a „ + P,ESNonGAAP + P,ESGAAPI^ + e, 
M o d e l 4: CAR = a „ + P^ESNonGAAP + P^ESGAAPl^ + e^  
P a n e l A : P r e - G F C 
I B E S 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
C O R E 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
C E 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
C F 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
E S N o n G A A P 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 2 4 0 . 0 2 7 0 . 1 4 2 ' 0 . 0 3 2 0 . 1 0 6 0 . 0 0 5 0 . 0 0 5 
(0 .05 ) ( 0 . 4 5 ) ( 0 . 5 9 ) (2 .21 ) (0 .82 ) ( 1 . 6 6 ) (0 .77 ) (0 .77 ) 
E S G A A P 0 . 1 7 8 " 0 . 0 9 2 0 . 1 5 6 ' 0 . 0 1 8 0 . 1 4 8 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 1 8 0 " 0 . 1 0 6 " 
(3 .29 ) ( 1 . 9 6 ) (1 .96 ) (0 .39 ) (1 .91 ) (0.1 1) ( 3 .28 ) (2 .83 ) 
In t e rcep t 0 . 0 0 4 " " 0 . 0 0 4 " " 0 . 0 0 4 " " 0 . 0 0 4 ' " 0 . 0 0 4 " ' 0 . 0 0 4 " 0 . 0 0 4 " " 0 . 0 0 4 " " 
(3 .66 ) ( 3 . 6 4 ) (3 .67 ) (3 .80 ) ( 3 . 5 5 ) ( 3 . 1 9 ) (3 .64 ) (3 .61 ) 
A d j O.OOS.-i 0 . 0 0 5 2 0 . 0 0 8 6 0 . 0 0 6 9 0 . 0 0 8 7 0 . 0 0 5 9 0 . 0 0 8 7 0 . 0 0 5 3 
M o d e l F 6 . 8 6 7 " 4 .158" 6.014"" 5 . 5 7 0 " 6 . 4 8 7 " 5 . 8 5 1 " 7 . 0 0 5 ' " 4 . 7 4 7 " 
B I G - 1 4 5 2 8 - 1 4 5 1 4 - 1 4 5 2 8 - 1 4 5 2 1 - 1 4 5 2 9 - 1 4 5 1 7 - 1 4 5 2 9 - 1 4 5 1 4 
BIG R a n k 3 7 3 5 1 6 1 7 
P a n e l B: G F C 
E S N o n G A A P 0 . 0 2 6 0 . 0 2 6 -0 .091 -0 .072" - 0 . 0 1 8 - 0 . 1 5 3 ' 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 6 
(0 .79 ) ( 0 . 7 7 ) ( - 1 . 6 3 ) ( -2 .13 ) ( - 0 . 4 8 ) ( -2 .31 ) (0 .49 ) (0 .47 ) 
E S G A A P 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 1 8 0.1 19 0 .092" 0 . 0 4 9 0.180"" 0 .031 0 . 0 2 8 
( 0 . 7 9 ) (0 .79 ) (1 .76 ) (2 .21 ) (0 .95 ) (2 .86 ) (1.-54) (1 .66 ) 
In t e rcep t - 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 3 
( - 1 . 0 9 ) ( - 1 . 0 9 ) ( - 1 . 1 3 ) ( -1 .14 ) ( -1 .17 ) ( - 0 . 9 7 ) ( -1 .22 ) ( - 1 . 2 2 ) 
A d j R- 0 . 0 0 2 5 0 . 0 0 2 4 0 . 0 0 4 4 0 . 0 0 3 7 0 . 0 0 1 8 0 . 0 0 4 0 0 . 0 0 1 9 0 . 0 0 1 8 
M o d c l F 1 .070 1.1 12 2 . 1 7 8 1.1.38 1.003 3 . 7 0 7 ' 1.102 1.089 
B I G - 3 2 3 0 - 3 2 3 0 - 3 2 3 2 -3231 - 3 2 2 9 -.3232 - 3 2 2 9 - 3 2 2 9 
B I G R a n k 4 4 1 3 6 1 6 6 
P a n e l C : P o s t - G F C 
E S N o n G A A P 0 . 0 4 3 0 . 0 4 5 0 . 0 3 3 0 . 0 5 7 0 . 0 1 2 - 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 1 5 0 . 0 1 5 
( 1 . 4 6 ) ( 1 . 4 9 ) (0 .69 ) (0 .92) (0 .56 ) ( - 0 . 0 8 ) (1 .68 ) (1 .74 ) 
E S G A A P 0.()80 ' 0 .066" 0 . 0 7 2 0 . 0 3 9 0 .089" 0 . 0 9 0 0.102"" 0 . 0 9 0 " 
( 2 . 3 2 ) ( 2 . 4 6 ) (1 .16 ) (0 .62) (1 .99 ) (1 .94 ) (2 .96) (3 .21 ) 
I n t c r ccp t 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1 0 .001 0 .001 0 .001 0 .001 0 .001 0 .001 
(0.,38) (0 .31 ) (0.,37) (0 .33) (0 .32 ) (0 .28 ) (0 .47 ) (0 .38 ) 
A d j R- 0 . 0 2 7 1 0.02.34 0 . 0 2 6 0 0 . 0 2 3 4 0 . 0 2 5 4 0 . 0 2 1 6 0 . 0 2 7 4 0 . 0 2 3 9 
M o d e l F 7 . 8 2 4 " ' 8 .737 ' "" 8 . 6 1 0 " ' 9 . 1 5 0 ' " 8 . 8 8 3 " " 9.295""" 11.355""" 1 3 . 2 0 3 ' " 
B I G - 9 3 3 5 - 9 3 2 4 - 9 3 3 1 - 9 3 2 4 - 9 3 3 0 - 9 3 1 8 - 9 3 3 6 - 9 3 2 5 
B I G R a n k 2 6 3 6 4 8 1 5 
• p < 0 . 0 5 , " p < 0 . 0 1 , ' " p < 0.001 
t statistics in parentheses and ealculatcd with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, CAR. is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns over a three-day window centred 
around the earnings announcement dale. ESNonGAAP represents the following variables for IBES, CORE, CE and 
CF models: ESIBES = IHES minus Forecast. ESCORE = CORE minus Forecast. ESCE = IBES minus Forecast. 
E S C F = IBES minus Forecast. E S G A A P represents ESGAAPl (Model 3) or ESGAAP2 (Model 4). ESGAAPl = 
G A A P l minus Forecast, where G A A P l is earnings per share from operations adjusted to e.xclude the effects of 
special items reported under G A A P . ESGAAP2 = GAAP2 minus Forecast, where GAAP2 is income before 
extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. Forecast = l/B/E/S median consensus forecasted earnings. All 
earnings minus forecast variables are scaled by share price at t-1. 
In Table 4 .5 the difference in mode l performance and the l ike l ihood that one mode l is 
better than another mode l is general ly strong to very strong in the pre- and post-GFC 
periods. In the G F C per iod, the evidence is on ly weak to posit ive that a given mode l is a 
better fit than the next ranked mode l . 
Table 4.5: CAR Model: Financial Sector Sample - Difference in BIC between 
Models 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
IBES C O R E CE CF 























Model 4 II -3 II 4 12 0 
CF 
Model 3 -I -15 -1 -8 0 -12 0 































Model 3 1 1 3 2 0 3 0 























Model 4 17 6 13 6 12 0 
CF 
Model 3 -1 -12 -5 -12 -6 -18 0 
Model 4 10 -I 6 -1 5 -7 I I 0 
The difference in B IC equals row model B IC less column model B IC . A negatii'e figure indicates Ihe row model is a 
better fit than the column model. The different grades of evidence corresponding to min imum B IC difference 
according to Rafter) (igg."!) are: 
M in imum BIC Difference of 0 
M in imum B IC Difference of 2 




M in imum B IC Difference of 10: Very Strong 
The results in Table 4 .6 for non-financial f i rms are also m ixed depend ing on the G A A P 
earnings measure used. A l l mode ls are statistically s ignif icant across all t ime periods. 
Table 4 .6 shows that E S G A A P l is s igni f icant across all n o n - G A A P earnings mode ls in 
both the pre- and post-GFC periods. I B E S and C O R E mode ls are general ly statistically 
s ignif icant across all periods. 
Table 4.6: CAR Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression 
3-Day Window Centred around Earnings Announcement Date 
( P r c - G F C : F i r m c l u s t e r = 1 , 8 5 0 a n d T i m e c l u s t e r = 2 5 ; G F C : F i r m c l u s t e r = 1 3 0 4 
a n d T i m e c l u s t e r = 9; P o s t - G F C : F i r m c l u s t e r = 1 ,678 a n d T i m e c l u s t e r = 16) 
M o d e l 3: CAR^ = a „ + P^ESNonGAAP^ + /3,ESGAAP/^ + e^ 
M o d e l 4: CAR^ = a „ + P^ESNoiiGAAP + P,ESGAAP2^ + e, 
P a n e l A : P r e - G F C 
I B E S 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
C O R E 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
C E 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
C F 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
E S N o n G A A P 0 . 3 1 8 " " 0 . 3 5 1 ' " 0 . 0 2 7 0 , 0 7 9 " 0 , 0 0 8 0 ,001 0 , 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 3 
( 3 , 4 9 ) (3 .77 ) (1 .55 ) (3 ,02 ) (0 ,83 ) (0 ,09 ) (0 ,27 ) (0 .50 ) 
R S G A A P 0.06,5' 0 . 0 1 3 0 . 1 . 3 7 " ' 0 , 0 0 0 0 , 1 5 7 " " 0 , 0 5 3 " 0 , 1 6 5 " ' 0 . 0 5 4 " 
( 2 . 0 3 ) ( I . .W) (3 .69 ) (0 ,02 ) (4 .02 ) (2 ,63 ) (3 ,94 ) ( 3 . 0 6 ) 
In te rcep t 0 . ( ) ( )4" ' 0 . 0 0 4 " " 0 . 0 0 4 ' " 0 , 0 0 5 " ' 0 . 0 0 4 " ' 0 , 0 0 4 " ' 0 , 0 0 4 " " 0.004""" 
( 5 , 7 6 ) (5 .68 ) (5 .86 ) (6 ,10 ) (5 .84 ) (5 ,76 ) (5 ,83 ) (5 .81 ) 
A d j R- 0 ,00X6 0 . 0 0 8 2 0 . 0 0 3 9 0 , 0 0 2 3 0 . 0 0 3 8 0 , 0 0 1 6 0 , 0 0 3 8 0 . 0 0 1 6 
M o d e l F I 2 , 7 9 7 " ' 1 3 , 1 2 7 ' " 2 8 . 7 , 5 7 " ' 17,0.^7"" 2 6 . 8 8 9 ' " ' 1 5 , 7 3 3 ' " 2 5 , 2 9 6 ' " 16.097"" ' 
B I C - 9 2 3 7 9 - 9 2 3 6 5 - 9 2 2 1 2 - 9 2 1 5 6 - 9 2 2 0 8 - 9 2 1 3 1 - 9 2 2 0 7 - 9 2 1 3 1 
B I C R a n k 1 2 3 6 4 7 5 7 
P a n e l B : G F C 
K S N o n O A A P 0 . 0 6 3 " 0 .061" 0 , 0 6 1 " " 0 , 0 5 5 ' 0 . 0 1 9 ' 0 , 0 2 0 0 , 0 2 3 0 . 0 2 3 
( 2 . 6 3 ) (2 .12 ) (4 ,57 ) (2 ,28) (2 .09 ) (1 ,04 ) (1 .85 ) (1 .91) 
K S G A A P 0 . 0 2 6 0 . 0 1 4 - 0 , 0 0 8 0 ,001 0 . 0 2 8 0 , 0 0 6 0 ,053" 0.027"" 
(I . .34) (1 .61 ) ( - 0 4 3 ) (0 ,12 ) (1 .12 ) (0 ,30 ) (2 ,22) (3 .08 ) 
In t e rcep t 0 . ( ) 0 3 " 0 . 0 0 3 " 0 , 0 0 3 " 0 , 0 0 3 " 0 . 0 0 3 ' 0 , 0 0 3 ' 0 , 0 0 3 ' 0 .003" 
(2 .70 ) (3 .01 ) (2 ,91 ) (2 ,98 ) (2 .47 ) (2 ,53 ) (2 ,04 ) (2 .42 ) 
A d j 0 . 0 0 3 0 0 . 0 0 3 2 0 ,0031 (),()()31 0 . 0 0 2 2 0 , 0 0 1 8 0 , 0 0 2 5 0 . 0 0 2 8 
M o d e l F 9 . 9 0 5 ' " 1 0 . 6 1 2 " ' 8 , 4 2 3 " ' 8 , 1 4 9 ' " 5 . 6 2 2 " 5 , 3 6 8 " 7 , 0 5 4 " 8 . 2 9 3 " " 
B I C - 2 0 8 0 5 - 2 0 8 0 6 - 2 0 8 0 6 - 2 0 8 0 6 - 2 0 7 9 7 - 2 0 7 9 4 - 2 0 8 0 0 - 2 0 8 0 3 
B I C R a n k 4 1 1 1 7 8 6 5 
P a n e l C : P o s t - G F C 
K S N o n G A A P 0 . 1 3 7 " ' 0 . 1 6 1 " " 0 , 0 0 8 0 , 0 7 2 " ' 0 .011 0 , 0 1 8 0 , 0 1 6 0 . 0 1 7 
(3 .50 ) (4 .23 ) (0 ,76 ) (3 ,98 ) (1 .32 ) (0 ,79 ) ( l , .30) ( 1 4 1 ) 
H , S G A A P 0 . 0 7 4 ' " 0 . 0 2 1 " 0 , 1 1 0 " ' 0 , 0 0 3 0 . 1 0 8 ' " 0 , 0 3 3 0 . 1 1 8 " " 0.050""" 
( 4 . 5 3 ) ( 2 . 7 6 ) (4 ,64 ) (0 ,21 ) (4 .44 ) (1 ,23 ) (5 .94 ) (5 .16 ) 
In t e rcep t 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 , 0 0 2 ' 0 ,002" 0 . 0 0 2 0 , 0 0 2 0 .002" 0 .002" 
( 1 . 8 6 ) ( 1 . 8 3 ) (1 ,99 ) (2 ,07 ) (1 .79) (1 ,66) (2 .03 ) (2 .10) 
A d j 0 . 0 0 8 0 0 . 0 0 6 8 0 , 0 0 5 0 0 , 0 0 3 4 0 . 0 0 5 0 0 , 0 0 2 5 0 . 0 0 5 6 0 . 0 0 3 2 
M o d e l F 2 2 . 4 2 1 " ' 15.5 .TO'" 1 8 , 4 0 0 ' " 1 6 , 8 2 1 " " 1 8 , 8 6 4 " " 1 2 , 2 2 0 " ' 2 0 . 6 3 6 " " 16.71""" 
B I C - 5 2 4 5 2 - 5 2 4 2 7 - 5 2 3 9 0 - 5 2 3 5 8 - 5 2 3 9 2 -523,39 - 5 2 4 0 3 - 5 2 3 5 3 
B I C R a n k 1 2 5 6 4 8 3 7 
• p < 0.05, *• p < 0.01, ••• p < 0.001 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, CAR. is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns over a three-day window centrcd 
around the earnmgs announcement date. ESNonGAAP represents the following variables for IBES, CORE, CE and 
C F models: ESIBES = IBES minus Forecast. ESCORE = C O R E minus Forecast. ESCE = IBES mmus Forecast. 
E S C F = IBES minus Forecast. E S G A A P represents ESGAAPl (Model 3) or ESGAAP2 (Model 4). ESGAAPl = 
G A A P l minus Forecast, where G A A P I is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of 
special items reported under GAAP. ESGAAP2 = GAAP2 minus Forecast, where GAAP2 is income before 
extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. Forecast = 1/B/E/S median consensus forecasted earnings. All 
earnings minus forecast variables are scaled by share price at t-1. 
E S C E is only marginal ly significant in relation to Model 3 in the G F C period but E S C F 
is not significant in any period. Simi lar to f inancial f irms, in both the pre- and post-GFC 
periods, the models using E S G A A P I perform better than corresponding models with 
E S G A A P 2 when ranked according to B IC . A lso , IBES is ranked highest in both these 
periods. 
These results show that G A A P earnings have incremental information content over non-
G A A P earnings in both the pre- and post-GFC periods. In the G F C period, however, the 
results show G A A P earnings have incremental information content only in relation to 
CF . It appears that investors do not f ind G A A P earnings to be informative during the 
G F C . A lso , there appears to be a shift in investor focus due to the G F C . In terms of 
model performance, the B I C ranking indicates that IBES generally outperforms other 
models across the three periods. 
Table 4.7 shows the difference in B I C between models for each time period. In the pre-
and post-GFC periods, the evidence is very strong that IBES is a better fit than all other 
models. During the G F C , the results generally show positive to strong evidence that 
IBES models are a better fit compared to the other models. 
Table 4.7: CAR Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Difference in BIC 
between Models 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
IBES C O R E CE CF 























Model 4 248 2.M 81 25 77 0 
CF 
Model 3 172 1.58 5 -51 1 -76 0 























Model 4 II 12 12 12 3 0 
CF 
Model 3 5 6 6 6 -3 6 0 























Model 4 113 88 51 19 53 0 
CF 
Model 3 49 24 -13 -45 -11 -64 0 
Model 4 99 74 37 5 39 -14 50 0 
The difference in B IC equals row model B IC less column model BIC. A negative figure indicates the row model is a 
better fit than the column model. The different grades of evidence corresponding to min imum BIC difference 
according to Raftery (199.5) are: 
M i n imum B IC Difference of 0: Weak 
M in imum B IC Difference of 2; Positive 
M in imum B IC Difference of 6: Strong 
M in imum BIC Difference of 10: Very Strong 
Table 4.8 reports the results for f i rms in the S & P 500 index. In the pre-GFC period, two 
o f the eight mode ls tested are not statistically s ignif icant , wh ich are C E Mode l 4 and C F 
Mode l 4 . O f the n o n - G A A P earnings measures, only E S I B E S (Mode l s 3 and 4) and 
E S C O R E ( M o d e 6) are strongly signif icant . The results for the pre-GFC period 
general ly show that G A A P earnings have incremental informat ion content. E S G A A P 2 
also has a stronger level o f statistical s ignif icance in compar ison to E S G A A P l in the 
I B E S and C O R E mode ls . The coefficients for E S G A A P 2 , however , are negative 
ind icat ing that investors v iew the earnings surprise as bad news. In the C E and C F 
mode l s , E S G A A P l is marg ina l ly signif icant but E S G A A P 2 is not s ignif icant . 
I f ind weak results in tiie G F C period. E S C O R E and ESCF are marginally significant. 
In these models, only E S G A A P 2 is marginally significant. The results do not indicate 
that G A A P earnings have incremental information content generally. Post-GFC, only 
the C P models are statistically significant. G A A P earnings, however, are not 
statistically significant and are not informative. 
In terms of model performance, six of the eight models are statistically significant in the 
pre-GFC period, however, only three and two models are statistically significant in the 
G F C and post-GFC periods, respectively. Therefore, the B I C ranking of relative model 
fit should be interpreted with caution for the G F C and post-GFC periods. In the pre-
G F C period, IBFS is most informative and only E S G A A P 2 has incremental information 
content relative to ES IBES . 
Tabic 4.8: CAR Model: S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
3-Day Window Centred Around Earnings Announcement Date 
(Pre-GFC: Firm cluster = 416 and Time cluster = 25; G F C : Firm cluster = 419 and 
Time cluster = 9; Post -GFC: Firm cluster = 424 and Time cluster = 16) 
Model 3: C/lf i = a „ + P,ESNonGAAP + P^ESGAAPI^ + e, 
Model 4: CAR = a „ + P^ESNonGAAP + P^ESGAAP2_ + e 
Panel A: Pre-GFC 
IBES 
Model 3 Model 4 
C O R E CE CF 
M o d e l s Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
K S N o n G A A I ' 1.1 i r " 1.279"" 0.01 1 0 . 1 4 5 " ' -0.026 -0.001 0.003 0.003 
(5.66) (6.18) (0.38) (4.30) (-1.16) (-0.02) (0.30) (0.28) 
E S G A A P 0.072 -0.052"" 0.214" - 0 . 1 0 2 ' " 0.246" 0.002 0.223" 0.002 
(.) (-3.84) (2.06) (-4.81) (2.34) (0.06) (2.55) (0.09) 
Intercept 0.()()4"" 0 .004"" 0 . 0 0 5 ' " O.OOS"" 0.005*'" 0 . 0 0 5 ' " 0 . 0 0 5 " ' 0 . 0 0 5 " ' 
(4.12) (3.82) (4.24) (4.40) (4.40) (4.00) (4.41) (4.34) 
Ad j 0.0198 0.0210 0.0042 0.0028 0.0046 -0.0003 0.0042 -0.0002 
Model F 24.179"" 2 4 . 2 8 9 ' " 3.836' 8.026""" 3.1 19" 0.002 3.189' 0.133 
BIC -24143 -24144 -24009 -23999 -24013 -23974 -24009 -23975 
BIG Rank 2 1 4 6 3 8 4 7 
Panel B: G F C 
E S N o n G A A P 0.076 0.079 0.080' 0.073 0.003 -0.013 0.037" 0.040" 
(1.76) (1.46) (2.32) (1..34) (0.10) (-0.92) (2.09) (2.17) 
E S G A A P 0.019 0.01 1 -0.030 -0.014 0.047 0.039 0.050 0.029" 
(0.89) (0.62) (-0.54) (-0.37) (0.99) (1.80) (1.66) (1.98) 
Intercept 0.002 0.002" 0.002' 0.002" 0.002 0 .002 ' 0.002 0.003' 
(1.65) (1.98) (2.07) (1.96) (1.52) (2.07) (1.80) (2.32) 
Ad j R- 0.0029 0.0029 0.0030 0.0030 0.0014 0.0010 0.0044 0.0043 
Model F 2.464 2.581 3.024" 2.538 1.695 1.492 4.698"" 4.631"" 
BIC -5665 -5665 -5665 -5665 -5662 -5661 -5668 -5668 
BIC Rank 3 3 3 3 7 8 1 1 
Panel C: Post -GFC 
E S N o n G A A P 0.197 ' 0.185 0 .139" 0.136 0.025 -0.000 0.029' 0.029" 
(2.20) (1.67) (2.89) (1.31) (0.71) (-0.00) (2.29) (2.18) 
E S G A A P 0.008 0.023 -0.030 -0.018 0.048 0.047 0.072 0.051 
(0.09) (0.61) (-0.36) (-0.39) (0.49) (0.48) (0.86) (1.35) 
Intercept -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.22) (-0.15) (0.12) (0.08) (-0.23) (0.02) (0.28) (0.38) 
Ad j R- 0.0036 0.0039 0.0028 0.0028 0.0013 0.0010 0.0036 0.0037 
Model F 1.784 1.056 2.503 1.750 0.902 0.976 6 .732" 7 . 3 7 8 " ' 
BIC -16532 -16533 -16527 -16527 -16518 -16517 -16531 -16532 
BIC Rank 2 1 5 5 7 8 4 2 
• p < 0 . 0 5 . " p < O . O I . ' " p < 0.001 
1 statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, CAR. is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns over a three-day window centred 
around the earnings announcement date. ESNonGAAP represents the following variables for IBES, CORE, CB and 
CF models: ESIBES = IBES minus Forecast. ESCORE = CORE minus Forecast. ESCE = IBES minus Forecast. 
ESCF = IBES minus Forecast. ESGAAP represents ESGAAPl (Model 3) or ESGAAP2 (Model 4). ESGAAPl = 
GAAPl minus Forecast, where GAAPl is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of 
special items reported under GAAP. ESGAAP2 = GAAP2 minus Forecast, where GAAP2 is income before 
extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. Forecast - 1/B/E/S median consensus forecasted earnings. All 
earnings minus forecast variables are scaled by share price at /-7. 
Table 4 .9 shows that, pre-GFC, there is very strong evidence that the data favour I B E S 
models over all other models . The level o f evidence is, however , weaker in the G F C 
period. W h i l e there is still very strong evidence that I B E S mode ls perform better than 
C E and C P models in the post-GFC period, the evidence is weak in respect to mode l 
performance between I B E S and C O R E . 
Table 4.9: CAR Model: S&P 500 Sample - Difference in BIC between Models 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
IBES C O R E CE CF 




















169 170 35 25 39 0 
Model 3 
Model 4 
134 135 0 -10 4 -35 0 




















4 4 4 4 1 0 
Model 3 
Model 4 
-3 -3 -3 -6 -7 0 



















15 16 10 10 1 0 
Model 3 
Model 4 
1 2 -4 -4 -13 -14 0 
0 1 -5 -5 -14 -15 -1 0 
The difference in B IC equals row model B IC less column model BIC. A negative figure indicates the row model is a 
better fit than the column model. The different grades of evidence corresponding to min imum BIC difference 
according to Raftery (I99.S) are: 
M in imum B IC Difference of 0: Weak 
Min imum BIC Difference of 2: Positive 
Min imum B IC Difference of 6: Strong 
M in imum B IC Difference of 10; Very Strong 
Given my results in the f inancial sector sample and in this S & P 500 sample , I re-
estimate and test my models on a sub-sample o f f i rms that are in the S & P 500 index 
after exc lud ing f inancial sector f i rms. The results for the pre-GFC period, reported in 
Table 4 .10 . are substantially s imi lar . The results for the G F C period are also general ly 
s imi lar except for C O R E Mode l 4 . which is statistically signif icant in this sub-sample. I 
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f ind that financial sector f irms in the S & P 500 index have an impact on my results 
primarily in the post-GFC period. 
In the post-GFC period, all models except C E (Model 4) are statistically significant. 
E S I B E S (Models 3 and 4) and E S C O R E (Model 4) are statistically significant. 
However, E S C F is not significant in this sub-sample. Whi le E S G A A P i and E S G A A P 2 
are not statistically significant in any model in the financial sector sample, E S G A A P I is 
statistically significant across all models in this sub-sample. The results indicate that 
G A A P earnings have incremental information content in respect to large non-financial 
f irms. 
ILS 
Table 4.10: CAR Model: S&P 500 Sample Excluding Financial Sector Firms -
Multivariate OLS Regression 
3-Day Window Centred Around Earnings Announcement Date 
( P r e - G F C : F i r m c lus ter = 3 6 4 a n d T i m e c l u s t e r = 25; G F C : F i r m c l u s t e r = 3 6 3 a n d 
T i m e c lus ter = 9; P o s t - G F C : F i r m c l u s t e r = 371 a n d T i m e c l u s t e r = 16 
M o d e l 3: CAR = a „ + p^ESNoiiGAAP + P,ESGAAPl + £, 
M o d e l 4: CAR = a „ + P^ESNonGAAP + p,ESGAAP2^ + £ 
P a n e l A : P r e - G F C 
I B E S 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
C O R E 
Mode l 3 M o d e l 4 
C E 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
C F 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
E S N o n G A A P 1 . 2 6 5 ' " 1 . 4 4 7 " ' 0 .0 lOy 0 . 1 4 . V " - 0 . 0 2 7 - 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 6 
(5 .61 ) (6 .22 ) (0 .35) (4 .15 ) ( -1 .21 ) ( -0 .12 ) (0 .48 ) (0 .48 ) 
E S G A A P 0 . 0 7 8 " " - 0 . 0 5 7 " " 0 .217" - 0 . 1 0 3 ' " 0 . 2 5 0 ' 0 . 0 0 3 0 .226" 0 .001 
(3 .76) ( -4 .33 ) (1 .96) ( -4 .78 ) (2 .21) (0 .08 ) (2 .40 ) (0 .03) 
In te rcept 0 . 0 0 4 " " 0.004""" 0.005""" 0 . 0 0 5 ' " 0 . 0 0 5 ' " 0 . 0 0 5 " ' 0 . 0 0 5 " " 0 . 0 0 5 " ' 
(4 .30) (3 .96) (4 .42) (4 .58) (4 .55) (4 .08 ) (4 .61 ) (4 .55 ) 
A d j R= 0 . 0 2 2 7 0 . 0 2 4 2 0 . 0 0 4 3 0 . 0 0 2 9 0 . 0 0 4 8 - 0 . 0 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 4 3 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 
M o d e l F 2 5 . 8 8 0 " " 2 6 . 1 1 9 " " 3 .438" 8.029""" 2 .831 0 . 0 0 8 3 . 1 0 7 ' 0 .361 
B I C - 2 1 0 4 7 - 2 1 0 5 8 - 2 0 9 1 6 - 2 0 9 0 7 - 2 0 9 2 0 - 2 0 8 8 4 - 2 0 9 1 7 - 2 0 8 8 5 
B I C R a n k 2 1 5 6 3 8 4 7 
P a n e l B: G F C 
E S N o n G A A P 0 . 0 7 4 0 . 0 9 4 0.121" 0 . 1 5 2 " - 0 . 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 1 8 0 .056" 0 .057" 
(0 .95) (1 .16 ) (1 .96) (2 .93) ( -0 .08 ) ( -1 .37 ) (1 .98 ) (1 .99 ) 
E S G A A P 0 . 0 5 0 0 . 0 1 5 - 0 . 0 4 6 - 0 . 0 3 9 0 . 0 7 8 0 . 0 3 9 0 . 0 8 3 0 . 0 2 8 
(0 .91) (0 .56) ( -0 .45) ( -1 .02 ) (1 .08) (1 .49 ) (1 .32 ) (1 .05 ) 
In te rcep t 0 . 0 0 3 0 .003" 0.003"" 0 .003" 0 . 0 0 3 0 .003" 0 . 0 0 3 ' 0 . 0 0 3 " 
(1 .86 ) (2 .21) (2 .76) (2 .53 ) (1 .69) (2..14) (2 .06 ) (2 .75 ) 
A d j R- 0 . 0 0 1 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 3 7 0 . 0 0 4 6 0 . 0 0 0 7 0 .0001 0 .0061 0 . 0 0 5 4 
M o d e l F 1.551 1 .414 3.827" 3 . 3 9 3 ' 0 . 6 0 8 1.160 6.120"" 6 . 3 1 7 " 
BIC - 4 9 0 3 - 4 9 0 2 - 4 9 0 8 - 4 9 0 9 - 4 9 0 2 -4901 - 4 9 1 2 -4911 
B I C R a n k 5 6 4 3 6 8 1 2 
P a n e l C : P o s t - G F C 
E S N o n G A A P 0.730" 0 . 8 2 5 " 0 .091 0 . 2 5 8 ' " 0 . 0 3 2 0 .011 0 . 0 1 9 0 . 0 2 4 
(2 .56 ) (3 .01 ) (1 .43 ) (3 .96) (0 .76) (0 .15 ) (0 .86 ) (1 .08 ) 
E S G A A P 0 .269" 0 . 0 5 0 0 . 3 7 3 ' - 0 . 0 0 5 0 . 4 2 2 ' 0 . 0 8 4 0 .452" ' 0 . 0 9 7 ' 
(2 .27) (1 .21) (2 .33) ( -0 .08 ) (2 .46) (1 .13 ) (3 .00 ) (2 .00 ) 
In te rcep t -0 .001 -0 .001 0 . 0 0 0 0 .001 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 .001 
( -0 .58 ) ( -0 .57 ) (0 .19) (0 .38) ( -0 .18 ) (0 .13 ) (0 .27 ) (0 .50 ) 
A d j R- 0 . 0 2 1 8 0 . 0 1 9 7 0 . 0 1 0 9 0 . 0 0 6 5 0 . 0 1 0 7 0 . 0 0 3 5 0 .01 II 0 . 0 0 4 7 
M o d e l F 1 3 . 5 8 9 ' " 6 . 2 5 5 " 6 . 1 3 1 " 7 . 4 1 3 ' " 6 . 6 8 2 " 1 .604 6 . 3 5 5 " 4 .231" 
B I C - 1 4 1 3 8 - 1 4 1 2 7 - 1 4 0 8 5 - 1 4 0 6 4 - 1 4 0 8 4 - 1 4 0 4 9 - 1 4 0 8 5 - 1 4 0 5 5 
B I C R a n k 1 2 3 6 5 8 3 7 
• p < 0.05. " p < 0 . 0 1 , " > < 0 . 0 0 1 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, C A R . is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns over a three-day window centred 
around the eamings announcement date. ESNonGAAP represents the following variables for IBES, CORE, C E and 
CF models: ESIBES = IBES minus Forecast. ESCORE = CORE minus Forecast. ESCE = IBES minus Forecast. 
ESCF = IBES minus Forecast. ESGAAP represents ESGAAPI (Model 3) or ESGAAP2 (Model 4). ESGAAPl = 
GAAPI minus Forecast, where G A A P I is eamings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of 
special items reported under GAAP. ESGAAP2 = GAAP2 minus Forecast, where GAAP2 is income before 
extraordinary' Items per share reported under GAAP. Forecast = I/B/H/S median consensus forecasted earnings. All 
eamings minus forecast variables are scaled by share price at t-7, 
In relation to mode l per formance, I B E S models outperform other models in both the 
pre- and post-GFC periods based on B I C . Table 4.11 shows that the evidence for this is 
very strong. The level o f evidence is weaker dur ing the G F C . 
Table 4.11: CAR Model: S&P 500 Sample Excluding Financial Sector Firms -
Difference in BIC between Models 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
IBES C O R E CE CF 





- I I 0 

















Model 4 163 174 32 23 36 0 
CF 
Model 3 l.W 141 -1 -10 3 -33 0 






C O R E 
















Model 4 2 1 7 8 1 0 
CF 
Model 3 -9 -10 -4 -3 -10 - I I 0 























Model 4 89 78 36 15 35 0 
CF 
Model 3 53 42 0 -21 -1 0 
Model 4 83 72 30 9 29 -6 30 0 
The difference in B IC equals row model B IC less column model B IC . A negative figure indicates the row model is a 
better fit than the column model. The different grades of evidence corresponding to min imum BIC difference 
according to Raftery (199.*;) are: 
M in imum B IC Difference of 0 
M in imum B IC Difference of 2 




M in imum B IC Difference of 10: Very Strong 
Table 4 .12 shows the results for f i rms not included in the S & P 500 index. A l l mode ls 
are moderately to strongly signif icant across all periods. 
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Table 4.12: CAR Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
3-Day Window Centred Around Earnings Announcement Date 
( P r e - G F C : F i r m c l u s t e r = 1 ,771 a n d T i m e c l u s t e r = 2 5 ; G F C : F i r m c l u s t e r = 1 , 6 6 4 
a n d T i m e c l u s t e r = 9; P o s t - G F C : F i r m c l u s t e r = 1 ,530 a n d T i m e c l u s t e r = 16 
M o d e l 5: CAR = a „ + ji^ESNonGAAP^ + P,ESGAAPI_ + £, 
M o d e l 6: CAR = + P^ESNonGAAP^ + P,ESGAAP2^ + e, 
P a n e l A : P r e - G F C 
I B E S 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
C O R E 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
C E 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
C F 
M o d e l 3 M o d e l 4 
E S N o n G A A P 0 . 2 2 2 " " 0.247""" 0 . 0 3 2 0 .068" 0 . 0 1 5 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 3 
( 3 . 6 2 ) (3 .90 ) ( 1 . 7 6 ) (2 .31 ) ( 1 . 5 2 ) ( 0 . 2 4 ) ( 0 . 4 1 ) ( 0 . 6 1 ) 
E S G A A P 0 .080" 0.029"" 0.128""" 0 .021 0 . 1 4 6 " " 0 .064"" 0 . 1 6 1 " " 0 . 0 6 7 ' " 
( 2 . 4 8 ) (3 .04 ) (3 .53 ) (1 .38 ) ( 3 . 8 1 ) ( 3 . 2 0 ) ( 4 . 1 4 ) ( 4 . 0 5 ) 
I n t e r cep t 0 . 0 0 4 ' " 0.004""" 0.004""" 0.004""" 0.004""" 0.004""" 0.004""" 0 . 0 0 4 " " 
( 5 . 7 3 ) ( 5 . 7 0 ) (5 .78 ) ( 6 . 0 7 ) (5 .67 ) ( 5 . 6 4 ) ( 5 . 7 0 ) ( 5 . 7 2 ) 
A d j R- 0 . 0 0 7 3 0 . 0 0 6 9 0 . 0 0 4 2 0 . 0 0 2 9 0 . 0 0 4 1 0 . 0 0 2 4 0 . 0 0 4 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 
M o d e l F 1 6 . 9 7 2 " " 1 9 . 2 7 1 " " 2 9 . 6 9 4 " " 2 3 . 0 0 1 " " 30.183""" 25.586""" 27.025""" 2 5 . 8 7 6 " " ' 
B I G - 8 2 3 7 6 - 8 2 3 6 4 - 8 2 2 7 8 - 8 2 2 3 7 - 8 2 2 7 5 - 8 2 2 2 1 - 8 2 2 7 2 - 8 2 2 2 2 
B I G R a n k 1 2 3 6 4 8 5 7 
P a n e l B: G F C 
E S N o n G A A P 0 . 0 5 4 " " 0 . 0 5 2 " 0.046""" 0 . 0 3 7 0 .020" 0 . 0 3 1 0 . 0 1 6 0 . 0 1 7 
( 3 . 7 9 ) (2 .77 ) (3 .97 ) ( 1 . 6 4 ) (2 .48 ) ( 1 . 2 7 ) ( 1 . 6 7 ) ( 1 . 7 8 ) 
E S G A A P 0 . 0 2 3 0 . 0 1 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 0 2 2 - 0 . 0 0 4 0 .046" 0 . 0 2 7 " 
( 1 . 1 3 ) ( 1 . 6 2 ) (0 .02 ) ( 0 . 5 9 ) ( 0 . 9 6 ) ( - 0 . 1 5 ) ( 2 . 0 7 ) ( 2 . 8 5 ) 
I n t e r cep t 0 . 0 0 3 0 .003" 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 3 
(1 .86 ) ( 2 . 0 2 ) ( 1 . 8 8 ) (1 .96 ) (1 .68 ) ( 1 . 4 9 ) ( 1 . 4 7 ) ( 1 . 6 9 ) 
A d j R- 0 . 0 0 3 0 0 . 0 0 3 2 0 . 0 0 2 5 0 . 0 0 2 6 0 . 0 0 2 4 0 . 0 0 2 1 0 . 0 0 2 1 0 . 0 0 2 5 
M o d e l F 8 . 4 0 8 " " 9.295""" 6 . 2 2 3 " 6.543"" 5 .803"" 5.634"" 5.732"" 6 .588"" 
B I G - 1 8 3 9 1 - 1 8 3 9 3 - 1 8 3 8 7 - 1 8 3 8 8 - 1 8 3 8 6 - 1 8 3 8 4 - 1 8 3 8 4 - 1 8 3 8 7 
B I G R a n k 2 I 4 3 6 7 7 4 
P a n e l C : P o s t - G F C 
E S N o n G A A P 0 . 1 0 0 " 0 . 1 2 6 " " 0 . 0 0 4 0.069""" 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 7 0 . 0 1 3 0 . 0 1 3 
( 3 . 1 0 ) (3 .92 ) (0 .42 ) (3 .93 ) (1 .09 ) ( 0 . 8 6 ) ( 1 . 4 5 ) ( 1 . 5 6 ) 
E S G A A P 0 . 0 7 9 " " 0.028""" 0 . 1 1 3 " " 0 . 0 0 9 0.108""" 0 . 0 4 2 0.1 17""" 0.058""" 
( 6 . 3 0 ) ( 4 . 0 4 ) (5 .61 ) ( 0 . 6 1 ) (5 .31 ) ( 1 . 7 8 ) ( 7 . 1 4 ) ( 5 . 3 4 ) 
In t e rcep t 0 .002" 0 .002" 0 .002" 0 .002" 0 .002" 0 . 0 0 2 0 .002" 0 .002" 
(2 .30 ) (2 .23 ) ( 2 . 3 5 ) (2 .39 ) ( 2 . 1 8 ) ( 1 . 8 8 ) ( 2 . 3 6 ) ( 2 . 3 8 ) 
A d j R- 0 . 0 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 8 1 0 . 0 0 7 5 0 . 0 0 5 2 0 . 0 0 7 6 0 . 0 0 4 1 0 . 0 0 8 0 0 . 0 0 4 6 
M o d e l F 36.814""" 23.843""" 31.4.37""" 22.695""" 31.941""" 18.481 '"" 31.941""" 20 .964 ' " " 
B I G - 4 5 1 7 4 - 4 5 1 4 0 - 4 5 1 2 9 - 4 5 0 8 8 - 4 5 1 3 0 - 4 5 0 6 8 - 4 5 1 3 8 - 4 5 0 7 6 
B I G R a n k 1 2 5 6 4 8 3 7 
• p < 0.05, •• p < 0.01, •'• p < 0.001 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, CAR, IS the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns over a three-day window ccntred 
around the earnings announcement date. E S N o n G A A P represents the following variables for IBES, C O R E , CE and 
C F models: ESIBES = IBES mmus Forecast. ESCORE = C O R E minus Forecast. ESCE = IBES minus Forecast. 
E S C F = IBES minus Forecast. E S G A A P represents E S G A A P l (Model 3) or ESGAAP2 (Model 4). E S G A A P l = 
G A A P l minus Forecast, where G A A P l is earnings per share from operations adjusted to e.xclude the effects of 
special items reported under GAAP. ESGAAP2 = G A A P 2 minus Forecast, where G A A P 2 is income before 
extraordmar> items per share reported under G A A P . Forecast = 1/B/E/S median consensus forecasted earnings. All 
earnings minus forecast variables are scaled by share price at t-1. 
ES IBES is statistically significant across all periods but ESCF is not significant across 
all periods. E S C O R E (Model 4) is significant in both the pre- and post-GFC periods but 
E S C O R E (Model 3) is significant only in the G F C period. E S C E is marginally 
significant only in the G F C period. E S G A A P is generally significant in the pre-and 
post-GFC periods. During the G F C , however, E S G A A P is only statistically significant 
in relation to ESCF . 
These results indicate that E S G A A P has incremental information content relative to 
IBES , C O R E , C E and C F measures of earnings in the pre- and post-GFC periods. 
Furthermore, the level of significance for E S G A A P has generally increased from the 
pre-GFC period to the post-GFC period. This suggests a shift in investors' focus on the 
informativeness of G A A P earnings after the GFC . 
Model performance based on the B IC ranking shows that IBES models outperform 
other models across the three periods. The model performance of C O R E deteriorated in 
the post-GFC period. 
Table 4.13 shows that the evidence is generally strong to very strong that the three 
highest ranked models in both the pre- and post-GFC periods are a better fit relative to 
the remaining models. 
Table 4.13: CAR Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample - Difference in BIC between 
Models 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
IBES C O R E CE C F 























Model 4 155 143 57 16 54 0 
C F 
Model 3 104 92 6 -35 3 -51 0 
Model 4 1.54 142 56 15 53 -1 50 0 




C O R E 










Model 3 5 7 1 2 0 
Model 4 7 9 3 4 2 0 
C F 
Model 3 7 9 3 4 2 0 0 























Model 4 106 72 61 20 62 0 
C F 
Model 3 36 2 9 -50 -8 -70 0 
Model 4 98 64 53 12 54 -8 62 0 
The di f ference in BIC equals row model BIC less column model BIC. A negative f igure indicates the row model is a 
better fit than the column model . The different grades of evidence corresponding to min imum BIC dif ference 
according to Rafterv' (1995) are: 
Min imum BIC Difference of 0 
Min imum BIC Dif ference of 2 




Min imum BIC Dif ference of 10: Ver> Strong 
4.4 DISCUSSION 
S i m i l a r to the r e su l t s f o r the O h i s o n m o d e l s , t h e r e su l t s f o r t h e C A R m o d e l s s h o w 
m i x e d e v i d e n c e on the i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t e n t of the a l t e r n a t i v e e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s . T h e 
r e su l t s s h o w o n l y C E M o d e l 4 is s ta t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t in the f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r s a m p l e 
f o r t h e G F C p e r i o d . In the S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e f o r the G F C a n d p o s t - G F C p e r i o d s , m o s t 
m o d e l s a re no t s ta t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t . F u r t h e r t e s t s on a s u b - s a m p l e of n o n - f i n a n c i a l 
f i r m s in the S & P 5 0 0 s h o w tha t f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r f i r m s h a v e an i m p a c t on m y S & P 5 0 0 
s a m p l e r e su l t s in the p o s t - G F C p e r i o d . T h i s m a y be d u e to the c o n t i n u i n g e f f e c t s of t h e 
G F C o n l a rge f i n a n c i a l f i r m s . A n o t a b l e resu l t f o r the S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e is the n e g a t i v e 
a n d s t a t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t f o r E S G A A P 2 in t h e I B E S a n d C O R E m o d e l s . 
The inverse relationship between this G A A P earnings surprise and CAR suggests that 
investors view the earnings surprise as bad news. The value relevance test of the S & P 
500 sample, in Chapter 3, shows DIFF2 is not significant in relation to IBES and C O R E 
in the pre-GFC period, however , the coefficients are negative. 
My results provide limited support for prior studies that find IBES earnings are more 
informative than G A A P earnings (Albring et al.. 2010; Bhattacharya el al., 2003; 
Brown and Sivakumar, 2003). The models show that across all samples . G A A P 
earnings have incremental information content over IBES, C O R E and CE. Generally, 
E S G A A P l shows the stronger result of the two G A A P earnings measures, both in terms 
of the magnitude of the coefficient and the level of statistical significance, with the 
exception of the S & P 500 sample where ESGAAP2 is negative. 
I note that all my earnings surprise measures are derived using analysts ' forecasts f rom 
IBES. This classic errors in variables problem biases the results in favour of IBES 
earnings (Bradshaw, 201 I). Therefore , my results are more conservative when statistical 
significance is found in other earnings variables. 
For financial sector f i rms, my results show little difference in the information content of 
G A A P earnings between the pre- and post-GFC periods. I find C F Model 3 to be 
superior in both these periods. In the non-financial sector sample, the results show that 
investors find ESIBES to be more informative in comparison to other non-GAAP 
earnings in the pre- and post-GFC periods. Nevertheless, investors also find G A A P 
earnings informative, particularly E S G A A P l . 
Table 4 .14 presents a summary of all model rankings based on BIC for all samples and 
models . My results do not indicate that G A A P informativeness is uniform across all 
samples. I do not find G A A P earnings to be systematically more informative in the 
G F C period in comparison to the pre- and post GFC periods. Other than financial f i rms, 
I find that IBES models generally outperform other models in the pre- and post-GFC 
periods. My CAR results generally support prior studies in respect to IBES being 
informative (Bhattacharya e! at., 2003; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003). However , my 
results also show that G A A P earnings have incremental information content. 
Table 4.14: Summary of BIC Ranking by Model and Sample 
IBES C O R E CE CF 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
Financial 
- Pre-GFC 3 7 3 5 1 6 1 7 
-GFC 4 4 1 3 6 1 6 6 
- Post-GFC 2 6 3 6 4 8 1 5 
Non-Financial 
- Pre-GFC 1 2 3 6 4 7 5 7 
- GFC 4 1 1 1 7 8 6 5 
- Post-GFC 1 2 5 6 4 8 3 7 
S&P 500 
- Pre-GFC 2 1 4 6 3 8 4 7 
GFC 3 3 3 3 7 8 1 1 
- Post-GFC 2 1 5 5 7 8 4 2 
Non-S&P 500 
- Pre-GFC 1 2 3 6 4 8 5 7 
-GFC 2 1 4 3 6 7 7 4 
- Post-GFC 1 2 5 6 4 8 3 7 
S&P 500 and Non-Financial 
- Pre-GFC 2 1 .5 6 3 8 4 7 
- GFC 6 4 3 6 8 1 2 
- Post-GFC 1 2 3 6 5 8 3 7 
Overa l l , my results suggest that investors shift their focus away f rom G A A P earnings 
dur ing the G F C and returned to G A A P earnings in the post-GFC per iod , except for 
large f i rms. In the S & P 500 sample , there is a shift away f rom G A A P earnings dur ing 
the G F C and investors do not f ind G A A P earnings to be informat ive in the post-GFC 
per iod. S im i l a r ly , the results o f the non-S&P 500 sample show G A A P earnings are 
generally in format ive in the pre-GFC period but not dur ing G F C . I f ind the evidence of 
a shift in investors' focus generally consistent with my results in Chapter 3. 
O n the other hand , the results o f the non-S&P 500 and the non-financial sector samples 
provide evidence that investors returned to G A A P earnings in the post-GFC period. 
They f ind G A A P earnings to be more informat ive in relation to n o n - G A A P earnings in 
the post-GFC period relative to the pre-GFC period. A n explanat ion may be that smal ler 
f i rms have fewer alternative sources o f in format ion and investors place greater focus on 
n o n - G A A P earnings. These results show that the G F C affected how in format ive G A A P 
earnings are to investors. 
4.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results from my CAR models are mixed. 1 do not find investors placing greater 
emphasis on G A A P earnings during the GFC. It is argued in the literature that IBES and 
C O R E earnings are more informative than G A A P earnings. My results only partly 
support this argument. I find that IBES earnings models rank higher than other earnings 
models in the non-financial sector, S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 samples in both the pre-
and post-GFC periods but not in the financial sector sample. CORE earnings models, 
however, generally rank below IBES earnings models. 
Similar to my Ohison models' results, possible explanations for the results reported in 
this chapter include the use of quarterly data instead of annual data and the time period 
covered in this study. Additionally, the GFC period is characterised by high volatility 
and uncertainty in the financial market. This will impact my cumulative abnormal 
returns measure, the financial sector sample and the GFC period of my study. 
My results, however, do show that the GFC has an impact on the informativeness of 
G A A P earnings. In relation to RQIa, there is evidence of a shift away from G A A P 
earnings during the GFC. There is also evidence that investors return to G A A P earnings 
in the post-GFC period in the non-S&P 500 and non-financial sector samples, but not in 





In this chapter, I investigate the impact of information asymmetry on the value 
relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings to address RQ2. Specifically, I examine 
whether the level of information asymmetry is systematically associated with the 
emphasis investors place on G A A P and non-GAAP earnings and whether the GFC has 
an impact on this association. 
In Chapter 3 ,1 find evidence that partly supports the findings of prior studies; however, 
it is not evident that IBES or CORE earnings are consistently more value relevant than 
G A A P earnings. My results show that the value relevance of non-GAAP earnings is 
sensitive to sample selection and the period windows used in this study. Similarly, the 
incremental value relevance of GAAP earnings is also sensitive to sample selection and 
period windows. Furthermore, I provide evidence of a shift in investors' emphasis on 
alternative earnings measures between the pre- and post-GFC periods. In summary, my 
results indicate that non-GAAP earnings are value relevant and that GAAP earnings 
have incremental value relevance in the financial sector sample in the pre- and post-
GFC periods. In the non-financial sector and S&P 500 samples, there is a discernible 
shift in investors" focus from the pre-GFC through to the post-GFC period. Non-GAAP 
earnings generally become more statistically significant in the post-GFC period. In the 
non-S&P 500 sample, generally both GAAP and non-GAAP earnings do not have 
incremental value relevance and, of the non-GAAP earnings, only IBES is statistically 
significant in the post-GFC period. 
In this chapter, I investigate the impact of information asymmetry on the results 
reported in Chapter 3. Specifically, I investigate whether there are systematic 
differences in the value relevance of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings between firms 
with a high level of information asymmetry and firms with a low level of information 
asymmetry. If there are systematic differences, it is more likely to be evident in firms 
with extreme levels of information asymmetry. Consequently, I focus on firms with 
either high or low levels of information asymmetry in my analysis. Consistent with 
Maskara and Mullineaux (2011), I construct an information asymmetry index (lAI) to 
12.5 
m e a s u r e the level of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y f o r f i r m s in my s a m p l e . I ass ign f i r m s into 
qu in t i l es based on the lAl.^ ' 
I use t w o d i f f e ren t a p p r o a c h e s to inves t iga te the impac t of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y . In 
the f i r s t a p p r o a c h , I inc lude a d u m m y var iab le ( l A ) w h e r e 1 ind ica tes f i r m s wi th a h igh 
level (quin t i le 5) of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y and 0 indica tes f i r m s with a low level 
(quin t i le 1) of in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y in m y O h l s o n m o d e l . F i rms in qu in t i l es 2 t h rough 
4 are not inc luded in the mode l as I f o c u s on the e x t r e m e leve ls of i n fo rma t ion 
a s y m m e t r y . I a l so inc lude in terac t ions of this d u m m y var iab le with B V , N o n G A A P E 
and D I F F in m y Oh l son m o d e l . I re -es t imate m y mode l and e x a m i n e the impac t of 
i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y on my resul ts . A s this app roach inc ludes in teract ion t e rms in the 
m o d e l , the in terpre ta t ion of the resul ts is d i f fe ren t to the base mode l wi thou t in teract ion 
t e rms . Spec i f i ca l ly , the un ique e f f ec t of the var iab le of interest is the sum of the 
c o e f f i c i e n t s of that v a r i a b l e ' s ma in e f f ec t and interact ion t e r m . For e x a m p l e , the un ique 
e f f e c t of book value of equi ty on share price is the s u m of the c o e f f i c i e n t s of book value 
of equi ty (ma in e f f ec t ) and its interact ion wi th the in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y d u m m y . 
A l s o , the coe f f i c i en t of the interact ion t e rm ref lec ts the marginal e f f e c t of book va lue of 
equi ty w h e n the d u m m y var iable equa l s I . T h e r e f o r e , a pos i t ive (nega t ive ) c o e f f i c i e n t 
on the in teract ion t e rm indicates the increased (dec reased) e f f ec t of book va lue of 
equ i ty . 
In the second a p p r o a c h , I re -es t imate my Ohl son mode l separa te ly fo r f i r m s with a high 
level (quint i le 5) of in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y and f o r f i r m s with a low level (quin t i le I ) of 
i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y , i.e., the level of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is not inc luded as a 
control var iable in the m o d e l . 
M y expec t a t i ons were d i scussed in detail in C h a p t e r 2. In s u m m a r y , I expec t to f i n d a 
c h a n g e in inves to r s ' f o c u s be tween the p r e - G F C per iod , dur ing the G F C and in the post-
G F C per iod . T h e s e per iods ref lect con t ras t ing e c o n o m i c cond i t i ons . Dur ing the G F C , 
e c o n o m i c cond i t i ons are at their mos t e x t r e m e . If inves tors are seek ing m o r e c red ib le 
i n f o r m a t i o n , I expec t to f ind s t ronger resul ts f o r G A A P ea rn ings in the p o s t - G F C per iod 
relat ive to the p r e - G F C per iod . Neve r the l e s s , as d i scussed in C h a p t e r 3 , the d i f f e r en t 
s a m p l e s m a y yield d i f fe ren t resul ts . T h e f inanc ia l sec tor and S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e s are 
c o m p a r a t i v e l y more h o m o g e n e o u s (e .g . , a s ingle sec tor , or only large f i r m s ) re la t ive to 
The con.slruction of the lAI results in a s ignif icant number of ties. W h e n fo rming quint i les , g roups of 
ties are sorted into the next quint i le , i .e.. the ties are not split to obtain equal number of observa t ions per 
quint i le . Consequen t ly , the number of observa t ions per quint i les is not a lways equal . 
the non- f inanc i a l sec tor and n o n - S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e s and this m a y impac t on the resu l t s . 
Pr ior s tud ies (e .g . , Eas iey and O ' H a r a (2004) ) show that inves tors pr ice i n f o r m a t i o n 
r i sk . T h e r e f o r e , 1 expec t to obse rve that high in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is nega t ive ly 
a s soc ia t ed wi th share pr ice . I a l so expec t to obse rve that f i r m s wi th h igh i n f o r m a t i o n 
a s y m m e t r y will be d i s coun ted by inves to r s , i .e. , inves tors will price d o w n the ea rn ings 
of f i r m s wi th h igh in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y . F u r t h e r m o r e , if inves tors are seek ing m o r e 
c red ib le e a r n i n g s i n fo rma t ion (i .e. , G A A P ea rn ings ) to mit igate in fo rma t ion r i sk , I 
e x p e c t to o b s e r v e s t ronger incrementa l va lue re levance of G A A P ea rn ings in the pos t -
G F C per iod re la t ive to the p r e - G F C per iod . 
C o n s i s t e n t wi th C h a p t e r 3 , the c o r r e s p o n d i n g N o n G A A P E m e a s u r e s in Equa t ions 2 .3 
and 2 . 4 in C h a p t e r 2 are I B E S , C O R E , C E and C F in the tables . T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g 
D I F F m e a s u r e s are D I F F l and D I F F 2 fo r Equa t ion 2 .3 (denoted as Mode l 1 in tab les ) 
and Equa t ion 2 . 4 (deno ted as Mode l 2 in tab les) , respec t ive ly . Fu r the rmore , r e f e rences 
to the va lue re levance of n o n - G A A P ea rn ings deno te compara t i ve va lue r e l evance 
b e t w e e n these ea rn ings , i.e., I B E S , C O R E , C E and C F , and r e fe rences to D I F F l , D1FF2 
and G A A P ea rn ings deno te incrementa l value re levance be tween G A A P and non-
G A A P ea rn ings . 
T a b l e 5.1 p resen ts a s u m m a r y of the t w o highes t ranked m o d e l s , with main e f f e c t s and 
in terac t ion t e r m s , f o r all s ample s and per iods that 1 test in this chap te r . It s h o w s that the 
C E m o d e l s genera l ly o u t p e r f o r m other m o d e l s excep t in the f inancia l sec tor s a m p l e . 
T h e e v i d e n c e that the h ighes t ranked model p e r f o r m s much better than the next r anked 
m o d e l s is genera l ly very s t rong . In te res t ing ly , it appea r s that inves tors p lace relat ively 
g rea te r e m p h a s i s on cash ea rn ings a f t e r cont ro l l ing fo r in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y . 
Table 5.1: Summary of Two Highest Ranked Models for All Samples with 
Information Asymmetry Index Dummy and Interaction Terms 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
Model I: P = a„ + /j^fiV;, + ^,NonGAAPE^^ + / 3 , Z ) / f f / , , + ^JA-, 
* s i / . , + ftM * NonGAAPE^, + pJA * DIFFI., + 
Model 2: P = a „ + j i f i V , + P,NonGAAPE^^ + ^,DIFF2., + jiJA., 
+PJA * BV-, + PJA *NimGAAPE-, + p.IA* DIFF2-, + f „ 
I B E S C O R E C E C F 
M o d e l I M o d e l 2 M o d e l I M o d e l 2 M o d e l I M o d e l 2 M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
F i n a n c i a l 
- P r e - C F C 1 2 
(8 ) ( 7 2 ) 
- G F C 2 
( 2 7 ) 
1 
(2 ) 
- P o s t - G F C 1 
( 1 2 ) 
2 
( 3 0 8 ) 
N o n - F i n a n c i a l 
P r e - G F C 1 
m 
2 
( 8 . 3 6 7 ) 
- G F C 1 
( 6 6 ) 
2 
( 1 , 5 5 5 ) 
- P o s l - G F C 1 
( 3 6 7 ) 
2 
( 1 . 9 8 4 ) 
S & P 5 0 0 
- P re G F C 1 
( 3 6 ) 
2 
( 1 . 1 2 9 ) 
- G F C 2 
(I-'52) 
1 
( 2 8 ) 
- P o s t - G F C 2 
(3 ) 
1 
( 4 7 ) 
N o n - S & P 5 0 0 
- P r c - G F C 1 
( 1 4 4 ) 
2 
( 4 . 5 0 9 ) 
- G F C 1 
( 4 7 ) 
2 
( 9 1 5 ) 
- P o s t - G F C 1 
( 3 2 ) 
2 
( 2 9 8 ) 
Models ranked I and 2 by their BIC are shown. The absolute d i f ference in HlC values between the model and the 
next lower ranked model is shown in parentheses. The different grades of e\ ' idence eorresponding to min imum BIC 
dif ference according to Rafter>' (1995) are: 
Min imum BIC Difference of 0; Weak 
Min imum BIC Difference of 2: Positive 
Min imum BIC Dif ference of 6: Strong 
Min imum BIC Dif ference of 10: Ver>- Strong 
The dependent \ 'ariable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
def ined as fol lows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPF, represents the fo l lowing variables for 
IBES. C O R E , C E and C F models: IBES = l /B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per share, af ter adding back depreciation and amort isat ion e.\penses. 
C F = Operat ing cash f lows per share. DIFT represents DIEFl in Model I and DIFF2 in Model 2. DIFFI = G A A P I 
minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings, where G A A P I is earnings per share f rom operat ions adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special i tems reported under G A A P . DIFF2 = G A A P 2 minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings , where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinar) i tems per share reported under G A A P . lA = 1 if the information asymmetry 
mdex ( lAI) quintile is 5 and 0 if the lAI quintile is 1. IA*BV = Interaction term of lAI with book value of c o m m o n 
equity per share. I A * N o n G A A P E = Interaction term of lAI with the corresponding non-CiAAP earnings measure of 
IBES, C O R E , C E and CF. l A ' D I F F = Interaction term of lAI with the corresponding DIFF measure of DIFFI and 
DIFF2. 
T a b l e 5 . 2 p r e s e n t s a s u m m a r y o f m y O h i s o n m o d e l r e g r e s s i o n s f o r e a c h s a m p l e b y 
p e r i o d w i n d o w a n d m o d e l s . T h i s t a b l e h i g h l i g h t s t h e k e y v a r i a b l e s t h a t a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t a t p = 0 . 0 5 o r s t r o n g e r . T h e n e g a t i v e s i g n o f s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s a r e 
i n d i c a t e d in b r a c k e t s . 
T a b l e 5 . 2 : S u m m a r y o f S i g n i f i c a n t K e y V a r i a b l e s f o r M u l t i v a r i a t e O L S 
R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s b y S a m p l e , M o d e l s a n d H i g h / L o w I n f o r m a t i o n 
A s y m m e t r y I n d e x Q u i n t i l e s 
Model 1: /;, = a„ + + PMmGAAPE^, + ji.DIFFl-, + 
Model 2: P„=a^ + + ji,NonGAAPE^^ + p,DIFF2„ + £„ 
Pane l A: F i n a n c i a l Sec to r S a m p l e 
Pre-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
lA Quinlile BV NonCiAAPE DIFFI BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES LOH sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
CORH Low sig sig 
Higli sig sig -sig 
CK Lou sig sig (-) sig s ig ( - ) 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C F Lou sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
lA Quinlile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFI BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Lou sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig 
C O R E Lou sig sig 
High sig sig sig 
C E Lou 
High sig sig (-) sig 
C F L o u sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
Posl-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
lA Quinlile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFI BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Lou sig sig s ig ( - ) 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C O R E L o u sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C E I^ow sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C F L o u sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
Panel B: Non-Financial Sector Sample 
Pre-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
lA Quimile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig 
High sig s ig ( - ) sig (-) sig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) 
CORK Low sig sig sig 
High sig s ig ( - ) s i g ( - ) sig s i g ( - ) sig 
C E Low sig sig sig 
High sig s ig ( - ) s i g ( - ) sig sig (-) 
C F Low sig sig 
High sig sig (-) sig (-) sig 
GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
lA Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DlFF l BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig s i g ( - ) sig sig s i g ( - ) 
High sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig s i g ( - ) sig sig (-) sig 
High sig sig 
("E Low sig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C F Low sig s i g ( - ) sig (-) sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
Posr-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
lA Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low- sig sig sig sig s i g ( - ) sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
CE Low sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C F Low sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
Panel C: S & P 500 Sample 
Pre-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
lA Quinli le BV N o n G A A I ' E DIKEl BV N o n G A A P E D1EE2 
IBES Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig s i g ( - ) 
T O R E Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C B Lou- sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C P Low sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
lA Quinli le BV NonGAAI 'E DIEEl BV N o n G A A P E D1EF2 
IBES Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
CORK 1 ,o\v sig sig 
High sig sig 
C E Low sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
C F Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
Post-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
lA Quinlile BV N o n G A A P E DlEEl BV N o n G A A P E DIEE2 
IBES Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low- sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C E Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
CE Low- sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
P a n e l D : N o n - S & P 5 0 0 S a m p l e 
Pre-GFC 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
lA Q u i n t i l e BV N o n G A A P E D I F F l B V N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 
I B E S L o w sig sig sig 
H igh •sig sig ( - ) s ig ( - ) s ig 
C O R K L o u sig sig s ig s ig 
High sig s i g ( - ) s ig s i g ( - ) 
C E L o w sig sig 
H igh sig s i g ( - ) s ig ( - ) s ig sig ( - ) 
C E L o w sig s ig 
H igh sig s i g ( - ) s ig ( - ) s ig sig ( - ) s ig ( - ) 
GFC 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
lA Quin t i l e BV N o n G A A P E D I F F l B V N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 
I B E S L o w sig sig ( - ) s ig sig ( - ) 
H igh sig sig s ig 
C O R E Low sig sig ( - ) s ig s i g ( - ) s ig 
High sig s ig 
C E L o w sig s ig (-) s ig ( - ) s ig sig ( - ) 
H igh sig sig sig sig 
C F L o w sig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) s ig sig ( - ) s i g ( - ) 
High sig sig sig s ig s ig sig 
Post-GFC 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
lA Quin t i l e BV N o n G A A P E D I F F l BV N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 
I B E S Low sig sig s ig s ig s i g ( - ) 
High sig sig sig s ig sig 
C O R E L o w s ig sig sig sig 
High sig sig s ig sig sig 
C E Low sig sig sig sig 
H igh sig s ig sig s ig 
C F L o w sig sig sig s ig s ig sig 
High sig sig sig s ig 
sig indicates Ihe variable is slalislically significant and positive at p = 0.05 or stronger, sig {-) indicates the variable is 
statistically significant and negative at p = 0.05 or stronger. The dependent variable, P, is closing share price at 
earnings announcement date. The independent variables are defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity 
per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for IBES, CORE, C E and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S 
earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per 
share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFFl = 
GAAPI minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPI is earnings per share from operations adjusted to 
exclude the effects of .special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, 
where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. lA = information asymmetry 
index (lAI) quintile, which is the average of six commonly used measures of information asymmetry (normalised 
analysts' forecast errors, dispersion of analysts forecast, volatility of residual returns, volatility of abnormal returns 
around earnings announcements, firm age and bid-ask spreads). Low and High indicate low information asymmetry 
and high information asymmetry, respectively. 
My results show that the G F C and information asymmetry have an impact on the value 
relevance of G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings. My key f indings are that: G A A P earnings 
have incremental information content; the peak of the G F C caused a shift in investors' 
emphasis on both G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings; and the extreme levels of 
information asymmetry affect the value relevance of G A A P and non -GAAP earnings 
different ly . Overal l , I find that G A A P earnings have incremental value relevance over 
n o n - G A A P earnings, however, this is conditioned by the level of information 
asymmetry . Both G A A P and non -GAAP earnings attain stronger statistical significance 
and are relatively more value relevant at a high level of information asymmetry in the 
post -GFC period, in comparison to the pre-GFC period, for the non-financial and non-
S & P 500 samples (Panel B and Panel D). However , after the GFC, non -GAAP earnings 
are value relevant across most levels of information asymmetry in these two samples. 
Furthermore, 1 find that that the positive or negative effect of information on share price 
is sensitive to the period window and sample selection. I also find an increase in 
investor emphasis on non-GAAP earnings in the post-GFC period in comparison the 
pre-GFC period. Finally, I find a shift in investors' emphasis on G A A P earnings that is 
consistent with G A A P earnings being perceived as more credible and reliable. 
5.2 RESULTS 
5.2 . / Financial Sector Sample 
5.2.1.1 Model Estimation with Main Effects and Interaction Terms 
Table 5.3 shows the financial sector sample estimation results for models with main 
effects and interaction terms. All models are statistically significant across all period 
windows. In the pre-GFC period, BV is strongly significant across all models. IBES and 
C F are marginally significant, however , C O R E and CE are not significant. DIFFl and 
DIFF2 are marginally significant only in relation to CE and CF. lA is strongly 
significant and negative in relation to IBES and C F but only marginally significant and 
negative in relation to CORE. The results of the main effects show that investors are 
focused on the book value of net assets during the pre-GFC period. As expected, high 
information asymmetry is negatively related to share price. Furthermore, the interaction 
term, IA*BV, is statistically significant indicating that the book value of net assets is 
incrementally value relevant when information asymmetry is high. I A * N o n G A A P E is 
only statistically significant in relation to CE, and IA*DIFF is only statistically 
significant in relation to C O R E and CE. The IBES and C F models are ranked highest 
and lowest , respectively, based on BIC. 
Table 5.3: Ohlson Model: Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression at Earnings Announcement Date by Models with 
Information Asymmetry Index Dummy and Interaction Terms as 
Controls 
Model 1: f = + ji^BV^ + ^MmGAAPE^ + l),DIFFI., + ^JA., 
+PJA * BV., + PJA * NonGAAPE,, + /3,M * DIFFl,, + e, 
Model 2: P = a„ + ftBV + P,NonGAAPE^^ + p,DIFF2^, + PJA., 
+I)JA • BV., + PJA * NonGAAPE-, + PJA* DIFF2-, + £„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 
CE 
I Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV () .943'" 0.939""" 1.323"" 1.322""" 1.332""" 1.343'"" 0.870""' 0 . 8 3 9 " ' 
(4.50) (4.33) (10.02) (10.06) (11.44) (11.52) (3.85) (3.5.1) 
NonGAAPE 12.727" 12.924" 6.51 1 6.51 1 1.770 1.616 9.120 9.936" 
(2.36) (2..M) (1.15) (1.15) (0.58) (0.52) (1.94) (2.01) 
DIFF -4.874 -3.634 -2.469 0.330 -14.317" -15.104" 9.013 9 .796 ' 
(-0.70) (-0.55) (-0.47) (0.06) (-2.22) (-2.27) (1.91) (1.97) 
lA -10.516"" -10 .671"" -6.864" -5.591 -1.265 -1.557 -12.916"" - 1 2 . 6 2 3 " ' 
(-3.99) (-4.04) (-1.97) (-1.-56) (-0.52) (-0.59) (-3.86) (-3.83) 
lA 'BV 0.530" 0.521" 0.212 0.288 - 0 4 1 6 -0.292 0.488"" 0.523"" 
(2.57) (2.46) (1.00) (1.11) (-1.71) (-1..39) (2.70) (2.86) 
lA 'NonGAAPK -5.933 -5.824 -3.551 -6.320 14.140"" 10.572' 2.572 1.354 
(-1.02) (-0.98) (-0.52) (-0.86) (2.72) (2.49) (0.42) (0.23) 
l A D I F F -3.176 -2.320 27.600""" 12.205 24.069"' 22 .511" 1.940 0.766 
(-0.34) (-0.25) (4.70) (1.-54) (3.08) (3.13) (0.32) (0.13) 
Intercept 13.798"" 13.896""* 10.060"" 9.983"'" 9 . 7 2 0 " ' 9 . 9 2 7 " ' 17.583""" 17 .475" ' 
(5.45) (5.46) (3.-57) (3.51) (4.65) (4.69) (4..50) (4.57) 
N 1.573 1573 1568 1.568 161 1 1611 1627 1627 
Ad j 0.8967 0.8961 0.9024 0.8900 0.8687 0.8645 0.8628 0.8627 
BIC 14271 14279 14351 14538 14923 14973 15475 15477 
BIC Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Panel B: G F C Period 
IBES C O R E CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0.118 0.113 0.321 0.319 0.427 0.425 0.552"" 0 . 5 4 3 " ' 
(0.64) (0.62) (1.88) (1.92) (1.47) (1.45) (4.97) (4.87) 
NOHGAAPF: 36.635"" 37 .078" 27.280"" 27 .570" 24.270 24.371 4 .004 4.526 
(3.07) (3.10) (2.67) (2.71) (1.66) (1.66) (1.78) (1.93) 
DIFF 8.024" 9.091" 7.905 9.660 -1.331 -0.645 3.376' 3.892' 
(2.18) (2.22) (1.18) (1.23) (-0.15) (-0.07) (2.34) (2.43) 
LA -13.5.54""" -13.444"" -16.125"" -16.104"" - 9 . 9 2 7 " ' - 1 0 . 4 9 8 ' " -20.022"" -19.8.55'" 
(-4.23) (-4.33) (-4.63) (-4.52) (-3..56) (-3.91) (-4.67) (-4.71) 
I A B V 0.927""" 0 . 9 6 0 " ' 0 . 7 0 9 ' " 0 . 7 4 1 ' " 0 .575' 0 .606 ' 0 . 4 9 3 ' " 0 . 5 0 8 " ' 
(4.42) (4.56) (3.72) (3.82) (2.03) (2.09) (4.94) (5.20) 
lA 'NonGAAPK -36.626"" -37.064"" -27 .226" -27 .480" -24.175 -24.175 -4.033 -4.486 
(-3.09) (-3.12) (-2.67) (-2.71) (-1.65) (-1.63) (-1.68) (-1.76) 
l A D l F F -7.355" -7.656" -7.677 -8.563 -2.228 0.063 -3.098 -3.539 
(-2.22) (-2.04) (-1.22) (-1.14) (-0.28) (0.02) (-1.92) (-1.95) 
Intercept 18.395""" 17.977"" 2 0 . 6 6 7 " ' 2 0 . 1 1 1 ' " 15 .540" ' 15.636"" 2 5 . 9 2 7 ' " 2 5 . 7 4 4 ' " 
(6.94) (6.87) (7.64) (7.47) (5.96) (5.96) (6.37) (6.40) 
N 466 466 471 471 463 463 472 472 
Ad j 0.8624 0 .8639 0.8510 0.8520 0.8565 0.8552 0 .8796 0.8800 
BIC 4335 4330 4413 4410 4354 4358 4303 4301 
BIC Rank 4 3 8 7 5 6 2 1 
Panel C: Post-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O R E 
Model I Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0,872'" 0.870"' 0.921"' 0.918"' 0.966"' 0 .968" 0.900"' 0.9()()'" 
(9.56) (9.74) (8.76) (8.95) (8.86) (9.10) (7.48) (7.51) 
NonGAAPK 4..169 4.612 2.174 2.666 -0.718 -0.585 1.415 1.415 
(1.6.1) (1.72) (1.10) (1.24) (-0.29) (-0.24) (0.51) (0.55) 
DIFF -4.02.1 -4.061' -4.074 -4.212 -1.880 -4.416 1.070 1.092 
(-1.86) (-1.98) (-1.66) (-1.68) (-1.17) (-1.-16) (0.18) (0.40) 
lA -6.262 -6.458 -5.919 -6.015 -I.0I4 1.542 -2.205 -2.576 
(-1.86) (-1.86) (-I..S2) (-l..'>2) (-0.11) (0.41) (-0.48) (-0.58) 
l A B V -0.152 -0.156 -0.210 -0.214 -0.447"' -0.572"' -0.182' -0.172' 
(-1.28) (-1.26) (-1.40) (-I..19) (-1.71) (-1.95) (-2.16) (-2.12) 
lA'NonCJAAPH 0.224 -0.264 2.285 1.770 4.957 1.494 1.520 1.476 
(0.07) (-0.08) (0.86) (0.68) (1.90) (1..57) (0.47) (0.49) 
lAD IFF 7.815" 7.466" 7.999" 7.586" 6.947' 5.142 2.180 2.212 
(.1.12) (2.95) (2.74) (1.07) (2.00) (1.51) (0.65) (0.71) 
Intercept 11.577"' 11.601"" 11..574"' 11.598'" 12.281'" 12.200"" 11.861"" 11.8.54"' 
(5.11) (5.19) (4.65) (4.69) (4.09) (4.09) (4.49) (4.50) 
N 1380 1.180 1.181 1.181 11.14 11.14 1.150 11.50 
Adj R- 0.7697 0.7670 0.7615 0.7609 0.7691 0.7660 0.7567 0.7569 
BIC 12276 12100 12.164 12186 11828 11840 12148 12151 
BIC Rank 5 6 7 8 1 2 1 4 
• p <0 . 05 , " p <0 . 01 . " ' p <0.001 
I statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. N o n G A A P E represents the following variables for 
IBES , C O R E , CE and CE models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E -
S&P Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CE = Operating cash flows per share. DIEF represents D lFE l in Model I and DIEE2 in Model 2. D lEE l = G A A P I 
minus the relev ant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P I is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under G A A P . DIEE2 = G A A P 2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnmgs, where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under G A A P . lA = 1 if the information asvmmetry 
index ( lA l ) quintile is ."i and 0 if the lA l quintile is 1. 1A*BV = Interaction term of lA l with book value of common 
equity per share. l A * N o n G A A P E = Interaction term of lAI with the corresponding non-GAAP earnings measure of 
IBES , C O R E , C E and CF. l A ' D I F E = Interaction term of lA l with the corresponding DIEF measure of D IFF I and 
D1FF2. 
The results show that investors are generally more focused on the book value of net 
assets than earnings in the pre-GFC period. When informat ion asymmetry is h igh , the 
results indicate that investors generally increase their focus on the book value o f net 
assets in the pre-GFC period. 
Dur i ng the G F C . B V is on ly statistically signif icant in relation to C F . I B E S and C O R E 
are moderately s igni f icant . D I F F I and D I F F 2 are on ly marg ina l ly s ignif icant in relation 
to I B E S and C F . l A is strongly signif icant and negative across all mode ls . I A * B V is 
statistically signif icant and positive across all models . I A * N o n G A A P E is moderately 
s igni f icant and negative in relation to I B E S and C O R E , and I A * D I F F is on ly margina l ly 
s igni f icant and negative in relation to I B E S . These results show a shift in the emphasis 
investors place on the book value o f net assets and earnings. The results for B V and 
I A * B V show that investors f ind the book value of net assets to be more value relevant 
1.15 
w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh but not w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is l o w , 
excep t in relat ion to C F . 
G A A P ea rn ings , h o w e v e r , are inc rementa l ly va lue re levant in relat ion to I B E S at both 
h igh and low levels of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y . T h e nega t ive sign of j i i s h o w s that 
inves tors dec rease thei r f o c u s on G A A P ea rn ings w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , P i + I h r ema ins pos i t ive indica t ing G A A P ea rn ings are inc rementa l ly 
va lue re levant w h e n in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh . T h e C F m o d e l s p e r f o r m best based 
on B I C , ind ica t ing that inves tors are f o c u s e d on cash f l o w s du r ing the G F C . 
T h e resul ts f o r the p o s t - G F C per iod show ano the r sh i f t in inves to r s ' e m p h a s i s . BV is 
s t rongly s ign i f ican t across all m o d e l s , h o w e v e r , I A * B V is only stat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t 
in relat ion to C E and C F . lA and D I F F are genera l ly not s ign i f i can t ac ros s all m o d e l s . 
1A*DIFF , h o w e v e r , is marg ina l ly to modera t e ly s ign i f ican t and posi t ive in relat ion to 
I B E S , C O R E and C E . T h i s indicates that G A A P ea rn ings are inc rementa l ly va lue 
re levant and that inves tors p lace relat ively grea ter e m p h a s i s on G A A P e a r n i n g s w h e n 
in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is high than w h e n it is l ow. T h e C E m o d e l s p e r f o r m bes t , 
f o l l o w e d by the C F m o d e l s , based on BIC , wh ich indicates that inves tors are pr imar i ly 
f o c u s e d on cash -based ea rn ings in the p o s t - G F C per iod . 
5.2.1.2 Model Estimation by Low and High Information Asymmetry 
T a b l e 5 . 4 presents the f inancia l sector s a m p l e es t imat ion resul ts , by low and high 
in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y , f o r each n o n - G A A P ea rn ings m e a s u r e . All m o d e l s are s t rongly 
s ign i f ican t . 
In the p r e - G F C per iod , the resul ts f o r n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are subs tan t ia l ly s imi lar in 
both Mode l 1 and Mode l 2 . I B E S and C F are genera l ly s ign i f ican t but C O R E is not 
s ign i f ican t at both high and low levels of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y . C E is s ign i f i can t only 
when in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh . D I F F l is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t , ind ica t ing that 
G A A P ea rn ings have incrementa l va lue r e l evance in relat ion to C O R E , C E and C F in 
Mode l I , w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh . T h e resul ts f o r D I F F I and D I F F 2 , in 
relat ion to C O R E and C E , h o w e v e r , s h o w d i f f e r e n c e s be tween Mode l I and Mode l 2 . 
Table 5.4: Ohlson Model: Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and 
High/Low Information Asymmetry Index Quintiles 
Model 1: P, = a„ + /3,SV, + ji^NoiiGAAPE^^ + pfilFFI,, + 
Model 2: P = «„ + li,BV, + ^,NonGAAPE^, + P OIFFI., + 
Panel A: Pre-GFC - Model I 
lA Quinti le BV N o n G A A P E DIEEI Intercept N Ad j R-
IBKS Low 0.943*** 12.727* -4.874 13.798*** 880 0.7611 
High 1.472*** 6.794* -8.049 3.282 693 0.9299 
C O R E Low 1.323*** 6.511 -2.469 10.060*** 859 0.7725 
High 1.535*** 2.960 25.131*** 3.196 709 0.9322 
C E Low 1.332*** 1.770 -14.317* 9.720*** 887 0.7664 
High 0.916*** 15.910*** 9.752** 8.455*** 724 0.8911 
CE Low- 0.870*** 9.120 9.013 17.583*** 894 0.6348 
High 1.358*** 1 1.692* 10.954* 4.667* 733 0.8964 
Panel B: Pre-GFC -Model 2 
lA Quinti le BV N o n G A A P E D1FE2 Intercept N Ad j R ' 
IBES Low 0.939*** 12.924* -3.634 13.896*** 880 0.7601 
High 1.460*** 7.100* -5.9.54 3.226 693 0.9294 
C O R E Low 1.322*** 6.511 0.3.30 9.983*** 859 0.7724 
High 1.610*** 0.192 12.535 4.392 709 0.9171 
C E Low 1.343*** 1.616 -15.104* 9.927*** 887 0.7661 
High 1.051*** 12.188*** 7.407 8.370*** 724 0.8861 
CE Low 0.839*** 9.936* 9.796* 17.475*** 894 0.6373 
High 1.362*** 1 1.290* 10.562* 4.852* 733 0.8959 
Panel C; GFC - Model 1 
lA Quinti le BV N o n G A A P E DIEEI Intercept N Ad j R-
IBES Low 0.1 18 36.635** 8.024* 18.395*** 247 0.6403 
High 1.044*** 0.009 0.670 4.842 219 0.9329 
C O R E Low 0.321 27.280** 7.905 20.667*** 255 0.5938 
High 1.030*** 0.054 0.229 4.542 216 0.9336 
C E Low 0.427 24.270 -1.331 15.540*** 247 0.5785 
High 1.002*** 0.094 -3.560* 5.613* 216 0.9325 
CE Low 0.552*** 4.004 3.376* 25.927*** 261 0.3476 
High 1.045*** -0.029 0.279 5.906* 211 0.9458 
Panel D : GFC - Model 2 
lA Quinti le BV N o n G A A P E DIEE2 Intercept N Ad j R-
IBES Low 0.113 37.078** 9.091* 17.977*** 247 0.6429 
High 1.073*** 0.014 1.435** 4.533 219 0.9.U1 
C O R E Low- 0.319 27.570** 9.660 20.111*** 255 0.5962 
High 1.060*** 0.091 1.097*** 4.007 216 0.9342 
C E Low- 0.425 24.371 -0.645 15.636*** 247 0.5784 
High 1.031 * * * 0,196 -0.582 5.139* 216 0.9309 
CE Low- 0.543*** 4.526 3.892* 25.744*** 261 0..3489 
High 1.051*** 0.041 0.352 5.890* 211 0.9460 
P a n e l E: P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 1 
lA Q u i n t i l e B V N o n C i A A P E D I E E l In te rcep t N A d i R-
I B E S L o w 0 . 8 7 2 * * * 4 . 3 6 9 - 4 . 0 2 3 1 3 . 5 7 7 * * * 891 0 . 7 4 2 6 
High 0 . 7 2 0 * * * 4 . 5 9 3 * * 3 . 7 9 2 * * * 7 . 3 1 4 * * * 4 8 9 0 . 8 2 3 0 
C O R K L o w 0 . 9 2 1 * * * 2 . 3 7 4 - 4 . 0 7 4 13. .574*** 8 9 2 0 . 7 4 4 4 
H i g h 0 . 7 1 1 * * * 4 . 6 5 9 * * * 3 . 9 2 5 * * * 7 .6 .54*** 4 8 9 0 . 7 9 9 4 
C E Low- 0 . 9 6 6 * * * - 0 . 7 1 8 - 3 . 8 8 0 1 2 . 2 8 1 * * * 8 8 3 0 . 7 6 3 3 
High 0 . 5 2 0 * * * 4 . 2 3 9 * * * 3 . 0 6 6 * * * 1 1 . 2 6 8 * * * 451 0 . 7 6 4 3 
C F L o w 0 . 9 0 0 * * * 1 4 1 5 1 .070 1 3 . 8 6 1 * * * 8 8 4 0 . 7 7 2 2 
High 0 . 5 1 8 * * * 2 . 9 3 5 * * * 3 . 2 4 9 * * * 1 1 . 6 5 6 * * * 4 6 6 0 . 5 0 0 0 
P a n e l F: P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 2 
lA Quin t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 In te rcept N A d i K ' 
I B E S l^ow 0 . 8 7 0 * * * 4 . 6 1 2 - 4 . 0 6 1 * 1 3 . 6 0 1 * * * 891 0 . 7 4 2 9 
High 0 . 7 1 4 * * * 4 . 3 4 8 * * 3 . 4 0 5 * * * 7 . 1 4 2 * * * 4 8 9 0 . 8 1 2 9 
C O R E Low 0 . 9 1 8 * * * 2 . 6 6 6 - 4 . 2 3 2 1 3 . 5 9 8 * * * 8 9 2 0 . 7 4 4 8 
High 0 . 7 0 4 * * * 4 .4 .^6*** 3.3.54 7 . 5 6 4 * * * 4 8 9 0 . 7 8 8 8 
C E Low 0 . 9 6 8 * * * - 0 . 5 8 5 - 4 . 4 3 6 1 2 . 2 0 0 * * * 8 8 3 0 . 7 6 3 8 
High 0 . .^95*** 2 . 9 1 0 * * * 0 . 7 0 6 1 3 . 7 4 3 * * * 4 5 1 0.7.181 
C F L o w 0 . 9 0 0 * * * 1.435 1.092 13.8.54*** 8 8 4 0 . 7 7 2 2 
H i g h 0 . 5 2 8 * * * 2 . 9 1 1 * * * 3 . 3 2 4 * * * 1 1 . 2 7 8 * * * 4 6 6 0 . 5 0 2 5 
• p < 0 . 0 5 , " p < O . O I , " ' p<O.OOI 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable. P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES. CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFFI = GAAPl minus the rele\ant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPI is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to e.xclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = 
GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A f ^ is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under GAAP. lA quintile is Low if the information asymmetry index (lAI) quintile is 1 and High if the lAI 
quintile is 5. 
G A A P e a r n i n g s a r e s i g n i f i c a n t w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y i s l i i g h i n M o d e l 1 b u t i s 
n o t s i g n i f i c a n t i n M o d e l 2 . I n r e l a t i o n t o C F , G A A P e a r n i n g s a r e n o t s i g n i f i c a n t w h e n 
i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y i s l o w i n M o d e l 1 b u t i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n M o d e l 2 . A l s o , b o t h 
D I F F I a n d D I F F 2 a r e w e a k l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d n e g a t i v e in r e l a t i o n t o C E w h e n 
i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y i s l o w . 
P a n e l s C a n d D p r e s e n t t h e r e s u l t s f o r t h e G F C p e r i o d . T h e r e i s s o m e e v i d e n c e o f a s h i f t 
i n i n v e s t o r s ' f o c u s i n t h i s p e r i o d . G A A P e a r n i n g s , i n r e l a t i o n t o I B E S , a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t a n d h a v e i n c r e m e n t a l v a l u e r e l e v a n c e a t l o w l e v e l o f i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y 
i n t h e G F C p e r i o d . T h i s i s i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e p r e v i o u s p e r i o d w h e r e D I F F I i s n o t 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . T h e r e s u l t s a l s o i n d i c a t e t h a t G A A P e a r n i n g s h a v e i n c r e m e n t a l 
v a l u e r e l e v a n c e i n r e l a t i o n t o C F a t a l o w l e v e l o f i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y . O n t h e o t h e r 
h a n d , D I F F I i s s i g n i f i c a n t a n d n e g a t i v e i n r e l a t i o n t o C E a n d D I F F 2 i s s i g n i f i c a n t a n d 
p o s i t i v e in r e l a t i o n t o C O R E a t a h i g h l e v e l o f i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y . 
T h e resul t s f o r the p o s t - G F C per iod are p resen ted in Pane l s E and F. For both M o d e l I 
and M o d e l 2 , all n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n 
a s y m m e t r y is h igh . A d d i t i o n a l l y , in Panel E , there is e v i d e n c e that w h e n in fo rma t ion 
a s y m m e t r y is h igh , G A A P ea rn ings are inc rementa l ly va lue re levant ; D I F F I is s t rongly 
s ign i f i can t is re lat ion to all n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . In Pane l s E and F, D I F F I and D I F F 2 
are not s ign i f i can t w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is low excep t f o r D1FF2 in relat ion to 
I B E S . In te res t ing ly , the s ign of the stat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t D I F F 2 is nega t ive w h e n 
i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is l ow. W h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh , h o w e v e r , all 
s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t D I F F I and D I F F 2 are pos i t ive . 
T h e resul ts genera l ly indicate an a s y m m e t r i c e m p h a s i s on G A A P ea rn ings by inves tors 
in re la t ion to I B E S , C O R E and C E in the pre- and p o s t - G F C per iods . Tha t is, D I F F I 
and D I F F 2 are nega t ive w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is low and are posi t ive w h e n 
i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is h igh . Recall that D I F F I and D I F F 2 are c o m p u t e d as G A A P 
e a r n i n g s less n o n - G A A P ea rn ings , t he r e fo re , nega t ive va lues of D I F F I and D I F F 2 
indica te G A A P e a r n i n g s , wh ich are genera l ly c loser to, or less t han , n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s . Inves tors m a y view the incrementa l va lue re levance of G A A P ea rn ings 
d i f f e r en t l y sub jec t to the level of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y . A n exp lana t ion is that w h e n 
i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is l ow , inves tors p lace grea te r e m p h a s i s on G A A P ea rn ings , 
w h i c h are genera l ly c lose r to , or less than n o n - G A A P ea rn ings , i .e. , nega t ive ly 
s ign i f i can t D I F F I or D1FF2. O n the o ther h a n d , w h e n in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh , 
G A A P e a r n i n g s are inc remen ta l ly va lue re levant no twi th s t and ing the compara t i ve ly 
h ighe r va lues of G A A P ea rn ings , as ev idenced by the posi t ive sign on D I F F I and 
D I F F 2 . T h e s e resul ts are cons i s ten t wi th inves tors f i n d i n g G A A P ea rn ings 
i nc r emen ta l l y va lue re levant because of the credibi l i ty and rel iabil i ty of G A A P 
e a r n i n g s . 
A l s o , recall that D I F F I is measu red us ing G A A P ea rn ings f r o m opera t ions ad ju s t ed to 
e x c l u d e specia l i t ems . T h e r e f o r e , this G A A P ea rn ings m e a s u r e is m o r e c lose ly a l igned 
wi th I B E S and C O R E , and these three ea rn ings m e a s u r e s are a rgued to bet ter re f lec t 
r ecur r ing e a r n i n g s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , D I F F I b iases the resul ts aga ins t f i n d i n g s ign i f i cance 
in inc rementa l va lue r e l evance of G A A P ea rn ings in relat ion to I B E S and C O R E . 
I f i nd s imi la r resul ts wi th Mode l 2 f o r IBES and C F but not f o r C O R E and C E . T h e 
resul t s f o r M o d e l 2 in Panel F s h o w D I F F 2 is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive in 
relation to IBES and C F when information asymmetry is iiigh. DIFF2 is not statistically 
significant in relation to C O R E and CE. 
The results generally show that investors primarily focus on the book value of net assets 
when valuing financial f i rms across all sub-periods. However , during the G F C , the 
IBES and C O R E models show that investors are focused on earnings when information 
asymmetry is low. 
5.2.2 Non-Financial Sector Sample 
5.2.2.1 Model Estimation with Main Effect.and Interaction Terms 
Table 5.5 shows the estimation results of the non-financial sector sample for models 
with main effects and interaction terms. All models are statistically significant. 
In the pre-GFC period, BV is strongly significant across all models, however, non-
G A A P earnings and lA are generally not statistically significant. G A A P earnings 
(Model 2) have incremental value relevance only in relation to C O R E and CE. IA*BV 
is not significant for all alternative earnings measures. IA*NonGAAPE is marginally to 
moderately significant and negative in relation to IBES. C O R E and CE. IA*DIFF is 
marginally significant and negative in relation to CORE, C E and CF. These results 
show that investors place strong emphasis on the book value of net assets. Nevertheless, 
when information asymmetry is high, IBES, C O R E and CE are value relevant, but the 
negative sign indicates these earnings have a negative impact on share price. G A A P 
earnings are also incrementally value relevant in relation to CORE, CE and C F when 
information asymmetry is high. However , the negative sign and the magnitude of the 
interaction terms of non-GAAP and G A A P earnings indicate that investors price down 
the f irm when information asymmetry is high. 
During the GFC, investors continued to place strong emphasis on the book value of net 
assets. The results also show that investors placed comparatively greater emphasis on 
G A A P and non-GAAP earnings during the G F C relative to the pre-GFC period. IBES is 
strongly significant and positive but C O R E , CE and C F are marginally to moderately 
significant and negative. G A A P earnings are moderately to strongly significant and 
generally negative in relation to IBES (Models I and 2), CE (Model 1) and C F (Model 
1), but it is positive in relation to C O R E (Model 2). lA is generally not statistically 
significant. 
Table 5.5: Ohlson Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression at Earnings Announcement Date by Models with 
Information Asymmetry Index Dummy and Interaction Terms as 
Controls 
Model + /3,eV + ,^NonGAAPE^  + /,, + J^A,, 
+ISJA * BV„ + AM * NonGMPE-, + p.lA* DIFFI-, + £„ 
Model 2: P = Cf„ + P^ BV + ^ ,NonGAAPE^ ^ + ^ filFFl^, + PJA^ , 
+PJA* BV„ + j3jA * NonGAAPE-, + /3 JA • DIFF2., + £„ 
Panel A; Pre -GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O R E 
Model I Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 2 . i o r " 2.151"" 2 . 1 1 8 " ' 2 .228"" 2 . 4 4 6 " ' 2.619""" 2 . 3 8 4 " ' 2.388""" 
(5.45) (5.74) (7.79) (7.53) (7.04) (7.17) (8.01) (8.06) 
N o n G A A P E 7 3 2 8 7.125 3.764 2.447 3.688 4.511 2.012 2.153 
(0.96) (0.93) (0.69) (0.44) (0.68) (0.95) (0.45) (0.52) 
DIFF -4.293 -1.553 37.724 13.976"" 8.818 18.018" 2.678 2.839 
(-0.95) (-0.43) (1.93) (2.73) (1.16) (2.05) (0.56) (0.68) 
lA 7 .055 ' 5.185 6.658 4.881 5.707 3.153 7.552 5.896 
(2.05) (1.53) (1.87) (1.32) (1.39) (0.74) (1.91) (1.39) 
l A B V -0.482 -0.287 -0.488 -0.630 - 0 4 3 2 -0 .434 -0.647 -0.543 
(-1.21) (-0.69) (-1.58) (-1.66) (-0.99) (-0.75) (-1.63) (-1.22) 
l A ' N o n G A A P E -17.102 ' -16.713" -15 .440" -10.668 -14.,345" -9.713 -11.208 -6.872 
(-236) (-2.16) (-2.68) (-1.85) (-2..38) (-1.81) (-1.90) (-1.31) 
l A ' D l F F -11.914 -7.528 -46.436 ' -3.745 -20.072" -21.830 ' -12.954 ' -8 .944 
(-1.96) (-1.70) (-2.33) (-0.57) (-2.41) (-2.11) (-2.24) (-1.81) 
Intercept 2.741 2.313 2.228 2.838 1.496 1.721 1.899 1.887 
(0.83) (0.74) (0.66) (0.86) (0.42) (0.53) (0.57) (0.59) 
N 13283 13283 13170 13170 12226 12226 13104 13104 
A d j R- 0 .6784 0 .6673 0.6704 0.6625 0.6728 0.6714 0.6788 0.6730 
BIC 124180 124632 123693 124007 115069 115122 123489 123725 
BIC Rank 7 8 4 6 1 2 3 5 
Panel B; G F C Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1 .403 ' " 1 . 4 4 9 " 1.726"" 1.679'"" 1.546""" 1.645""" 1.703'"" 1.710""" 
(9.93) (8.47) (10.51) (13.04) (14.98) (11.31) (10.48) (10.36) 
N o n G A A P E 12 .413" ' 1 1 .070 ' " -1.717' -1.905"" -2 .407" -1.711 -1.762" -1.281 
(4.57) (4.55) (-2.38) (-2.80) (-3.08) (-1.83) (-2.38) (-1.22) 
D I F F - 5 . 2 3 3 ' " - 3 . 9 7 1 " ' -7.048 5 .574" -4 .415" 2.686 -1.827"" -1.228 
(-14.68) (-4.10) (-1.39) (2.59) (-2.72) (0.56) (-2.71) (-1.14) 
lA -3.521 -2.938 -5.093 -6.081' 1.780 1.714 -0.065 0.564 
(-1.09) (-1.00) (-1.77) (-2.17) (1.74) (1.84) (-0.03) (0.22) 
l A B V 0.163 0.1 11 -0.146 -0.121 -0.861""" -0.901'"" -0 .759" -0 .625 ' 
(0.61) (0.43) (-0.52) (-0.47) (-8 ..35) (-5.93) (-3.20) (-2.37) 
l A N o n G A A P H -15 .809 ' -13.780" -1.559 -0.423 7.748""" 4.209""" 11.506" 6 . 1 6 3 " 
(-2.22) (-2.49) (-0.31) (-0.09) (3.73) (3.45) (3.02) (2.77) 
l A D l F F 2.053 6 . ( )60 '" -1 .337 -3.312 8 . 4 3 1 " -2.332 10.478" 4 . 6 8 9 " 
(0.47) (5.24) (-0.23) (-1.30) (3.27) (-0.44) (2.88) (2.90) 
Intercept 8 .197 7.993 9.893 10.240 10.793"" 10 .930" ' 9.807'"" 9 . 5 4 6 " ' 
(.) (.) (.) (•) (12.26) (12.53) (23.63) (31.88) 
N 3310 3310 3299 3299 3210 3210 3336 3336 
A d j R- 0.661 1 0.6501 0 .6367 0 .6362 0 .5676 0 .5587 0.6434 0.6338 
BIC 30184 30290 30397 30402 28563 28629 30271 30360 
BIC Rank 3 5 7 8 1 2 4 6 
Panel C: Post-GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
B V 1 . 1 6 8 " ' 1 . 2 5 1 " ' 1 . 1 7 0 " " 1 . 2 . 3 4 " ' 1 . 2 5 8 " " 1 . 5 0 5 " " 1 .202 ' "" 1 . 4 0 1 ' " 
( .3.45) ( 3 . 7 8 ) ( 3 . 4 8 ) ( 3 . 9 2 ) ( 3 . 8 1 ) ( 5 . 0 8 ) ( 3 . 8 2 ) ( 4 . 5 2 ) 
N o n G A A P H .1.5.142*" 3 2 . L 5 6 ' " 3 5 . 1 4 8 ' " 3 3 . 2 3 5 " " 3 2 . 1 6 0 " " 2 6 . 0 4 1 ' " 3 1 . 8 7 7 ' " ' 2 5 . 0 1 8 * " 
( 6 . 7 6 ) ( 5 . 6 0 ) ( 6 . 5 7 ) ( 6 . 3 1 ) ( 5 . 3 2 ) ( 4 . 2 5 ) ( 6 . 1 5 ) ( 4 . 8 4 ) 
D I F F 21 . .120 ' 1 3 . 6 5 5 2 5 . 2 2 3 ' " - 1 1 . 2 . 3 8 " " 3 5 . 3 1 2 " " 37 .372""" 3 2 . 2 1 7 " ' 2 4 . 6 3 4 ' * ' 
( 2 . 1 7 ) ( 1 . 6 6 ) ( 3 . 9 6 ) ( - 3 . 5 3 ) ( 3 . 3 7 ) ( 4 . 3 1 ) ( 6 . 2 5 ) ( 4 . 7 0 ) 
l A 7 . 3 1 8 " 6 . 7 2 8 7 . 2 7 7 ' 7 . 4 7 3 " 6 4 1 8 ' 3 . 9 0 0 6 . 3 7 2 * 5 . 7 3 2 
( 2 . 1 1 ) ( 1 . 9 0 ) ( 2 . 1 8 ) ( 2 . 2 3 ) ( 2 . 3 6 ) ( 1 . 9 3 ) ( 2 . 1 1 ) ( 1 . 8 3 ) 
l A ' B V - 0 . 4 4 3 - 0 . 5 1 5 - 0 . 4 2 1 -0. .381 - 0 . 5 2 2 - 0 . 6 9 6 " - 0 . 4 6 9 - 0 . 5 3 0 
( - 1 . 2 4 ) ( - 1 . 4 8 ) ( - 1 . 2 1 ) ( - 1 . 1 6 ) ( - 1 . 4 8 ) ( - 2 . 1 8 ) ( - 1 . 4 1 ) ( - 1 . 6 4 ) 
I A ' N O I I G A A P F : - 2 4 . 4 1 0 " ' - 2 1 . 7 . 3 9 ' " - 2 6 . 3 4 2 " " - 3 0 . 2 4 2 ' " - 2 2 . 2 0 8 ' " - 2 3 . 0 . 3 8 " " - 2 2 . 1 6 7 ' " - 2 2 . 4 3 5 " ' 
( - 4 . 1 8 ) ( - 3 . 4 6 ) ( - 4 . 8 7 ) ( - 5 . 2 4 ) ( - 3 . 3 3 ) ( - 3 . 5 1 ) ( - 3 . 6 5 ) ( - 3 . 7 8 ) 
l A D I F F - 1 7 . 8 7 2 - 1 3 . 7 5 3 - 1 4 . 3 0 7 ' 1 2 . 9 6 2 " " - 2 6 . 0 4 2 " - . 1 9 . 4 7 4 ' " - 2 1 . 9 9 0 " ' - 2 1 . 6 4 8 ' " 
( - 1 . 8 4 ) ( - 1 . 6 5 ) ( - 2 . 0 5 ) ( 3 . 9 6 ) ( -2 . .38) ( - 4 . 3 6 ) ( - 3 . 5 8 ) ( - 3 . 6 2 ) 
I n t e r c e p t 4 . 7 2 1 5 . L 5 5 4 . 9 6 9 5 . 4 0 0 5 .980"" 7 . 9 4 6 " ' 5 . 7 8 5 ' 6 . 9 1 8 " 
( 1 . 4 9 ) (1.-59) ( 1 . 6 1 ) ( 1 . 7 6 ) (2. .58) ( 4 . 7 1 ) ( 2 . 0 6 ) ( 2 . 4 0 ) 
N 7 4 3 4 7 4 3 4 7.341 7.341 7 0 3 5 7 0 3 5 7 6 2 3 7 6 2 3 
A d j 0 . 6 9 0 3 0 . 6 8 0 5 0 . 6 8 3 9 0 . 6 7 4 7 0 . 7 0 0 1 0 . 6 8 4 0 0 . 7 0 4 8 0 . 6 7 4 4 
B I C 6 8 1 4 9 6 8 3 8 0 6 7 2 4 1 6 7 4 5 2 6 4 8 9 0 6 5 2 5 7 6 9 7 8 1 7 0 5 2 6 
B I C R a n k 5 6 3 4 1 2 7 8 
• p < 0 .05. " p < 0.01, • " p < 0.001 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with s tandard errors clustered on f i rm and l ime (fiscal quarters) . 
T h e dependent \ a r i ab le , P. is c losing share price at earnings announcement date . T h e independent variables are 
def ined as fol lows: BV = Book \ 'alue of c o m m o n equity per share. N o n G A A P E represents the fo l lowing variables for 
IBES , C O R E . C E and C F models : IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts . C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per share, af ter adding back depreciat ion and amort isa t ion e.xpenses. 
C F = Opera t ing cash f lows per share. DIFF represents D l F F l in Model 1 and D1FF2 in Model 2. D I F F l = G A A P l 
minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings , where G A A P l is earn ings per share f r o m opera t ions adjus ted to exclude the 
e f fec t s of special i tems reported under G A A P . D1FF2 = G A A P 2 minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earn ings , whe re 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary i tems per share reported under G A A P . lA = 1 if the informat ion a symmet ry 
index ( lAI) quinti le is .5 and 0 if the lAl quintile is 1. 1A*BV = Interaction term of lAI with book value of c o m m o n 
equity per share . l A ^ N o n G A A P E = Interaction term of lAI with the cor responding n o n - G A A P earn ings measure of 
IBES, C O R E . C E and C F . 1A»D1FF = Interaction term of lAl with the cor responding D I F F measure of D I F F l and 
D1FF2. 
The results of the main ef fects show some evidence that investors place greater 
emphasis on G A A P earnings that are generally c loser to, or less than, n o n - G A A P 
earnings, i.e., the negative sign of the relevant coef f ic ients , when information 
asymmetry is low. The results of the interaction terms show that I A * B V is statistically 
significant and negative in relation to C E and CF. I A * N o n G A A P E is marginally 
significant and negative in relation to IBES but moderately to strongly significant in 
relation to C E and CF. IA*DIFF is moderately significant and posit ive in relation to 
IBES, C E and CF. Generally, the results show that n o n - G A A P earnings are value 
relevant when information asymmetry is high, but a negative sign indicates that 
investors reduce the emphasis they place on these earnings. Converse ly , G A A P earnings 
are incrementally value relevant when information asymmetry is high and investors 
increase their emphasis on these earnings. 
In the post -GFC period, there is an observable shift in investors ' emphasis on earnings. 
While investors maintain a strong emphasis on the booi< value of net assets, IBES, 
C O R E , CE and C F are all strongly significant and positive, which is in contrast to the 
pre-GFC period. Also, non -GAAP earnings are generally incrementally value relevant 
in relation to all alternative earnings measures. 
In contrast to the main effects , the interaction terms for G A A P and non-GAAP earnings 
are statistically significant and negative for all alternative earnings measures, except 
G A A P earnings in relation to IBES (not statistically significant) and C O R E Model 2 
(statistically significant but positive). Generally, these results show that high 
information asymmetry has a negative impact on the emphasis investors place on 
earnings. Using BIC to assess model performance, the CE models perform best across 
the three period windows. 
5.2.2.2 Model Estimation by Low and High Information Asymmetry 
Table 5.6 shows the results for the non-financial sector sample. Panel A shows all non-
G A A P earnings are statistically significant at the high level of information asymmetry. 
However , the sign of these coefficients is negative. This suggests that investors find 
lower values of non-GAAP earnings value relevant at higher levels of information 
asymmetry . Additionally, DIFFI is significant and negative in relation to all non-GAAP 
earnings at the high level of information asymmetry. The finding of negative and 
significant DIFFI indicates that investors find G A A P earnings, which are generally 
closer to, or less than, non-GAAP earnings incrementally value relevant. Overall , for 
Model 2 in Panel B, the results for IBES, C O R E and C E are generally similar to Model 
I. However , DIFF2 is significant in relation to C O R E and not significant in relation to 
C F for both low and high levels of information asymmetry. Also, DIFF2 is significant 
in relation to C E when information asymmetry is low but not when it is high. 
General ly, the results provide evidence that investors focus predominantly on book 
values of net assets at the low level of information asymmetry in the pre-GFC period. 
At the high level of information asymmetry , however, investors appear to focus more 
strongly on non -GAAP earnings. Additionally, the evidence also shows that at a high 
level of information asymmetry, G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant. 
In the G F C period, IBES and C O R E are statistically significant only at a low level of 
information asymmetry for both Model 1 and Model 2. CE and CF, however, are 
s ign i f ican t at botii low and iiigii levels of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y in Mode l 1 but 
s ign i f ican t only at a high level of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y in Mode l 2 . D I F F I is 
s igni f icant at both low and high levels of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y in relat ion to C E and 
C F . but only s ign i f ican t at a low level of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y in relat ion to I B E S . 
D I F F 2 is s ign i f ican t at both low and high levels of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y in relat ion to 
I B E S . but is s ign i f ican t at a low level of in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y in relat ion to C O R E 
and s igni f icant at a high level of in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y in relat ion to C F . N o t a b l y , the 
sign of s ign i f ican t D I F F I and D I F F 2 is nega t ive w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is low 
and posi t ive w h e n in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh . T h e only excep t ion is D I F F 2 in 
relat ion to C O R E , wh ich is pos i t ive w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is l ow. T h e resul ts 
show that G A A P ea rn ings genera l ly have incrementa l va lue r e l evance in relat ion to 
n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . 
In teres t ingly , the resul ts f o r IBES and C O R E indicate that these n o n - G A A P ea rn ings 
are value re levant at the low level of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y but not w h e n in fo rma t ion 
a s y m m e t r y is h igh . W h e n in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh , the resul ts s h o w that 
inves tors f ind C E and C F s igni f icant ly va lue re levant , ind ica t ing inves tors p lace grea te r 
e m p h a s i s on cash f l o w s dur ing the G F C . 
T h e r e is a marked contras t in the resul ts the p o s t - G F C per iod relat ive to the p r e - G F C 
per iod . Panel E s h o w s all n o n - G A A P ea rn ings and D I F F I are s t rongly s ign i f ican t and 
posi t ive at both levels of in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y excep t fo r D I F F I in relat ion to I B E S , 
which is marg ina l ly s ign i f ican t . In c o m p a r i s o n , all n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s and D I F F I are 
only s igni f icant and negat ive w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is high in the p r e - G F C 
per iod . 
In Panel F, IBES is s t rongly s igni f icant and posi t ive at both levels of i n fo rma t ion 
a s y m m e t r y but C O R E , C E and C F are s t rongly s ign i f ican t and pos i t ive only at the low 
level of in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y . In con t ras t , I B E S , C O R E and C E are s ign i f ican t and 
nega t ive when in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh in the p r e - G F C per iod . D I F F 2 is not 
s igni f icant in relat ion to IBES in the p o s t - G F C per iod but is s ign i f i can t and nega t ive 
when in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y is high in the p r e - G F C pe r iod . 
Table 5.6: Ohlson Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and 
High/Low Information Asymmetry Index Quintiles 
Model 1: P = a„ + li,BV, + l},NonGAAPE^, + PPIFFI-, + 
Model 2: + P^BV, + PMnGAAPE^^ + P,DIFF2„ + £„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC - Model I 
lA Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFFl Inlercepl N Adj R= 
IBKS Low 2.107*** 7.328 -4.293 2.741 8254 0.6416 
High 1.625*** -9.774* -16.207*** 9.796*** 5029 0.7473 
CORK Low 2.1 18*** 3.764 37.724 2.228 8174 0.6238 
High 1.630*** -11.676*** -8.712** 8.886*** 4996 0.7483 
CE Low 2.446*** 3.688 8.818 1.496 7754 0.6224 
High 2.015*** -10.657*** -1 1.254** 7.203** 4472 0.7776 
CF Lou 2.384*** 2.012 2.678 1.899 8199 0.6570 
High 1.737*** -9.197* -10.276** 9.452*** 4905 0.7242 
Panel B Pre-GFC - Model 2 
lA Quinlile BV NonGAAPE D1FF2 Inlercepl N Adj R-
IBES 1 ,o\\ 2.151*** 7.125 -1.553 2.313 82,54 0.6390 
High 1.864*** -9.588* -9.082* 7.498*** 5029 0.7194 
CORK Low 2.228*** 2.447 13.976** 2.8.18 8174 0.6144 
High 1.598*** -8.221** 10.231** 7.718*** 4996 0.7429 
CH Low 2.619*** 4.511 18.018* 1.721 7754 0.6402 
High 2.186*** -5.202* -3.812 4.874 4472 0.7354 
CF Low 2.388*** 2.153 2.839 1.887 8199 0.6583 
High 1.844*** -4.719 -6.105 7.783* 4905 0.7021 
Panel C : GFC - Model 1 
lA Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DlFFl Inlercepl N Adj 
IBES Low 1.403*** 12.413*** -5.233*** 8.197 2082 0.7440 
High 1.567*** -3.396 -3.180 4.676 1228 0.4272 
CORE Low 1.726*** -1.717* -7.048 9.893 2077 0.7044 
High 1.580*** -3.276 -8.385 4.800 1222 0.4360 
CE Low 1.546*** -2.407** -4.415** 10.793*** 2033 0.6090 
High 0.685*** 5.341** 4.015* 12.573*** 1177 0.3427 
CF Low 1.703*** -1.762* -1.827** 9.807*** 2118 0.6908 
High 0.944*** 9.744* 8.651* 9.742*** 1218 0.4352 
Panel D: G F C - Model 2 
lA Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFF2 Inlercepl N Adj 
IBES Low 1.449*** 1 1.070*** -3.971*** 7.993 2082 0.7285 
High 1.560*** -2.709 2.089** 5.055 1228 0.4284 
CORE Low 1.679*** -1.905** 5.574** 10.240 2077 0.7067 
High 1.558*** -2.328 2.262 4.158 1222 0.4271 
CH Low 1.645*** -1.711 2.686 10930*** 2033 0.6027 
High 0.744*** 2.498*** 0.354 12.644*** 1177 0.3204 
CF Low 1.710*** -1.281 -1.228 9.546*** 2118 0.6860 
High 1.086*** 4.882* 3.461*** 10.1 10*** 1218 0.4055 
Panel E: Post-GFC - Model 1 
lA Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D I F F l I n t e r c e p t N A d j R -
I B E S L o w 1 . 1 6 8 * * * 3 5 . 1 4 2 * * * 2 1 . 3 2 0 * 4 . 7 2 1 4 6 6 5 0 . 7 1 8 0 
Hi;;!! 0 . 7 2 5 * * * 1 0 . 7 3 2 * * * 3 . 4 4 8 * 1 2 . 0 3 9 * * * 2 7 6 9 0 4 0 2 2 
C O R E L o w 1 . 1 7 0 * * * 3 5 . 1 4 8 * * * 2 5 . 2 2 3 * * * 4 . 9 6 9 4 6 2 9 0 . 7 1 2 5 
H i g h 0 . 7 5 0 * * * 8 . 8 0 6 * * * 1 0 . 9 1 6 * * * 1 2 . 2 4 6 * * * 2 7 1 2 0 . 3 6 7 0 
C E L o w 1 . 2 5 8 * * * 3 2 . 1 6 0 * * * 3 5 . 3 1 2 * * * 5 . 9 8 0 * * 4 4 5 2 0 . 7 2 8 5 
H i g h 0 . 7 3 6 * * * 9 . 9 5 2 * * * 9 . 2 6 9 * * * 1 2 . 3 9 7 * * * 2 5 8 3 0 . 4 0 5 0 
C F L o w 1 . 2 0 2 * * * 3 1 . 8 7 7 * * * 3 2 . 2 1 7 * * * 5 . 7 8 5 * 4 7 9 0 0 . 7 3 2 7 
H i g h 0 . 7 3 4 * * * 9 . 7 1 0 * * * 1 0 . 2 2 6 * * * 1 2 . 1 5 7 * * * 2 8 3 3 0 . 3 7 4 1 
Panel F: Post-GFC - Model 2 
l A Q u i t i t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 I n t e r c e p t N A d j R -
I B E S Low- 1 . 2 5 1 * * * 3 2 . 1 5 6 * * * 1 3 . 6 5 5 5 . 1 5 5 4 6 6 5 0 . 7 0 7 4 
H i g h 0 . 7 3 6 * * * 1 0 4 1 7 * * * - 0 . 0 9 8 1 1 . 8 8 3 * * * 2 7 6 9 0 . 3 9 8 3 
C O R E Low- 1 . 2 3 4 * * * 3 3 . 2 3 5 * * * - 1 1 . 2 3 8 * * * 5 . 4 0 0 4 6 2 9 0 . 7 0 9 0 
H i g h 0 . 8 5 3 * * * 2 . 9 9 3 1 . 7 2 4 * * 1 2 . 8 7 3 * * * 2 7 1 2 0 . 3 0 1 2 
C E Losv 1 . 5 0 5 * * * 2 6 . 0 4 1 * * * 3 7 . 3 7 2 * * * 7 . 9 4 6 * * * 4 4 5 2 0 . 7 1 6 2 
H i g h 0 . 8 0 9 * * * 3 . 0 0 3 - 2 . 1 0 3 1 1 . 8 4 5 * * * 2 5 8 3 0 . 3 5 0 5 
C F L o w 1 . 4 0 1 * * * 2 5 . 0 1 8 * * * 2 4 . 6 3 4 * * * 6 . 9 1 8 * 4 7 9 0 0 . 7 0 6 0 
H i g h 0 . 8 7 1 * * * 2 . 5 8 3 2 . 9 8 5 1 2 . 6 5 0 * * * 2 8 3 3 0 . 3 0 1 1 
• p < 0 . 0 5 , " p < 0 . 0 1 , < 0 . 0 0 1 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on f i rm and time (fiscal quarters) . 
T h e dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. T h e independent variables are 
def ined as fol lows; BV = Book value of c o m m o n equity per share. N o n G A A P E represents the fo l lowing \ ar iables for 
IBES, C O R E , C E and C P models : IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts . C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per share, af ter adding back depreciat ion and amort isat ion expenses . 
C P = Opera t ing cash f lows per share. D l P P l = G A A P l minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings , where G A A P l is 
earnings per share f rom operat ions adjusted to e.xclude the effects of special i tems reported under G A A P . DIPF2 = 
G A A P 2 minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings, where G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary i tems per share 
reported under G A A P . lA quintile is Low if the information asymmetry index ( lAl) quinti le is I and High if the lAI 
quinti le is 5. 
A l s o , D I F F 2 is s i g n i f i c a n t in r e l a t ion to C E a n d C F w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is l o w 
in t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , bu t it is s i g n i f i c a n t o n l y in r e l a t ion t o C E w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n 
a s y m m e t r y is l o w in t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d . W h i l e D I F F 2 is s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e in 
r e l a t ion t o C O R E at b o t h l e v e l s of i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y in t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d , t h e r e 
is a c h a n g e in s ign w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is l ow in the p o s t - G F C p e r i o d . 
T h e s e r e su l t s i n d i c a t e tha t i n v e s t o r s p l a c e c o m p a r a t i v e l y g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s o n e a r n i n g s 
in t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d r e l a t i v e t o t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e s ign of 
N o n G A A P E is p o s i t i v e w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is h igh in t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , 
w h i c h is in c o n t r a s t to the p r e - G F C p e r i o d . It s u g g e s t s tha t i n v e s t o r s a r e s e e k i n g 
i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m a l t e r n a t i v e s o u r c e s a n d t h e y f i n d th i s i n f o r m a t i o n p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h s h a r e p r i c e . C o n v e r s e l y , G A A P e a r n i n g s r e m a i n s t a t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t w h e n 
i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is h i g h in r e l a t ion t o I B E S a n d C O R E . N o t a b l y , h o w e v e r , I B E S 
is s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t in the p o s t - G F C p e r i o d w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is h i g h bu t 
o n l y m a r g i n a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t in t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d . T h i s r e su l t s h o w s i n v e s t o r s t u r n i n g 
t h e i r f o c u s b a c k t o I B E S a f t e r t h e p e a k of t h e G F C . 
H o w e v e r , the resul t s a l so s h o w a sh i f t In i nves to r s ' f o c u s in re la t ion to G A A P e a r n i n g s 
w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is low in the p o s t - G F C pe r iod ; D I F F I is s ta t is t ica l ly 
s i gn i f i c an t in re la t ion to all n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . In c o m p a r i s o n . Panel A s h o w D I F F I 
is s ta t i s t ica l ly s ign i f i can t on ly at the high level of i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y . In Panel F, 
the resul t s f o r M o d e l 2 s h o w C E , C F and D I F F 2 are s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t w h e n 
i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is l o w , wh ich is in con t ras t to Panel B. 
G e n e r a l l y , the resul t s f o r non - f inanc i a l f i r m s s h o w a sh i f t in the e m p h a s i s inves tors 
p l ace on G A A P e a r n i n g s . D u r i n g the G F C , inves tors sh i f t the i r f o c u s to G A A P e a r n i n g s 
at the low level of i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y , whi l e th is f o c u s is genera l ly absen t fo r the 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g level of i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y in the p r e - G F C pe r iod . A d d i t i o n a l l y , 
G A A P e a r n i n g s r ema in i nc remen ta l l y va lue re levant in relat ion to C E and C F du r ing the 
G F C w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is h igh . A f t e r the G F C , G A A P e a r n i n g s , par t icu lar ly 
D I F F I , c o n t i n u e to r e m a i n inc remen ta l ly va lue re levan t . 
5.2.3 S&P 500 Sample 
5.2.3.1 Model Estimation with Main Effects and Interaction Terms 
T a b l e 5 .7 s h o w s the e s t ima t ion resul ts of the S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e f o r m o d e l s wi th main 
e f f e c t s and in te rac t ion t e r m s . All m o d e l s are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t . 
In the p r e - G F C p e r i o d , B V , I B E S , C O R E , C E and C F are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and 
pos i t ive a c r o s s all m o d e l s . G A A P ea rn ings are inc rementa l ly va lue re levant on ly in 
re la t ion to C E and C F . lA is marg ina l ly to mode ra t e ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive in 
re la t ion to I B E S , C O R E and C E , but not s ign i f i can t in relat ion to C F . A s this s a m p l e 
c o m p r i s e s la rge f i r m s , it gene ra l ly impl ies that these f i r m s have m o r e ana lys t s f o l l o w i n g 
and h i g h e r leve ls of pub l i c ly ava i l ab le i n f o r m a t i o n , i .e. , the f i r m s are relat ively 
h o m o g e n e o u s in respec t to i n f o r m a t i o n set by vir tue of s ize . T h e r e f o r e , lA m a y be 
sens i t ive to smal l va r i a t ions . T h i s m a y expla in the pos i t ive s ign in s tat is t ical ly 
s ign i f i can t l A . 
I A * B V is not s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t ac ros s all m o d e l s . H o w e v e r , the in terac t ion t e r m s 
f o r G A A P and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s are genera l ly s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and nega t ive in 
re la t ion to C O R E , C E and C F . T h e s e resul t s s h o w that w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is 
h i g h , G A A P e a r n i n g s are i nc r emen ta l l y va lue re levan t but inves to r s r educe thei r 
e m p h a s i s on G A A P e a r n i n g s in c o m p a r i s o n to w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is l ow. 
Table 5.7: Ohlson Model: S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression at 
Earnings Announcement Date by Models with Information 
Asymmetry Index Dummy and Interaction Terms as Controls 
Model 1: P = a„ + P^ BV^  + ^ ,NonGAAPE^ ^ + 4 + PJA., 
+\lA * BV., + PJA * NotiGAAPE,, + p.IA * DIFFI-, + £, 
Model 2: P = «„ + + P,NonGAAPE^ ^ + ^ .DIFFI-^  + ^JA-, 
+I}JA * BV., + PJA * NonGAAPE-, + p.lA* DIFFI,, + 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 Model 2 
C E 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0 . 9 5 4 " ' 0 . 9 5 4 ' " 1.187"" 1.171"" 1 .190" ' 1 .225" ' 0.948""" 1.075""" 
( 3 3 1 ) (3.31) (4.97) (4.80) (7.32) (8.28) (4.84) (7.09) 
N o n G A A P h 2 4 . 3 9 r " 24 .530" 2 0 . 9 8 6 ' " 21.543"" 19.822" 19.042"" 21 . 146" ' 18.077"" 
(3.13) (3.17) (3.61) (3.70) (4.26) (4.55) (3.65) (4.54) 
DIFF 2.182 4.391 -10.934 -3.897 26 .721" 27.021"" 2 1 . 2 9 1 ' " 18.193"" 
(0.49) (1.19) (-1.46) (-0.66) (3.50) (4.01) (3.62) (4.52) 
lA 4.194" 3.986' 4.521 6.396"" 4 .768 ' 5 .072 ' 3.753 4.217 
(2.33) (2.10) (1.88) (2.71) (2.09) (2.51) (1.51) (1.77) 
l A B V -0.300 -0.307 -0.415 -0.207 -0.229 -0.181 -0.067 -0.122 
(-0.85) (-0.86) (-1.28) (-0.68) (-0.84) (-0.69) (-0.26) (-0.52) 
l A ' N o n G A A P E -9.447 -9.188 -10.818 -20.293""" -11.802 - 1 8 . 3 4 1 ' " -15.788 ' -16 .418"" 
(-1.21) (-1.16) (-1.62) (-3.86) (-1.93) (-4.62) (-2.46) (-3.81) 
lA 'DIFF -2.987 -5.357 22 .096" 8.978 -17.209 ' - 2 9 . 5 9 5 ' " -15.711 ' -16 .348"" 
(-0.73) (-1.47) (2.70) (1.43) (-2.11) (-4.13) (-2.35) (-3.69) 
Intercept 12.724"" 12.682" ' 12 .628 ' " 12 .174 ' " 12 .513" 13.113"" 14.634""" 15.004""" 
(8.72) (8.68) (7.35) (6.78) (7.67) (8.07) (7.54) (7.70) 
N 3142 3142 3110 3110 2909 2909 3099 3099 
Ad j 0.8940 0.8944 0.8985 0.8943 0.9048 0.9034 0.8489 0 .8417 
BIC 28024 28011 27486 27606 26310 26346 27475 27619 
BIC Rank 8 7 4 5 1 2 3 6 
Panel B: G F C Period 
IBES C O R E CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0 . 9 8 1 " ' 0 . 9 9 5 " ' 1 .262 ' " 1 .329 '" 1 .068" ' 1.007""" 1 .271" ' 1 .354" ' 
(4.30) (4.10) (11.74) (13.90) (6.21) (9.14) (10.41) (9.90) 
NonGAAPH 2 0 . 6 6 1 " 21 .019" ' 7 .210 6.834 6.252 5.885' 7.420 6 .712 ' 
(3.28) (3.46) (1.60) (1.79) (1.87) (2.29) (1.83) (2.48) 
DIFF 1.000 2.041 5.015 6.271 -0.773 -6.920 7.047 6.331" 
(0.92) (1.36) (0.87) (1.30) (-0.20) (-1.63) (1.71) (2.26) 
lA 3.555 3.725 0.441 -2.760 -3.980 -3.385 -3.957 -1.443 
(0.59) (0.61) (0.07) (-0.47) (-0.73) (-0.64) (-0.63) (-0.24) 
l A B V 0.068 0.096 -0 .444" -0,319" -0.034 0.064 -0.137 -0.270 
(0.21) (0.29) (-3.06) (-2.06) (-0.15) (0.36) (-0.76) (-1.67) 
l A ' N o n G A A P F -18 .272" -18 .951" -6.329 -6.003 -5.230 -4.582 -4.662 -4.597 
(-2.79) (-3.00) (-1.30) (-1.42) (-1.46) (-1.90) (-1.08) (-1.53) 
lA 'DIFF -0.805 -0.831 -8.476 -5.721 0.490 8 .062 ' -3 .189 -3.177 
(-0.55) (-0.56) (-1.51) (-1.13) (0.10) (2.02) (-0.71) (-1.01) 
Intercept 14.243 13 .942 '" 20.761"" 2 0 . 0 8 5 " ' 2 2 . 3 6 5 ' " 21.678"" 2 0 . 1 9 4 " ' 19.526"" 
(.) (18.88) (9.18) (7.57) (6.63) (6.97) (6.83) (5.50) 
N 801 801 782 782 760 760 809 809 
Ad j R- 0.7739 0.7753 0 .7827 0.7830 0 .8287 0.8318 0.7667 0 .7666 
BIC 7430 7418 7276 7281 7124 7096 7519 7519 
BIC Rank 6 5 3 4 2 1 7 7 
Panel C: Post-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model I Model 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model I Model 2 
CF 
Model I Model 2 
BV 0.133 0.133 0..345 0.366 0..383 0.419 0.328 0.379' 
(0.89) (0.90) (1.78) (1.95) (1.75) (1.84) (1.70) (2.05) 
NonGAAPE 53.309"" 53..342"" 42.850'" 41.943"' 43.032'" 40.645'"" 39.290"' 36.966"" 
(7.71) (7.68) (4.47) (4.42) (4.23) (4.13) (4.59) (4.50) 
DIFF 1.-447 2.576 21.995' 9.440 46.424" 42.511" 38.7.38'" 35.933"" 
(0.53) (1.03) (2.52) (1.55) (3.08) (2.91) (4.52) (4.46) 
lA 8.113 9.353 1.992 4.069 2.848 4.405 -0.365 0.027 
(1.52) (1.77) (0.35) (0.69) (0.51) (0.80) (-0.07) (0.01) 
l A B V 0.625"" 0.513" 0.418" 0.287 0.080 0.274 0.320 0.436" 
(3.60) (2.84) (2.03) (1.32) (0.34) (1.05) (1.41) (2.00) 
lA'NonGAAPE -44.068"" -42.778'"" -34.448"" -33.6.38""" -26.428" -34.753"" -25.760" -30.979""" 
(-6.28) (-6.05) (-3.71) (-3.46) (-2.61) (-3.-59) (-3.06) (-3.76) 
lAD IFF 4.433 0.530 -15.907 -7.378 -32.210" -.38.914'" -24.944" -29.787'"' 
(1.18) (0.16) (-1.95) (-1.25) (-2.14) (-2.63) (-2.97) (-3.69) 
Intercept 10.1 14" 10.226" 17.230""" 17.892'" 16.691"" 18.475"" 18.431'" 20.260'" 
(2.38) (2.42) (3.75) (3.98) (3.55) (4.33) (4.21) (5.15) 
N 2065 2065 2030 2030 1996 1996 2142 2142 
Adj 0.5657 0.5648 0.4912 0.4827 0.4855 0.4603 0.4958 0.4710 
BIG 19841 198.38 20022 20063 19791 19886 20746 20849 
BIC Rank 3 2 5 6 1 4 7 8 
• p < 0 . 0 5 , " p <0 . 01 , ••• p < 0.001 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable. P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES . C O R E . C E and CF models; IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. CH = Net mcome per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
C F = Operating cash flows per share. D IFF represents D lFF l in Model 1 and DIFF2 in Model 2. D lFF l = G A A P l 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P l is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under G A A P . D1FF2 = G A A P 2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under G A A P . lA = 1 if the information asymmetry 
index ( lA I ) quintile is 5 and 0 if the lA l quintile is 1. 1A*BV = Interaction term of lA l with book value of common 
equity per share. l A * N o n G A A P E = Interaction term of lA l with the corresponding non-GAAP earnings measure of 
IBES , C O R E , C E and CF. 1A*D1FF = Interaction term of lAI with the corresponding D IFF measure of D lFF l and 
D1FF2. 
Dur i ng the G F C , B V is strongly signif icant across all models . I B E S is statistically 
s igni f icant in both Mode l I and Mode l 2 , however , C E and C F are only statistically 
s igni f icant in Mode l 2. G A A P earnings and lA are generally not statistically signif icant . 
These results o f the ma in effects show investors ma in ta in ing their focus on the book 
value o f net assets, but p lac ing less emphasis on earnings dur ing the G F C . l A and all the 
interaction terms are general ly not statistically signif icant . 
The exception is I A * N o n G A A P E in relation to I B E S (moderately signif icant and 
negat ive) , and I A * D I F F (marg ina l ly signif icant and posit ive) in relation to C E . 
Genera l ly the level o f in format ion asymmetry has little margina l impact on the 
emphas is investors place on G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings dur ing the G F C . 
In the p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , the re is an o b s e r v a b l e sh i f t in i n v e s t o r s ' e m p h a s i s on B V and 
n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . BV is gene ra l ly no t s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t but all n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s are s t rong ly s ign i f i can t a c r o s s all m o d e l s . G A A P e a r n i n g s are m o d e r a t e l y to 
s t rongly s ign i f i can t in re la t ion to C E and C F . lA is not s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t f o r all 
m o d e l s . T h e s e resul ts s h o w that in the p o s t - G F C per iod inves to r s p laced g rea te r 
e m p h a s i s on e a r n i n g s than on the book va lue of net asse t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the in te rac t ion 
t e r m , I A * N o n G A A P E , is m o d e r a t e l y to s t rong ly s ign i f i can t and nega t i ve f o r all m o d e l s . 
T h i s ind ica tes h igh i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y has a nega t ive marg ina l i m p a c t on i n v e s t o r s ' 
e m p h a s i s on n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . I A * D I F F , h o w e v e r , a re on ly s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t 
and nega t ive in re la t ion to C E and C F . G A A P e a r n i n g s a p p e a r to be i n c r e m e n t a l l y va lue 
re levant w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is h igh . A d d i t i o n a l l y , the nega t i ve s ign s h o w s 
that inves tors a p p e a r to p lace less e m p h a s i s on G A A P e a r n i n g s re la t ive to w h e n 
in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh . 
5.2.3.2 Model Estimation by Low and High Information Asymmetry 
T h e resul ts f o r the S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e are p resen ted in T a b l e 5 .8 . Panel A s h o w s all n o n -
G A A P e a r n i n g s are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t at both leve ls of i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y 
excep t f o r C F w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is l o w . D I F F l is s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t in 
relat ion to C O R E w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is h igh and is s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t in 
relat ion to C F w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is l ow. A l s o , D I F F l is s ta t is t ical ly 
s ign i f i can t in re la t ion to C E at both levels of i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y . 
T h e resul ts f o r I B E S and C F f o r Mode l 2 in Panel B are gene ra l ly s imi la r to Panel A . 
H o w e v e r , D I F F 2 is s ign i f i can t and nega t ive at the h igh level of i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y 
in relat ion to I B E S and is s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive in relat ion to C F at the low level of 
i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y . C O R E and C E are s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t on ly w h e n 
in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is l ow. D I F F 2 is a l so s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t in re la t ion to C E 
on ly w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is l o w . 
In the G F C p e r i o d . Panel C s h o w s on ly I B E S and C F are s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t w h e n 
i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is low and h i g h , r e spec t i ve ly . A l s o , D I F F l is on ly s i gn i f i c an t in 
relat ion to C F w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is h igh . In Panel D , I B E S and C E are 
s ign i f i can t w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is l o w , h o w e v e r , C F is s i gn i f i c an t at both 
levels of i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y . D I F F 2 is s ign i f i can t on ly in re la t ion to C F at both low 
and high leve ls of i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y . 
Table 5.8: Ohison Model: S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and High/Low 
Information Asymmetry Index Quintiles 
Model 1: P = a„ + l),BV, + ,^NonGAAPE^ ^ + P.DIFFI^ , + 
Model 2: P„=a^ + li,BV, + pMonGAAPE^^ + P.DIFFl-, + 
Panel A: Pre-GFC - Model 1 
lA Quintile BV NonGAAPE DIFFl Intercept N Adi 
IBES Low 0.954*** 24.391** 2.182 12.724*** 1963 0.91 16 
High 0.654** 14.944*** -0.805 16.918*** 1179 0.4305 
CORfi Low 1.187*** 20.986*** -10.934 12.628*** 1951 0.9177 
High 0.772*** 10.169** 1 1.162*** 17.148*** 1 L59 0.3971 
CH Low 1.190*** 19.822*** 26.721*** 12.513*** 1827 0.9211 
High 0.962*** 8.019* 9.512** 17.281*** 1082 0.4071 
CF Low 0.948*** 21.146*** 21.291*** I4.6.U*** 1943 0.8816 
High 0.881*** 5.358 5.581 18.387*** 1 156 0.3256 
Panel B : Pre-GFC - Model 2 
lA Quintile BV NonGAAPH DIFF2 Intercept N Adj R' 
IRES Low 0.954*** 24.530** 4.391 12.682*** 1963 0.91 19 
High 0.647** 15.342*** -0.966* 16.668*** 1 179 0.4354 
CORE Low 1.171*** 21.543*** -3.897 12.174*** 1951 0.9171 
High 0.964*** 1.250 5.081 18.570*** 1159 0.3060 
CH Low 1.225*** 19.042*** 27.021*** 13.113*** 1827 0.9218 
High 1.044*** 0.701 -2.574 18.185*** 1082 0.3439 
CF Low- 1.075*** 18.077*** 18.193*** 15.004*** 1943 0.8762 
High 0.95.1*** 1.659 1.845 19.221*** 1 156 0.2908 
Panel C: GFC - Model 1 
lA Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFFl Intercept N Adj R-
IBES Low 0.981*** 20.661** 1.000 14.243 514 0.7694 
High 1.049*** 2..389 0.196 17.798*** 287 0.7762 
CORE Low 1.262*** 7.210 5.015 20.761*** 500 0.7641 
High 0.818*** 0.882 -3.462 21.202*** 282 0.8053 
CE Low 1.068*** 6.252 -0.773 22.365*** 491 0.8384 
High 1.034*** 1.022 -0.284 18.384*** 269 0.8031 
CF Low- 1.271*** 7.420 7.047 20.194*** 524 0.7244 
High 1.135*** 2.7.58* 3.8.57** 16.2.37*** 285 0.8209 
Panel D: ; GFC - Model 2 
lA Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFF2 Intercept N Adj R= 
IBES Low 0.995*** 21.019*** 2.041 13.942*** 514 0.7709 
High 1.091*** 2.068 1.210 17.667*** 287 0.7775 
CORE Low 1.329*** 6.834 6.271 20.085*** 500 0.7664 
High 1.011*** 0.832 0.5.50 17.325*** 282 0.8023 
CH Low- 1.007*** 5.885* -6.920 21.678*** 491 0.8427 
High 1.071*** 1.304 1.141 18.292*** 269 0.8036 
CF Low 1.354*** 6.712* 6.331* 19.526*** 524 0.7237 
High 1.084*** 2.115* 3.1,54** 18.082*** 285 0.8214 
Panel E: Post-GFC - Model 1 
lA Quintile BV NonGAAPE DIFFl Intercept N Adj R-
IBES Low 0.1.^3 53.309*** 1.447 10.114* 1319 0.5984 
High 0.758*** 9.242*** 5.880*** 18.227*** 746 0.3365 
CORK Low 0.345 42.850*** 21.995* 17.2.30*** 1306 0.5063 
High 0.763*** 8.401*** 6.088*** 19.221*** 724 0.3255 
CE Low 0.383 43.032*** 46.424** 16.691*** 1286 0.4977 
High 0.463*** 16.605*** 14.214*** 19.5.39*** 710 0.3833 
CF Lou 0.328 39.290*** 38.738*** 18.431*** 1353 0.5072 
High 0.648*** 13.5.30*** 13.793*** 18.065*** 789 04007 
Panel F; Post-GFC - Model 2 
lA Quintile BV NonGAAPE DIFF2 Intercepl N Adj R-
IBES Low 0.133 53..342*** 2.576 10.226* 1319 0.5988 
High 0.647*** 10.564*** 3.106*** 19.579*** 746 0.3278 
CORE Low 0.366 41.943*** 9.440 17.892*** 1306 0.5008 
High 0.653*** 8.304*** 2.062** 21.961*** 724 0.2966 
CE Low 0.419 40.645*** 42.511** 18.475*** 1286 0.4843 
High 0.694*** 5.892** 3.597 22.880*** 710 0.2820 
CF Low 0.379* 36.966*** 35.933*** 20.260*** 1353 0.4919 
High 0.814*** 5.987* 6.146* 20.288*** 789 0.3304 
• p < 0.05, " p < 0 . 0 1 , " ' p < 0.001 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable. P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. N o n G A A P E represents the fol lowing variables for 
IBES , C O R E , CE and CE models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CE = Operating cash flows per share. D lFE l = G A A P l minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P l is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under G A A P . D1EH2 = 
G A A P 2 minus the rele\anl non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under G A A P . lA quintile is Low if the information as\mmetry index ( lA l ) quintile is 1 and High if the lA l 
quintile is 5. 
The results for the post-GFC period are in strong contrast to the results for the pre-GFC 
and G F C periods. A l l n o n - G A A P earnings are strongly s ignif icant at both low and h igh 
levels o f in format ion asymmetry in Mode l 1 (Panel E) and Mode l 2 (Panel F) except for 
C F , wh ich is marg ina l ly s ignif icant when in format ion asymmetry is h igh in Mode l 2 . 
The results show that D I F F l , in Panel E , is incremental ly value relevant at both levels 
o f in format ion asymmetry in relation to all n o n - G A A P earnings except I B E S when 
in format ion asymmetry is l ow. D I F F 2 is s igni f icant in relation to I B E S , C O R E and C F 
when informat ion asymmetry is h igh and it is also s ignif icant in relation to C E and C F 
when informat ion asymmetry is l ow . 
There is some evidence o f a shift in investors' focus between the pre- and pos t-GFC 
periods. D I F F l is strongly s igni f icant when in format ion asymmetry is h igh in relation 
to I B E S in the post-GFC period (Panel E) but is not s igni f icant in the pre-GFC period 
(Panel A ) . A l so , D I F F l and D I F F 2 are statistically s igni f icant at both levels o f 
in format ion asymmetry in relation to C F in the post-GFC per iod , but are general ly on ly 
s ta t i s t ica l ly s ign i f i can t w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is low in the p r e - G F C pe r iod . T h e 
resul t s f o r C E are genera l ly s imi la r b e t w e e n the pre- and p o s t - G F C pe r iods . It is no tab le 
that B V is not s ign i f i can t w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is l o w , in relat ion to all non-
G A A P e a r n i n g s f o r both M o d e l I and Mode l 2 . It a p p e a r s that inves tors f i nd the non-
G A A P e a r n i n g s f o r la rge f i r m s re la t ively m o r e va lue re levant w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n 
a s y m m e t r y is l o w . 
5.2.4 Non-S&P 500 Sample 
5.2.4.1 Model Estimation with Main Effects and Interaction Terms 
T a b l e 5 .9 s h o w s the e s t ima t ion resul ts of the n o n - S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e f o r m o d e l s wi th 
m a i n e f f e c t s and in terac t ion t e r m s . All m o d e l s are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t . 
In the p r e - G F C pe r iod , BV is s t rongly s ign i f i can t ac ross all mode l s . All n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s and lA are not s ign i f i can t . G A A P ea rn ings are inc rementa l ly va lue re levant 
on ly in re la t ion to C O R E . I A * N o n G A A P E is genera l ly s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and 
nega t ive . H o w e v e r . I A * D I F F is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f ican t and nega t ive on ly in relat ion to 
C O R E and C F . T h e resul t s s h o w inves tors f o c u s p r edominan t ly on the book value of 
net asse t s . H o w e v e r , w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh , inves tors dec rease their 
e m p h a s i s on n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . T h e r e is s o m e ev idence that G A A P ea rn ings are 
i nc r emen ta l l y va lue re levan t . 
D u r i n g the G F C , there is e v i d e n c e of a shif t in inves to r s ' f o c u s on a c c o u n t i n g n u m b e r s . 
In c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C per iod , inves tors appea r to be m o r e f o c u s e d on ea rn ings . 
C O R E , C E and C F are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t . F u r t h e r m o r e , G A A P e a r n i n g s genera l ly 
h a v e inc remen ta l va lue r e l evance ove r n o n - G A A P ea rn ings and the stat is t ical ly 
s ign i f i can t c o e f f i c i e n t s are genera l ly nega t ive . T h i s a l so indica tes that inves tors placed 
grea te r e m p h a s i s on va lues of G A A P ea rn ings , wh ich are genera l ly c lose r to , or less 
t han , n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . lA is genera l ly not s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t . T h e resul ts f o r 
the in te rac t ion t e r m s s h o w that G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are va lue re levant only 
in re la t ion to C E and C F w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh . In te res t ing ly , these 
s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t c o e f f i c i e n t s are pos i t ive , ind ica t ing that inves tors p lace increased 
e m p h a s i s on these e a r n i n g s w h e n i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y is h igh . 
Table 5.9: Ohlson Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
at Earnings Announcement Date by Models with Information 
Asymmetry Index Dummy and Interaction Terms as Controls 
Model 1: P, = Cf„ + j3,fiV + ,^NonGAAPE^  + ^fllFFl-, + PJA-, 
+liJA * BV-, + PJA * NonGAAPE^, + /3,M * DIFF!-, + £, 
Model 2: P = a„ + /3,ev;, + jj^NoiiGAAPE^^ + P,DIFF2., + jiJA., 
+PJA * BV., + ftM * NonGAAPE-, +j}.IA* DIFF2., + £, 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.270"" 1 .270" ' 1 .153 ' " 1 .195 ' " 1 .169 ' " 1.170"" 1.395"" 1 .392 ' " 
(3.76) (3.71) (3.32) (3.58) (3.38) (3.41) (3.52) (3.49) 
NonGAAPK 12.095 12.249" 8.700 7.866 8.045 8.116 4.580 4.559 
(1.94) (1.99) (1.29) (1.17) (1.11) (1.17) (0.75) (0.77) 
DIFF -3.622 -2.635 33.842" 29.982 ' 0.463 0.989 4.236 4.192 
(-0.58) (-0.51) (2.27) (2.01) (0.05) (0.10) (0.73) (0.76) 
lA 2.346 1.653 0.108 0.162 0.901 -0.349 2.928 2.076 
(0.60) (0.43) (0.03) (0.04) (0.23) (-0.08) (0.59) (0.42) 
lA 'BV 0.239 0.268 0.250 0.170 0.385 0 4 3 7 -0.120 -0.095 
(0.54) (0.61) (0.66) (0.46) (0.90) (0.90) (-0.25) (-0.20) 
l A ' N o n G A A P E -21 .902" -21 .255" -17 .784" -16.566 ' -17.035 ' -14.427 -17.460"' - 16 .071" 
(-3.25) (-3.09) (-2.58) (-2.49) (-2.18) (-1.86) (-2.75) (-2.69) 
l A D l F F -8.530 -7.417 -33.121" -21.706 -9.176 -7.491 -16 .926" -15..570" 
(-0.96) (-1.00) (-2.20) (-1.44) (-0.86) (-0.68) (-2.91) (-2.85) 
Intercept 7 .565' 7.498" 9.080" 9.103' 8 .843' 8.897" 8.865" 8.938" 
(2.20) (2.17) (2.38) (2.50) (2.47) (2.44) (2.01) (2.06) 
N 12907 12907 12874 12874 12316 12316 12797 12797 
Ad j R- 0.6357 0.6327 0.6140 0.6173 0.5938 0.5891 0.5891 0..5885 
Bir 1232.32 123350 123168 12.30.57 118404 118548 124144 124164 
BIC Rank 5 6 4 3 1 2 7 8 
Panel B: G F C Period 
IBES C O R E C E CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0.994"" 1.018"" 1.077"" 1 .086 ' " 1.114"" 1 .122 ' " 1.071'"" 1 .080 ' " 
(6.81) (6.84) (7.02) (7.16) (8.13) (8.08) (12.02) (11.70) 
N o n G A A P E 6.393 6.034 -3 .994"" 3 . 9 6 9 ' " -3 .288 ' -2.971' -3.675" -3 .328 ' 
(1..35) (1.40) (-3.69) (-3.73) (-2.36) (-1.97) (-2.47) (-2.16) 
DIFH -4.931" -4.320" 1.403 2.695"" -7 .873" -8.625 -3 .526 ' -3 .084 ' 
(-2.29) (-2.11) (1.51) (3.21) (-2.83) (-1.73) (-2.56) (-2.04) 
lA -7.395 -6.833 -9.031 -9.208 -2.595 -1.582 -5.558" -5.103 
(-1.47) (-1..37) (-1.63) (-1.61) (-1.33) (-0.81) (-2.00) (-1.79) 
l A B V 0.412 0.408 0.292 0.276 -0.295 -0.299 -0.146 -0.098 
(0.83) (0.84) (0.62) (0.60) (-1.70) (-1.70) (-0.72) (-0.43) 
l A ' N o n G A A P F -8.766 -8.513 2.515 2.793 5 . 5 4 3 " 4 . 9 6 7 " 10.642'" 8 . 0 9 7 " 
(-1.05) (-1.15) (0.58) (0.68) (2.70) (2.79) (2.74) (2.85) 
l A D l F F 5.178 7 . 0 0 4 " -6.089 -0.683 8.781' 10.504 8 . 6 8 4 " 5 . 9 2 6 " 
(1.69) (2.85) (-1.13) (-0.39) (2.54) (1.91) (2.79) (3.18) 
Intercept 11 .955 '" 11.690""" 13.824"" 13 .732 ' " 12..?78"" 11 .881 ' " 13 .970" ' 13 .719 ' " 
(7.72) (7.39) (5.65) (5.65) (6.98) (6.61) (8.06) (8.07) 
N 3359 3359 3341 3341 3284 3284 3402 3402 
Ad j R- 0.6067 0.6026 0..5760 0 .5779 0 .6247 0 .6194 0.6264 0.6182 
BIC 310,58 31093 30684 30661 29449 29496 .10411 30485 
BIC Rank 7 8 6 5 1 2 3 4 
P a n e l C : P o s t - G F C P e r i o d 
I B E S 
M o d e l I M o d e l 2 
C O R E C E C F 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 1 
B V 0 , 9 9 7 " " 0 . 9 8 7 " " 1 . 0 5 6 " ' 1 . 062"" 1 . 0 9 3 " " 1.132'"" 1.073""" 1 . 1 0 9 " " 
(3 ,90 ) (3 .93 ) (4 .02 ) (4 .12 ) (4 .53 ) (4 .66 ) ( 4 . 4 8 ) ( 4 . 5 0 ) 
N o n G A A P K 1 9 , 4 2 9 ' " 1 9 , 9 9 8 ' " 1 5 . 1 0 I ' " 15..307"" 12.853"" 1 1.173"" 11.956"" 10 . .348 ' " 
( 4 .09 ) (4 .18 ) (3 .90 ) (4 .01 ) (2 .99 ) (3 .17 ) (3 .06 ) ( 3 . 4 6 ) 
D I F F - 8 . 0 5 2 -7 .864" - 3 . 4 3 6 - 6 . 6 0 5 1.782 - 5 . 0 3 0 1 1.608"" 9 . 9 0 7 " 
( -1 .90 ) ( - 2 . 2 4 ) ( - 0 . 7 0 ) ( - 1 . 6 4 ) (0..36) ( -1 .26 ) (2 .70 ) (2 .84 ) 
lA 1.8.37 1.858 2 . 1 6 7 2 . 6 1 0 3 . 7 3 2 3 . 8 9 4 1.193 0 . 9 2 8 
( 0 . 5 0 ) (0 .51 ) (0 .55 ) ( 0 . 7 0 ) (0 .92 ) (0 .94 ) ( 0 . 2 9 ) (0 .22 ) 
l A ' B V - 0 . 1 6 5 - 0 . 1 3 9 - 0 . 3 3 7 - 0 . 3 1 8 -0..301 - 0 . 3 4 4 -0..342 - 0 . 3 0 6 
( - 0 . 6 1 ) ( - 0 . 5 3 ) ( - 1 . 1 8 ) ( -1 .19 ) ( - 1 . 1 3 ) ( - 1 . 2 8 ) ( - 1 . 2 8 ) ( - 1 . 1 0 ) 
l A ' N o n G A A P K - 1 2 . 9 1 7 ' - 1 4 . 2 0 0 " - 9 . 7 6 1 ' -12.784"" - 6 . 3 8 3 - 8 . 6 2 7 ' - 6 4 3 8 - 8 . 5 7 1 " 
(-2,.50) ( - 2 . 8 0 ) ( -2 .43 ) ( - 3 . 1 0 ) ( - 1 . 3 7 ) ( -2 .29 ) ( - 1 . 5 1 ) ( - 2 . 6 7 ) 
l A ' D I F F 9 , 8 9 6 ' 7 . 8 8 5 ' 9 . 1 7 5 9..54I"" 3 . 9 2 2 2 . 4 3 5 - 5 . 2 9 9 - 7 . 3 0 4 
(2 .21 ) (2 .12 ) (1 .68 ) (2 .60 ) (0 .73) (0 .52 ) ( -1 .10 ) ( - 1 . 9 2 ) 
In te rcep t 8 , 0 3 2 ' 7 . 8 8 7 ' 9 . 2 5 2 ' 9 .121" 7 . 0 0 7 6 . 0 7 6 9 .746" 9 . 8 9 7 " 
(2 .26 ) (2 .23 ) (2.56) (2 .53 ) (1 .87 ) (1 .60 ) (2 .56 ) (2 .60 ) 
N 7 2 7 1 7 2 7 1 7 2 4 7 7 2 4 7 7 0 8 7 7 0 8 7 7 3 4 7 7 3 4 7 
A d j R- 0 . 7 1 2 0 0 . 7 1 2 4 0 . 6 8 6 3 0 . 6 8 6 0 0 . 6 8 1 4 0 . 6 8 0 0 0 . 6 8 6 0 0 . 6 8 1 4 
B I C 653.37 6 5 3 2 8 6 5 5 0 6 6 5 5 1 4 6 4 9 9 8 6 5 0 3 0 6 7 6 5 9 6 7 7 6 7 
B I C R a n k 4 3 5 6 1 2 7 8 
• p < 0.05, •• p < 0 . 0 1 , " > < 0 . 0 0 1 
1 statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPH represents the following variables for 
IBES, CORF,, C E and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORB = 
Sr&P Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
C F = Operating cash flows per share. DIFF represents DIFFI in Model 1 and DIFF2 in Model 2. DIFFl = G A A P I 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPI is earnings per share from operations adjusted to e.xclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the rcle\ant non-GAAP earnings, where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. lA = 1 if the information asymmetry 
index (lAI) quintile is .5 and 0 if the lAI quintile is 1. IA*BV = Interaction term of lAI with book value of common 
equity per share. IA*NonGAAPE = Interaction term of lAI with the corresponding non-GAAP earnings measure of 
IBES, C O R E , CE and CF. IA*DIFF = Interaction term of lAI with the corresponding DIFF measure of DIFFI and 
DIFF2. 
T h e r e s u l t s f o r t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d s h o w a n o b s e r v a b l e s h i f t i n i n v e s t o r s ' f o c u s in 
c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d . I n t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , B V a n d a i l n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , w h i c h i s i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d w h e r e 
n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . T h e r e i s s o m e e v i d e n c e t h a t G A A P 
e a r n i n g s h a v e i n c r e m e n t a l v a l u e r e l e v a n c e . D I F F I a n d D I F F 2 a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n r e l a t i o n t o I B E S a n d C F . l A i s n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , 
I A * N o n G A A P E i s g e n e r a l l y s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d n e g a t i v e , w h i c h i n d i c a t e t h a t 
t h e m a r g i n a l e f f e c t o f h i g h i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y o n n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s i s n e g a t i v e l y 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s h a r e p r i c e . T h e r e i s s o m e e v i d e n c e t h a t G A A P e a r n i n g s a r e 
i n c r e m e n t a l l y v a l u e r e l e v a n t i n r e l a t i o n t o I B E S a n d C O R E . 
5.2 .4.2 Models by Low and High Information Asymmetry 
Table 5.10 presents the results for the non-S&P 500 sample. All n o n - G A A P earnings 
are statistically significant at the higher level of information asymmetry for both Model 
1 (Panel A) and Model 2 (Panel B) in the pre-GFC period. In Model I, G A A P earnings 
are incrementally value relevant at the higher level of information asymmetry in relation 
to IBES, CE and CF. In contrast , G A A P earnings are only incrementally value relevant 
when information asymmetry is low in relation to C O R E . I find similar results for 
Model 2 (Panel B) in relation to IBES, C O R E and CF. However , DIFF2 is not 
statistically significant in relation to CE across all quintiles. 
My results for the non-S&P 500 sample for the pre-GFC period are similar to those for 
the non-financial sample. N o n - G A A P earnings, DIFFl and DIFF2 are generally 
significant and negative at the high level of information asymmetry . 
Also, DIFFl and DIFF2 are significant and positive in relation to C O R E at the low level 
of information asymmetry . The significant and negative results for DIFFl and DIFF2 
suggest that for small f i rms , investors find G A A P earnings that are generally closer to, 
or less than. n o n - G A A P earnings incrementally value relevant. 
In the G F C period, IBES is not significant and C O R E is significant and negative when 
information asymmetry is low in both Model 1 (Panel C) and Model 2 (Panel D). Also, 
CE and C F are both significant and negative when information asymmetry is low and 
significant and positive when information asymmetry is high in Model 1 and Model 2. 
The results also show an inverse relationship for DIFFl and DIFF2 at low and high 
levels of information asymmetry . DIFFl is significant and negative when information 
asymmetry is low in relation to IBES, CE and CF. However , it is significant and 
positive when information asymmetry is high in relation to CF. DIFF2 is significant and 
negative in relation to IBES and C F when information asymmetry is low but it is 
significant and positive when information asymmetry is high. However , DIFF2 is 
significant and positive in relation to C O R E when information asymmetry is low. 
Tabic 5.10: Ohlson Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and High/Low 
Information Asymmetry Index Quintiles 
Model 1: P = a„ + P^BV, + l},NonGAAPE^^ + P P I F F I . , + £. 
Model 2: P = a„ + + P^NonGAAPE^ + P,DIFF2., + 
Panel A: Pre-GFC - Model 1 
lA Quint i lc BV N o n G A A P E D IFE l Intcrccpt N Ad j 
IBES Low 1.270*** 12.095 -3.622 7.565* 8057 0.6171 
Hish 1.508*** -9.807* -12.151* 9 .911*** 4850 0.6918 
C O K H I.ow 1.153*** 8.700 33.842* 9.080* 8024 0.5760 
High 1.404*** -9.084*** 0.721 9.188*** 4850 0.7217 
C h Low 1.169*** 8.045 0.463 8.843* 7806 0.5680 
High 1.555*** -8.990** -8.713** 9.743*** 4510 0.7075 
CF I.o\v 1.395*** 4.580 4.2.36 8.865* 8021 0.5671 
High 1.275*** -12.880*** -12.690*** 1 1.793*** 4776 0.6806 
Panel B: ; Pre-GFC -Model 2 
lA Quint i lc BV N o n G A A I ' E DIFF2 Intercept N Ad j R-
IBES Low 1.270*** 12.249* -2.635 7.498* 8057 0.6163 
High 1.5.38*** -9.007 -10.052 9.1.52*** 4850 0.6804 
C O R E Low 1.195*** 7.866 29.982* 9.103* 8024 0.5783 
High 1.365*** -8.700*** 8.275 9.265*** 4850 0.7284 
C E Low 1.170*** 8.116 0.989 8.897* 7806 0.5681 
High 1.607*** -6.311 * -6.501 8.548*** 4510 0.6774 
CE Low 1.392*** 4.559 4.192 8.938* 8021 0.5676 
High 1.297*** -1 1.512** -1 1.378*** 1 1.014*** 4776 0.6742 
Panel C; : GFC - Model 1 
lA Qu imi le BV N o n G A A P E DIEF l Intercept N Ad j R-
IBES Low 0.994*** 6.393 -4.931* 1 1 .955*** 2106 0.6795 
High 1.406** -2.373 0.247 4.559 1253 0.3285 
C O R E Low 1.077*** -3.994*** 1.403 13.824*** 2084 0.6555 
High 1.369** -1.480 -4.686 4.794 1257 0.32.39 
C E Low 1.114*** -3.288* -7.873** 12.378*** 2065 0.6490 
High 0.819*** 2.255* 0.909 9.783*** 1219 0.4231 
CF Low 1.071*** -3.675* -3.526* 13.970*** 2146 0.6568 
High 0 .925*** 6.967* 5.158* 8.412*** 1256 0.4752 
Panel D: GFC - Model 2 
lA Quint i lc BV N o n G A A P E DIEF2 Intercept N Ad j R-
IBES Low 1.018*** 6.034 -4.320* 11.690*** 2106 0.6714 
High 1.426** -2.479 2.684*** 4.856 1253 0.3383 
C O R E Low 1 .086*** -3.969*** 2.695** 13.7.32*** 2084 0.6584 
High 1.362** -1.175 2.012 4.524 1257 0.3225 
C E Lou' 1.122*** -2.971* -8.625 1 1.881*** 2065 0.6426 
High 0.822*** 1 .995*** 1.879 10.299*** 1219 0.4241 
C E Low 1.080*** -3.328* -3.084* 13.719*** 2146 0.6493 
High 0 .983*** 4.768* 2.843*** 8 .617*** 1256 0.4636 
Panel E: Post-GFC - Model I 
lA Quintile BV NonGAAPE DlFEl Intercept N Adi R-
IBES Lou 0.997*** 19.429*** -8.052 8.032* 4579 07277 
High 0.831*** 6.513*** 1.844* 9.869*** 2692 0.5581 
CORK Low 1.056*** 15.101*** -3.4.36 9.252* 4579 0.7079 
High 0.719*** 5.340*** 5.739* 11.419*** 2668 0.4437 
CK Low 1.09.1*** 12.853** 1.782 7.007 4513 0.7021 
High 0.792*** 6.470*** 5,704*** 10.740*** 2574 0.4042 
CF Low 1.073*** 11.9.56** 11.608** 9.746* 4650 0.6974 
High 0731*** 5,518*** 6.308*** 10.939*** 2697 0.5204 
Panel F: Post-GFC - Model 2 
lA Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFF2 Intercept N Adj 
IBES Low 0.987*** 19.998*** -7.864* 7.887* 4579 0.7285 
High 0.847*** 5.798*** 0.021 9.745*** 2692 0.5547 
CORE Low 1.062*** 15.307*** -6.605 9.121* 4579 07102 
High 0.7-14*** 2.523 2.937* 11.731*** 2668 0.4181 
CE Low 1.132*** 11.173** -5.030 6.076 4513 0.7031 
High 0.788*** 2..546 -2.595 9.970*** 2574 0.3739 
CE Low 1.109*** 10.348*** 9.907** 9.897** 4650 0.6950 
High 0.803*** 1.777 2.603 10.826*** 2697 0.4913 
• p < 0 . 0 5 , " p < 0 . 0 1 , " ' p<0 , 001 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent \ariable, P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the follow ing variables for 
IBES, C O R E , CE and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S&P Core earnings per share, CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. D IFFI = G A A P l minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P I is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under G A A P . DIFF2 = 
G A A P 2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under G A A P . lA quintile is Low if the information asymmetry index ( lA I ) quintile is I and High if the lAI 
quintile is .'i. 
In the post-GFC period, the results show a shift in investors' emphasis on n o n - G A A P 
earnings. Panel E shows that ail n o n - G A A P earnings are statistically signif icant at both 
levels o f information asymmetry . G A A P earnings have incremental value relevance 
only when informat ion asymmetry is high in relation to all n o n - G A A P earnings. In 
Panel F , all n o n - G A A P earnings are statistically signif icant when informat ion 
asymmetry is low. Add i t i ona l ly . I B E S is also signif icant when informat ion asymmetry 
is h igh. D I FF2 . however , is only signif icant in relation to I B E S and C F when 
information asymmetry is low and signif icant in relation to C O R E when informat ion 
asymmetry is h igh. 
5.3 DISCUSSION 
I use two alternative approaches to investigate the impact o f in format ion asymmetry . 
These two approaches yield complementary and consistent f ind ings . Genera l ly , 
est imating the models with the ma in effects and interaction terms show the impact o f 
informat ion asymmetry on the pooled sample . However , separately est imat ing the 
I.58 
models for f irms with low information asymmetry and firms with high information 
asymmetry provides a contrast of the value relevance of the alternative earnings 
measures for each of these sub-samples. 
M y results indicate that information asymmetry has an impact on the value relevance of 
G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. The G A A P earnings measure used in each model also 
has an impact on the results. Recall that D IFF I is measured using G A A P earnings from 
operations adjusted to exclude special items. Therefore, this G A A P earnings measure is 
more closely aligned with IBES and C O R E , and these three earnings measures are 
argued to better reflect recurring earnings. Consequently, D IFF I biases the results 
against f inding significance in increinental value relevance of G A A P earnings in 
relation to IBES and C O R E . 
A comparison of Chapter 3 Table 3.3 with Table 5.1 and Chapter 3 Table 3.4 with Table 
5.2 highlights the impact of information asymmetry on the results. Table 5.1 shows that 
C E and C F models generally outperform all other models tested across all samples after 
controlling for the main effects and interaction terms of information asymmetry. This is 
in marked contrast with the results reported in Table 3.3, which show that IBES models 
are generally the best performers. Table 5.2 highlights additional and complementary 
insight into the impact of information asymmetry. Specifically, it shows that the value 
relevance of non-GAAP earnings and the incremental value relevance of G A A P 
earnings are subject to the level of information asymmetry. This is most evident in the 
results of: the financial sector sample in the pre- and post-GFC periods; the non-
financial sector sample in the pre-GFC and G F C periods; the S & P 500 sample in the 
G F C period; and the non-S&P 500 sample in all periods. 
In the financial sector sample, my results show that information asymmetry impacts on 
the emphasis investors place on both G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. My results show 
a shift in investors' focus towards G A A P earnings between the pre- and post-GFC 
periods, particularly when the level of information asymmetry is high. I find the 
interaction of D IFF I is marginally to moderately significant in relation to IBES , C O R E 
and CE . However, in the results from separately estimating the models for firms with 
low or high information asymmetry, I find D IFF I is strongly significant, indicating 
investors f ind it incrementally value relevant, relative to all non-GAAP earnings when 
information asymmetry is high in the post-GFC period; the comparative results pre-
G F C is weaker. An explanation for the weaker results in the model with main effects 
and in terac t ions t e rms is that tiie s a m p l e is p o o l e d , w h i c h a v e r a g e s out the e f f e c t s of 
i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y . 
I a l so f ind that the level of statistical s ign i f i cance f o r both D I F F I and D I F F 2 is 
genera l ly h igher in the p o s t - G F C per iod relat ive to the p r e - G F C pe r iod . I f i nd s imi la r 
resul ts f o r D I F F 2 in relat ion to I B E S and C F but not in relat ion to C O R E and C E . T h e s e 
resul ts a l so sugges t that inves tors genera l ly f ind the G A A P I ea rn ings m e a s u r e m o r e 
value re levant than the G A A P 2 ea rn ings m e a s u r e . In the G F C pe r iod , I f ind a genera l 
increase in inves to r s ' f o c u s on G A A P ea rn ings , h o w e v e r , the resul ts d o not indicate a 
cons is ten t f o c u s on G A A P ea rn ings at spec i f i c levels of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y 
In c o m p a r i s o n to the resul ts f o r the f inanc ia l sector s a m p l e in C h a p t e r 3 , 1 f ind that the 
level of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y impac t s on the resul ts . In the p o s t - G F C per iod , the 
pooled sample resul ts show no , or marg ina l , statistical s ign i f i cance f o r G A A P ea rn ings 
in relation to IBES and C O R E . H o w e v e r , I present e v i d e n c e in this chap te r that s h o w s 
that G A A P ea rn ings have stat ist ical ly s ign i f i can t incrementa l va lue r e l evance w h e n the 
level of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh . F u r t h e r m o r e , the best p e r f o r m i n g m o d e l s a f t e r 
cont ro l l ing fo r i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y are in con t ras t to those in C h a p t e r 3 . M y resul t s 
f o r the f inancia l sector s ample are cons is ten t wi th inves tors p lac ing grea te r e m p h a s i s on 
G A A P ea rn ings , which are relat ively m o r e c red ib le and re l iable than n o n - G A A P 
ea rn ings in the w a k e of the G F C , and that G A A P ea rn ings are inc rementa l ly va lue 
re levant . 
T h e resul ts of the m o d e l s wi th ma in e f f ec t s and in teract ion t e rms fo r f i r m s not in the 
f inancia l sec tor s h o w interes t ing con t ras t s . W h i l e there is e v i d e n c e of a sh i f t in 
inves tors ' f o c u s to G A A P ea rn ings p o s t - G F C , it appea r s the m o r e s ign i f i can t sh i f t in 
f o c u s relates to n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . Whi l e there are f e w d i f f e r e n c e s be tween the 
results f r o m the t w o a l te rna t ive es t imat ion a p p r o a c h e s , the substant ia l f i n d i n g s are 
cons is ten t and remain the s a m e . In the p r e - G F C pe r iod , both n o n - G A A P and G A A P 
ea rn ings are genera l ly not va lue re levant at low level of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y . I 
obse rve statistical s ign i f i cance genera l ly w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is high and that 
it has a nega t ive impac t on the e m p h a s i s inves tors p lace on these e a r n i n g s . In the pos t -
G F C per iod , h o w e v e r , n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s are s t rong ly s ign i f i can t at low level of 
i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y in all m o d e l s . N o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s are s t rong ly s ign i f i can t , but 
" I re-esl imale my models in the CiFC window clus ler ing on a single d imens ion - by l ime and by f i rm . 
Whi le there are f ew individual d i f fe rences in the results across all samples , the subs tance of the 
inferences and interpretat ions discussed in this chapter remain the .same. 
negative, when information asymmetry is high in all models. These results show a shift 
in investors' emphasis between the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods when information 
asymmetry is low. Nevertheless, in both instances, investors appear to reduce their 
emphasis on non-GAAP earnings when information asymmetry is high. The results for 
G A A P earnings show they generally have incremental value relevance when the level 
of information. 
Dur ing the G F C , there is some evidence of a shift in investors' focus on accounting 
numbers. In comparison to the pre-GFC period, investors appear to generally be more 
focused on earnings. C O R E , C E and C F are statistically significant. Furthermore, 
G A A P earnings generally have incremental value relevance over non-GAAP earnings 
and the statistically significant coefficients are generally negative at the low level of 
information asymmetry. This also indicates that investors place greater emphasis on 
values of G A A P earnings, which are generally closer to, or less than, non-GAAP 
earnings. 
More interesting is the apparent inverse relationship between information asymmetry 
and G A A P and non-GAAP earnings when the models are estimated separately for firms 
with high or low information asymmetry. In the pre-GFC period, I observe an inverse 
relationship between higher levels of information asymmetry and both G A A P and non-
G A A P earnings. In the post-GFC period, however, there is a positive relationship 
between a high level of information asymmetry and both G A A P and non-GAAP 
earnings. In addit ion, in the post-GFC period, at a low level of information asymmetry, 
significant coefficients of non-GAAP and G A A P earnings are positive. These results for 
the post-GFC period are consistent with investors f inding G A A P earnings to be more 
credible and reliable and to have incremental value relevance. 
The results for model performance based on B IC show a contrast to the results in 
Chapter 3. The C E models are the best performing models across the three period 
windows, however, IBES models perform best in the estimation results in Chapter 3. 
In the S & P 500 sample, the results from the models with main effects and interactions 
terms show an observable shift in investors' focus between the pre-GFC period and the 
post-GFC period. Investors appear to place greater emphasis on earnings in the post-
G F C period, however, they appear to place greater emphasis on the book value of net 
assets in the pre-GFC period. There is some evidence that G A A P earnings are 
incrementally value relevant in relation to C E and CF . 
In the resul ts f r o m separa te ly es t ima t ing the m o d e l s f o r f i r m s with h igh or low 
in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y , the p o s t - G F C resul ts f o r Mode l 1 s h o w inves tors f i n d G A A P 
ea rn ings incrementa l ly va lue re levant ac ros s all levels of i n fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y , 
excep t in relation to I B E S w h e r e G A A P ea rn ings are inc rementa l ly va lue re levant only 
when in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh . Whi l e the resul ts f o r Mode l 2 are w e a k e r , there is 
still ev idence of a sh i f t in inves to r s ' f o c u s . In te res t ing ly , C F , w h i c h is not s tat is t ical ly 
s igni f icant in the p r e - G F C per iod w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h i g h , b e c o m e s 
margina l ly s igni f icant in the G F C period when in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh . T h i s is 
cons is tent with the G F C caus ing inves tors to p lace m o r e f o c u s on cash f l o w s . 
T h e resul ts f o r the n o n - S & P 5 0 0 sample show n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are genera l ly va lue 
relevant w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh in the p r e - G F C per iod . T h e r e is a l so s o m e 
ev idence that G A A P ea rn ings are incrementa l ly va lue re levant . T h i s e v i d e n c e , h o w e v e r , 
is c learer and s t ronger in the resul ts f r o m separa te ly es t ima t ing the mode l fo r f i r m s wi th 
high or low in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y . G A A P ea rn ings are genera l ly inc rementa l ly va lue 
re levant when in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y is high in relat ion to I B E S , C E and C F . In 
cont ras t , G A A P ea rn ings are incrementa l ly va lue re levant in relat ion to C O R E only 
when in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y is low, 
I a lso f ind an inverse re la t ionship be tween relat ively high levels of i n fo rma t ion 
a symmet ry and both n o n - G A A P and G A A P earn ings . S imi la r to the non- f inanc ia l 
s ample , the resul ts sugges t s that w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh , inves tors f ind 
more conserva t ive ea rn ings more value re levant . 
P o s t - G F C , h o w e v e r . n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are genera l ly va lue re levant ac ross all levels 
of in format ion a s y m m e t r y in Mode l 1 and w h e n in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is low to 
modera te in Model 2 . N o n - G A A P ea rn ings are incrementa l ly va lue re levant genera l ly 
when in format ion a s y m m e t r y is h igh . In te res t ing ly , when in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y is 
high in the G F C per iod , I B E S and C O R E are not stat ist ical ly s ign i f i can t but C E and C F 
are statist ically s ign i f ican t . Add i t i ona l l y , G A A P ea rn ings are inc rementa l ly va lue 
re levant in relation to C F in this pe r iod . T h e s e resul ts sugges t that inves tors are f o c u s e d 
on cash and cash-based ea rn ings in the G F C in respect to smal l e r f i r m s . 
Fu r the rmore , the c h a n g e f r o m an inverse re la t ionsh ip be tween high in fo rma t ion 
a s y m m e t r y and G A A P ea rn ings in the p r e - G F C per iod to a d i rec t re la t ionsh ip in the 
p o s t - G F C period is cons is ten t wi th inves tors f i n d i n g G A A P e a r n i n g s m o r e c red ib le and 
more value re levant . 
5.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
My results for the Ohison models presented in Chapter 3 show mixed evidence of the 
comparat ive value relevance of non-GAAP earnings and the incremental value 
relevance of G A A P earnings. 1 expect investors to shift their focus to G A A P earnings 
during and after the GFC. I report mixed results in Chapter 3 that show a shift in 
investors ' focus on G A A P and non -GAAP earnings before, during and after the GFC. 
In summary , the results in Chapter 3 provide some support for prior studies that find 
non -GAAP earnings to be value relevant. They also show that G A A P earnings are 
incrementally value relevant. However , these results are weak and are not consistent 
across all samples and are subject to the measure of G A A P earnings used, particularly 
in the non-financial and non-S&P 500 samples. 
In this chapter, I address RQ2 and investigate whether levels of information asymmetry 
explain my mixed f indings in Chapter 3. Specifically, I investigate how different levels 
of information asymmetry impact on my results and, at extreme levels of information 
asymmetry , if there is a change in the value relevance of non-GAAP and G A A P 
earnings between the three sub-periods in my study. Prior studies on the value relevance 
of G A A P versus non -GAAP earnings (Albring et al.. 2010; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002: 
Brown and Sivakumar, 2003) do not control for or investigate the impact of information 
asymmetry on the results. 
In this chapter, I find evidence of a shift in investors' focus on G A A P and non-GAAP 
earnings conditioned by the level of information asymmetry. Investors place greater 
emphasis on G A A P earnings, when information asymmetry is high, in the post-GFC 
period in comparison to the pre-GFC period. The results are also consistent with the 
argument that investors may seek more credible and reliable information in the wake of 
the G F C . The results f rom the pre-GFC period show that investors value relatively more 
conservative earnings when information asymmetry is high. In the post-GFC period, 
however , I find that G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant and positive when 
information asymmetry is high. Furthermore, the evidence of a negative relationship 
between a low level of information asymmetry and earnings, and a positive relationship 
between a high level of information asymmetry and earnings in the non-financial sector 
and non-S&P 500 samples explain the weak and mixed results in Chapter 3. 
Specifically, in the aggregated samples in Chapter 3, these positive and negative 
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re la t ionsh ips will b iased aga ins t f i n d i n g s ign i f i can t resul t s in the G A A P and n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e s . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , there is e v i d e n c e that inves tors a l so p lace grea te r overa l l e m p h a s i s on n o n -
G A A P and G A A P ea rn ings in the p o s t - G F C per iod re la t ive to the p r e - G F C pe r iod . T h i s 
is cons is ten t ac ross all s a m p l e s in th is s t udy . T h e resul ts are genera l ly s t ronge r f o r 
Mode l 1 relat ive to Mode l 2 . G iven that the G A A P l e a r n i n g s m e a s u r e is a rgued to be 
m o r e c o m p a r a b l e to both I B E S and C O R E , an essent ia l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n G A A P and 
n o n - G A A P ea rn ings is that the f o r m e r c o m p l i e s wi th m a n d a t e d rules . W h i l e quar te r ly 
ea rn ings are not typical ly aud i t ed , the i r c o m p l i a n c e wi th G A A P sugges t s g rea te r 
credibi l i ty and re l iabi l i ty . T h e r e f o r e , the resul t s I p resen t are cons i s ten t wi th inves tors 
sh i f t ing their f o c u s to ea rn ings that are m o r e c red ib le and re l iable as a c o n s e q u e n c e of 
the G F C . 
F ina l ly , the resul ts s h o w an impac t on mode l p e r f o r m a n c e . In con t ras t to C h a p t e r 3 , m y 
resul ts in this chap te r s h o w that C E cons i s ten t ly o u t p e r f o r m I B E S in three of the f o u r 
s a m p l e s , wh ich are the non- f inanc ia l sec to r , S & P 5 0 0 and n o n - S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e s . T h i s 
is in stark contras t to the resul ts of the pr ior s tud ies noted above and h igh l igh t s the 
impac t of in fo rmat ion a s y m m e t r y on the e m p h a s i s inves tors p lace on both G A A P and 
n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . M y resul ts sugges t that inves tors are m o r e f o c u s e d on ca sh -based 




In this chapter , I investigate the impact of earnings quality on the value relevance of 
G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings to address RQS. I examine if the level of earnings 
quality is systematically associated with the emphasis investors place on the value 
relevance of G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings. I also examine if the G F C may have had 
an impact on the value relevance of these earnings. 
My results in Chapters 3 and 5 show that the G F C has an impact on the value relevance 
of G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings. Furthermore. I find that investors place greater 
emphasis on G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings after the GFC, particularly in the financial 
sector, non-financial sector and S & P 500 samples. I also find evidence of a change in 
investors ' emphasis to more credible and reliable earnings, i.e., G A A P earnings. My 
examinat ion of the impact of information symmetry, in Chapter 5, indicates that the 
emphasis investors place on G A A P and non-GAAP earnings is f luid. My results are 
also consistent with prior studies showing the market prices information risk, consistent 
with poor earnings quality. 
In this chapter , I fur ther examine the impact of earnings quality and the G F C on the 
value relevance of my alternative earnings measure. Specifically, I adopt a returns-
based measure of earnings quality that captures investors' perceptions of their exposure 
to poor earning quality f rom Ecker er al. (2006), who refer to this measure as e-loading. 
Ecker et al. (2006) show two alternative methods of calculating e-loading - a one-factor 
e- loading and a three-factor e- loading. I apply and test both methods of calculating e-
loadings. For brevity, I report the one-factor e-loading method in this chapter.^^ 
Consistent with Chapter 5 , 1 adopt two alternative approaches to investigate the impact 
of earnings quality. I focus on the extreme quintiles of e- loading, as systematic 
di f ferences are more likely to be evident in f i rms with extreme levels of exposure to low 
- ' T h e r e are f ew d i f f e rences be tween the results f rom the one- fac tor e - loading and three-fac tor e - load ing 
m o d e l s e s t imat ions . These d i f f e rences may be expla ined by the inclusion of size and \ a lue in es t imat ing 
the th ree- fac tor e - load ing . T h e three- fac tor e - loading may be a noisy measu re in the sample of large 
f i rms . Never the less , the in fe rences f rom the one - fac to r e - loading and three-fac tor e - load ing results are 
substant ia l ly s imi lar . 
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qual i ty ea rn ings . T h e f irs t a p p r o a c h e x a m i n e s the main e f f e c t s and in teract ion t e r m s in 
the m o d e l . I inc lude a d u m m y var iab le , E L , w h e r e 1 ind ica tes f i r m s wi th high e - l o a d i n g 
(i .e. , h igh e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings ) and 0 ind ica tes f i r m s wi th low e - load ing 
( i .e . . low exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings ) . Add i t i ona l l y , the in terpre ta t ion of the 
coe f f i c i en t s is d i f f e r en t due to inc lud ing interact ion t e r m s in the m o d e l . In s u m m a r y , the 
coe f f i c i en t s of the main e f f ec t s ref lec t the i r impac t w h e n E L equa l s 0 . T h e c o e f f i c i e n t s 
of the interact ion t e rms measu re the marg ina l e f f ec t of that var iable w h e n E L equa l s I , 
i .e., a pos i t ive (nega t ive ) coe f f i c i en t indica tes the increased (dec reased ) e f f e c t of that 
var iab le . T h e r e f o r e , the un ique e f f ec t of a test var iable is the sum of the c o e f f i c i e n t s of 
the main e f f ec t and its interact ion t e rm. 
In the second a p p r o a c h , I ass ign f i r m s into quin t i les based on e - load ing . I r e -es t ima te 
my Oh i son m o d e l s separa te ly fo r f i r m s in the high or low quin t i les of e - l oad ing fo r each 
s a m p l e in my s tudy . 
A l so , cons is ten t wi th prior chap te r s , r e f e rences to the va lue re levance of n o n - G A A P 
ea rn ings deno te c o m p a r a t i v e va lue re levance be tween these ea rn ings , i .e. , I B E S , C O R E , 
C E and C F , and r e fe rences to D I F F l , D1FF2 and G A A P ea rn ings deno te inc rementa l 
va lue re levance be tween G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . 
In s u m m a r y , I expec t inves tors to d i scoun t the share price of f i r m s wi th high e x p o s u r e 
to low qual i ty ea rn ings . T h a t is, I expec t to f ind a nega t ive assoc ia t ion be tween share 
pr ice and G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings when the level of e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty 
ea rn ings is h igh . O n the o ther h a n d , w h e n the exposu re to low qual i ty e a r n i n g s is l ow , I 
expec t G A A P ea rn ings to be value re levant . Neve r the l e s s , the type of s a m p l e m a y be 
biased aga ins t f i n d i n g s igni f icant resul ts . For e x a m p l e , f i r m s in the S & P 5 0 0 index will 
genera l ly have a relat ively lower risk of exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings in c o m p a r i s o n 
to f i r m s not in the S & P 5 0 0 index . T h e r e f o r e , sor t ing large f i r m s into quin t i les based on 
e - load ing m e a n s that the relat ive level of e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings will be smal l 
in compar i son to f i r m s not in the S & P 5 0 0 index . C o n s e q u e n t l y , th is m a y bias aga ins t 
f i nd ing s ign i f ican t resul ts in the test var iab les . S imi la r ly , f i r m s in the f inanc ia l sector are 
genera l ly m o r e highly regu la ted . F u r t h e r m o r e , this s a m p l e is re lat ively m o r e 
h o m o g e n e o u s in c o m p a r i s o n to the o the r s amp le s . T h i s m a y a l so bias aga ins t f i n d i n g 
s ign i f ican t resul ts in the test var iab les . 
M y resul ts show that the G F C has an impac t that resul t s in a sh i f t in inves to r s ' f o c u s on 
G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . F u r t h e r m o r e , I f i nd e v i d e n c e that low qual i ty e a r n i n g s 
are d i s c o u n t e d by inves to rs . G e n e r a l l y , e a r n i n g s qual i ty has an impac t on the va lue 
r e l e v a n c e of n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s and the inc rementa l va lue r e l evance of G A A P 
e a r n i n g s . 
T a b l e 6.1 p resen t s a s u m m a r y of the t w o h ighes t ranked m o d e l s , wi th ma in e f f e c t s and 
in te rac t ion t e r m s , f o r all s a m p l e s and pe r iods that I test in this chap t e r . It s h o w s that in 
the pre- and p o s t - G F C pe r iods , I B E S m o d e l s genera l ly o u t p e r f o r m all o the r m o d e l s . 
H o w e v e r , du r ing the G F C , C F m o d e l s p e r f o r m best . T h e resul ts are cons i s ten t wi th the 
a r g u m e n t that in a per iod of unce r t a in ty , inves tors are c o n c e r n e d with cash f l o w s . 
Table 6.1: Summary of Two Highest Ranked Models for All Samples with e-
loading and Interaction Terms 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
Model 1: P = + P^BV, + P^NoiiGAAPE^^ + P,DIFF!.^ + 
* b\ + PfiL • NonGAAPE^, + p,EL * DIFF!-, + £„ 
Model 2: / ; , = « „ + PfiV^^ + ji,NonCAAPE^^ + PPIFF2-, + P^EL., 
+I},EL * BV., + * NonGAAPE-, +p.EL* DIFF2i, + e„ 
I B E S C O R E C E C T 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model I Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Financial 



















































Models ranked I and 2 by their BIC are shown. The absolute difference in BIC values between the model and the 
next lower ranked model is shown in parentheses. The different grades of evidence corresponding to minimum BIC 
difference according to Rafter>' (1995) are: 
Minimum BIC Difference of 0: Weak 
Minimum BIC Difference of 2: Positive 
Minimum BIC Difference of 6: Strong 
Mmimum BIC Difference of 10: Ver> Strong 
The dependent variable. P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES, CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = I/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFT represents DIFFI in Model 1 and DIFF2 in Model 2. DIFFl = GAAPl 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPl is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. EL = 1 if e-loading quintile is 5 and 0 
if e-loading quintile is I. EL'BV = Interaction term of e-loading with book value of common equity per share. 
EL'NonGAAPE = Interaction term of e-loading with the corresponding non-GAAP earnings measure of IBES, 
CORE, CE and CF. EL'DIFF = Interaction term of e-loading with the corresponding DIFF measure of DIFFl and 
DIFF2. 
Table 6.2 presents a summary of my Ohlson model regressions for each sample by 
period w indows , models and low and iiigh quintiles of exposure to low quality earnings. 
This table highlights the i<ey variables that are statistically significant at p = 0.05 or 
stronger. The negative sign of significant variables are indicated in brackets. The results 
show that investors are predominantly focused on the book value of equity. In the 
financial sector and S & P 500 samples, there is evidence of investors placing relatively 
greater emphasis on G A A P and non-GAAP earnings in the post-GFC period in 
comparison to the pre-GFC period. On the other hand, the results show a shift in 
investors' emphasis away from G A A P and non-GAAP earnings in the post-GFC period 
in comparison to the pre-GFC period. 
Table 6.2: Summary of Significant Key Variables for Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results by Sample, Models and High/Low e-loading 
Quintiles 
Model 1: P, = a„ + /3,BV;, + P^NonGAAPE^, + P f i lFF I- , + E„ 
Model 2: P„=a„ + li,BV, + PMoiiGAAPE^^ + P.DIFFI., + £„ 
Panel A: Financial Sector Sample 
Model 1 Model 2 
EL Quinli le BV N o n G A A P E DIFEI BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBKS Lou- sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig(-) sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C E Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
CF Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
EL Quintile BV NonCiAAPE n i F F i BV N o n G A A P E DIEF2 
IBES Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
CE Low- sig sig (-) sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
CF Low- sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
Post GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
EL Quintile BV NonCiAAPE DIFFI BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low- sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low- sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
CE Low sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig 
CF Low- sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
Panel B: Non-Financial Sector Sample 
Pre-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
EL Quinli le BV N o n G A A P E DIFFl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBfiS I ,ow sig sig 
High sig s i g ( - ) sig s i g ( - ) 
CORH Low sig sig sig 
High sig s i g ( - ) sig (-) sig s ig(^) 
C E Low sig sig 
High sig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) sig s ig{-) 
C F Low sig sig 
High sig sig (-) s i g ( - ) sig s i g ( - ) sig<-) 
GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
EL Qiiintile BV N o n f i A A P E DlFFl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig s i g ( - ) sig 
C O R E Linv sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig s i g ( - ) sig s i g ( - ) sig 
C E Low sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig (-) sig s i g ( - ) 
C F Low sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig s i g ( - ) sig s i g ( - ) 
Post-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
EL Quinli le BV N o n G A A P E DIFFl BV NonGAAF'E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig s i g ( - ) sig sig s i g ( - ) 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R F Low sig sig 
High sig sig 
C E Low sig sig 
High sig sig 
C F Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
Panel C: S & P 500 Sample 
Pre-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
EEQuin t i l e BV N o n G A A P E DIFFI BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig (-) sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig (-) 
C O R E Eon sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
CK Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C F Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
EL Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFI BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C E Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C F Low sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
Post-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
EL Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFI BV N o n G A A P E D1FF2 
IBES Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
CE Low sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C F Low sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
Panel D: Non-S&P 500 Sample 
Pre-GFC 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
E L Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D I F F I B V N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 
I B E S L o u s i g s ig 
H i g h s ig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) s ig s ig ( - ) s i g ( - ) 
C O R H L o w s ig s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s i g ( - ) s ig s ig ( - ) 
C E 1 , o w s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) s ig s i g ( - ) 
C F L o w s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) s ig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) 
GFC 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
E L Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D I F F I B V N o n G A A P E D 1 F F 2 
I B E S L o w s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s i g ( - ) s ig s ig ( - ) 
C O K E L o w s ig s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s i g ( - ) s ig s i g ( - ) s ig 
C E L o w s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) s ig s i g ( - ) 
C F L o w s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) s ig s i g ( - ) 
Post GFC 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
E L Q u i n t i l e B V N o n ( i A A I ' E D I F F I B V N o n G A A P E D 1 F F 2 
I B E S L o w s ig s ig s i g ( - ) s ig s ig s i g ( - ) 
H i g h s ig s ig s ig s ig 
C O R E L o w s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s ig s ig 
C E L o w s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s ig s i g ( - ) 
C F L o w s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s ig 
sig indicates the var iable is statistically signif icant and posi t ive at p = 0.05 or s tronger, sig (-) indicates the variable is 
statist ically s ignif icant and negat ive at p = 0.05 or s t ronger . T h e dependen t variable , P. is closing share price at 
ea rn ings a n n o u n c e m e n t date . T h e independent variables are def ined as fo l lows: BV = Book value of c o m m o n equity 
per share. N o n G A A P E represents the fo l lowing var iables for IBES , C O R E , C E and C E models : IBES = l /B/E/S 
earn ings per share as compu ted by securi ty analysts . C O R E = S & P Core earn ings per share. C E = Net i ncome per 
share , a f t e r adding back deprecia t ion and amort isat ion expenses . C E = Operat ing cash f lows per share. DIEEI = 
G A A P I minus the re levant n o n - G A A P earn ings , where G A A P l is earn ings per share f r o m opera t ions ad jus ted to 
exc lude the e f fec t s of special i tems reported under G A A P . DIEE2 = G A A P 2 minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earn ings , 
where G A A P 2 is i ncome before extraordinary i tems per share reported under G A A P , EL quinti le is Low if e- loading 
quint i le is I and High if e - loading quinti le is 5 , 1 . o w and High indicate low exposure to low quali ty earnings and high 
exposu re to low qual i ty earn ings , respect ively . 
6.2 RESULTS 
As with the p rev ious chap te r , the c o r r e s p o n d i n g N o n G A A P E m e a s u r e s in E q u a t i o n s 2 .5 
and 2 .6 are I B E S , C O R E , C E and C F in the tab les . T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g D I F F m e a s u r e s 
are D I F F l and D I F F 2 fo r Equa t ion 2 .5 (denoted as Mode l I in tab les ) and Equa t ion 2 .6 
(denoted as Mode l 2 in t ab les ) , r espec t ive ly . Recal l that e - l o a d i n g is inverse ly re la ted to 
ea rn ings qua l i ty . Tha t is, high e - load ing indicates high e x p o s u r e to low e a r n i n g s qual i ty 
and low e - load ing indicates low e x p o s u r e to low ea rn ings qua l i ty . T h e r e f o r e , the high 
( low) quint i le of e - load ing indica tes low (h igh) ea rn ings qua l i ty . 
My ana lyses use a t w o - w a y clus ter app roach to es t imate robus t s t andard e r rors , 
c lus ter ing on both f i r m and t ime . T h e reduced sub - sample and the increased n u m b e r of 
var iab les in the m o d e l s wi th main e f f e c t and in terac t ions t e r m s , h o w e v e r , resul ted wi th 
insuf f ic ien t n u m b e r of c lus ters to ca lcula te robus t cova r i ance mat r ix in s o m e per iods 
(e .g . , the G F C period in the f inanc ia l sector s ample ) . C o n s e q u e n t l y , I r e -es t ima ted m y 
m o d e l s us ing a o n e - w a y c lus ter a p p r o a c h , i .e. , the robust s tandard er rors are c lus te red 
on f i r m . For cons i s t ency , I report the o n e - w a y c lus ter es t imat ion resul ts f o r all tes ts and 
s ample s . 
6.2.1 Financial Sector Sample 
6.2.1.1 Model Estimation with Main Effects and Interaction Terms 
T a b l e 6 .3 s h o w s the es t imat ion resul ts of the one - fac to r e - l oad ing m o d e l s wi th ma in 
e f f ec t s and interact ion t e rms f o r the f inanc ia l sector s ample . All m o d e l s are s tat is t ical ly 
s igni f icant ac ross all per iod w i n d o w s . 
In the p r e - G F C per iod , BV is s t rongly s ign i f ican t ac ross all a l t e rna t ive e a r n i n g s 
measu re s . E L is marg ina l ly s ign i f ican t only in relat ion to C F mode l 2 . T h e ma in e f f e c t s 
of all n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are not s tat is t ical ly s ign i f ican t . T h e ma in e f f e c t of G A A P 
ea rn ings is marg ina l ly s ign i f ican t and nega t ive only in relat ion to C O R E M o d e l 1. 
E L * B V is stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t and nega t ive and E L * N o n G A A P E is s ta t is t ical ly 
s ign i f ican t and posi t ive ac ross all m o d e l s . E L * D I F F , h o w e v e r , is on ly marg ina l ly 
s ign i f ican t and posi t ive in relat ion to C O R E and C F . T h e s e resul t s s h o w that inves tors 
are p r edominan t ly f o c u s e d on the book value of equi ty w h e n e - l o a d i n g is l o w , i .e. , 
exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings is l ow. 
Tabic 6.3: Ohlson Model: Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression at Earnings Announcement Date by Models with One-
Factor e-loading Dummy and Interaction Terms as Controls 
Model 1: P = a„ + + p.NonGAAPE^^ + P P I F F I - , + P^EL., 
* bV„ + PEL * NonGAAPE,, +p.EL* DIFFI-, + £„ 
Model 2: = a„ + P^BV + p.NonGAAPE^^ + P,DIFF2., + PfiL^, 
+P^EL * BV-, +P^EL * NonGAAPEi, +p.EL* DIFF2„ + £„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
CORE 
Model I Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CP 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.334'" 1.355"' 1.333'" 1.314'" 1.331"" 1.346"" 1.333"' 1.359"" 
(5.41) (5.09) (6.52) (6.33) (5.03) (4.90) (5.33) (5.22) 
NonGAAPK 3.555 3.073 4.169 3.935 3.649 2.908 3.345 2.728 
(0.85) (0.61) (1.09) (0.99) (0.84) (0.60) (0.89) (0.61) 
DIFF 4.153 3.648 -17.726' -14.837 3.242 -0.528 3.525 2.874 
< 1.02) (0.72) (-2.16) (-1.53) (1.66) (-0.12) (0.85) (0.61) 
EL 0.761 1.306 0.653 0.941 1.615 1.581 1.992 3.396' 
(0.36) (0.67) (0.34) (0.47) (0.96) (0.89) (1.06) (2.06) 
HL'BV -0.584' -0.621" -0 .568" -0 .544" -0.606"" -0.600" -0.552" -0.569" 
( - 2 4 1 ) (-2.53) (-2.61) (-2.81) (-2.73) (-2.58) (-2.36) (-2.53) 
EL 'NonGAAPE 19.447" 19.728" 17.977" 16.798" 17.369' 14.364' 18.156' 16.019" 
(2.70) (2.66) (2.53) (2.44) (2.55) (2.22) (2.55) (2.33) 
E L D I F F 5.230 5.239 34.764" 27.134' 6.505 -11.084 17.568" 15.503" 
(0.74) (0.94) (2.25) (1.99) (0.91) (-0.71) (2.35) (2.15) 
Intercepl 8 .652" 8 .423" 10.069"" 10.544"' 8.746"" 8 .381" 8 .739" 8.523"" 
(2.91) (2.91) (3.68) (4.12) (3.56) (3.18) (3.02) (3.02) 
N 1634 1634 1634 1634 1634 1634 1634 1634 
Adj R- 0.8804 0.8816 0.8767 0.8764 0.8752 0.8733 0.8728 0.8699 
BIC 16147 16130 16196 16201 16217 16241 16248 16284 
BIC Rank 2 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Panel B: GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0.824"" 0 .830 ' " 0.811"' 0 .880" 0 .782 '" 0 .736" 0.819""" 0.829'"" 
(4.07) (4.09) (3.02) (2.97) (4.35) (3.12) (5.42) (5.34) 
NonGAAPE 4.909 4.994 0.090 0.085 0.378 0.634 -1.663 -1.376 
(1.43) (1.53) (0.09) (0.09) (0.27) (0.43) (-1.90) (-1.43) 
DIFF - 0 4 0 6 -0.246 0.427 2.633 -4.917' -11.311 -0.608 -0.341 
( -041) (-0.24) (0.10) (0.52) (-1.98) (-0.99) (-0.68) (-0.35) 
EL -2.562 -2.399 -3.011 -1.356 -3.644 -3.493 -3.407 -2.986 
(-0.54) (-0.51) (-0.50) (-0.21) (-0.84) (-0.76) (-0.84) (-0.73) 
EL'BV 0.250 0.242 0.291 0.217 0.393 0.433 0.363 0.349 
(1.13) (1.09) (1.02) (0.70) (1.73) (1.-59) (1.83) (1.73) 
EL 'NonGAAPE 4.326 4.232 7 .579" 7 .552" 3.987' 3.479' 5.186"" • 4.675""" 
(1.07) (1.08) (3.10) (3.01) (2.40) (2.05) (4.31) (3.78) 
EL 'DIFF 1.660 1.381 1.245 -1.243 10.145" 16.074 4.689"" • 4.211"' 
(1.15) (0.90) (0.29) (-0.24) (2.68) (1.42) (3.75) (3.30) 
Intercept 10.425" 10.336" 11.296" 9.769 11.718""' ' 11.847" 11.536" • 11.363"" 
(2.64) (2.65) (2.09) (1.65) (3.54) (3.29) (3.91) (3.78) 
N 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Adj R= 0.8418 0.8416 0.8316 0.8329 0.8303 0.8286 0.8474 0.8466 
BIC 4510 4511 4541 4537 4544 4549 4493 4496 
BIC Rank 3 4 6 5 7 8 1 2 
Panel C: Post-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model I Model 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model I Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0 . 8 1 8 " ' 0 . 8 I 7 ' " 0 . 8 5 0 " ' 0 .875"" 0 . 8 5 0 ' " 0 . 8 4 6 " ' 0.867""" 0 . 8 6 8 " 
(6.21) (6.62) (6.84) (8.37) (6.84) (7.10) (7.93) (8.46) 
NonGAAPK 8.9.'58" 8 . 9 0 1 " 5 .629" 5 . 5 4 8 " 5 . 9 8 9 " 7 . 0 8 7 " 5.652"' 6 . 2 2 8 ' " 
(3.07) (3.23) (2.93) (3.24) (2.84) (2,81) (2.74) (3.35) 
DIFF -0.268 3.274 8.928 11.032' 2 .164 10.208" 4.905" 5 . 6 1 4 " 
(-0.11) (0.86) (1.45) (2.42) (0.34) (2.31) (2,46) (3.05) 
HL 0.-558 -0.086 0.470 1.004 1.472 0.752 0.839 0.680 
(0.31) (-0.05) (0.25) (0.43) (0.57) (0.38) (0.43) (0.35) 
E L B V -0.153 -0.130 -0.176 -0.195 -0.194 -0.174 -0.199 -0.183 
(-1.82) (-1.37) (-1.73) (-1.46) (-1.68) (-1.84) (-1.65) (-1.56) 
EL 'NonGAAPK -2.523 -2.722 0.013 0.021 -l,.506 -3.349 -1.388 -2.690 
(-1.02) (-1.14) (0.01) (0.01) (-0.60) (-1.72) (-0.51) (-1.20) 
E I / D I F F 2.169 -3.398 -7.401 -10 .244" 1.843 -6.949 -0.298 -1.755 
(0.60) (-1.04) (-1.34) (-2.75) (0.25) (-1.68) (-0.10) (-0.70) 
Intercept 8 .889"" 8.9.50"' 9 . 2 6 6 " ' 8 . 5 4 7 ' " 8 . 8 7 7 ' " 9.19.3""" 9 .123"" 8.8.58"' 
(3.39) (3 ..56) (3.62) (3.65) (3.40) (3.83) (3.92) (3.93) 
N 1126 1126 1126 1126 1126 1126 1126 1126 
Ad j 0.6929 0.6922 0.6886 0.6915 0.6861 0.6851 0.6894 0.6875 
BIC 10174 10176 10189 10179 10198 10202 10186 10193 
BIC Rank 1 2 5 3 7 8 4 6 
• p < 0 . 0 5 , " p < O . O I , ' " p<O.OOI 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm. 
The dependent variable. P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES, CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFF represents DIFFI in Model I and DIFF2 in Model 2. DIFFI = GAAPl 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPl is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. EL = 1 if e-loading quintile is ."i and 0 
if e-loading quintile is I. EL'BV = Interaction term of e-loading with book value of common equity per share. 
EL'NonGAAPE = Interaction term of e-loading with the corresponding non-GAAP earnings measure of IBES, 
CORE, CE and CF. EL'DIFF = Interaction term of e-loading with the corresponding DIFF measure of DIFFI and 
DIFF2. 
In c o n t r a s t , the n e g a t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t o f E L * B V i n d i c a t e s that a high e x p o s u r e to low 
qual i ty e a r n i n g s has a n e g a t i v e i m p a c t on inves tors" e m p h a s i s on the b o o k v a l u e o f 
e q u i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n e x p o s u r e to l o w qual i ty e a r n i n g s is h i g h , the resul ts are 
c o n s i s t e n t with i n v e s t o r s s e e k i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s , as ind ica t e d by 
a s i g n i f i c a n t and pos i t ive E L * N o n G A A P E . N e v e r t h e l e s s , G A A P e a r n i n g s h a v e 
i n c r e a s e d i n c r e m e n t a l va lue r e l e v a n c e in re la t ion to C O R E and C F w h e n e x p o s u r e to 
low qual i ty e a r n i n g s is h i g h . U s i n g B I C to e v a l u a t e m o d e l p e r f o r m a n c e , I B E S p e r f o r m s 
b e s t . 
D u r i n g the G F C , there is an o b s e r v a b l e shi f t in i n v e s t o r s ' e m p h a s i s . B V r e m a i n s 
s ta t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t in all m o d e l s w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty e a r n i n g s is low but 
not w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty e a r n i n g s is h i g h , E L is not s ta t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t 
a c r o s s all m o d e l s . T h e ma in e f f e c t of n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s is not s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t , 
but the in terac t ion t e rm is s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive in relat ion to C O R E , C E 
and C P . T h e m a i n e f f ec t of G A A P ea rn ings is marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t and nega t ive only 
in re la t ion to C E Mode l I . T h e interact ion t e rm of G A A P e a r n i n g s , h o w e v e r , is 
s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive in relat ion to C E and C P . T h e s e resul ts sugges t that 
inves to r s are f o c u s e d p r e d o m i n a n t l y on the book value of equi ty re la t ive to ea rn ings 
d u r i n g the G P C . P u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings is h igh , inves tors 
a p p e a r to p lace increased e m p h a s i s on C O R E , C E and C P . G A A P e a r n i n g s are not 
i nc remen ta l ly va lue re levant in relat ion to I B E S and C O R E , but are genera l ly 
i nc remen ta l ly va lue re levant in relat ion to C E and C P w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty 
e a r n i n g s is h igh . 
I f i nd con t ra s t ing resul ts in the p o s t - G P C per iod . Panel C s h o w s BV and N o n G A A P E 
are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t ac ross all mode l s . D I P P is marg ina l ly to modera t e ly 
s ign i f i can t in relat ion to C O R E , C E and C P . E L , E L * B V and E L * N o n G A A P E are not 
s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t . E L * D I P F is mode ra t e ly s igni f icant and nega t ive only in relat ion 
to C O R E Mode l 2. T h e s e resul t s indicate that inves tors give grea ter a t tent ion to both 
G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings in the p o s t - G P C period relat ive to the p r e - G P C and 
G P C pe r iods . P u r t h e r m o r e , a high level of exposure to low qual i ty ea rn ings does not 
impac t on the e m p h a s i s inves tors place on the book value of equi ty and n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s . G e n e r a l l y , G A A P ea rn ings are incrementa l ly va lue re levant in relat ion to 
C O R E . C E and C P . A l s o , inves tors a p p e a r to dec rease the e m p h a s i s they place on 
G A A P e a r n i n g s w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings is h igh in relat ion to C O R E . 
O v e r a l l , these resul ts s h o w inves tors f o c u s p redominan t ly on the book va lue of equi ty . 
H o w e v e r , they a l so s h o w that inves tors shif t their f o c u s a w a y f r o m ea rn ings du r ing the 
G P C and return their f o c u s to e a r n i n g s in the p o s t - G P C per iod . G A A P ea rn ings are 
genera l ly not i nc remen ta l ly va lue re levant in the p o s t - G P C period when exposu re to 
low qua l i ty e a r n i n g s is h igh . 
6.2.1.2 Model Estimation by Low and Hi^h e-loading 
T a b l e 6 . 4 p resen t s the es t imat ion resul ts , by low and high e - l oad ing , f o r the f inanc ia l 
sec to r s a m p l e us ing the o n e - f a c t o r e - l o a d i n g . Mode l I and Mode l 2 are presen ted in 
s epa ra t e pane l s f o r each per iod w i n d o w . All m o d e l s are s t rongly s ign i f ican t . 
Table 6.4: Ohlson Model: Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and 
High/Low One-Factor e-loading Quintiles 
Model 1: P = a„ + P,BV, + p.NonGAAPE^, + + £„ 
Model 2: P = a„ + + p^NonGAAPE^, + P,DIFF2„ + e„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC - Model 1 
EE Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DlFFl Intercept N A d j R-
IBES Low 1 3 3 4 ' " 3.555 4.153 8 . 6 5 2 " 817 0.9195 
High 0 .750 ' 23.003"" 9.383 9 . 4 1 3 " 817 0.8222 
C O R E Low 1.333"" 4.169 -17.726" 10.069""' 817 0.9280 
High 0.764" 22 .146" 17.038 1 0 7 2 2 " 817 0.8003 
C E Low 1.331""" 3.649 3.242 8 . 7 4 6 ' " 817 0.9189 
High 0 .725" 21.017"" 9.747 10 .361 ' " 817 0.8101 
C F Low 1.333"" 3.345 3.525 8 7 3 9 " 817 0.9193 
High 0.780'" 21 .501" 21.093"' 10 .731" 817 0.8033 
Panel B: Pre-GFC - Model 2 
EL Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 Intercept N Ad j 
IBES Low 1 .355 ' " 3.073 3.648 8 . 4 2 3 " 817 0 .9186 
High 0 7 3 4 " 22.801""" 8.887 9.728'" 817 0.8265 
C O R E Low 1.314"" 3.935 -14.837 10.544""" 817 0 .9284 
High 0 . 7 7 0 " 20.733""" 12.298 11.485" 817 0.7989 
C E Low 1.346""' 2.908 -0.528 8.381"" 817 0 .9184 
High 0.747"" 17.272"" -11.612 9 . 9 6 2 " 817 0.8061 
C F Low 1.359"" 2.728 2.874 8 . 5 2 3 " 817 0 .9184 
High 0 . 7 8 9 " 18.747" 18.377"" 11.918""" 817 0.7977 
Panel C : G F C - Model 1 
EL Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DlFFl Intercept N A d j R= 
IBES Low 0.824"" 4 .909 -0.406 10.425"" 240 0.7376 
High 1.075"" 9 .234"" 1.254 7.863"' 240 0.8777 
C O R E Low 0 .811" 0.090 0.427 11.296' 240 0 7 1 2 2 
High 1 .103 ' " 7.669'"" 1.671" 8 . 2 8 5 " 240 0.8728 
CE Low 0 . 7 8 2 " ' 0.378 -4.917" 1 1 7 1 8 " " 240 0.7261 
High 1 .175 '" 4.365""" 5.227 8.074"' 240 0.8659 
C F Low 0 .819"" -1.663 -0.608 11 .536" ' 240 0 .7816 
High 1.182"" 3.523"" 4.080'"" 8 . 1 2 9 " 240 0.8692 
Panel D: G F C - Model 2 
EL Quintile BV N o n G A A P E D1FF2 Intercept N Ad j R-
IBES Low 0.830"" 4 .994 -0.246 10.336" 240 0.7369 
High 1.072"" 9.227""" 1.135 7.937"" 240 0 .8776 
C O R E Low 0 . 8 8 0 " 0.085 2.633 9.769 240 0 .7183 
High 1.098"" 7.638""" 1.390 8 . 4 1 2 " 240 0 .8724 
CE Low 0.736"" 0.634 -11.311 1 1.847"" 240 0.7217 
High 1.169"" 4 .113"" 4 .763 ' 8.354"" 240 0.8652 
C F Low- 0.829""' -1..376 -0.341 11.363""" 240 0.7799 
High 1.178"" 3.299""' 3 .870"" 8.376'" 240 0 .8687 
Panel E: Post-GFC - Model 1 
EL Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFFI Intercepl N Adj R-
1BE.S Low 0.818'" 8.958" -0.268 8.889"* 563 0.6313 
Hloh 0.66.5"' 6.4.35' 1.901 9.446" 563 0.7254 
CORK Low 0.850"* 5.629" 8.928 9.266"" 563 0.6243 
High 0.674"* 5.641" 1.527 9.737" 563 0.7225 
CH Low 0.850"* 5.989" 2.164 8.877'" 563 0.6245 
High 0.656"' 4.48,3 4.007" I0..349" 563 0.7185 
CF Low- 0.867'** 5.652" 4.905" 9.123'" 563 0.6308 
High 0.668"* 4.264 4.607 9.962"* 563 0.7203 
Panel F: Post-GFC - Model 2 
EL Quintile BV NonGAAPE DIFF2 Intercept N Adj K-
IBES Low 0.817'" 8.901" 3.274 8.950"' 563 0.6332 
High 0.687'" 6.179" -0.124 8.864" 563 0.7232 
CORF: Low 0.875'" 5.548"" 11.032" 8.547""" 563 0.6338 
High 0.680"' 5.569" 0.788 9.551'" 563 0.7219 
CE Low 0.846'" 7.087"" 10.208" 9.193""" 563 0.6303 
High 0.672"' 3.7.18 3.260 9.946"" 563 0.7140 
CF Low 0.868"* 6.228"" 5.614"" 8.8.58"" 563 0.6346 
High 0.685"" 3.5.38 3.8.59 9.5.38""" 563 0.7 L54 
• p < 0.05," p<( ) . ( ) l . ' " p < 0.001 
I statistics arc calculated with standard errors clustered on firm. 
The dependent variable. P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent \ariables are 
defined as follows; BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES, CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFFI = GAAPI minus the relevant non GAAP earnings, where GAAPl is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = 
C1AAP2 minus the rcle\ant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under GAAP. EL quintile is Low if e-loading quintile is 1 and High if e-loading quintile is Low and High 
indicate low exposure to low quality earnings and high exposure to low quality earnings, respectively. 
In the pre-GFC per iod, all n o n - G A A P earnings are not statistically signif icant when e-
load ing is l ow , i.e., low exposure to low qual i ty earnings, for both Mode l 1 and Mode l 
2 , in Panels A and B , respectively. Converse ly , all n o n - G A A P earnings are moderately 
to strongly s ignif icant when e-loading is h igh , i,e,, h igh exposure to low quality 
earnings, for both Mode l I and Mode l 2, D I F F I and D I FF2 are not statistically 
s igni f icant when e-loading is l ow , except in relation to C O R E and C E for Mode l I . 
They are also not statistically signif icant when e-loading is h igh , except in relation to 
C F f o r both Mode l 1 and Mode l 2. B V is statistically signif icant in all models . Overa l l , 
investors do not appear to place emphasis on G A A P earnings except in relation to 
C O R E and C F and it is not clear that investors f ind G A A P earnings incremental ly value 
relevant at either extreme levels o f exposure to low qual i ty earnings. It appears 
investors are focused predominant ly on the book value o f equity. Interestingly, the 
magn i t ude o f B V is consistently larger when exposure to low qual i ty earnings is low in 
compar i son to when it is h igh. In contrast, the magn i tude of N o n G A A P E is larger when 
exposure to low qual i ty earnings is h igh . 
It appears that when exposure to low quality is earnings is high, investors may be 
seeking information form alternative sources and, therefore, placing comparatively 
greater emphasis on non-GAAP earnings. Conversely, when exposure to low quality 
earnings is low, investors focus predominantly on the book value of equity. 
During the G F C , all non-GAAP earnings are strongly significant at the high level of 
exposure to low quality earnings in both Model 1 and Model 2. The results of the 
incremental value relevance of G A A P earnings are mixed. D l F F l is statistically 
significant and positive when exposure to low quality earnings is high in relation to 
C O R E and CP. However, D IFF I is statistically significant and negative when exposure 
to low quality earnings is low in relation to CE . D IFF2 is statistically significant when 
exposure to low quality earnings is high in relation to C E and CF. 
The results show that, during the G F C , investors are predominantly focused on the book 
value of equity in valuing financial f irms. Notably, non-GAAP earnings do not appear 
to be value relevant when exposure to low quality earnings is low. It is only when 
exposure to low quality earnings is high that non-GAAP earnings become statistically 
significant. Furthermore, the magnitude of BV is consistently larger when exposure to 
low quality earnings is high relative to when it is low. These results for the G F C period 
are in contrast to the results from the pre-GFC period. There is a shift in investors' 
emphasis on the book value of equity and non-GAAP earnings. It appears that when 
exposure to low quality earnings is high, investors seek information from alternative 
sources. 
In the post-GFC period, IBES and C O R E are statistically significant at both low and 
high levels of exposure to low quality earnings for both Models 1 and 2. However, 
D IFF2 are statistically significant only in relation to C O R E when exposure to low 
quality earnings is low. 
C E and C F are statistically significant when exposure to low quality earnings is low in 
both Model I and Model 2. D IFF I is statistically significant when exposure to low 
quality earnings is high in relation to CE , but is statistically significant when exposure 
to low quality earnings is low in relation to CF . D IFF2 is only statistically significant 
when exposure to low quality earnings is low in relation to C O R E , C E and CF . The 
pattern of the magnitude of BV and non-GAAP earnings in the post-GFC period is 
similar to those of the pre-GFC period. 
T h e s e resu l t s p r o v i d e add i t iona l insigint into the e m p h a s i s inves to r s p lace on the book 
va lue of e q u i t y . S p e c i f i c a l l y , they s h o w that i n v e s t o r s ' e m p h a s i s on e a r n i n g s 
i n f o r m a t i o n is not u n i f o r m at the e x t r e m e qu in t i l e s of e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty e a r n i n g s . 
T h e resu l t s a l so s h o w that the G F C has an impac t on the e m p h a s i s inves to r s p lace on 
G A A P and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . T h e r e is e v i d e n c e of a sh i f t in i nves to r s ' f o c u s in 
re la t ion to n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s ove r the three sub -pe r iods . H o w e v e r , the e v i d e n c e of a 
sh i f t in f o c u s in re la t ion to G A A P e a r n i n g s is m i x e d . 
6.2.2 Non-Financial Sector Sample 
6.2.2.1 Model Estimation with Main Ejfects and Interaction Terms 
T a b l e 6 .5 p resen t s the e s t ima t ion resul ts of the o n e - f a c t o r e - l o a d i n g m o d e l s wi th ma in 
e f f e c t s and in te rac t ion t e r m s f o r the non- f inanc ia l sec tor s a m p l e . All m o d e l s are 
s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t ac ros s all per iod w i n d o w s . 
In the p r e - G F C p e r i o d , BV is s t rongly s ign i f i can t ac ros s all m o d e l s , h o w e v e r , 
N o n G A A P E is not s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t ac ros s all m o d e l s . D I F F is only marg ina l ly 
s i gn i f i c an t in re la t ion to C O R E M o d e l 2 . E L and E L * B V are not s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t . 
In con t r a s t , E L * N o n G A A P E is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and nega t ive in relat ion to 
C O R E , C E and C F . T h e s e resul ts indicate that inves tors are f o c u s e d p r e d o m i n a n t l y on 
the book va lue of equ i ty w h e n va lu ing the f i r m . 
H o w e v e r , w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings is h igh , inves tors a l so g ive re la t ively 
g rea t e r e m p h a s i s to n o n - G A A P ea rn ings and price the sha re s d o w n w a r d s . G A A P 
e a r n i n g s are i n c r e m e n t a l l y va lue re levant w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty e a r n i n g s is h igh 
on ly in re la t ion to I B E S and C F . T h e s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t c o e f f i c i e n t s are a l so 
n e g a t i v e , ind ica t ing that h igh level e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty e a r n i n g s impac t s on pr ice 
n e g a t i v e l y . 
D u r i n g the G F C , there is an o b s e r v a b l e sh i f t in inves to r s ' f o c u s . B V and N o n G A A P E 
are s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t ac ros s all m o d e l s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , the in te rac t ions t e rms are 
gene ra l ly s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t ac ros s all m o d e l s . T h e in terac t ion t e r m , E L * B V , is 
pos i t ive and the in te rac t ion t e rms of both G A A P and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s are nega t ive . 
Table 6.5: Ohison Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression at Earnings Announcement Date by Models with One-
Factor e-loading Dummy and Interaction Terms as Controls 
Model ! : / ' , = « „ + + ji^NoiiGAAPE^^ + jifilFFI., + 
+I}^EL * BV-, + * NonGMPEi, + ;8,£L * DJFFI^, + £„ 
Model 2; P=a^ + + ji.NonGAAPE^ + P.DIFFI,, + P^EL., 
+\EL * BV„ +P^EL * NimGMPE^, + P.EL * DIFF2,, + £„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
CORE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.987"" 1.998"' 1.980"" 1.967""" 2 .015 '" 2.096""" 2.000"" 2 .013 ' " 
(5.74) (5.74) (6.13) (6.99) (5.89) (6.05) (5.88) (6.37) 
NonGAAPE 5.979 5.906 5.762 5.180 5.601 5.236 5.620 5.486 
(0.77) (0.76) (0.77) (0.86) (0.74) (0.86) (0.78) (0.95) 
DIFF -5.04.3 3.463 8.494 17.952" 6.569 9.611 5.586 5.436 
(-1.23) (1.34) (0.79) (2.14) (0.74) (1.29) (0.74) (0.88) 
KL 4.365 -0.270 2.509 1.501 2.863 0.049 3.124 0.522 
(1.48) (-0.08) (0.85) (0.53) (0.97) (0.02) (1.04) (0.17) 
F.L'BV -0.591 -0.035 -0.337 -0.347 -0.272 0.014 -0.315 -0.091 
(-1.80) (-0.09) (-0.93) (-1.11) (-0.73) (0.03) (-0.87) (-0.25) 
EL'NonGAAPK -11.984 -12.335 -20.256" -18.797" -19.989" -14.167" -22.148"' -17.943" 
(-1.93) (-1.85) (-2.35) (-2.48) (-2.32) (-2.04) (-2.65) (-2.52) 
F.LDIFF -15.909' -13.091" -15.480 -13.819 -18.597 -11.543 -17.917" -12.525 
(-2.16) (-2.34) (-1.44) (-1.50) (-1.93) (-1.-59) (-2.19) (-1.91) 
Intercept 4.963 5.060 4.972 5.297" 5.052 5.427" 5.013 5.141 
(1.83) (1.86) (1.77) (2.01) (1.84) (2.06) (1.82) (1.91) 
N 13213 13213 13213 13213 13213 13213 13213 13213 
Adj 0.6487 0.5992 0.6336 0.6372 0.6322 0.6087 0.f>44+ 0.6226 
B i r 125663 127405 126222 126089 126272 127090 125826 126612 
BIC Rank 1 8 4 3 5 7 2 6 
Panel B: GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.211'" 1.230"'" 1.218"" 1.256""" 1.229""" 1.395""' 1.231""' ' 1.313"' 
(4.87) (4.76) (4.87) (4.84) (4.74) (3.70) (4.95) (4.40) 
NonGAAPF: 10.994'" 10.260"" 10.771"" 9 .494 ' " 1 1.053"' 6.544"" 10.059"" 5 .901" 
(3.70) (3.67) (3.72) (3.47) (3.58) (3.25) (3.37) (2.69) 
DIFF 6.553 1.872' 8.968"" -0.386 12.381" 11.385 U).8.30'"' ' 6.568"" 
(1.94) (2.42) (3.18) (-0.32) (2.65) (1.57) (3.53) (2.95) 
EL -0.801 -1.330 -0.906 -1.086 -0.846 -1.672 -0.820 -1.648 
(-0.21) (-0.35) (-0.24) (-0.29) (-0.23) (-0.51) (-0.21) (-0.41) 
E l / B V 0.760" 0.780" 0.734" 0.687' 0.716" 0.653 0.730" 0.660 
(2.30) (2.37) (2.41) (2.22) (2.29) (1.62) (2.33) (1.90) 
E I / N o n G A A P F -13.469" -12.904" -12.775"" -11.596""" -13.072"" ' -8 .033" ' -12.518" " -8.148"" 
(-3.27) (-3.30) (-4.28) (-4.11) (-4.12) (-3.75) (-4.06) (-3.53) 
EL'DIFF -8.346" -2.990" -11.107" 4.506""" -14.778"" -8.942 -11.667" " -6.942"" 
(-2.44) (-2.76) (-2.60) (3.60) (-3.04) (-1.21) (-3.70) (-2.99) 
Intercept 6.230" 6.327" 6.368" 6.713' 6.288" 7.197" 6.255' 6.839" 
(2.00) (2.00) (2.07) (2.19) (2.06) (2.56) (2.03) (2.07) 
N 3470 3470 3470 3470 3470 3470 3470 3470 
Adj R- 0.6600 0.6563 0.6587 0.6579 0.6592 0.6461 0.6663 0.6506 
BIC 31456 31493 31469 31477 31464 31595 31391 31551 
BIC Rank 2 6 4 5 3 8 1 7 
Panel C: Pos t -GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 
CE C F 
Model 2 
BV 1 .056 ' " 1 .031 ' " 1.350""" 1.422""" 1.381""" 1.414""" I..362"" 1.424""' 
(3.42) (3.31) (4.46) (5.20) (4.43) (3.96) (4.76) (5.48) 
N o n G A A P E 19.17.5"" 2 0 . 0 9 1 ' " 4 .503 1.576 4.049 1.646 3.436 1.031 
(3.96) (4.17) (0.84) (0.51) (0.78) (0.66) (0.65) (0.38) 
DIFF - 5 . 4 3 0 ' " - 3 .922" 9.148 1.945 5.333 1.243 4 .516 1.832 
(-6.44) (-3.02) (1.61) (0.75) (1.02) (0.23) (0.89) (0.80) 
KL 2.763 2.923 0.697 0.233 0.168 -0.138 0.624 0.303 
(0.87) (0.92) (0.21) (0.07) (0.05) (-0.05) (0.20) (0.10) 
E L ' B V 0.092 0.126 0.085 0.069 -0.001 -0.006 0.036 0.03S 
(0.26) (0.35) (0.28) (0.23) (-0.00) (-0.01) (0.12) (0.13) 
E I / N o n G A A P K -2.567 -3.761 2.702 4 .354 3.344 4.400 6.391 7.302'" 
(-0.34) (-0.50) (0.77) (1.15) (0.95) (1.24) (1.66) (2.67) 
E L ' D I F F 6.348 4 .087 -0.582 3.589 -0.818 0.777 3.828 5.041 
(1.29) (1.13) (-0.14) (1.13) (-0.21) (0.11) (1.15) (1.79) 
Intercept 6 .238 ' 6.005" 7.851"" 8 . 2 1 7 " 8.160"" 8.162""" 8.037"" 8.195"" 
(2.08) (1.97) (2.60) (2.74) (2.80) (3.48) (2.78) (2.81) 
N 7740 7740 7740 7740 7740 7740 7740 7740 
A d j 0 .5196 0.5210 0.4390 0.4304 0.4382 0.4316 0.4442 0.4372 
BIC 71329 71307 72530 72649 72541 72631 72458 72555 
BIC Rank 2 1 4 8 5 7 3 6 
• p < 0 . 0 5 , ' > < 0 . 0 1 , " > < 0 . 0 0 1 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm. 
The dependent variable. P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPB represents the following variables for 
IBES, CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation e.xpcnses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFF represents DIFFl in Model 1 and DIFF2 in Model 2. DIFFI = GAAPI 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPI is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. EL = I if e-loading quintile is .S and 0 
if e-loading quintile is 1. EL'BV = Interaction term of e-loading with book value of common equity per share. 
EL'NonGAAPH = Interaction term of e-loading with the corresponding non-GAAP earnings measure of IBES, 
CORF, CE and CF. FL'DIFF = Interaction term of e-loadmg with the corresponding DIFF measure of DIFFl and 
DIFF2. 
T h e r e s u l t s s u g g e s t t h a t i n v e s t o r s d e c r e a s e t h e e m p h a s i s t h e y p l a c e o n n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s w h e n e x p o s u r e t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s is h i g h . S i m i l a r l y , i n v e s t o r s a l s o 
d e c r e a s e t h e e m p h a s i s t h e y p l a c e o n G A A P e a r n i n g s w h e n e x p o s u r e t o l o w q u a l i t y 
e a r n i n g s i s h i g h . In c o n t r a s t , t h e y a p p e a r t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r f o c u s o n B V w h e n e x p o s u r e 
t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i s h i g h . 
In t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , h o w e v e r , i n v e s t o r s s h i f t t h e i r f o c u s a n d t h e r e s u l t s a r e s i m i l a r 
t o t h o s e o b s e r v e d in t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d . B V is s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t a c r o s s al l m o d e l s , 
h o w e v e r , N o n G A A P E a n d D I F F a r e o n l y s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t in r e l a t i o n t o I B E S . E L 
a n d al l i n t e r a c t i o n t e r m s a r e g e n e r a l l y n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t e x c e p t f o r 
E L * N o n G A A P E in r e l a t i o n t o C F M o d e l 2 , w h e r e it is m o d e r a t e l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d 
posi t ive. It appears that af ter the peak of the G F C , investors returned their f o c u s to the 
book value of equi ty . 
Overa l l . IBES and C F mode l s generally per form best based on BIC across all three 
period w i n d o w s . Fur thermore , the results suggest that share price is dr iven primari ly by 
the book value of equi ty . However , when there is s ignif icant uncer ta in ty , as in the peak 
of the G F C , investors appear to seek other informat ion and fac tor in their exposure to 
low quality earnings . A l so , there is some evidence of a t rade-off in the relative emphas i s 
investors place on BV and earnings when exposure to low quality earn ings is h igh. 
6.2.2.2 Model Estimation by Low and High e-loading 
T h e est imation results, by low and high e- loading, for the non-f inancia l sector sample 
are presented in Table 6 .6 . In Panels A and B, n o n - G A A P earnings are general ly 
statistically signif icant and negat ive at high levels of exposure to low quality earnings in 
both Model I and Model 2 in the p re -GFC period. DIFFI is statistically s ignif icant and 
negat ive when exposure to low quality earnings is high, but it is not statistically 
s ignif icant when exposure to low quality earnings is low. 
In contrast , DIFF2 is marginal ly signif icant and negat ive when exposure to low quality 
earnings is high in relation to C F and is marginal ly s ignif icant and posi t ive when 
exposure to low quality earnings is low in relation to C O R E . These results are 
consistent with investors discount ing f i rm value for low quality earn ings . 
The negative coef f ic ien ts fo r n o n - G A A P earnings indicate high n o n - G A A P earn ings are 
associated with low share price. Negat ive and s ignif icant DIFFI and D I F F 2 at high 
level of exposure to low quality earnings indicate that G A A P earn ings are incremental ly 
value relevant and that investors place greater emphas i s on G A A P earn ings , which are 
general ly closer to, or less than, n o n - G A A P earnings . 
In the G F C per iod, n o n - G A A P earnings are general ly statistically s ignif icant across all 
levels of exposure to low quality earnings for Model 1 and Model 2 , except in relation 
to IBES (Model 1 and Model 2) where it is not statistically s ignif icant when exposure to 
low quality earnings is high. Fur thermore , the sign of the statistically s ignif icant non-
G A A P earnings is negat ive when exposure to low quality earn ings is high and posi t ive 
when exposure to low quality earnings is low. These results are consistent with 
investors d iscount ing the share price of f i rms with low quality earn ings . 
Table 6.6: Ohlson Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and 
High/Low One-Factor e-loading Quintilcs 
Model 1: f;, = + /j^fiV + p,NonGAAPE^^ + (i.piFFI., + 
Model 2: P = a„ + P,BV, + P,NonGAAPE^^ + P f i l F F l , , + £„ 
Panel A: Pre -GFC - Model I 
EI. Quinlilc BV NonCiAAPH DlFEl liUerccpt N Ad j R-
IBES Low 1 .987" ' 5.979 -5.043 4.963 6606 0.6185 
High 1 .397" ' -6.005 -20 .951"" 9 .328"" 6607 0.6631 
C O R E Low 1 .980" ' 5.762 8.494 4.972 6606 0.6164 
High 1.644"" -14 .494" -6 .987" 7 . 4 8 2 ' " 6607 0 .6407 
C E Low- 2 . 0 1 5 ' " 5.601 6.569 5.052 6606 0.6160 
High 1.74.V" -14 .388" -12.028 ' 7 . 9 1 5 " ' 6607 0.6387 
CE Low 2 . 0 0 0 " ' 5.620 5.586 5.013 6606 0.6158 
High 1 .684 ' " -16 .528"" -12 .331"" 8 . 1 3 8 ' " 6607 0.6578 
Pane! B: Pre -GFC - Model 2 
EL Quintile BV NonGAAPF: DIFF2 Intercept N Ad j R= 
1BE.S Low 1.998""" 5.906 3.463 5.060 6606 0.6193 
High 1.963"" -6.429' -9.628 4.791' 6607 0.5857 
C O R E Low 1.967" ' 5.180 17.952" 5.297' 6606 0.6260 
High 1.620"" - 1 3 . 6 1 7 " 4.1.33 6 . 7 9 8 " ' 6607 0.641 1 
C E Low 2 .096"" 5.2.36 9.611 5.427" 6606 0.6214 
High 2 . 1 0 9 ' " -8.930" -1.931 5.476" 6607 0.5992 
C F Low 2 .013"" 5.486 5.436 5.141 6606 0.6188 
High 1.922""' - 12 .456" -7.089' 5 .664" 6607 0.6223 
Panel C : G F C - Model 1 
EL Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFl Intercept N Ad j R-
IBES Low- 1.211"" 10 .994 ' " 6.553 6.2.30" 17.35 0.6651 
High 1.971"" -2.474 -1.793' 5 .429" 17.35 0.6529 
C O R E Low- 1.218""' 10 .771" ' 8 . 9 6 8 " 6.368' 17.35 0 .6624 
High 1 .953 ' " - 2 .004" -2.140 5 .462" 1735 0.6527 
C E Low- 1.229" ' 1 1.053"'" 12..381" 6.288' 17.35 0.6635 
High 1 .945" ' - 2 . 019" -2.397 5.442"" 17.35 0.6527 
C F Low 1.231"" 10 .059" ' 10.8.30"" 6.2,55' 17.35 0 .6684 
High 1.961""" - 2 . 4 5 9 " ' -0.8.37 5 . 4 3 5 " 17.35 0.6615 
Panel D: G F C - Model 2 
EL Quinlilc BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 Intercept N Adi R= 
IBES Low 1 .230 ' " 10.260"" 1.872" 6.327' 17,35 0.6620 
High 2.011"" -2.645 -1.1 18 4 . 9 9 7 " 17.35 0.6487 
C O R E L o « 1.256"" 9.494"'" -0.386 6.713' 17.35 0.6542 
High 1.943""" - 2 . 1 0 2 " 4 .120"" 5 .626 ' " 1735 0.6572 
C E Low 1..395"" 6.544"' 1 1.385 7.197' 1735 0 .6339 
High 2.048""" -1.489' 2.443 5 . 5 2 5 " ' 1735 0.6512 
C F Low- 1.313"" 5 . 9 0 1 " 6 .568" 6.839" 1735 0.6323 
High 1.973"" - 2 . 2 4 8 " -0.375 5 . 1 9 1 " 1735 0.6602 
Panel E: Post-GFC - Model 1 
EL Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFI Intercept N Adi R-
IBES Low 1.0.S6'" 19 .175 ' " - 5 . 4 3 0 ' " 6 .238 ' 3870 0 .6109 
High 1.147"" 16.608" 0.919 9 . 0 0 1 ' " 3870 0 .4343 
CORK Low 1 .350" ' 4.503 9.148 7 , 8 5 1 " 3870 0 .5237 
High 1.4.36"' 7.205 8.566 8, .548'" 3870 0 .3599 
CE Lou- 1 . . 18 r " 4.049 5,333 8 , 1 6 0 " 3870 0 .5189 
High I . . « 0 ' " 7.393 4,515 8 , 3 2 8 " ' 3870 0.3628 
C F Low 1 362"' 3.436 4.516 8 , 0 3 7 " 3870 0..523I 
High 1.398"" 9.828" 8..344 8 , 6 6 0 ' " 3870 0.3705 
Panel F: Post-GFC - Model 2 
EL Quintile BV NonCiAAPE DIFF2 Intercept N A d j 
IBES Low 1.031"" 20 .091" ' -3 .922" 6,005' 3870 0.6142 
High 1 .157" ' 16 .330" 0.166 8 , 9 2 8 " ' 3870 0 .4339 
CORE Low 1.422"" 1.576 1.945 8 . 2 1 7 " 3870 0.5104 
High 1.491"" 5.930 5.535 8.450""' 3870 0..3556 
CE Low 1 4 1 4 ' " 1.646 1.243 8 . 1 6 2 ' " 3870 0.5104 
High 1.408"" 6.046 2.020 8.024""" 3870 0..3580 
C F Low 1.424""" 1.031 1.832 8 . 1 9 5 " 3870 0.5133 
High 1.462""" 8.333" 6.873 8.498"" 3870 0.3660 
' p < 0.05, •• p < 0.01, p < 0.001 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm. 
The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the follow ing variables for 
IBES, CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. DlFFl = GAAPl minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPl is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = 
GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under GAAP. EL quintile is Low if e-loading quintile is 1 and High if e-loading quintile is .5. Low and High 
indicate low exposure to low quality earnings and high exposure to low quality earnings, respectively. 
T h e r e s u l t s f o r D I F F l a n d D I F F 2 are m i x e d . W h e r e D I F F I i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , 
the c o e f f i c i e n t i s p o s i t i v e w h e n e x p o s u r e to l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s is l o w , a n d n e g a t i v e 
w h e n e x p o s u r e to l o w q u a l i t y i s h i g h . D I F F 2 is s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e in 
re la t ion to I B E S a n d C F w h e n e x p o s u r e to l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i s l o w . H o w e v e r , D I F F 2 
is a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e in re la t ion to C O R E w h e n e x p o s u r e to l o w q u a l i t y 
e a r n i n g s i s h i g h . 
G e n e r a l l y , t h e s e r e s u l t s s u g g e s t that G A A P e a r n i n g s are i n c r e m e n t a l l y v a l u e r e l e v a n t . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , it a p p e a r s t h e r e is a s y m m e t r i c t r e a t m e n t o f G A A P e a r n i n g s b y i n v e s t o r s . 
W h e n e x p o s u r e t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i s l o w , i n v e s t o r s a p p e a r to p l a c e g r e a t e r 
e m p h a s i s o n G A A P e a r n i n g s that are r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r than n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . 
H o w e v e r , w h e n e x p o s u r e t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i s h i g h , i n v e s t o r s a p p e a r t o p l a c e 
g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s o n G A A P e a r n i n g s , w h i c h are g e n e r a l l y c l o s e r t o , or l e s s t h a n , n o n -
G A A P e a r n i n g s . 
In the p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , I B E S is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive at both leve ls of 
e x p o s u r e to low qua l i ty e a r n i n g s in Mode l 1 and M o d e l 2 , and C F is s tat is t ical ly 
s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty e a r n i n g s is high in M o d e l I and 
M o d e l 2 . C O R E and C E are not s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t . D I F F I and D I F F 2 are only 
s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t and nega t ive in relat ion to I B E S w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty 
e a r n i n g s is l o w . 
W h i l e inves tors c o n t i n u e to f o c u s p r edominan t ly on the book value of equ i ty , the resul ts 
ac ros s the th ree per iod w i n d o w s a l so s h o w an obse rvab le sh i f t in inves to r s ' f o c u s on 
e a r n i n g s . P r e - G F C , inves tors genera l ly f o c u s on G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings w h e n 
e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings is h igh . F u r t h e r m o r e , the resul ts indicate inves tors 
d i s coun t the share pr ice of f i r m s wi th poor qual i ty ea rn ings ; the un ique e f f e c t of both 
N o n G A A P E and D I F F is genera l ly nega t ive w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings is 
h igh . D u r i n g the G F C , there appea r s to be relat ively grea ter e m p h a s i s on ea rn ings by 
inves tors and that their va lua t ion of ea rn ings is a s y m m e t r i c be tween high and low levels 
of e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings . In con t ras t , in the p o s t - G F C pe r iod , inves to r s ' 
e m p h a s i s a p p e a r s to be a l m o s t exc lus ive ly on the book value of equ i ty . Wi th the 
excep t ion of I B E S , all o the r G A A P and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s d o not a p p e a r to be va lue 
r e l evan t . 
O v e r a l l , the resul t s f r o m the o n e - f a c t o r e - l oad ing a n a l y s e s are genera l ly cons i s ten t wi th 
e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h e y indicate that f i r m value is d i scoun ted fo r low qual i ty ea rn ings . A l s o , 
the G F C has an impac t on inves to r s ' f o c u s on ea rn ings . T h e r e is e v i d e n c e of a c h a n g e in 
e m p h a s i s f r o m the p r e - G F C period to the p o s t - G F C pe r iod . F u r t h e r m o r e , there is s o m e 
e v i d e n c e of a t r ade -o f f b e t w e e n inves to r s ' e m p h a s i s on the book va lue of equi ty and 
e a r n i n g s du r ing the G F C . 
6.2.3 S&P 500 Sample 
6.2.3.1 Model Estimation with Main Effects and Interaction Terms 
T a b l e 6 .7 p resen t s the es t imat ion resul ts of the o n e - f a c t o r e - l oad ing m o d e l s wi th ma in 
e f f e c t s and in te rac t ion t e rms f o r the S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e . All m o d e l s are s tat is t ical ly 
s i gn i f i c an t a c r o s s all per iod w i n d o w s . 
Table 6.7: Ohlson Model: S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression at 
Earnings Announcement Date by Models with One-Factor e-loading 
Dummy and Interaction Terms as Controls 
Model I; F = a„ + P^BV, + MonGAAPE^^ + P.DIFFl,, + p^EL,, 
+li,EL * BV., + * NonGAAPE,, + PM * DIFFI., + e„ 
Model 2:P = a„ + p,BV^ + p,NonGAAPE^_ + PfiIFF2„ + P,EL., 
+PfiL * BV„ +P^EL * NonGAAPE,, + P,EL * DIFF2., + £„ 




Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.249*" 1.266"' 1.322"' 1.296""" 1.335'"" 1.370"" 1.310"" 1.351"' 
(5.92) (5.49) (6.69) (8.57) (6.13) (8.59) (6.33) (9.82) 
NonGAAPE 7.020 6.607 4.827 5.480 4.601 3.716 5.898 4.600 
(1.20) (1.04) (0.87) (1.33) (0.78) (0.95) (1.01) (1.27) 
DIFF -12..312" -1.337 -2.332 -7.398 4.513 4.792 5.614 4.355 
(-3.02) (-0.75) (-0.28) (-1.61) (0.77) (1.27) (0.97) (1.21) 
EL -5.941" -5.978" -6.843" -6.426"" -6.185" -5.575" -5.918" -5.998' 
(-2.47) (-2.48) (-2.36) (-2.65) (-2.25) (-2.08) (-2.20) (-2.43) 
FL'BV -0.053 -0.076 0.241"" 0.345"" 0 .232" 0.377"" 0.238" 0.318"" 
(-0.41) (-0.56) (2.81) (3.51) (2.60) (3.60) (2.57) (3.34) 
EL'NonGAAPF 7.607 8.269 0.580 -3.262 1.222 -2.542 -0.697 -3.340 
(1.12) (1.14) (0.10) (-0.70) (0.19) (-0.63) (-0.11) (-0.88) 
F L D I F F 11.054" 0.567 7.574 6.682 2.619 1.645 -0.113 -2.904 
(2.71) (0.31) (0.88) (1.41) (0.40) (0.28) (-0.02) (-0.76) 
Intercept 17.029"" 16.935""" 17.816"" 17.984" 17.115""" 17.602"" 16.994"" 17.313'" 
(17.30) (17.12) (15.17) (18.30) (16.30) (14.53) (16.99) (18.10) 
N 3117 3117 31 17 3117 3117 3117 31 17 3117 
Adj R= 0.8832 0.8820 0.8710 0.8681 0.8703 0.8662 0.8706 0.8655 
BIC 26795 26828 27106 27175 27122 27219 27115 27234 
BIC Rank 1 2 3 6 5 7 4 8 
Panel B: GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.097"" 1.118'" 1.111"" 1.150""" 1.093"' 1.144'" 1.117"' 1.121'" 
(12.94) (13.02) (11.57) (11.68) (10.01) (9.19) (22.27) (21.23) 
NonGAAPE 3.839 3.596 2.849 2.475 1.988 2.327 2.461"" 2.418"" 
(1.69) (1.50) (1.49) (1.24) (1.52) (1.80) (4.06) (4.05) 
DIFF 0.199 0.843 0.923 2.158 -1.053 1.659 3.424"" 3.353"" 
(0.19) (0.62) (0.55) (1.06) (-0.40) (0.44) (5.72) (5.77) 
EL 7.512 7.893" 10.635"" 11.282"" 10.878" 11.705"" 9 .610" 9.798"' 
(1.95) (2.11) (2.67) (2.95) (2.73) (3.04) (2.68) (2.76) 
EL'BV -0.436" -0.449" -0.164 -0.189 -0.211 -0.201 -0.067 -0.018 
(-2.27) (-2.38) (-0.82) (-0.95) (-1.07) (-0.93) (-0.34) (-0.10) 
EL'NonGAAPF 9.798" 9.880" 1.747 1.832 2.731 1.048 0.473 -0.808 
(2.57) (2.56) (0.72) (0.75) (1.33) (0.65) (0.28) (-0.73) 
EL'DIFF -0.381 -0.059 0.274 -0.903 4.016 0.362 1.013 -0.242 
(-0.33) (-0.04) (0.08) (-0.39) (1.35) (0.09) (0.62) (-0.22) 
Intercept 15.360"" 15.194"" 15.835'" 15.350"" 15.692"" • 15.287'" 15.511"' ' 15.916'" 
(6.20) (6.55) (6.38) (6.75) (6.11) (6.86) (9.47) (9.92) 
N 870 870 870 870 870 870 870 870 
Adj R- 0.7003 0.7012 0.6769 0.6785 0.6793 0.6774 0.7194 0.7195 
BIC 8071 8068 8136 8132 81.30 8135 8013 8013 
BIC Rank 4 3 8 6 5 7 1 1 
P a n e l C : P o s t - G F C P e r i o d 
I B E S 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
C O R E 
M o d e l I M o d e l 2 
C E 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
C F 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
B V 0 . 3 0 4 0 . 2 8 9 0 . 3 5 6 0 . 4 4 7 ' 0 . 2 9 5 0 . 4 6 5 ' 0 . 3 3 7 0.550"" 
( 1 . 4 6 ) (1 .40 ) (1 .62 ) ( 2 . 1 9 ) (1 .26 ) (1 .98 ) (1 .50 ) ( 2 . 7 6 ) 
N o n G A A F H 3 1 . 9 2 0 " " 3 1 . 9 6 3 " ' 2 6 . 2 6 0 " " 24.282""" 2 5 . 1 4 3 " " 18.567"" 25.594""" 18.792"" 
(4 .88 ) (4 .87 ) (4 .04 ) (3 .83 ) (4 .00 ) (3 .26 ) (3 .96 ) (3 .16 ) 
D I E F - 4 . 7 3 2 2 . 5 3 3 14.987" 0 . 0 2 7 20.716""" 12.053" 2 6 . 3 4 1 " " 1 8 . 4 5 3 " 
( - 1 . 1 2 ) (1 .90 ) (2 .26 ) (0 .01 ) (3 .88 ) (2 .35 ) ( 4 . 0 3 ) (3 .15 ) 
EL - 7 . 8 0 3 -8 .,383 -10.6.37" -9 .881" -10 .896" -8 .061 -10.6.56" - 8 . 6 0 2 
( - 1 . 8 3 ) ( - 1 . 8 9 ) ( - 2 . 2 5 ) ( -1 .99 ) ( - 2 . 2 6 ) ( - 1 . 6 2 ) ( - 2 . 2 2 ) ( - 1 . 5 4 ) 
F:L B V 0 . 2 5 2 0 .241 0 .708" 0 .705" 0 . 6 8 4 0 . 5 7 0 0 .718" 0 . 5 5 5 
(0 .81 ) (0 .78 ) (2 .29 ) (2 .25 ) ( 1 . 9 2 ) (1 .44 ) (2 .32 ) (1 .68) 
K L ' N o n G A A P K 12.1 12 1 1 .827 6 . 3 1 3 5 . 6 0 6 7 . 7 6 6 7 . 7 9 4 6 . 7 7 0 7 . 5 5 3 
(1 .63 ) (1 -59) ( 0 . 8 6 ) (0 .77 ) (1 .07 ) (1 .13 ) (0 .92 ) (1 .07 ) 
K L ' D I F F 12 .548 - 2 . 2 2 3 9 . 7 8 3 1 .810 9 . 0 1 3 1 1.171 6 . 1 7 0 7 . 5 7 0 
(1 .71 ) ( - 1 . 0 9 ) ( 1 . 1 4 ) (0 .35 ) (1 .25 ) (1 .19 ) (0 .83 ) (1 .06 ) 
In t e rcep t 1 5 . 4 7 6 " " 16 .057*" 19.838"" ' 2 0 . 2 6 2 " " 19.719""" 21.389""" 19.685" '" 22.375""" 
(10 .36 ) ( 1 0 . 6 2 ) ( 1 4 . 1 2 ) ( 15 .39 ) ( 13 .10 ) ( 1 3 . 1 7 ) ( 14 .05 ) ( 1 1 . 2 8 ) 
N 2 1 8 8 2 1 8 8 2 1 8 8 2 1 8 8 2 1 8 8 2 1 8 8 2 1 8 8 2 1 8 8 
A d j K- 0 . 6 0 8 0 0 . 6 0 3 7 0 . 5 3 0 9 0 . 5 1 0 0 0 . 5 2 9 4 0 . 4 6 2 9 0 . 5 2 7 5 0 . 4 6 0 7 
B I C 2 1 6 9 9 2 1 7 2 3 2 2 0 9 2 2 2 1 8 7 2 2 0 9 9 2 2 3 8 8 2 2 1 0 8 2 2 3 9 7 
B I C R a n k I 2 3 6 4 7 5 8 
• p < 0 . 0 5 , " p < O . O I . " * p < 0.001 
t stalislics in parentheses and calculaled wilh standard errors clustered on firm. 
The dependent \ar iable . P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES, C O R E , C E and CE models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation e.xpenses. 
CE = Operating cash f lows per share. DIEE represents DIEFl in Model I and DIEE2 in Model 2. DIFFl = GAAPI 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPI is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIEF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
G A A P 2 is income before e.\traordinary items per share reported under GAAP. EL = I if e-loading quintile is 5 and 0 
if e-loading quintile is I. EL 'BV = Interaction term of e-loading with book value of common equity per share. 
E L ' N o n G A A P E - Interaction term of e-loading with the corresponding non-GAAP earnings measure of IBES, 
C O R E , CE and CF. EL 'DIFF = Interaction term of e-loading with the corresponding DIEE measure of DIEFl and 
D1FF2. 
I n t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d , B V i s s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t a c r o s s a i l m o d e l s b u t N o n G A A P E i s 
n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . A l s o , t h e i n t e r a c t i o n t e r m , E L * N o n G A A P E , i s n o t 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t in a l l m o d e l s . I n c o n t r a s t , E L * B V i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n 
r e l a t i o n t o C O R E , C E a n d C F . D I F F i s m o d e r a t e l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d n e g a t i v e o n l y i n 
r e l a t i o n t o I B E S M o d e l 1 . 
E L i s m a r g i n a l l y t o m o d e r a t e l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d n e g a t i v e in a l l m o d e l s , w h i c h i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t h i g h e x p o s u r e t o p o o r q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s h a s a n e g a t i v e i m p a c t o n s h a r e p r i c e . T h e s e 
r e s u l t s s u g g e s t t h a t i n v e s t o r s i n l a r g e f i r m s a r e p r e d o m i n a n t l y f o c u s e d o n t h e b o o k v a l u e 
o f e q u i t y . B o t h G A A P a n d n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s d o n o t a p p e a r t o b e v a l u e r e l e v a n t a t 
b o t h l o w a n d h i g h l e v e l s o f e x p o s u r e t o p o o r q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s . I B E S m o d e l s p e r f o r m 
b e s t b a s e d o n B I C in r e l a t i o n t o a l l m o d e l s t e s t e d . 
In the G F C pe r iod , inves to rs a p p e a r to r ema in f o c u s e d on the b o o k va lue of equ i ty . 
T h e r e is s o m e e v i d e n c e of a sh i f t in f o c u s , h o w e v e r , in re la t ion to C F . C P is s t rong ly 
s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive in the G F C per iod . A l s o , G A A P e a r n i n g s a p p e a r to be 
inc rementa l ly value re levant in relat ion to C F . E L is s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive 
in all m o d e l s excep t I B E S Mode l I . T h i s is con t ra ry to e x p e c t a t i o n s . S u b s e q u e n t 
ana lyses in Sect ion 6 .2 .3 .2 s h o w inves tors g ive grea te r e m p h a s i s to both G A A P and 
n o n - G A A P ea rn ings than is ev iden t he re . A n exp lana t ion f o r the resul t s o b s e r v e d here is 
that poo l ing the s a m p l e and inc lud ing main e f f e c t s and in te rac t ion t e r m s f o r e a r n i n g s 
var iab les m a y bias the resul t s , par t icular ly as there is s t ruc tura l mul t i co l l inear i ty 
inherent in m o d e l s wi th ma in e f f e c t s and in terac t ion t e r m s . 
E L * B V is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and nega t ive on ly in relat ion to I B E S , w h i c h indica tes 
that inves tors dec rea se thei r f o c u s on the book value of equ i ty w h e n the e x p o s u r e to 
poor qual i ty ea rn ings is h igh . G A A P e a r n i n g s are not i nc remen ta l ly va lue re levant w h e n 
exposure to low qual i ty ea rn ings is h igh . In t e rms of mode l p e r f o r m a n c e , C F m o d e l s 
p e r f o r m best based on B I C . 
In the p o s t - G F C per iod , there is an o b s e r v a b l e sh i f t in i nves to r s ' f o c u s . It a p p e a r s that 
inves tors f o c u s p r e d o m i n a n t l y on n o n - G A A P ea rn ings , w h i c h is in con t ras t to the pre-
G F C and G F C per iods . G e n e r a l l y , E L is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and nega t ive in relat ion 
to C O R E . C E and C F . D I F F is s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive in relat ion to C O R E , 
C E and C F genera l ly . T h e interact ion t e r m , E L * B V , is marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t and 
posi t ive on ly in relat ion to C O R E and C F . E L ^ N o n G A A P E and E L * D 1 F F are not 
stat ist ically s ign i f ican t in all m o d e l s . T h e s e resul ts indica te inves to r s g ive grea te r 
e m p h a s i s to n o n - G A A P ea rn ings in the p o s t - G F C per iod in c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C 
per iod . F u r t h e r m o r e , a high level of e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty e a r n i n g s d o e s not a p p e a r to 
c h a n g e the e m p h a s i s inves tors p lace on both G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . Based on 
B I C , IBES mode l s p e r f o r m bes t . 
6.2.3.2 Model Estimation by Low and High e-loading 
T h e es t imat ion resul ts , by low and high e - l o a d i n g , f o r f i r m s in the ScfeP 5 0 0 s a m p l e are 
presented in T a b l e 6 .8 . In the p r e - G F C pe r iod , B V is s t rongly s ign i f i can t in all m o d e l s 
at both low and high levels of e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty e a r n i n g s . 
Table 6.8: Ohison Model: S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and High/Low 
One-Factor e-loading Quintiles 
Model 1; P, = a„ + p^BV + p.NonGAAPE^^ + P P I F F 1 „ + e„ 
Model 2: P, = a„ + jifiV^ + ji,NonGAAPE^^ + P.DIFFI^, + e . 
Panel A: Pre -GFC - Model 1 
EL Quintile BV NonGAAPE DIEFl Intercepl Adj k ' 
IBES Low 1.249"" 7.020 -12.312" 17.029"' 1558 0.9097 
High 1.196"" 14.627"" -1.258 11.088"' 1559 0.8133 
CORE Low 1.322"" 4.827 -2.332 17.816'" 1558 0.9072 
High 1 ..S6.V"" 5.407"" 5.242" 10.973"" 1559 0.7760 
CE Low 1.335'"' 4.601 4.513 17.115'" 1558 0.9052 
High 1.566'" 5.823"" 7.132"" 10.931'" 1559 0.7788 
CF Low 1.310'" 5.898 5.614 16.994"" 1558 0.9063 
High 1.54«'" 5.201" 5.500"" 11.077"' 1559 0.7768 
Panel B: P re -GFC - Model 2 
EL Quintile BV NonGAAPE D1FF2 Intercept N Adj R-
IBES Low 1.266"" 6.607 -1.337 16.935"" 1558 0.9077 
High 1.190"" 14.876"" -0.770" 10.958'" 1559 0.8142 
CORE Low 1.296""" 5.480 -7.398 17.984"" 1558 0.9084 
High 1.641"" 2.218 -0.715 11.558'" 1559 0.7627 
CE Low 1.370""" 3.716 4.792 17.602'" 1558 0.9049 
High 1.747"" 1.174 6.437' 12.027""" 1559 0.7647 
CE Low 1.351'" 4.600 4.355 17.313"" 1558 0.9058 
High 1.668'"" 1.260 1.451 11.315'" 1559 0.7602 
Panel C: : G F C - Model 1 
EL Quintile BV NonGAAPE DIFFl Intercept N Adj R-
IBES Low 1.097""" 3.8.39 0.199 15.360"' 435 0.8085 
High 0.661"" 13.6.37'" -0.182 22.872"" 435 0.3438 
CORE Low 1.111'" 2.849 0.923 15.835"" 435 0.8053 
High 0.948""" 4.596" 1.196 26.470'" 435 0.2537 
CE Low 1.093"" 1.988 -1.053 15.692"' 435 0.8068 
High 0.882"" 4.719" 2.963 26.570"' 435 0.2590 
CF Low 1.1 17"" 2.461"" 3.424"' 15.511"' 435 0.8545 
High 1.051'" 2.934 4.437" 25.121"" 435 0.2747 
Panel D ; G F C - Model 2 
EL Quintile BV NonGAAPE DIFE2 Intercept N Adi R-
IBES Low 1.1 18"" 3.596 0.843 15.194"" 435 0.8089 
High 0.670""" 13.475"" 0.784" 23.087"' 435 0.3460 
CORE Low 1.150"" 2.475 2.158 15.3.50"" 435 0.8069 
High 0.961"" 4.307" 1.255 26.632"" 435 0.2554 
CE Low 1.144"" 2.327 1.659 15.287"" 435 0.8069 
High 0.943"" 3.375" 2.021 26.992"" 435 0.2507 
CF Low 1.121'" 2.418"" 3.353'" 15.916"' 435 0.8553 
High 1.103"" 1.609 3.111" 2 5 7 1 4 " ' 435 0.2722 
P a n e l E : P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 1 
E L Q u i n t i l e BV N o n G A A P E D l E F l In t e rcep t N A d i R-
I B E S L o w 0 . 3 0 4 3 1 . 9 2 0 " " - 4 . 7 3 2 15.476"" ' 1 0 9 4 0 .56.34 
H i g h 0 .556" 44.032""" 7 . 8 1 7 7 . 6 7 3 1 0 9 4 0 . 6 2 0 4 
C O R K L o w 0 . 3 5 6 2 6 . 2 6 0 * " 1 4 . 9 8 7 ' 1 9 . 8 3 8 ' " 1094 0 . 5 0 5 4 
H i g h 1 . 0 6 5 " " 32 .573"" ' 2 4 . 7 7 0 " ' 9 .201 1094 0 . 5 3 6 9 
C E I ^ n v 0 . 2 9 5 2 5 . 1 4 3 " " 2 0 . 7 1 6 " " 1 9 . 7 1 9 ' " 1094 0 . 5 0 2 1 
H i g h 0 . 9 7 9 " 3 2 . 9 0 9 " " 2 9 . 7 2 9 " " 8 . 8 2 3 1 0 9 4 0 . 5 3 6 1 
C F L o w 0 . 3 3 7 2 5 . 5 9 4 " " 2 6 . . 3 4 r " 1 9 . 6 8 5 " " 1 0 9 4 0 . 4 9 8 8 
High 1 . 0 5 5 " " 32 .365 ' "" 3 2 . 5 1 2 ' " 9 . 0 3 0 1 0 9 4 0 . 5 3 4 6 
P a n e l F: P o s t - G F C M o d e l 2 
Ad.i R= E L Q u i n t i l e BV N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 In te rcep t N 
I B E S L o w 0 . 2 8 9 3 1 . 9 6 3 " ' 2 . 5 3 3 1 6 . 0 5 7 ' " 1094 0 . 5 6 3 6 
H i g h 0 .530" 4 3 . 7 9 0 " ' 0 . 3 1 0 7 . 6 7 4 1094 0 . 6 1 4 7 
C O R E Low- 0.-147" 2 4 . 2 8 2 " " 0 . 0 2 7 2 0 . 2 6 2 " " 1 0 9 4 0 . 4 8 8 0 
H i g h 1.152""' 2 9 . 8 8 8 " " 1.838 1 0 . . 3 8 r 1 0 9 4 0 . 5 1 4 9 
C E L o w 0 .465" 1 8 . 5 6 7 " 12.0.53" 2 1 . . 3 8 9 " ' 1 0 9 4 0 . 4 4 7 8 
High 1 . 0 3 6 " 2 6 . 3 6 1 " " 23 .224" 1 3 . 3 2 9 " 1 0 9 4 0 . 4 6 5 4 
C F L o w 0.550"" 18.792"" 18 .453" ' 2 2 . 3 7 5 ' " 1 0 9 4 0 . 4 3 9 2 
High 1 .106"" 26 .345*" ' 2 6 . 0 2 2 " ' 13.774" 1094 0 . 4 6 5 3 
' p < ( ) . 0 5 . " p < ( ) . O I , ' " p < 0 . ( ) 0 l 
t statistics arc calculated with standard errors clustered on firm. 
The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The mdcpendent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the follow ing \ ariables for 
IBES, C O R E , CE and C F models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
C F = Operating cash f lows per share. DIFFl = G A A P l minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P I is 
earnings per share f rom operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under G A A P . DIFF2 = 
GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under GAAP. EL quintile is Low if e-loading quintile is I and High if e-loading quintile is 5. Low and High 
indicate low exposure to low quality earnings and high exposure to low quality earnings, respectively. 
I n r e l a t i o n t o M o d e l 1 , n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s a r e n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t w h e n 
e x p o s u r e t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i s l o w b u t a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e 
w h e n e x p o s u r e t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i s h i g h . In M o d e l 2 . h o w e v e r , o n l y I B E S i s 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a t t h e h i g h l e v e l o f e x p o s u r e t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s . 
D I F F l i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e w h e n e x p o s u r e t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i s 
h i g h i n r e l a t i o n t o C O R E , C E a n d C F . D I F F l i s o n l y s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d 
n e g a t i v e , h o w e v e r , w h e n e x p o s u r e t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i s l o w i n r e l a t i o n t o I B E S . 
P a n e l B s h o w s D I F F 2 i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n r e l a t i o n I B E S a n d C E w h e n e x p o s u r e 
t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i s h i g h . H o w e v e r , i n r e l a t i o n t o I B E S , t h e s i g n o f t h e c o e f f i c i e n t 
i s n e g a t i v e . C F a n d C O R E a r e n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . 
D u r i n g t h e G F C , I B E S , C O R E a n d C E a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e a t t h e 
h i g h l e v e l o f e x p o s u r e t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i n M o d e l I a n d M o d e l 2 . C F , h o w e v e r , i s 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t o n l y w h e n e x p o s u r e t o l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i s l o w f o r b o t h 
m o d e l s . 
In Panel C . D IFF l is statistically significant and positive only in relation to C F at both 
levels of exposure to low quality earnings. In Panel D , DIFF2 is statistically significant 
at both levels of exposure to low quality earnings in relation to CF . DIFF2 is also 
statistically significant when exposure to low quality earnings is low in relation to 
IBES . BV remains strongly significant in all models. 
In the post-GFC period, all non-GAAP earnings are statistically significant and positive 
for both levels of exposure to low quality earnings in all models. In Panel E, D IFF l is 
statistically significant and positive at low and high levels of exposure to low quality 
earnings in relation to C O R E , C E and CF. In Panel F, DIFF2 is statistically significant 
at low and high levels of exposure to low quality earnings in relation to C E and CF. BV 
is only statistically significant at high level of exposure to low quality earnings in 
Model I . In Model 2, however. BV is statistically significant at both levels of exposure 
to low quality earnings in relation to C O R E , C E and CF , and only at high level of 
exposure to low quality earnings in relation to IBES. 
The results for large firms show share price is driven largely by the book value of 
equity. Non-GAAP earnings are generally value relevant only at the high level of 
exposure to low quality earnings in the pre-GFC and G F C periods. This is consistent 
with investors seeking information from alternative sources to mitigate exposure to low 
quality earnings. There is some evidence that G A A P earnings are incrementally value 
relevant but it is mixed. Interestingly, the sign of statistically significant N o n G A A P E , 
D IFF l and D IFF2 are generally positive, which suggests investors are not discounting 
firm value for low quality earnings. 
An explanation for the result is size. This sample comprises large firms, which may be 
relatively homogenous in terms of risk of poor quality earnings. Furthermore, while a 
f irm in the S&P500 may be assigned to a high-risk quintile, this risk may still be low 
relative to the market. Furthermore, large firms generally have more analysts fol lowing 
them and more information available from alternative sources, which may explain the 
value relevance of non-GAAP earnings when exposure to low quality earnings is high. 
Therefore, the results may reflect a bias in the sample. 
There is some evidence of a shift in investors' focus, particularly in relation to Model I , 
between the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods. D IFF l is generally incrementally value 
relevant at both levels of exposure to low quality earnings in the post-GFC period, 
which is in contrast to the pre-GFC and G F C periods. More interestingly, however, are 
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the resul t s f o r BV and N o n G A A P E . It a p p e a r s that inves tors genera l ly f ind the booic 
va lue of equi ty m o r e va lue re levant w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings is h igh in 
c o m p a r i s o n to w h e n it is l ow. S imi la r ly , the m a g n i t u d e of N o n G A A P E is cons i s ten t ly 
la rger at high level of e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings re la t ive to low level of e x p o s u r e 
to low qual i ty ea rn ings . Neve r the l e s s , it a lso a p p e a r s tha t , in the p o s t - G F C pe r iod , 
inves tors sh i f ted their f o c u s and genera l ly p lace grea te r e m p h a s i s on n o n - G A A P 
ea rn ings in c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C and G F C per iods . 
6.2.4 Non-S&P 500 Sample 
6.2.4.1 Model Estimation with Main Effects and Interaction Terms 
T a b l e 6 .9 s h o w s the n o n - S & P 5 0 0 sample es t imat ion resul ts f o r m o d e l s wi th ma in 
e f f e c t s and interact ion t e rms . All mode l s are stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t ac ros s all per iod 
w i n d o w s . 
In the p r e - G F C per iod , BV is s t rongly s igni f icant in all mode l s . H o w e v e r , N o n G A A P E , 
E L and E L * B V are not stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t . D I F F is only marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t in 
relat ion to C O R E in Model 2 . E L * N o n G A A P E is marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t and nega t ive in 
all mode l s excep t IBES in Mode l 1. E L * D 1 F F is stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t and nega t ive in 
relat ion to I B E S and C F . T h e resul ts show that inves tors are f o c u s e d p r edominan t ly on 
the book value of equi ty , it appea r s that inves tors s igni f icant ly reduce the e m p h a s i s they 
place on n o n - G A A P ea rn ings w h e n exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings is h igh . S imi la r ly , 
there is ev idence that inves tors a lso s igni f icant ly reduce the e m p h a s i s they place on 
G A A P ea rn ings w h e n exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings is high in relat ion to I B E S and 
C F . F u r t h e r m o r e , the un ique e f f ec t s ( the sum of the coe f f i c i en t s of the ma in e f f ec t and 
its c o r r e s p o n d i n g interact ion t e rm) of both N o n G A A P E and D I F F are nega t ive , wh ich 
indicate that ea rn ings of f i r m s wi th high exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings are nega t ive ly 
related wi th share pr ice . 
I f i nd s imi lar resul ts dur ing the G F C . Inves tors remain f o c u s e d p r edominan t ly on the 
book value of equi ty and give grea ter e m p h a s i s to C O R E , C E and C F w h e n e x p o s u r e to 
low qual i ty ea rn ings is h igh . In cont ras t to the p r e - G F C pe r iod , G A A P ea rn ings are not 
inc rementa l ly va lue re levant w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings is h igh . 
Table 6.9: Ohlson Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample -
Multivariate OLS Regression at Earnings Announcement Date by 
Models with One-Factor e-loading Dummy and Interaction Terms as 
Controls 
Model 1: P = a , + P^BV^ + P^NonGAAPE^^ + P.DIFFI., + ji^EL,, 
+P^EL * BV., +PEL * NonGAAPE., + p.EL* DIFFl^^ + £„ 
Model 2: P = a„ + + P,NonGAAPE^^ + P-,DIFF2.„ + p^EL-, 
+P^EL* BV-, + /J, EL * NonGAAPE,, + p.EL * DIFF2,, + £„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model I Model 2 
CORE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.656"" 1.652""" 1.628""' 1 ..578"" 1.605"' 1.613"' 1.652"' 1.649"' 
(4.52) (4.60) (4.70) (4.86) (4.41) (4.35) (4.48) (4.60) 
NonGAAPE 3.167 3.489 3.406 3.724 3..304 3.705 2.955 3.267 
(0.41) (0.50) (0.45) (0.57) (0.43) (0.53) (0.40) (0.49) 
DIFF .3.48.1 3.973 7.709 18.422" -1.645 0.424 3.-366 3.618 
(0.47) (0.61) (0.68) (2.02) (-0.18) (0.05) (0.43) (0.52) 
El . 3.247 0.215 1.458 0.672 2.743 1.193 2.630 0.870 
(1.09) (0.07) (0.47) (0.23) (0.98) (0.40) (0.91) (0.30) 
E I ; B V -0.429 -0.092 -0.241 -0.219 -0.095 0.092 -0.253 -0.120 
(-1.39) (-0.30) (-0.78) (-0.79) (-0.31) (0.26) (-0.78) (-0..38) 
HL'NonOAAFH -1 1.161 -11.8.34" -21.186" -20.813' -21.428' -17.096' -22.329' -18.-542' 
(-1.80) (-2.01) (-2.-39) (-2.50) (-2.42) (-2.07) (-2.53) (-2.20) 
E L D I F F -28..541" -19.093" -13.289 -15.763 -12.6-37 -7.158 -20.303' -15.724' 
(-3.04) (-2.02) (-1.13) (-1.57) (-1.35) (-0.85) (-2.29) (-1.96) 
Inlercept 6.504 6.587" 6.488 6.861" 6.1.30 6.259 6.527' 6.600' 
(1.95) (1.99) (1.92) (2.12) (1.93) (1.94) (1.98) (2.01) 
N 117.30 117.30 1 17.30 117.30 117-30 1 17-30 117.30 1 17.30 
Adj R- 0.6375 0.5874 0.6221 0.6260 0.6218 0.5922 0.6224 0.5942 
BIC 113294 114813 113783 11-3659 113791 114675 11-3773 114616 
BIC Rank 1 8 4 2 5 7 3 6 
Panel B: GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.030"' 1.033"" 1.034" 1.048""' 1.027" 1.041" 1.051"" 1.0.54"" 
(3.33) (3.33) (3.26) (3.32) (3.24) (3.14) (3.-38) (3.-38) 
NonGAAPF 2.216 2.244 1.386 1.440 1.391 1.545 0.533 0.689 
(1.02) (1.04) (0.87) (0.95) (0.88) (0.99) (0.33) (0.43) 
DIFF -0.529 0.108 -0.945 4.235" -1.013 1.675 1.363 1.498 
(-0.98) (0.15) (-0.35) (2.38) (-0.47) ( 0 4 1 ) (0.86) (0.97) 
F l . -1.165 -I..540 -1.546 -1.223 -1.365 -2.190 -1.549 -1.903 
(-0.26) (-0..35) (-0.35) (-0.28) (-0.32) (-0.56) (-0.36) (-0.44) 
E L B V 0.655 0.676 0.631 0.601 0.607 0.621 0.633 0.643 
(1.66) (1.71) (1.65) (1.-55) (1.-58) (1..56) (1.68) (1.70) 
EL 'NonGAAFF -5.702 -5.742 -4.348" -4 .503" -4.404' -4.189" -3.705" -3.681" 
(-1.62) (-1.63) (-2.41) (-2.60) (-2.45) (-2.33) (-1.99) (-2.01) 
F L ' D I F F -2.163 -2..344 0..385 0.881 -4.838 -6.276 -3.276 -2.955 
(-1.96) (-1.81) (0.09) (0.42) (-1.66) (-1.14) (-1.80) (-1.68) 
Intercept 7.968" 8.010" 8.313" 8.25-5" 7.872" 8 .280" 8.232' 8.331' 
(2.14) (2.17) (2.21) (2.27) (2.17) (2-59) (2.24) (2.31) 
N 3080 3080 3080 3080 3080 3080 3080 3080 
Adj 0.6274 0.6244 0.6225 0.6272 0.6252 0.6209 0.6276 0.6276 
BIC 28450 28474 28490 28452 28468 28503 28448 28448 
BIC Rank 3 6 7 4 5 8 1 1 
Panel C: Post -GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model I Model 2 
BV 1.115"" 1 .095" ' 1.300*'* 1.337*" 1 .309 ' " 1 .293 ' " 1.303"" 1.31.3'" 
(5.41) (5.30) (5.95) (6.31) (5.83) (5 ..34) (6.03) (6.28) 
NonGAAPK 12.043*" 13 .295" ' 1.161 -0.891 0.566 -0.116 0.729 0.232 
(4.27) (4.78) (0.35) (-0.54) (0.18) (-0.07) (0.22) (0.12) 
IMFF - 4 . 9 2 6 ' " - 3 . 6 6 8 " ' 5.716 3.8.38 1.101 -2.933 0.175 -0.385 
(-7.60) (-3.36) (1.67) (1.28) (0.34) (-0.94) (0.06) (-0.25) 
EL 6 .291 ' 6.554* 5.993' 5 .686' 4 .642 4 .247 5 .784 ' 5 .777 ' 
(2.44) (2.56) (2.19) (2.08) (1.88) (1.94) (2.15) (2.15) 
H L B V -0..364 -0.353 -0.503 -0.522 -0.518' -0.544" -0.528 -0 .528 ' 
(-1.47) (-1.43) (-1.84) (-1.86) (-2.08) (-2.12) (-1.94) (-1.98) 
EL 'NonGAAPF, -5.749 -6.768 0.388 2.198 0.957 1.444 2.147 2 . 5 5 4 " 
(-1.65) (-1.93) (0.48) (1.18) (0.99) (1.00) (1.70) (2.81) 
E L ' D I F F .3.494 2.263 -3.714 -0.545 -4 .389" -5.396 2 .021 ' 2 . 4 8 0 " 
(1.24) (1.01) (-1.75) (-0.16) (-2.65) (-1..37) (2.26) (2..58) 
Intercept 5 .326' 5 .089' 5.976" 6 . 1 9 1 " 6 . 2 9 2 " 5 . 7 9 6 " 6 . 2 8 9 " 6 . 2 4 8 " 
(2.28) (2.18) (2.52) (2.61) (2.71) (2.93) (2.69) (2.66) 
N 6678 6678 6678 6678 6678 6678 6678 6678 
Ad j R- 0.5194 0.5223 0.4702 0.4681 0.4743 0.4817 0.4683 0.4690 
BIC 57648 57607 58299 .58325 58247 .58151 .58323 58313 
B i r Rank 2 1 5 8 4 3 7 6 
' p < 0.05, •• p < 0.01. ••• p < 0.001 
t .statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm. 
The dependent variable. P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows; BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES, CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash Rows per share. DIFF represents DIFFl in Model 1 and D1FF2 in Model 2. DIFFl = GAAPl 
minus the rele\ant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPl is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. D1FF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. EL = 1 if e-loading quintile is and 0 
if e-loading quintile is 1. EL'BV = Interaction term of e-loading with book value of common equity per share. 
EL'NonGAAPE = Interaction term of e-loading with the corresponding non-GAAP earnings measure of IBES, 
CORE, CE and CF. EL'DIFF = Interaction term of e-loading with the corresponding DIFF measure of DIFFl and 
D1FF2. 
In the p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , there a p p e a r s t o be a s h i f t in i n v e s t o r s ' f o c u s . W h i l e i n v e s t o r s 
r e m a i n s t r o n g l y f o c u s e d o n t h e b o o k v a l u e o f e q u i t y , I B E S is a l s o v a l u e r e l e v a n t w h e n 
e x p o s u r e to l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s is l o w . S i m i l a r l y , G A A P e a r n i n g s are i n c r e m e n t a l l y 
v a l u e r e l e v a n t in re la t ion t o I B E S w h e n e x p o s u r e to l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s is l o w , E L is 
m a r g i n a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e in re la t ion I B E S , C O R E a n d C F . T h e i n t e r a c t i o n 
t e r m s are not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t in re la t ion t o I B E S a n d C O R E . H o w e v e r , E L * B V 
a n d E L * D I F F are g e n e r a l l y s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t in re la t ion C E a n d C F , In r e l a t i o n to 
C E , the n e g a t i v e s i g n o f E L * B V a n d E L * D I F F i n d i c a t e s that i n v e s t o r s d e c r e a s e t h e 
e m p h a s i s t h e y p l a c e o n the b o o k v a l u e o f e q u i t y a n d G A A P e a r n i n g s w h e n e x p o s u r e t o 
l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s is h i g h . In c o n t r a s t , i n v e s t o r s i n c r e a s e t h e e m p h a s i s t h e y p l a c e o n 
G A A P a n d n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s w h e n e x p o s u r e to l o w q u a l i t y e a r n i n g s i s h i g h in 
r e l a t i o n to C F , 
O v e r a l l , the resul t s s h o w s o m e e v i d e n c e of a sh i f t in inves to r s ' f o c u s ac ros s the three 
per iod w i n d o w s . In the p r e - G F C and G F C per iods , inves tors are m o r e f o c u s e d on the 
book va lue of equ i ty . In the p o s t - G F C per iod , h o w e v e r , inves tors a p p e a r to g ive 
c o m p a r a t i v e l y grea ter e m p h a s i s to I B E S ea rn ings . Us ing B I C to eva lua te mode l 
p e r f o r m a n c e , I B E S p e r f o r m s best in the pre- and p o s t - G F C pe r iod . H o w e v e r , C F 
p e r f o r m s best du r ing the G F C . 
6.2.4.2 Model Estimation by Low and High e-loading 
T h e es t imat ion resul ts , by low and high e - l o a d i n g , f o r f i r m s not inc luded in the S & P 
5 0 0 are p resen ted in T a b l e 6 .10 . In the p r e - G F C per iod , BV is s t rongly s ign i f ican t in all 
m o d e l s . All n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t and nega t ive at the high 
level of e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings in Model 1 and Mode l 2. T h e resul ts f o r 
D I F F I in Panel A exhibi t a s imi lar pat tern . D I F F 2 is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f ican t and 
nega t ive at the high level of exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings in relation to IBES and C F 
but it is s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f ican t and posi t ive when exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings is 
low in relat ion to C O R E . T h e s e resul ts are cons is ten t with inves tors d i scoun t ing the 
share pr ice of f i r m s with a high level exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings . 
In the G F C per iod , C O R E , C E and C F are stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t and nega t ive at the 
h igh level of e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings in both Mode l 1 and Model 2. D l F F l is 
s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and negat ive in relat ion to I B E S , C E and C F w h e n exposu re to 
low qual i ty ea rn ings is h igh . D I F F 2 is statist ically s ign i f ican t and posi t ive at both levels 
of e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings in relation to C O R E but it is s tat ist ical ly s ign i f i can t 
and nega t ive at the high level of exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings in relat ion to I B E S . It 
a p p e a r s that f i r m value is largely dr iven by the book value of equi ty . Fu r the rmore , the 
resul t s are genera l ly cons i s ten t with inves tors d i scoun t ing f i r m value fo r low qual i ty 
e a r n i n g s . 
In the p o s t - G F C per iod , C O R E , C E and C F are not stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t but I B E S is 
s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and posi t ive at both levels of exposu re to low qual i ty ea rn ings in 
M o d e l 1 and Mode l 2 . D I F F I and D I F F 2 are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f ican t and negat ive w h e n 
e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings is low in relat ion to I B E S . D I F F 2 is a l so stat is t ical ly 
s ign i f i can t and posi t ive when e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings is high in relat ion to 
C O R E , h o w e v e r , it is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f ican t and nega t ive w h e n e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty 
e a r n i n g s is h igh in relat ion to C E . 
Table 6.10: Ohlson Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and High/Low 
One-Factor e-loading Quintiles 
Model I: P = a„ + /J.fiV + l},NonGMPE^^ + p.DIFFI^, + £ „ 
Model 2: P=a„ + P,BV., + P^NonGAAPE,, + + £„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC - Model 1 
ELQuin l i l e BV N o n G A A P E DlFEl Intercept N Adi R ' 
IBES Eow 1.656*" 3.167 3.483 6.504 5865 0 .5824 
High 1 .228" ' -7 .994 ' - 2 5 . 0 5 8 " ' 9 . 7 5 1 ' " 5865 0.6711 
C O R E Eow 1.628"" 3.406 7.709 6.488 5865 0 .5834 
High 1 .387" ' - 1 7 . 7 7 9 ' " -5.579 7 . 9 4 6 " ' 5865 0 .6449 
C E Low 1 .605" ' 3.304 -1.645 6.130 5865 0 .5864 
High 1.510"" - 1 8 . 1 2 3 " ' - 14 .282" 8 . 8 7 3 ' " 5865 0.6425 
C F Low 1.652"" 2.955 3.366 6.527' 5865 0.5835 
High 1 .399" ' - 1 9 . . m ' " - 1 6 . 9 3 7 ' " 9 . 1 5 7 ' " 5865 0 .6453 
Panel B: Pre-GFC - Model 2 
EL Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFE2 Intercept N A d j R-
IBES Low 1.652" ' 3.489 3.973 6.587' 5865 0 .5849 
High 1.559"" -8 .345" -15.120 ' 6 . 8 0 1 " ' 5865 0 .5864 
C O R E Low 1.578"" 3.724 18.422' 6.861" 5865 0.5941 
High 1 .359" ' -17 .089" 2.659 7 . 5 3 3 ' " 5865 0.6445 
CE Low 1.613" ' 3.705 0.424 6.259 5865 0.5861 
High 1.705"" -13..391" -6.734 7 . 4 5 2 " ' 5865 0 .5936 
C F Low 1 .649" ' 3.267 3.618 6.600" 5865 0.5855 
High 1 .529" ' - 15 .275" -12 .106" 7 . 4 7 1 ' " 5865 0 .5973 
Panel C : G F C - Model 1 
EL Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DlFFl Intercept N Ad j 
IBES Low 1 .030 ' " 2.216 -0.529 7.968' 1540 0 .5336 
High 1 .686" ' -3.486 -2 .692" 6 .803" 1540 0.6954 
C O R F Low 1.034" 1.386 -0.945 8.313' 1540 0 .5220 
High 1 .665" ' - 2 . 9 6 2 " ' -0.560 6 . 7 6 7 " 1540 0 .6953 
C E Low 1.027" 1.391 -1.013 7.872" 1540 0.5251 
High 1.6.M'" - 3 . 0 1 4 ' " -5 .852" 6 .507" 1540 0.6978 
C F Low- 1.051 • " 0.533 1.363 8.232' 1540 0 .5282 
High 1 .684" ' - 3 . 1 7 2 ' " -1.913' 6 . 6 8 2 " 1540 0 .6996 
Panel D: G F C - Model 2 
EL Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 Intercept N Adi R ' 
IBES Low 1.033" ' 2.244 0.108 8.010" 1540 0 .5330 
High 1 .709" ' -3.498 -2.236' 6 . 4 7 0 " 1540 0 .6906 
C O R E Low 1 .048" ' 1.440 4 .235 ' 8 .255' 1540 0 .5276 
High 1 .64«" ' - 3 . 0 6 4 " ' 5 . 1 1 6 ' " 7 . 0 3 3 " 1540 0 .6994 
C E Low- 1.041" 1.545 1.675 8 . 2 8 0 " 1540 0 .5252 
High 1 .662 ' " - 2 . 6 4 4 " -4.601 6 . 0 9 1 " 1540 0 .6903 
CE Low 1 .054" ' 0.689 1.498 8.331" 1540 0 .5319 
High 1 .696" ' - 2 . 9 9 1 ' " -1.456 6 . 4 2 9 " 1,540 0 .6970 
P a n e l E : P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 1 
E L Q u i n t i l e BV N o n G A A P E D l F F l In t e rcep t N A d j R-
I B E S L o u l . I I . i " " 12.043""" - 4 . 9 2 6 " ' 5 . 3 2 6 ' 3 3 3 9 0 . 6 3 1 1 
High 0 . 7 5 1 ' " 6 .294" - 1 . 4 3 2 11.617""" 3 3 3 9 0 . 3 1 4 8 
C O R E Low 1 . .100 ' " 1.161 5 . 7 1 6 5 . 9 7 6 ' 33.39 0 . 5 8 4 9 
H i g h 0 . 7 9 8 " " 1 .549 2 . 0 0 2 11.970""" 3 3 3 9 0 . 2 5 9 7 
C E Lov\ 1 . .109" ' 0 . 5 6 6 1.101 6 . 2 9 2 " 33.39 0 . 5 7 6 8 
High 0 . 7 9 1 ' " 1.523 - 3 . 2 8 8 1 0 . 9 . M ' " 33.39 0 . 2 8 5 9 
C F L o w 1..103"" 0 7 2 9 0 . 1 7 5 6 . 2 8 9 " 3 3 3 9 0 . 5 7 8 2 
High 0.77.'5"" 2 . 8 7 6 2 . 1 9 6 1 2 . 0 7 3 " " 3 3 3 9 0 . 2 6 6 5 
P a n e l F : P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 2 
E L Q u i n t i l e BV N o n G A A P E D1FF2 In te rcep t N A d j R-
I B E S L o w 1 . 0 9 5 " " 1 3 . 2 9 5 " ' -3.668""" 5 .089" 3 3 3 9 0 . 6 3 5 4 
High 0.742""" 6 . 5 2 7 ' - 1 . 4 0 5 11.643""" 3 3 3 9 0 . 3 1 5 3 
C O R K Low 1 ..337""" -0 .891 3.8.38 6 . 1 9 1 " 3 3 3 9 0 . 5 8 0 3 
High 0.814""" 1.307 3 . 2 9 3 ' 11.877""" 33.39 0 . 2 6 2 2 
C E L o u 1.293""" - 0 . 1 1 6 - 2 . 9 3 3 5.796"" 3 3 3 9 0 . 5 7 8 0 
High 0 . 7 4 8 ' " 1.328 - 8 . 3 2 9 ' 1 0 . 0 4 3 " ' 3 3 3 9 0 . 3 0 4 6 
C F L o w 1 .313"" 0 . 2 3 2 - 0 . 3 8 5 6.248"" 3 3 3 9 0 . 5 7 8 5 
High 0 . 7 8 6 " ' 2 . 7 8 6 2 . 0 9 5 1 2 . 0 2 5 " " 3 3 3 9 0 . 2 6 8 1 
" p < 0 . 0 5 . " p < O . O I . ' " p < 0 .001 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm. 
The dependent variable. P . is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following \ ariables for 
IBES, C O R E , CE and CE models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S & P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash f lows per share. DIHHI = G A A P l minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPI is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to e.xclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIEF2 = 
GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under GAAP. EL quintile is Low if e-loading quintile is 1 and High if e-loading quintile is 5. Low and High 
indicate low exposure to low quality earnings and high exposure to low quality earnings, respectively. 
T h e r e is an o b s e r v a b l e shif t in inves to r s ' f o c u s in the p o s t - G F C per iod . It appea r s that 
inves tors f o c u s p r e d o m i n a n t l y on the book value of equi ty a f te r the G F C . F u r t h e r m o r e , 
th is e m p h a s i s on the book value of equi ty is cons is ten t ly greater w h e n e x p o s u r e to low 
qual i ty ea rn ings is low relat ive to w h e n it is h igh : the m a g n i t u d e of BV is cons is tent ly 
h igher at low level , in c o m p a r i s o n to high level , e x p o s u r e to low qual i ty ea rn ings . 
T h e resul t s f o r the o n e - f a c t o r e - l oad ing are cons is ten t wi th expec ta t ions . A l s o , this 
sugges t s that the resul ts f o r the S & P 5 0 0 sample are due to s ize . Gene ra l l y , the resul ts in 
T a b l e 6 . 1 0 are cons i s t en t wi th inves tors d i scoun t ing the share pr ice of f i r m s with poor 
qual i ty e a r n i n g s . T h e resul ts are a l so s imi lar to the non- f inanc ia l sector s a m p l e . It 
a p p e a r s that inves tors g ive less e m p h a s i s to ea rn ings i n fo rma t ion in the p o s t - G F C 
per iod in c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C per iod . 
6.3 DISCUSSION 
Recall that a lower e-loading indicates lower exposure, and lower sensitivity, to poor 
earnings quality. I argue that when G A A P earnings quality is high (i.e., low e-loading), 
investors may place greater emphasis on G A A P earnings. Therefore, I expect, other 
things being equal, when the e-loading is low (i.e., low exposure to low quality 
earnings), G A A P earnings may be value relevant. Conversely, when the e-loading is 
high, indicating greater sensitivity to poor quality earnings, investors may penalise the 
firm for increased information risk. 
Re-estimating the models by low and high e-loading quintiles provides both 
complementary and additional insights into the effects of exposure to low quality 
earnings. This is particularly evident when comparing the results of the base analyses in 
Chapter 3 and this chapter; the summary tables of Chapter 3, Table 3.4, and Table 6.2 
show the impact that exposure to low quality earnings has on the results by models and 
samples. 
In the financial sector sample, the results of the pre-GFC and G F C periods show that 
when exposure to low quality earnings is low, non-GAAP earnings are not significant. 
Conversely, when exposure to low quality earnings is high, non-GAAP earnings are 
statistically significant. The results also show some evidence that G A A P earnings 
generally have incremental value relevance, however, this varies with different non-
G A A P earnings measure. Interestingly, investors are focused predominantly on book 
value of equity when exposure to low quality earnings is low during the G F C . On the 
other hand, non-GAAP earnings are generally significant when exposure to low quality 
earnings is high. An explanation for this is when exposure to low quality earnings is 
high, investors seek alternative sources of information. 
The results for the post-GFC period suggest a change in investors' emphasis; non-
G A A P earnings are statistically significant across both levels of e-loading in contrast to 
the G F C period. The results for G A A P earnings are mixed, i.e., after the G F C , investors 
appear to place greater emphasis on alternative sources of information. However, there 
is evidence that G A A P earnings have incremental value relevance. This suggests that 
for a given level of earnings quality, investors may find G A A P and non-GAAP earnings 
complementary. Interestingly, there is no evidence investors discount the share price of 
firm with high exposure to low quality earnings. This may be due to the relatively 
homogenous sample of financial f irms. 
In the non-financial sector and non-S&P 500 samples, the results are somewhat similar 
in the pre-GFC and GFC periods. When exposure to low quality earnings is relatively 
high, the statistically significant coefficients for non-GAAP earnings are negative. 
Additionally, the results also show that G A A P earnings have incremental value 
relevance but the coefficients are also negative when exposure to low quality earnings is 
high. These results are consistent with investors seeking information from alternative 
sources and also discounting firm value for high exposure to low quality earnings. Low 
earnings quality suggests greater information risk, therefore, these results are consistent 
with prior studies that find investors price information risk (Easley and O'Hara , 2004). 
The results also show a shift in investors' focus. While GAAP earnings have 
incremental value relevance, it appears that a major impact of the GFC was to shift 
investors' emphasis to non-GAAP earnings measures for firms in the financial sector 
and S&P 500 samples. Interestingly, in the post-GFC period, investors appear to focus 
predominantly on the book value of equity and give almost no emphasis to non-GAAP 
earnings except IBES in the non-financial sector and non-S&P 500 samples. 
The results for the S&P 500 sample where GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are 
positively associated with share price when exposure to low quality earnings is high are 
notable. However, an explanation for these results is the sample itself, which comprises 
large firms that are relatively homogenous in terms of exposure to low quality earnings. 
That is, the risk of exposure to low quality earnings may be high for firms in the highest 
quintile within the sample. Nevertheless, this risk may be low relative to other firms in 
the market, i.e., firms that are not included in the S&P 500 index. Therefore, there may 
be a size effect that biases the observed results. 
6.4 S U M M A R Y AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter. 1 address RQ3 and investigate the impact of earnings quality on the 
value relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings measures and whether earnings 
quality may explain my findings in Chapter 3. Specifically. I examine whether varying 
levels of earnings quality impact on the value relevance of non-GAAP earnings and on 
the incremental value relevance of GAAP earnings. I also investigate the impact of the 
GFC on investors' focus on G A A P and non-GAAP earnings after controlling for 
earnings quality. 
I f ind similar results for my non-financial f irms and non-S&P 500 samples. M y results 
show that the G F C has an impact on the emphasis investors place on G A A P and non-
G A A P earnings. The evidence suggests that an impact of the G F C was to shift 
investors' focus to the book value of equity. In the post-GFC period, investors appear to 
give little emphasis to both G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. Nevertheless, G A A P 
earnings appear to have incremental value relevance in relation to IBES . 1 also f ind 
evidence that investors discount f irm value for low quality earnings in the pre-GFC and 
G F C periods. 
The financial sector and S & P 500 samples yield some interesting results. High levels of 
exposure to low quality earnings do not appear to impact on the value relevance o f both 
G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. An explanation for these results may be the relative 
homogeneity of the samples. 
Overal l . I f ind evidence that the G F C had an impact on the value relevance o f both 
G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. I also find evidence of a shift in investors' emphasis 




In this chapter, I investigate the impact of conservatism on the value relevance of 
G A A P and non-GAAP earnings to address RQ4. 1 examine whether the GFC and the 
level of conservatism, both unconditional and conditional, are systematically associated 
with the emphasis investors place on GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. 
In Chapter 3. I find evidence that investors place greater emphasis on GAAP earnings, 
which are generally closer to, or less than, I/B/E/S earnings in the non-financial sector 
sample before and during the GFC. In subsequent tests on the impact of information 
asymmetry in Chapter 5, I find evidence that investors focus on GAAP earnings, which 
are generally closer to, or less than, non-GAAP earnings at a high level of information 
asymmetry in the non-financial sector and non-S&P 500 samples in the pre-GFC 
period. This result, however, does not hold at a low level of information asymmetry in 
the same period. They show a shift in investors' emphasis in the post-GFC period in 
these samples. Furthermore, DIFFI and DIFF2 are negatively related to share price. As 
DIFF variables are defined as GAAP less non-GAAP earnings, lower values of the 
DIFF variables indicate G A A P earnings that are closer to. or less than. non-GAAP 
earnings. I also find similar results for these two samples in my tests on the impact of 
earnings quality in Chapter 6. 
In this chapter, I investigate if there is a systematic association in the value relevance of 
G A A P and non-GAAP earnings across different levels of conservatism. Specifically, I 
use two alternative measures of conservatism - market-to-book (MTB) ratio for 
unconditional conservatism and asymmetric timeliness (AT) measure for conditional 
conservatism. Consistent with previous chapters. I adopt two alternative approaches to 
investigate the impact of each measure of conservatism. First, I assign firms into 
quintiles based on each of these measures. Also, I focus only on the extreme quintiles of 
my conservatism measures, where systematic differences due to conservatism are more 
likely to be evident. The first approach examines the main effects and interaction terms 
in the model. I include a dummy variable, CON, where I indicates firms with high 
conservatism and 0 indicates firms with low conservatism. Accordingly, CON is based 
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on the M T B ra t io u n d e r uncond i t i ona l c o n s e r v a t i s m and based on the A T m e a s u r e u n d e r 
cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . In the s e c o n d a p p r o a c h , I a s s ign f i r m s in to qu in t i l e s b a s e d on 
the c o r r e s p o n d i n g m e a s u r e of c o n s e r v a t i s m . I r e -e s t ima te m y O h i s o n m o d e l s s epa ra t e ly 
f o r f i r m s in the h igh or low qu in t i l e s of the c o r r e s p o n d i n g m e a s u r e of c o n s e r v a t i s m f o r 
e a c h s a m p l e in m y s tudy . 
In s u m m a r y , I B E S and C O R E gene ra l ly p r o d u c e l o w e r va lues of e a r n i n g s re la t ive to 
G A A P e a r n i n g s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , there m a y be a c o n f i r m a t i o n e f f e c t w h e r e the level of 
c o n s e r v a t i s m in G A A P e a r n i n g s re f l ec t s i n v e s t o r s ' e x p e c t a t i o n s , w h i c h b ia ses a g a i n s t 
f i n d i n g s ign i f i can t resu l t s . C o n v e r s e l y , if i nves to r s f i nd G A A P e a r n i n g s to be m o r e 
c red ib le and re l i ab le , I expec t G A A P e a r n i n g s to be inc remen ta l ly va lue r e l evan t and 
pos i t ive ly assoc ia ted wi th f i r m va lue . T h i s impl i e s a pos i t ive a s soc i a t i on b e t w e e n 
D I F F I and D I F F 2 and share pr ice . Recal l that D I F F I and D I F F 2 m e a s u r e the d i f f e r e n c e 
b e t w e e n G A A P and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . T h e r e f o r e , s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive D I F F I and 
D I F F 2 indica te inves tors f a v o u r G A A P e a r n i n g s w h e r e they are not c o m p a r a t i v e l y 
l o w e r ( i .e . , less c o n s e r v a t i v e ) than n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s , w h i c h is cons i s t en t wi th 
inves to r s f i n d i n g G A A P e a r n i n g s m o r e c red ib le and re l iable . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t he re is 
re la t ive ly g rea te r uncer ta in ty in the m a r k e t in the G F C and p o s t - G F C per iod in 
c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C pe r iod . T h e r e f o r e , I expec t G A A P e a r n i n g s to h a v e 
inc remen ta l va lue r e l evance re la t ive to n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s in the G F C and p o s t - G F C 
pe r iods in c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C pe r iod . A l s o , cons i s t en t wi th pr ior c h a p t e r s , 
r e f e r e n c e s to the va lue r e l evance of n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s d e n o t e c o m p a r a t i v e va lue 
r e l e v a n c e b e t w e e n these e a r n i n g s , i .e. , I B E S , C O R E , C E and C F , and r e f e r e n c e s to 
D I F F I , D I F F 2 and G A A P e a r n i n g s d e n o t e i nc remen ta l va lue r e l e v a n c e b e t w e e n G A A P 
and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . 
A l s o , the type of s a m p l e m a y bias aga ins t f i n d i n g s ign i f i can t resu l t s . For e x a m p l e , f i r m s 
in the f inanc ia l sec tor are s ign i f i can t ly a f f e c t e d by the G F C wi th s i gn i f i c an t c o r r e c t i o n s 
in the book va lue of asse t s that m a y h a v e been ove r s t a t ed in the pe r iod l ead ing u p to the 
G F C . It is a re la t ive ly h o m o g e n o u s s a m p l e of f i r m s wi th in the s a m e sec to r that are 
gene ra l ly m o r e h igh ly r egu la t ed . T h e r e f o r e , so r t ing f inanc ia l f i r m s , w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e 
s imi la r i m p a c t on e a r n i n g s and book va lue of a s se t s , in to qu in t i l e s based on 
c o n s e r v a t i s m m e a n s that the re la t ive level of c o n s e r v a t i s m will be smal l b e t w e e n 
qu in t i l e s . T h i s m a y bias aga ins t f i n d i n g s i gn i f i c an t resu l t s in the test v a r i a b l e s . 
I f ind evidence that G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant. However, the 
measure of conservatism and the sample selection impact on the results. Table 7.1 
presents a summary of the two highest ranked models under unconditional 
conservatism, with main effects and interaction terms, for all samples and periods that I 
test in this chapter. 
I BES models generally outperform other models in the non-financial, S & P 500 and 
non-S&P 500 samples, particularly in the post-GFC period. The results are mixed in the 
financial sector sample. 
Table 7.1: Summary of Two Highest Ranked Models for All Samples with 
Market-to-Book Ratio Dummy and Interaction Terms 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
Model 1: P = a„ + /J,BV + /3,A'ohGA4P£ + P.DIFFI., + jifon., 
+Pfon * "BV., + pCon * NonGAAPE,, + pSon * DIFFI^, + £„ 
Model 2: P = a„ + /j.BK, + P,NonGAAPE_^ + PPIFFI^, + P.Con-, 
+Pfon * BV., + pCon * NonGAAPE., + PXon * DIFF2., + £„ 
IBES C O R E C E C F 
Model I Model 2 Model I Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model I Model 2 
Financial 
- P re -GFC 
- G F C 


























S & P 500 












N o n - S & P 500 












Models ranked 1 and 2 are shown. The absolute difference in BIC values belween the model and the next lower 
ranked model is shown in parentheses. The different grades of evidence corresponding to minimum BIC difference 
according to Raflery (1995) are: 
Minimum BIC Difference of 0: Weak 
Minimum BIC Difference of 2: Positive 
Minimum BIC Difference of 6: Strong 
Minimum BIC Difference of 10: Very Strong 
The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book \alue of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES, CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIEE represents DIFEl in Model 1 and D1EE2 in Model 2. DlFFl = GAAPl 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPl is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFE2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. CON = 1 if market-to-book (MTB) 
ratio quintile is S and 0 if MTB ratio quintile is 1. CON'BV = Interaction term of MTB ratio with book value of 
common equity per share. CON'NonGAAPE = Interaction term of MTB ratio with the corresponding non-GAAP 
earnings measure of IBES, CORE, CE and CF. CON'DIFF = Interaction term of MTB ratio with the corresponding 
DIFF measure of DlFFl and D1FF2. 
Table 7.2 presents a summary of the two highest ranked models under conditional 
conservatism, with main effects and interaction terms, for all samples and periods that I 
test in this chapter. The results appear stronger that IBES models generally outperform 
other models across all samples. The notable exceptions are in the financial sector and 
S & P 500 samples in the pre-GFC period. 
Table 7.2: Summary of Two Highest Ranked Models for All Samples with 
Asymmetric Timeliness Measure Dummy and Interaction Terms 
(Comparison of Model Performance using BIC) 
Model 1: P = a„ + PfiV, + P^NonGMPE^^ + PfilFFI., + Pfon,^ 
+Pfon * BV^J + P^Con * NunGAAPE., + p f i m * DIFFI-, + £„ 
Model 2: P = «„ + /3,SV + P^NonGAAPE^^ + P,DIFF2,, + Pfim-, 
+Pfon * 'BV., + Pfon * NonGAAPE., + p^Con * DIFF2., + £, 
I B E S C O R E C E C F 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model I Model 2 Model I Model 2 
F i n a n c i a l 
- Pre-GFC I 2 
(24) (2) 
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Models ranked 1 and 2 by Iheir BK" are shown. The absolute difference in BIC values between the model and the 
next lower ranked model is shown in parentheses. The different grades of evidence corresponding to minimum BIC 
difference according to Raftery (1995) are: 
Minimum BIC Difference of 0: Weak 
Minimum BIC Difference of 2: Positive 
Minimum BIC Difference of 6: Strong 
Minimum BIC Difference of 10: Very Strong 
The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES. CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation e.xpenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIEE represents DIFFl in Model 1 and DIFF2 in Model 2. DIFEl = GAAPl 
mmus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPl is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. CON = 1 if asymmetric timeliness 
(AT) measure quintile is 5 and 0 if AT measure quintile is 1. CON'BV = Interaction term of AT measure with book 
value of common equity per share. CON'NonGAAPE - Interaction term of AT measure with the corresponding non-
GAAP earnings measure of IBES, CORE, CE and CF. CON'DIEE = Interaction term of AT measure with the 
corresponding DIFF measure of DlEFl and DIFF2. 
Table 7.3 presents a summary of my Ohison model regressions for each sample by 
period window and models under unconditional conservatism. This table highlights the 
key variables that are statistically significant at p = 0.05 or stronger. The negative sign 
of significant variables are indicated in brackets. The results show that investors are 
predominantly focused on the book value of equity. G A A P earnings are generally 
incrementally value relevant in the financial sector and S & P 500 samples. Addit ional ly , 
in the financial sector sample, G A A P earnings is positively associated with share price 
when unconditional conservatism is low in the post-GFC period, which is consistent 
with investors f inding G A A P earnings more credible and reliable during that period. 
The G F C appears to have a greater impact in the financial sector, non-financial sector 
and S & P 500 samples but less so in the non-S&P 500 sample. There is evidence of a 
shift in investors' focus due to the GFC . In the financial sector, investors shift their 
focus to both G A A P and non-GAAP earnings when unconditional conservatism is low 
but not when it is high in the post-GFC period. In the non-financial sector, they appear 
to generally shift their focus away from non-GAAP earnings. In contrast, investors 
appear to shift their focus to non-GAAP earnings, particularly when unconditional 
conservatism is low in the post-GFC period. 
Table 7.3: Summary of Significant Key Variables for Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results by Sample, Models and High/Low Market-to-Book 
Ratio Quintiles 
Model !:/;,=«„ + + l3,NonGAAPE^^ + P.DIFFl-, + e„ 
Model 2: P, = a„ + PfiV, + ji.NonGAAPE^, + P.DIFFl,, + £„ 
Panel A: Financial Sector Sample 
PreGFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quinlile BV NonCiAAPE DIFEl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Lou sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C E Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C P Lou sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFEl BV N o n G A A P E DIEE2 
IBES Lou sig s i g ( - ) sig s i g ( - ) 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig (-) sig s i g ( - ) 
High sig sig sig sig 
C E Lou sig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) sig s i g ( - ) s i g ( - ) 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
CE Low sig s i g ( - ) sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
Post-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
CON Quinli le BV N o n G A A P E DIFEl HV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Lou sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
C O R E Lou sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
C E Low sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
CE Low sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig 
Panel B: Non-Financial Sector Sample 
Pre-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
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Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFl BV NonCiAAPE DIFF2 
IBES Low 
High sig sig 
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sig sig 
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Panel C: S&P 500 Sample 
Pre-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quinti le BV N o n G A A P E DIFEl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig sig sig s i g ( - ) 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Lou sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C E Lo« sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C F Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quinti le BV N o n G A A P E DIEFl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C E Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
CE l.ow sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
Post-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quinti le BV N o n G A A P E DIFFI BV N o n U A A P H DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C E Low sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
CE Low sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
P a n e l D : N o n - S & P 5 0 0 S a m p l e 
Pre-GFC 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P K D I F F I B V N o n G A A P K D I F F 2 
I B E S L o w 
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M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P K D I F F I B V N o n G A A P K D I F F 2 
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M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P K D I F F I B V N o n G A A P K D I F F 2 






C O R E L o w 
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sig 
sig s ig 
sig 
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CK L o w 
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sig indicates the variable is statistically significant and positive at p = 0.05 or stronger, sig (-) indicates the variable is 
statistically significant and negative at p = 0.05 or stronger. The dependent variable. P. is closing share price at 
earnings announcement date. The independent variables are defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity 
per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for IBES, C O R E , CE and CE models: IBES = l/B/E/S 
earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per 
share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. CF = Operating cash flows per share. DIFFI = 
G A A P I minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P l is earnings per share from operations adjusted to 
exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, 
where G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. CON quintile is Low if market-
to-book (MTB) ratio quintile is 1 and High if MTB ratio quintile is ,5. Low and High indicate low unconditional 
conservatism and high unconditional conservatism, respectively. 
21.3 
Table 7.4 presents a summary of my Ohison model regressions for each sample by 
period window and models under conditional conservatism. This table highlights the 
key variables that are statistically significant at p = 0.05 or stronger. The negative sign 
of significant variables are indicated in brackets. The results show that investors are 
predominantly focused on the book value of equity, which is consistent with my results 
under unconditional conservatism. G A A P earnings are generally incrementally value 
relevant across all samples but the results are mixed in relation to the period windows. 
In the non-S&P 500 sample, G A A P earnings are generally not incrementally value 
relevant in the G F C and post-GFC period. In contrast, there appears to be a shift in 
investors' focus towards G A A P and non-GAAP earnings in the post-GFC period in 
comparison to the pre-GFC and G F C periods in the financial sector sample. There is 
evidence of a shift in investors' focus due to the G F C . The impact of the G F C on 
investors' focus is relatively more evident in the financial sector and non-S&P 500 
samples. In the former, investors shift their focus to both G A A P and non-GAAP 
earnings when conditional conservatism is high but not when it is low in the post-GFC 
period in comparison to the pre-GFC period. In the latter, investors generally shift their 
focus to non-GAAP earnings when conditional conservatism is high but not when it is 
low in the post-GFC period in comparison to the pre-GFC period. 
Overal l , I find G A A P earnings are generally incrementally value relevant under both 
unconditional conservatism and conditional conservatism in my financial sector, non-
financial sector and non-S&P 500 samples in relation to all non-GAAP earnings. In the 
S & P 500 sample, however, G A A P earnings generally are not incrementally value 
relevant before, during and after the G F C in relation to IBES . I also f ind evidence of 
systematic differences in investors' focus in my samples in the pre-GFC, G F C and post-
G F C periods. In the post-GFC period, I find evidence of investors' emphasis on G A A P 
earnings consistent with G A A P earnings being more credible and reliable. 
Table 7.4: Summary of Significant Key Variables for Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results by Sample, Models and High/Low Asymmetric 
Timeliness Measure Quintiles 
Model I: P = + /J^BV + p,NoiiGAAPE^, + PMIFFI^ , + £„ 
Model 2: P = + + p,NonGAAPE^, + p,DIFF2„ + £„ 
P a n e l A: F i n a n c i a l Sec to r S a m p l e 
Pre-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFEl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Lou sig sig 
High sig sig 
CORK Low sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
CE Low sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
C F Low sig sig 
High sig sig 
GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quinlile BV N o n G A A P E DlEFl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
C O R E I ,ou sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C E Low sig sig 
High sig sig 
C F Low sig sig 
High sig sig 
Post-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig g 
High sig sig sig g sig sig 
C O R E Lou sig e 
High sig sig sig g sig 
C E Lou' sig g 
High sig sig sig c sig sig 
C F Low sig g 
High sig sig sig g sig sig 
Panel B: Non-Financia l Sector Sample 
Pre-GFC 
Model I Model 2 
C O N Quinli le BV N o n G A A P E DIFFI BV N o n G A A P E 1)IFF2 
IBES Lou sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig s i g ( - ) sig sig s i g ( - ) 
C O R E Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
C E Low sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
C F Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig 
GFC 
Model I Model 2 
C O N Quintilc BV N o n G A A P E DIHFl BV N o n G A A P E D1FF2 
IBES Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C E Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C F Low sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
Post-GFC 
Model I Model 2 
C O N Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFI BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig s i g ( - ) sig sig s i g ( - ) 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
CE Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C F Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
Panel C: S & P 500 Sample 
PreGFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Lo«' sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Lou sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig s i g ( - ) 
CK Low sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C F Low sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quinlile BV N o n G A A P E n i F F l BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low- sig sig s ig ( - ) sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
C E Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C F Low- sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
Post-GFC 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O N Quintile BV NonCiAAPE DlFFl BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 
IBES Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C O R E Low sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig 
C E Low sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig 
C F Low sig sig sig sig sig sig 
High sig sig sig sig sig sig 
P a n e l D : N o n - S & P 5 0 0 S a m p l e 
Pre-GFC 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D l F F l B V N o n G A A P E i:)IHF2 
I B E S Low s ig s ig sig sig 
H i g h s ig s ig sig ( - ) s ig sig s i g ( - ) 
C O R K L o u s ig sig sig s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s ig 
C E Low s ig sig sig s ig s ig 
H i g h sig s ig 
C F L o w sig sig sig s ig s ig 
H i g h sig s ig 
GFC 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D I F F I B V N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 
I B E S L o w sig sig s ig s ig 
H igh sig sig 
C O R E 1 .ow s ig s ig s ig 
H igh sig s ig s ig 
C E L o w s ig s ig 
H i g h sig s ig sig 
C F Low sig s ig sig 
H i g h sig s ig s ig 
Posr-GFC 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D l F F l B V N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 
I B K S L o w sig sig s ig sig 
H i g h sig s ig s ig sig 
C O R E Low sig s ig 
H i g h s ig s ig s ig 
C E Low s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig s ig s ig s i g ( - ) 
C F Low s ig s ig 
H i g h s ig sig sig s ig 
sig indicales the variable is statistically significant and positive at p = 0.05 or stronger, sig (-) indicates the variable is 
statistically significant and negative at p = 0.05 or stronger. The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at 
earnings announcement dale. The independent variables are defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity 
per share. N o n G A A P E represents the following variables for IBES, CORF,, C E and CK models: IBES = l/B/E/S 
earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E - S»&P Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per 
share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. CE = Operating cash flows per share. DIEEI = 
G A A P l minus the relevant non -GAAP earnings, where G A A P I is earnings per share from operations adjusted to 
exclude the effects of special items reported under G A A P . DIEF2 = G A A P 2 minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings, 
where G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under G A A P . CON quintile is Low if 
asymmetric timeliness (AT) measure quintile is 1 and High if AT measure quintile is 5. Low and High indicate low-
conditional conservatism and high conditional conservat ism, respectively. 
7.2 RESULTS 
Consistent with previous chapters, the corresponding N o n G A A P E measures in 
Equations 2.7 and 2.8 are IBES, C O R E , CE and C F in the tables. The corresponding 
DIFF measures are DIFFl and DiFF2 for Equation 2.7 (denoted as Model I in tables) 
and Equation 2.8 (denoted as Model 2 in tables), respectively. The results of the 
analyses under unconditional conservatism are presented in Table 7.5 through to Table 
7.12 and those under conditional conservatism are presented in Table 7.13 through to 
Table 7.20. '" 
7.2./ Unconditional conservatism - Market-to-Book Ratio 
7.2.1.1 Financial Sector Sample 
7.2.1.1.1 Model Estimation with Main Effects and Interaction Terms 
Table 7.5 shows the estimation results of unconditional conservatism models with main 
effects and interaction variables for the financial sector sample. All models are 
statistically significant across all period windows. 
In the pre-GFC period, BV is strongly significant in all models, however, NonGAAPE 
is not statistically significant in all models. DIFF is only incrementally value relevant in 
relation to C O R E . CON is not statistically significant. In contrast, all interaction terms 
are statistically significant and positive except for C O N * D I F F in relation to IBES. 
These results show that in the pre-GFC period, investors are focused generally on the 
book value of equity when valuing f irms. However, when unconditional conservatism is 
high, investors place increased emphasis on both G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. 
Based on BIC, IBES models outperform the other models. 
During the G F C , there is an observable shift in investors' focus. While BV remains 
strongly significant in all models, DIFF is also statistically significant and negative in 
all models except C F Model 2. CE is marginally significant and negative but IBES, 
C O R E and C F a r e not statistically significant. 
Similar lo previous cl iapters . I re-est imate iny models in the G F C window cluster ing on a single 
d imens ion - by f i rm and by t ime (fiscal quarters) . Whi le there are fesv individual d i f fe rences in the results 
across all s amples , the subs tance of the inferences and interpretat ions discussed in this chapter remain the 
s a m e . 
Table 7.5: Ohlson Model: Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression at Earnings Announcement Date by Models with Market-
to-Book Ratio Dummy and Interaction Terms as Controls 
Model I: P = a„ + /3,BV + p,NonGAAPE^ + + ppm^, 
+Pfon * BV., + Pfon * NmGAAPE., + /3,Co« * DIFF!., + £„ 
Model 2: P = a„ + p^BV, + P,NonGAAPE^^ + PfiIFF2., + P,Con.^ 
+Pfon * BV., + Pfon * NonGAAPE-, + P^Con * DIFF2,, + £„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
CORE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0 .529 '" 0.528"* 0 .523" ' 0.539"" 0 .537" ' 0.530"" 0 .529" ' 0 .532 ' " 
(8.94) (10.61) (9.31) (12.80) (7.90) (9.86) (8.67) (10.66) 
NonGAAPh 2.345 3.060 1.433 1.435 2.008 2.648 2.017 2.657 
(1.12) (1.84) (0.71) (1.05) (1.00) (1.64) (0.96) (1.65) 
DIFF 1.347 2.152 5.253" 7 .366" ' 1.049 3.656 2.115 2.730 
(0.61) (1.24) (2.95) (5.91) (0.29) (1.31) (0.98) (1.69) 
CON 3.124 3.513 2.656 3.075 3.085 2.950 2.806 3.179 
(0.77) (0.87) (0.65) (0.76) (0.74) (0.72) (0.69) (0.79) 
C O N B V 1.238"' 1.200"' 1.349"" 1.341"' 1.374""" 1.383"" 1.369""" 1.403""" 
(7.63) (5.99) (6.62) (7.04) (8.27) (9.33) (7.77) (9.08) 
CON'NonGAAPF: 16.922"' 16.577'" 16.514'" 15.966"' 15.788"" 13.068"" 15.545"' 13.530"" 
(5.66) (5.05) (4.22) (4.47) (5.10) (5.00) (5.18) (5.24) 
CON'DIFF 7.088 0.474 1 1.931"" 7 .785" 20.240" 8.512' 15.238'" 13.189"" 
(1.12) (0.07) (4.41) (2.96) (3.04) (2.04) (5.02) (5.06) 
Intercept 15.018'" 14.709'" 15.276"' 14.883"' 14.889"' 14.965"' 15.107'" 14.786"" 
(4.22) (4.15) (4.22) (4.18) (4.18) (4.22) (4.24) (4.17) 
N 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 
Adj 0.8726 0.8728 0.8712 0.8716 0.8707 0.8695 0.8713 0.8705 
BIC 15733 15737 15751 15739 15743 15752 15751 15754 
BIC Rank 1 2 5 3 4 7 5 8 
Panel B: GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0.601" ' 0 .603 '" 0 .566 '" 0 .570 ' " 0 .600 '" 0.578"" 0 .574" ' 0.579""" 
(12.09) (10.75) (12.54) (10.51) (14.11) (12.60) (11.45) (10.57) 
NonGAAPE -0.640 -0.270 -0.752 -0.471 -1.235' -0.621" -0.638 -0.369 
(-0.52) (-0.23) (-1.45) (-0.91) (-2.16) (-2.28) (-1.45) (-0.91) 
DIFF -1.459' -1.290" -2.568" -2.320' -3.966" -11..357" -1.145" -0.892 
(-2.33) (-2.34) (-2.76) (-2.28) ( -241) (-2.13) (-2.05) (-1.68) 
CON 8.292" 8 .698" 8 .210" 8 .910" 8 .956" 9.716"' 8 .829" 9.723"" 
(2.80) (2.80) (2.69) (2.89) (3.00) (3.01) (2.98) (3.08) 
CON'BV 1.476'" 1.485'" 1.595'" 1.603""" 1.569'" 1.639""" 1.601"" 1.651"" 
(4.74) (4.83) (4.86) (5.05) (4.86) (5.20) (5.1 1) (5.45) 
CON'NonGAAPE 14.172" 12.510' 10.969" 9.965" 11.303" 7.249' 10.036" 6.275 
(2.80) (2.54) (2.67) (2.49) (2.87) (2.31) (2.27) (1.69) 
CON'DIFF 8.441" 5 .443" 11.685" 2.795 14.466""" 17.490" 11.125" 7.416' 
(2.69) (2.82) (2.24) (1.69) (3.59) (2.48) (2.74) (2.28) 
Intercept 4.225 4.053 5.289 4.916 4.552 4.448 4.712 4.557 
(1.68) (1.57) (1.94) (1.76) (1.75) (1.63) (1.73) (1.63) 
N 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 
Adj R- 0.8212 0.8177 0.8248 0.8198 0.8226 0.8213 0.8237 0.8185 
BIC 4142 4152 4132 4146 4132 4142 4135 4143 
BIC Rank 4 8 1 7 1 4 3 6 
Panel C: Post-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
CORE 
Model I Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model I Model 2 
BV 0 .42 . r " 0.427'" 0.424""" 0.427"' 0.424"" 0.427"" 0.423""" 0 .427 '" 
(4.85) (5.24) (4.67) (5.16) (5.20) (5.35) (4.60) (5.28) 
NonGAAPH 4.541" ' .1.727"" 4 .148 '" 3.795'" 3.902"" 3.516"" 3.511'" 3.407'" 
(5.89) (6.28) (5.50) (5.64) (7.10) (7.69) (6.35) (8.94) 
DIFF 2.620"' .1.116'" 2.583" 2.911'" 2.099" 2.600 3.488'" 3.492'" 
(.3 ..14) (6.40) (3.21) (7.68) (2.42) (1.94) (5.75) (7.29) 
CON .1.140 2.832 2.944 2.807 3.603 3..182 2.544 2.510 
(0.82) (0.75) (0.76) (0.74) (0.95) (0.92) (0.66) (0.68) 
CON'BV 2.199"" 2.183"" 2.272'" 2.196"" 2.318""" 2.23.1""" 2.268""" 2.191" ' 
(1 1.80) (12.10) (12.95) (13.10) (12.96) (13.62) (13.12) (13.28) 
CON'NonGAAPK 1.7.19 4.299 1.002 4.153 0.258 5.303 0.839 4.065 
(0.40) (0.91) (0.22) (0.96) (0.05) (1.35) (0.18) (0.98) 
C O N D I F F -5.9,17 3.1.30 -2.413 3.128 9.069 19.016" 2.157 5.211 
(-0.69) (0.64) (-0.31) (0.56) (1.12) (2.,50) (0.51) (1.32) 
Intercept 7.110" 7.101" 7.226' 7.096" 7.023" 7.053" 7.434' 7.170' 
(2.10) (2.13) (2.10) (2.11) (2.18) (2.18) (2.17) (2.20) 
N 1 1.58 11.58 1158 1158 1 158 1 158 1158 1158 
Adj 0.793.1 0.7910 0.7911 0.7914 0.7922 0.7974 0.7915 0.7948 
BIC 9550 9563 9562 9554 9556 9527 9553 95.34 
BIC Rank .1 8 7 5 6 1 4 2 
• p < 0 . 0 5 . " p < 0.01. " > < 0 . 0 0 1 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated w ith standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters) . 
T h e dependent variable. F, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
def ined as fol lows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. N o n G A A P E represents the fol lowing variables for 
IBES, C O R E , C F and C F models: IBES = l /B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & F Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per share, af ter adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
C F = Opera t ing cash f lows per share. DIFF represents DIFFl in Model 1 and DIFF2 in Model 2. DIFFI = G A A P I 
minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings, where G A A P I is earnings per share f rom operat ions adjusted to exclude the 
c f fec ts of special i tems reported under G A A P . DIFF2 = G A A P 2 minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings, where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary i tems per share reported under G A A P . CON = I if market- to-book (MTB) 
ratio quinti le is and 0 if M T B ratio quintile is 1. C O N * B V = Interaction term of M T B ratio with book value of 
c o m m o n equity per share. C O N * N o n G A A P H = Interaction term of M T B ratio with the corresponding n o n - G A A P 
earnings measure of IBES, C O R E , C E and CF. C O N * D I F F = Interaction term of M T B ratio with the corresponding 
D I F F measure of D I F F l and DIFF2. 
T h e s e r e su l t s s u g g e s t tha t w h e n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m is l o w , i n v e s t o r s f i n d 
G A A P e a r n i n g s i n c r e m e n t a l l y va lue r e l e v a n t bu t n e g a t i v e l y r e l a t ed to s h a r e p r i c e . 
R e c a l l tha t u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m is m e a s u r e d a s the ra t io of m a r k e t v a l u e of 
e q u i t y to b o o k v a l u e of e q u i t y . T h e n e g a t i v e s ign of D I F F i n d i c a t e s tha t i n v e s t o r s p l a c e 
g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s on G A A P e a r n i n g s , w h i c h a re g e n e r a l l y c l o s e r t o , o r less t h a n , n o n -
G A A P e a r n i n g s w h e n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m is l o w . " T h e i n t e r a c t i o n s t e r m s a re 
g e n e r a l l y s t a t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t a n d pos i t i ve in re la t ion to bo th G A A P a n d n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s . W h e n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m is h i g h , i n v e s t o r s p l ace i n c r e a s e d e m p h a s i s 
o n n o n - G A A P a n d G A A P e a r n i n g s . T h e c h a n g e in the s ign of the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r t h e 
m a i n e f f e c t a n d i n t e r a c t i o n t e r m of G A A P a n d n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g c l ea r ly i n d i c a t e s the 
" Prior studies (Givoly et al.. 2007: Roychowdhury and Walts, 2007) suggest that unconditional 
conservatism may be negatively related to conditional conservatism. While I do not lest cotiditional 
conservatism in this section, my results, showing low unconditional conservatism is related with more 
conservative GAAP earnings, imply they are consistent with these prior studies. 
change in the emphasis that investors place on earnings at the different levels of 
unconditional conservatism. The earnings of f irms with high unconditional 
conservatism are valued more positively by investors than firms with low unconditional 
conservatism. In relation to model performance, C O R E Model 1 and C E Model I 
perform best of all the models based on B IC . 
The results of the post-GFC period show a contrast in comparison to the results of the 
pre-GFC period. In the post-GFC period, BV and N o n G A A P E are strongly significant 
and positive in all models. D IFF is also statistically significant and positive in all 
models except in relation to C E Model 2. C O N , however, is not statistically significant. 
The interaction term, C O N * B V , is strongly significant and positive but 
C O N * N o n G A A P E is not statistically significant in all models. C O N * D I F F is only 
marginally significant in relation to C E Model 2. These results show that investors f ind 
G A A P earnings incrementally value relevant when unconditional conservatism is low. 
However, high unconditional conservatism does not appear to change the emphasis 
investors place on either G A A P or non-GAAP earnings. Based on B IC , C E Model 2 
and C F Model 2 perform best of all the models tested. 
7.2.1.1.2 Model Estimation by Low and High Unconditional Conservatism 
Table 7.6 shows my estimation results, by low and high unconditional conservatism, for 
the financial sector sample. In both Panel A and Panel B , the results for the pre-GFC 
period are consistent and show that non-GAAP earnings are strongly significant at high 
level of unconditional conservatism. Both D IFF I and D IFF2 are statistically significant 
at high level of unconditional conservatism in relation all non-GAAP earnings except 
IBES . D IFF I and DIFF2 are also generally moderately to strongly significant at low 
levels of unconditional conservatism in relation to C O R E . The results show that G A A P 
earnings are incrementally value relevant when unconditional conservatism is 
comparatively high. 
In the G F C period, I f ind results that are generally consistent at the high level o f 
unconditional conservatism with the pre-GFC period. Panels C and D show all non-
G A A P earnings are generally statistically significant at the high level o f unconditional 
conservatism except in C F Model 2. 
Table 7.6: Ohison Model: Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and 
High/Low Market-to-Book Ratio Quintiles 
Model 1: P = + / j .BV + ji,NonGAAPE^^ + PfilFFl^, + 
Model 2: /;, = «„ + P,BV, + P.NonGAAPE^, + PPIFF2„ + 
Panel A: P r e - G F C - Mode l 1 
BV N o n G A A P E D l F F l InlercepI A d j R-
IBES Low 0 .529"* 2.345 1.347 15.018"" 8.50 0 .5883 
High 1 . 7 6 7 " ' 19.267"" 8.435 18.141"" 8 5 0 0 .9477 
C O R E L o u 0 . 5 2 3 " ' 1.433 5 . 2 5 3 " 15.276"" 8.50 0.5851 
Hioh 1 . 8 7 2 " ' 1 7 . 9 4 7 " ' 17.184""" 1 7 . 9 3 2 ' " 8 5 0 0 .9468 
C E Low 0 . 5 3 7 " " 2 .008 1.049 14.889"" 8 5 0 0 .5823 
Hish 1 . 9 1 2 ' " 17.796"" 2 1 . 2 8 8 " ' 1 7 . 9 7 5 " ' 8 5 0 0 .9469 
C F Low 0 . 5 2 9 ' " 2 .017 2.115 15.107"" 8 5 0 0 .5822 
High 1 . 8 9 8 " ' 1 7 . 5 6 2 ' " 1 7 . 3 5 3 " ' 1 7 . 9 1 3 " ' 8 5 0 0 .9477 
Panel B: P r e - G F C - Mode l 2 
C O N Q u i n l i l e BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 Intercept N A d j R-
IBES Low 0 . 5 2 8 " ' 3 .060 2.152 14.709"" 8 5 0 0 .5918 
High 1 . 7 2 8 ' " 19.637"" 2 .626 18.222"" 8 5 0 0.9471 
C O R E Low 0 . 5 3 9 ' " 1.435 7.366"'" 14.883"" 8 5 0 0 .5962 
High 1 . 8 8 0 " ' 17.401"" 15 .150 ' " 17.9.58"" 8 5 0 0 .9443 
C E Low 0 . 5 3 0 - 2.648 3.656 14.965"" 8 5 0 0 .5867 
High 1 . 9 1 3 ' " 15.715"" 12.168"" 17 .914" ' 8 5 0 0 .9441 
C F Low 0 . 5 3 2 " ' 2 .657 2 .730 1 4 . 7 8 6 ' " 8 5 0 0 .5865 
High 1 . 9 3 5 ' " 16.187""' 15.919""' 17.965"" 8 5 0 0 .9455 
Panel C : G F C - Mode l 1 
C O N Quint i le BV N o n G A A P E DIFF l Intercept N A d j R= 
IBES Low 0 . 6 0 1 ' " -0 .640 -1.459" 4 .225 247 0 .8780 
High 2 . 0 7 6 " ' 13.532" 6.982" 1 2 . 5 1 8 " ' 247 0 .6387 
C O R E Low 0 . 5 6 6 ' " -0 .752 -2.568"" 5 .289 247 0 .8865 
High 2 . 1 6 1 ' " 10.218" 9.1 17 13.499"" 247 0 .6305 
C E Low 0 . 6 0 0 ' " -1.235" -3 .966 ' 4 .552 247 0 .8832 
High 2 . 1 6 8 ' " 10.068' 10 .500" 13.508""" 247 0 .6305 
C F Low 0 . 5 7 4 " ' -0 .638 -1.145" 4 .712 247 0 .8842 
High 2 .175"" 9.397" 9.981" 13.541"'" 247 0 .6324 
Panel D : G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Quinl i le BV N o n G A A P E DIFFl Intercept N A d j R-
IBES Low 0 . 6 0 3 " ' -0 .270 -1.290" 4 .053 247 0 .8744 
High 2 . 0 8 8 " ' 12.241" 4.153" 12 .750" ' 247 0 .6346 
C O R E Low 0 . 5 7 0 " ' -0.471 -2.320" 4 .916 247 0 .8807 
High 2 . 1 7 3 ' " 9.493" 0.475 13.826"" 247 0 .6265 
C E Low- 0 . 5 7 8 " ' -0.621" -11.357" 4 .448 247 0 .8854 
High 2 . 2 1 8 " ' 6.628" 6 .133 14.164"" 247 0 .6204 
C F Low 0 . 5 7 9 ' " -0 .369 -0 .892 4 .557 247 0 .8804 
High 2 . 2 3 0 " ' 5 .907 6 .523 1 4 . 2 8 0 " ' 247 0 .6225 
Panel E: Post-GFC - Model 1 
CON Quintile BV NonGAAPE DIEEI Intercept N Adj R-
IBES Low 0.423'" 4.541'" 2.620'*' 7.1 10* 579 0.6899 
High 2.623**' 6.280 -3.317 10.250*"* 579 0.7877 
CORE Low 0.424'" 4.14«"" 2.583" 7.226* 579 0.6846 
High 2.696"' .5.150 0.170 10.169*" 579 0.7865 
CE Low 0.424"' 3.902""" 2.099" 7.023* 579 0.6905 
High 2.743"" 4.161 1 1.168 10.626*** 579 0.7854 
CE Low 0.423"* 3.511"" 3.488""" 7.434" 579 0.6786 
High 2.691'" 4.350 5.646 9.977""' 579 0.7903 
Panel F: Post-GFC - Model 2 
CON Quintile BV NonGAAPE DIEE2 Intercept N Ad| R= 
IBES l.ow 0.427"" 3.727"" 3.116"" 7.101' 579 0.6789 
High 2.610"' 8.025 6.246 9.933""" 579 0.7892 
CORE I.OW 0.427*" 3.795"" 2.911"" 7.096" 579 0.6796 
High 2.623*"" 7.948 6.039 9.902""" 579 0.7895 
CE Low 0427*"* 3.516"" 2.600 7.053" 579 0.6789 
High 2.660""" 8.818" 21.616" 10.435**' 579 0.8007 
CE Low 0.427""" 3.407""" 3.492"'" 7.170" 579 0.6788 
High 2.618*"* 7.472 8.703" 9.680""" 579 0.7962 
• p < 0.05, " p < 0.01, ••• p < 0.001 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the follow ing variables for 
IBES, C O R E , CE and CF models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. D lFF l = G A A P l minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAA IM is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under G A A P . D1FF2 = 
G A A P 2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under G A A P . C O N quintile is Low if market-to-book (MTB) ratio quintile is 1 and High if M f B ratio 
quintile is Low and High indicate low unconditional conservatism and high unconditional conser\'atism, 
respectively. 
D I F F l is marginal ly to moderately signif icant in relation to C O R E , C E and C F at the 
high level o f uncondit ional conservatism. D I FF2 is only margina l ly signif icant and 
positive in relation to I B E S at the high level o f uncondit ional conservat ism. In contrast, 
D I F F l and D I FF2 are statistically signif icant and negative when uncondi t ional 
conservatism is low in relation to all n o n - G A A P earnings except in relation to C F 
Mode l 2. 
In the post-GFC period, all n o n - G A A P earnings are not signif icant when uncondi t ional 
conservatism is high in all models . In contrast, all n o n - G A A P earnings are strongly 
signif icant when uncondi t ional conservatism is low in all models . D I F F I and D I F F 2 are 
generally statistically signif icant and positive in relation to all n o n - G A A P earnings, 
except C E Mode l 2 , when uncondit ional conservatism is low. D I F F l is not statistically 
signif icant when uncondi t ional conservatism is h igh . However , D I F F 2 is marg ina l ly to 
moderately signif icant and positive in relation to C E and C F when uncondi t iona l 
conservatism is h igh. Notab ly , in the post-GFC per iod, the sign o f statistically 
significant DIFFI and DIFF2 are positive vviien unconditional conservatism is low. Tiiis 
contrasts witii tiie results during tiie G F C . Consistent with my results using main effects 
and interaction terms in the models, I find a change in investors ' focus during and after 
the G F C . The results for the post -GFC period is consistent with the expectation that 
investors find G A A P earnings incrementally value relevant because G A A P earnings are 
more credible and reliable. Furthermore, it is notable that the magnitude of the 
coeff ic ients of BV, N o n G A A P E , DIFFI and DIFF2 are consistently larger when 
unconditional conservatism is high. 
7.2. / .2 Non-Financial Sector Sample 
7.2.1.2.1 Model Estimation with Main Effects and Interaction Terms 
Table 7.7 shows the estimation results of the unconditional conservatism models with 
main effects and interaction variables for f i rms not in the financial sector. All models 
are statistically significant across all period windows. 
In the pre-GFC period, BV is strongly significant but N o n G A A P E is not statistically 
significant in all models. DIFF is only marginally significant and negative in relation to 
C E Model 2. C O N , however, is marginally significant and negative in all models, 
indicating that a low level of conservatism is negatively associated with share price. It 
appears that investors generally focus on the book value of equity when unconditional 
conservatism is low. Interestingly, when unconditional conservatism is high, investors 
place increased emphasis on the book value of equity, as indicated by the strongly 
significant and positive C O N * B V . Non-GAAP earnings do not appear to be value 
relevant when unconditional conservatism is high. G A A P earnings are incrementally 
value relevant and negatively associated with share price when unconditional 
conservat ism is high in relation to IBES. 
However , C O N * D I F F is strongly significant and positive in relation to C O R E Model 2. 
The results show that investors focus predominantly on the book value of equity, but 
there is also some evidence that G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant when 
unconditional conservatism is high. Using BIC to evaluate model performance, IBES 
models perform best of all the models tested. 
Table 7.7: Ohlson Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression at Earnings Announcement Date by Models with Market-
to-Book Ratio Dummy and Interaction Terms as Controls 
Model 1: P = a„ + + ftWonGAAffi + pfilFFl-, + Pfon„ 
+P,Con * "bV., + Pfon * NonGAAPE., + PX<>n * DIFFI., + £. 
Model 2: P = a„ + P,BV, + P^NonGAAPE^ + P,DlFF2i, + Pfon.^ 
+ppm * B V„ + P^Con * NonGAAPE., + P,Con * D1FF2^, + £„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
CORE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model I Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0 .610 '" 0 .610" ' 0 .602 ' " 0 .613 '" 0 .603" ' 0 .583" ' 0.606"" 0.607"" 
(4.47) (4.45) (4.31) (4.21) (4.31) (4.08) (4.37) (4.03) 
NonGAAPE -0.542 -0.540 -0.364 -0.857 -0.212 -0.261 -0.095 -0.206 
(-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.20) (-0.76) (-0.12) (-0.40) (-0.05) (-0.23) 
DIFF 0.2.52 -0.558 1.241 0.071 -1.138 -4498" -0.457 -0.556 
(0.28) (-1.68) (0.69) (0.10) (-0.56) (-2.51) (-0.25) (-0.70) 
CON -5.144' -5.560" -6.190" -6.042' -6.286' -5.273' -6.214' -6.283' 
(-2.07) (-2..30) (-2.18) (-2.20) (-2.22) (-2.07) (-2.18) (-2.2.3) 
CON'BV 5.430" ' 5 .489 '" 5 .676" ' 5.5.38"' 5 .744" ' 5 .793" ' 5 .745" ' 5 .756" ' 
(15.58) (16.15) (10.96) (11..37) (11.22) (1 1.22) (1 1.40) (11.47) 
CON'NonGAAPE 0.821 1.032 -0.767 0.244 -1.168 -0.881 -1.565 -1.244 
(0.26) (0.35) (-0.26) (0.10) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-0.51) (-0.51) 
CON'DIFH -9 .956 '" -7 .670" ' 3.832 16.131"' -2.803 3.255 -0.783 -0.423 
(-4.18) (-3.37) (0.97) (3.85) (-0.76) (1.04) (-0.26) (-0.19) 
Intercept 8 .785" ' 8 .723" ' 8 .677 ' " 8 .659" ' 8.644"" 7 .685 '" 8 .796" ' 8 .738" ' 
(4.92) (4.91) (4.97) (4.98) (4.95) (5.30) (4.91) (4.81) 
N 14022 14022 14022 14022 14022 14022 14022 14022 
Adj R- 0.8738 0.8714 0.8655 0.8689 0.8648 0.8664 0.8646 0.8644 
BIC 117875 118146 118772 118412 118844 118678 118871 118887 
BIC Rank 1 2 5 3 6 4 7 8 
Panel B: GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0.526" ' 0 .529" ' 0 .525 ' " 0 .529" ' 0 .513" ' 0.479"" 0.529"'" 0 .533" ' 
(8.19) (841) (8.14) (8.40) (8.62) (8.81) (8.25) (8.69) 
NonGAAPE 1.750"' 1.668"' 1 4 2 0 " 1.151" 1.389" 1.044'" 1.1.36' 0.678 
(3.63) (3.65) (2.68) (2.51) (2.81) (4.22) (2.03) (1.72) 
DIFF 0.509 0 .505" ' 1.095 0 .659" 0.404 -1.660 1.387" 0 .924 ' " 
(1.15) (3..55) (1.42) (3.25) (0.77) (-1.83) (2.99) (4..38) 
CON 2.243 2.064 2.1.50 1.878 2.175 2.340 2.274 2.193 
(1.49) (1.36) (1.32) (1.14) (1..36) (1.44) (1.43) (1.33) 
CON'BV 4.357" ' 4 .353" ' 4 .362" ' 4 .367 ' " 4 .397" ' 4 4 1 4 ' " 4.336"" 4..349"' 
(9.72) (9.76) (9.96) (10..54) (10.19) (10.92) (9.99) (1 1.12) 
CON'NonGAAPE -1.823 -1.802 -1.367 -0.863 -1..3.50 -1.539 -1.676 -1.814 
(-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.36) (-0.22) (-0.35) (-0.64) (-0.46) (-0.76) 
CON'DIFF -0.082 -1.608 -2.285 -4.368 1.342 1.166 -0.884 -1.097 
(-0.05) (-1.23) (-0.58) (-1.02) (0.22) (0.31) (-0.24) (-0.48) 
Intercept 5 .267 '" 5 .373 ' " 5 .326 ' " 5 .469" ' 5 .398 '" 5 .216" ' 5..301'" ' 5.488"" 
(4.81) (4.85) (4.72) (4.88) (5.03) (4.92) (4.86) (4.91) 
N 3636 3636 3636 3636 3636 3636 3636 3636 
Adj 0.6885 0.6891 0.6881 0.6897 0.6897 0.6897 0.6903 0.6903 
BIC 30493 30479 30490 30479 30479 30479 30463 30464 
BIC Rank 8 3 7 3 3 3 1 2 
Panel C: Pos t -GFC Period 
IBES 
Model I Model 2 
C O R E C E CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model I Model 2 
BV 0.3.S 1 0.3.37 0 .522" 0 . 5 4 8 " 0.485' 0 .283 0 . 5 0 3 " 0.5.32" 
(1.6,5) (1..59) (2.60) (2.89) (2.41) (1.26) (2.58) (3.07) 
N o n G A A P E 1.5.182 15.724 3.214 1.855 2.957 1.804 4.683 3.200 
(1.87) (1.93) (0.62) (0.53) (0.59) (0.72) (0.94) (1.19) 
DIFF -i.292'" -2 .488 ' 5.292 1.123 0.287 -13 .658" 3.449 1.982 
(-4.03) (-2.07) (0.93) (0.89) (0.06) (-3.07) (0.71) (0.81) 
C O N -5.011 -4 .944 -5.069 -5.196 -4.913 -3.452 -5.387 -5.5.37 
(-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.33) (-1.35) (-1,34) (-1.24) (-1.42) (-1.45) 
C O N ' B V 4 . 3 7 1 " ' 4 . 4 0 0 ' " 4 . 4 1 3 ' " 4 . 6 1 4 ' " 4 . 4 7 2 " ' 4 . 8 8 1 " ' 4 . 4 3 1 " ' 4 . 6 5 4 ' " 
(9.07) (9.18) (8.72) (9.18) (8.29) (9.61) (8.63) (9.73) 
C O N ' N o n G A A P H -4.623 -5.356 4 .854 3.351 4.797 2.923 2.745 1.162 
(-0.53) (-0.60) (1.03) (0.95) (1.06) (0.98) (0.55) (0.33) 
C O N ' D I F F 4 .454 2.932 7.188 0.1 19 7.065 14.719' 4 .884 3.149 
(0.79) (0.95) (1.02) (0.04) (1..39) (2.31) (1.02) (0.98) 
Intercept 9 . 1 3 3 ' " 9 . 0 4 4 ' " 9 . 0 3 3 " 9 .073" 8 . 8 8 7 " 6 . 6 9 0 " ' 9 . 3 2 9 " 9 . 2 7 7 " 
(3.82) (3.86) (3.04) (2.98) (3.10) (3.80) (3.15) (3.12) 
N 8188 8188 8188 8188 8188 8188 8188 8188 
A d j R- 0.7442 0 .7446 0.7106 0.7048 0.7118 0.7189 0.7137 0.7079 
BIC 73601 73599 74620 74785 74589 74384 74525 74688 
BIC Rank 2 1 6 8 5 3 4 7 
• p < 0 . 0 5 . '• p < 0 . 0 1 , p < 0.001 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and lime (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following \'ariables for 
IBES, CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = I/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE -
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash Hows per share. DIFF represents DIFFI in Model 1 and DIFF2 in Model 2. DIFFI = GAAPI 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPI is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. t^lFF2 = GAAP2 minus the rele\ant non-GAAP earnings, where 
GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. CON = 1 if market-to-book (MTB) 
ratio quintile is and 0 if M TB ratio quintile is 1. CON"BV = Interaction term of MTB ratio with book value of 
common equity per share. CON'NonGAAPB - Interaction term of MTB ratio with the corresponding non-GAAP 
earnings measure of IBES, CORE, CE and CF. CON'DIFF = Interaction term of MTB ratio with the corresponding 
DIFF measure of DIFFI and DIFF2. 
D u r i n g t h e G F C , t h e r e is a n o b s e r v a b l e s h i f t in i n v e s t o r s ' f o c u s t o e a r n i n g s , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . W h i l e B V r e m a i n s s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e in al l m o d e l s , 
N o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s a r e a l s o g e n e r a l l y s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e in a l l 
m o d e l s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , D I F F is s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e in r e l a t i o n t o I B E S 
M o d e l 2 , C O R E M o d e l 2 a n d C F M o d e l s I a n d 2 , C O N is n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . 
O v e r a l l , t h e s e r e s u l t s s h o w i n v e s t o r s p l a c e g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s o n e a r n i n g s d u r i n g t h e G F C 
in c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d . H i g h u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m d o e s n o t a p p e a r 
t o i m p a c t o n i n v e s t o r s ' f o c u s o n G A A P a n d n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s , h o w e v e r , i n v e s t o r s 
a p p e a r t o p l a c e s t r o n g e r e m p h a s i s o n t h e b o o k v a l u e o f e q u i t y w h e n u n c o n d i t i o n a l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m i s h i g h . B a s e d o n B I C , C F m o d e l s o u t p e r f o r m t h e o t h e r m o d e l s t e s t e d . 
In t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , t h e r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e a n o t h e r s h i f t in i n v e s t o r s ' e m p h a s i s , B V is 
m a r g i n a l l y t o m o d e r a t e l y s i g n i f i c a n t in r e l a t i o n t o C O R E ( M o d e l s I a n d 2 ) , C E ( M o d e l 
1) and C F (Models I and 2) but not in other models. However, C O N * B V is strongly 
significant in all models. In contrast to the G F C period, N o n G A A P E is not statistically 
significant in all models. D IFF is statistically significant and negative only in relation to 
IBES Models I and 2 and C E Model 2. The results of the main effects o f G A A P and 
non-GAAP earnings in the post-GFC period are similar to the pre-GFC period. The 
results of the interaction terms, C O N * D I F F and C O N * N o n G A A P E , are generally not 
significant. Overal l , the results are mixed. It appears investors remain focused on the 
book value of equity in relation to C O R E . C E and CF. However, in relation to IBES , 
investors are focused on the book value of equity primarily when unconditional 
conservatism is high. When unconditional conservatism is low, investors appear to f ind 
G A A P earnings incrementally value relevant. Furthermore, when unconditional 
conservatism is low, investors appear to focus on G A A P earnings, which are generally 
closer to, or lower than, non-GAAP earnings. Based on B IC . IBES models perform best 
of all models tested. 
7.2.1.2.2 Model Estimation by Low and High Unconditional Conservatism 
The estimation results by low and high unconditional conservatism for the non-financial 
sector sample is shown in Table 7.8. The results for the pre-GFC period show non-
G A A P earnings are not statistically significant at both low and high levels of 
unconditional conservatism. The results for D IFF l and D1FF2 are mixed. D I F F l and 
D IFF2 are strongly significant and negative at the high level of unconditional 
conservatism in relation to IBES . However, D IFF2 is statistically significant and 
positive at the high level of unconditional conservatism in relation to C O R E but it is 
marginally significant and negative at the low level of unconditional conservatism in 
relation to CE . 
These results show that in the pre-GFC period, investors focus predominantly on book 
value of equity. Nevertheless, G A A P earnings have incremental value relevance in 
relation to non-GAAP earnings, in relation to IBES , C O R E and C E , at the high level of 
unconditional conservatism. Interestingly, in relation to IBES , investors appear to place 
greater emphasis on G A A P earnings, which are generally closer to, or lower than, non-
G A A P earnings when unconditional conservatism is high. 
Table 7.8: Ohlson Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and 
High/Low Market-to-Book Ratio Quintiles 
Model 1: P = a „ + + PMonGAAPE^, + P,DIFF1^, + f „ 
Model 2: P = a„ + p^BV^ + p,NonGAAPE^^ + P,D!FF2„ + £„ 
Panel A : P r e - G F C - M o d e l 1 
C O N Quint i le BV N o n G A A P E DIEEI Intercept N A d j R-
IBES Low 0 . 6 1 0 ' " -0 .542 0 .252 8 . 7 8 5 ' " 7011 0 .3872 
High 6 .040*" 0 .279 - 9 . 7 0 5 " ' 3.641" 701 1 0 .9016 
C O R H L o u 0 .602"* -0 .364 1.241 8 . 6 7 7 " ' 701 1 0 .3924 
High 6 .278"* - I . I 31 5 .073 2 .487 701 1 0.8921 
C E Low 0.603*'* -0 .212 -1 .138 8 . 6 4 4 " ' 7011 0 .3927 
High 6 .346"* -1 .380 -3 .942 2.358 701 1 0 .8913 
T F Low 0.606*** -0 .095 -0 .457 8 . 7 9 6 ' " 701 1 0 .3893 
High 6.351*** -1.661 -1 .239 2.582 7011 0 .8912 
Panel B: P r e - G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Quint i le BV N o n G A A P E D1FF2 Intercept N A d j R-
IBES Low 0 . 6 1 0 " ' -0 .540 -0.558 8 .723 ' " ' 701 1 0 .3887 
High 6 .098"* 0 .492 -8 .228"* 3 .163 701 1 0 .8989 
C O K E Low 0 . 6 1 3 " ' -0 .857 0.071 8 . 6 5 9 " 7011 0 .3904 
High 6 .151"* -0 .613 1 6 . 2 0 2 ' " 2 .617 7011 0 .8960 
C E L o u 0 . 5 8 3 " ' -0.261 - 4 4 9 8 " 7 .685"" 701 1 0 .4288 
High 6.376'** -1 .142 -1 .243 2.412 701 1 0 .8906 
C E L o u 0.607*** -0 .206 -0 .556 8 .738"" 7011 0 .3910 
High 6 .363*" -1 .449 -0 .979 2.455 7011 0 .8910 
Panel C : G F C - M o d e l 1 
C O N Quint i le BV N o n G A A P E DlEEl Intercept N A d j 
IBES Low 0.526*** 1 . 7 5 0 " ' 0 .509 5 ,267"" 1818 0 4 8 4 2 
High 4 .884"* -0 .073 0 .427 7.511""" 1818 0.6261 
C O R E Low 0 .525"* 1 .420" 1.095 5 .326"" 1818 0 .4796 
High 4 .888"* 0.0.54 -1 .189 7 .477"" 1818 0 .6262 
C E Low 0.513*** 1 .389" 0 .404 5.398""" 1818 0 .4900 
High 4 . 9 1 0 ' " 0 .039 1.747 7.573""' 1818 0 .6269 
C E Low 0.529*" 1.136' 1 .387" 5 . 3 0 1 ' " 1818 0 .4813 
High 4 .866*" -0.541 0 .503 7 . 5 7 5 " ' 1818 0 .6292 
Panel D : G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Quint i le BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 Intercept N A d j R-
IBES Low 0 . 5 2 9 ' " 1 . 6 6 8 " ' 0.505*** 5 . 3 7 3 " ' 1818 0 .4864 
High 4 . 8 8 3 ' " -0 .134 -1 .103 7.436""" 1818 0 .6266 
C O R E Low 0 .529"" 1.151' 0.659"* 5 .469"" 1818 0 .4807 
High 4 . 8 9 6 " ' 0 .288 -3 .709 7 .347"" 1818 0 .6284 
C E Low- 0 . 4 7 9 " ' 1 .044"" -1 .660 5 .216"" 1818 0 .4946 
High 4.893*** -0 .494 - 0 4 9 4 7.556""" 1818 0 .6263 
C E Low 0 . 5 3 3 " ' 0 .678 0 .924"" 5.488"** 1818 0 .4817 
High 4.882**' -1 .136 -0 .173 7.681'"" 1818 0 .6290 
Panel E: Post-GFC - Model 1 
CON Quintile BV NonGAAPE DIFFI Intercept N Adi R= 
IBE.S Low 0.3,51 15.182 -3.292'" 9.133'" 4094 04141 
High 4.722'" 10.560" 1.162 4.122 4094 0.7737 
CORB Low 0.,i22" 3.214 5.292 9.033" 4094 0.2253 
High 4.935'" 8.068 12.481" 3.965 4094 0.7662 
CE Low 0.485' 2.957 0.287 8.887" 4094 0.2.372 
High 4.957"' 7.753 7.352 3.974 4094 0.7653 
CF Low 0.503" 4.683 3.449 9.329" 4094 0.2420 
High 4.935'" 7428 8.333 3.943 4094 0.7669 
Pane! F: Post-GFC - Model 2 
CON Quintile BV NonGAAPE D1FF2 Intercept N Adj R-
IBES Low 0.3.17 15.724 -2.488" 9.044"' 4094 04169 
High 4.737'" 10.368' 0.444 4.100 4094 0.7736 
CORE Low 0.548" 1.855 1.123 9.073" 4094 0.2114 
High 5.162'" 5.205 1.242 3.877 4094 0.7611 
CE Low 0.283 1.804 -13.6.58" 6.690"' 4094 0.3066 
High 5.164'" 4.727 1.060 3.237 4094 0.7610 
CF Low 0.532" 3.200 1.982 9.277" 4094 0.2303 
High 5.187'" 4.362 5.1.30 3.739 4094 0.7615 
• p < 0.05, " > < 0 . 0 1 . " > < 0 . 0 0 1 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book \alue of common equity per share. N o n G A A P E represents the following variables for 
IBES , C O R E , CE and CF models: IBES = I/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S&P Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. D IFFI = G A A P l minus the relevant non-( jAAP earnings, where G A A P I is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under G A A P . DIFF2 = 
G A A P 2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under G A A P . C O N quintile is Low if market-to-book (MTB) ratio quintile is I and High if MTB ratio 
quintile is 5. Low and High indicate low unconditional conservatism and high unconditional conservatism, 
respectively. 
Dur ing the G F C , I B E S , C O R E , C E and C F are statistically s ignif icant and posit ive 
when uncondit ional conservatism is low in Mode l I , In Mode l 2 , I B E S , C O R E and C E 
are statistically signif icant and positive when uncondit ional conservatism is low. D I F F I 
is only moderately signif icant and positive at the low level o f uncondi t iona l 
conservatism in relation to C F but D I FF2 is moderately to strongly s ignif icant and 
positive in relation to I B E S , C O R E and C F at the low level o f uncondi t iona l 
conservatism. W h i l e the results for the G F C period show some evidence o f a shift in 
investors' emphas is , it appears that investors remain focused predominant ly on the book 
value of equity. 
The results for the post-GFC period show another shift in investor's emphasis on G A A P 
and n o n - G A A P earnings. Interestingly, both B V and I B E S are not signif icant when 
uncondit ional conservatism is low for both Mode l 1 and Mode l 2. However , D I F F I is 
strongly signif icant and negative and D I F F 2 is marg ina l ly signif icant and negative in 
these instances. S imi lar ly in Mode l 2 , B V and C E are not signif icant when 
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uncond i t i ona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is l o w , h o w e v e r , D I F F 2 is mode ra t e ly s ign i f i can t and 
n e g a t i v e . It a p p e a r s that inves tors are f o c u s e d on G A A P e a r n i n g s , wh ich are genera l ly 
c lo se r t o , or l ower t h a n , n o n - G A A P ea rn ings a f t e r the G F C in relat ion to I B E S and C E . 
Inves to r s m a y be l i eve the net asse t s are ove rva lued and f ind c o m p a r a t i v e l y lower 
G A A P e a r n i n g s m o r e va lue re levan t . 
7.2.1.3 S&P 500 Sample 
7.2 .1 .3 .1 M o d e l Es t imat ion wi th Main E f f e c t s and In teract ion T e r m s 
T h e e s t ima t ion resul ts of the uncondi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m m o d e l s with main e f f ec t s and 
in te rac t ion va r i ab les fo r f i r m s in the S & P 5 0 0 index are s h o w n in T a b l e 7 .9 . All m o d e l s 
are s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t ac ros s all per iod w i n d o w s . 
In the p r e - G F C pe r iod , BV and C O N are s t rongly s ign i f ican t and posi t ive in all mode l s . 
N o n G A A P E is genera l ly s tat is t ical ly s ign i f ican t and pos i t ive . T h e resul ts f o r D I F F , 
h o w e v e r , a re m i x e d . It is marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t and nega t ive in relat ion to IBES Mode l 
2 , but marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t and posi t ive in relat ion to Mode l 1 of C O R E , C E and C F . 
T h e s e resul t s indicate that inves tors f o c u s p r edominan t ly on the book value of equi ty 
but a l so f ind n o n - G A A P ea rn ings genera l ly va lue re levan t . Fu r the rmore , inves tors a l so 
f ind G A A P e a r n i n g s inc rementa l ly value re levant . T h e resul ts a l so s h o w that 
uncond i t i ona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is pos i t ive ly assoc ia ted wi th share pr ice . In add i t ion , w h e n 
uncond i t i ona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is h igh , inves tors place increased e m p h a s i s on the book 
va lue of equ i ty . T h e r e is weak e v i d e n c e that inves tors place increased e m p h a s i s on 
G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings when uncondi t iona l conse rva t i sm is high but only in 
re la t ion to C O R E , C E and C F . In t e rms of mode l p e r f o r m a n c e , I B E S m o d e l s 
o u t p e r f o r m o the r m o d e l s tested based on BIC . 
D u r i n g the G F C , inves tors remain s t rongly f o c u s e d on the book va lue of equ i ty . C O N is 
m a r g i n a l l y to m o d e r a t e l y s ign i f ican t and posi t ive only in relat ion to Mode l 2 of C O R E , 
C E and C F . W h e n uncond i t iona l conse rva t i sm is l ow , inves tors do not a p p e a r to f ind 
G A A P and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s va lue re levant - N o n G A A P E and D I F F are not 
s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t . 
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Table 7.9: Ohison Model: S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression at 
Earnings Announcement Date by Models with Market-to-Book Ratio 
Dummy and Interaction Terms as Controls 
Model 1: F = A„ + /J.BV + P,NoiiGAAPE^^ + P,DIFFI., + /J,COH,., 
+Pfun * BV.I + Pfon * NonGAAPEi, + Pfon * DIFFl., + £„ 
Model 2: P=a^ + P,BV, + P,NonGAAPE^^ + P,DIFF2., + Pfon., 
+Pfoii * "BV.„ + Pfon * NonGAAPEii + Pfon * DIFF2., + £, 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
C F 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1 . 0 3 r " 1.030""" 1.208"" 1.331""" 1.219"" 1.374"'" 1.208"" 1.348""" 
(8.03) (7.93) (12.49) (13.23) (12.88) (16.00) (12.54) (14.49) 
NonGAAFK 9 .055" 9 .262"" 4.483" 1.394 4.343" 0.839 4.467" 0.995 
(3.28) (3.40) (2.49) (0.85) (2.37) (0.72) (2.48) (0.79) 
DIFH -0.289 -0.884" 4.621" -1.208 5.162" 3.935 4.481" 1.016 
(-0.26) (-2.26) (2.23) (-0.87) (2.33) (1.55) (2.50) (0.81) 
CON 14 .811 ' " 14 .961" ' 16.481"" 18.181"" 16.325"" 17 .779" ' 16.304""" 18 .444 ' " 
(3.60) (3.62) (4.24) (5.32) (4.28) (5.10) (4.23) (5.35) 
r O N ' B V 1.71 1"" 1.753""" 1.618"" 1.880""" 1 .584" 1.900""" 1.565"" 1 .867" ' 
(3.40) (3.54) (3.30) (3.29) (3.17) (3.78) (3.13) (3.36) 
C O N ' N o n G A A P E 9.813 9.259 13.211 10.680 13.905 1 1.420" 13.293 10.539" 
(1.121 (1.04) (1.70) (1.88) (1.89) (2.28) (1.75) (1.99) 
C O N ' D I F F 7.805 4.585 11.307 9.165" 14.367" 12..368 13.854 10.772" 
(1.22) (1.60) (1.11) (2.051 (2.00) (1.78) (1.78) (2.01) 
Inlercepl 2.519 2.416 1.142 0.316 1.201 0.725 1.178 0 .000 
(1.61) (1.53) (0.72) (0.19) (0.73) (0.41) (0.73) (0.00) 
N 3163 3163 3163 3163 3163 3163 3163 3163 
Ad j R- 0.8944 0.8951 0.8881 0.8826 0 .8886 0 .8834 0 .8883 0 .8816 
B i r 25548 25528 25733 25884 25718 25862 25719 25902 
BIC Rank 2 1 5 7 3 6 4 8 
Panel B: G F C Period 
IBES C O R E CE C F 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0 . 9 6 4 " ' 0 .979"" 0.971""" 0.984""" 0 .960"" 0.953""" 0.993""" 0 . 9 9 5 " ' 
(11.24) (14.82) (10.96) (15.75) (10.16) (15.96) (13.92) (18.12) 
NonGAAPK -0.076 -0.076 -0 .274 -0.300 -0.246 -0.068 -0 .060 -0.022 
(-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.24) (-0.28) (-0.23) (-0.10) (-0.07) (-0.04) 
DIFF -0.441 -0.030 -0 .114 0.304 -0.995 -2.367 0.225 0.266 
(-0.68) (-0.08) (-0.10) (0.77) (-0.71) (-1.16) (0.23) (0.47) 
CON 5.710 6.237 7.971 10.225" 7.559 11.645"" 7.835 1 1.089" 
(1.17) (1.36) (1.77) (2.14) (1.64) (2.74) (1.80) (2.47) 
C O N ' B V 2.554"" 2.525""' 2 .615"" 3 .145"" 2.627""" 3 .337"" 2 .566"" 3 . 3 0 2 " ' 
(3.76) (3.75) (3,76) (5.01) (3.67) (4.54) (3.67) (5.03) 
C O N ' N o n G A A P K 23.696"" 2 3 . 7 4 0 " ' 21.517"" 13.898" 22.040"" 9 .486 ' 20.950""" 8.814" 
(3.69) (3.73) (3.40) (2.41) (3.46) (2.20) (3.64) (2.00) 
C O N ' D I F F -3.388 -0.241 18.980"' -5 .756 26.353"'" 12.239" 2 2 . 0 5 3 ' " 9 .459 
(-0.52) (-0.13) (2.74) (-1.55) (3.89) (2.13) (3.59) (1.96) 
Inlercepl 3.229 2.868 3.091 2.836 3.387 2.450 2.802 2.853 
(1.20) (1.32) (1.11) (1.43) (1.21) (1.13) (1.18) (1.43) 
N 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 
A d j 0.8283 0.8280 0.8245 0.8172 0 .8257 0 .8116 0 .8313 0 .8167 
BIC 7594 7595 7612 7648 7607 7668 7571 7 6 4 4 
BIC Rank 2 3 5 7 4 8 1 6 
P a n e l C ; P o s t - G F C P e r i o d 
I B E S 
M o d e l I M o d e l 2 
C O R E 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
C E 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
C F 
M o d e l 1 M o d e l 2 
B V 0 . 5 7 3 * 0 . 5 6 7 * 0 . 6 2 4 * * 0 . 6 1 7 * * 0 . 5 2 1 * 0 . 3 9 4 0 . 6 6 1 * * 0 . 6 6 0 * * 
(2 .42 ) ( 2 . 5 1 ) (2 .82 ) (2 .90 ) (2 .07 ) ( 1 . 5 4 ) (3 .21 ) (2 .86 ) 
N o i i G A A P K 17 .769* 18 .541* 15 .064* 15 .436* 13 .025* 10 .236* 12 .046* 10.8.38* 
( 2 . 0 4 ) ( 2 . 2 2 ) (2 .03 ) (2 .20 ) (2 .13 ) (2 .14 ) (2 .04 ) (2 .05 ) 
D I E F 2 . 5 3 0 3 . 2 7 4 3 . 2 5 9 0 . 2 2 7 5 . 6 8 4 - 5 . 3 1 6 12 .093* 10 .708* 
( 0 . 6 4 ) (1 .89 ) ( 0 . 7 6 ) (0 .22 ) ( 1 . 8 2 ) ( - 1 . 5 9 ) (1 .98 ) (2 .02 ) 
C O N -6..348 -5. .542 - 4 . 6 9 0 -5 .191 -6 .481 - 6 . 9 3 2 - 7 . 7 4 9 - 8 . 0 2 5 
( - 0 . 8 6 ) ( - 0 . 7 4 ) ( - 0 . 5 9 ) ( - 0 . 6 5 ) ( - 0 . 8 5 ) ( - 0 . 9 2 ) ( - 0 . 9 2 ) ( -0 .89 ) 
C O N ' B V 3 . 9 9 5 * * * 3 . 8 1 7 * * * 4 . 0 4 6 * * * 3 . 9 7 4 * * * 4 . 1 9 1 * * * 4 . 3 8 1 * * * 3 . 9 6 0 * * * 4 . 1 0 8 * * * 
( 4 . 8 6 ) ( 4 . 7 2 ) (5..37) (5 .32 ) (5 .61 ) (6 .12 ) (5 .70 ) (6 .16) 
C O N ' N o n G A A P K 2 . 9 1 2 4 . 3 4 9 4.,581 5 . 0 4 8 5 .721 8 . 1 6 8 7..341 7 . 0 6 7 
( 0 . 2 8 ) ( 0 4 1 ) (0 .50 ) (0 .56 ) (0 .72 ) (1 .13 ) (0 .93 ) (0 .94 ) 
C O N ' D I E F - 5 0 . 8 0 0 * - 1 5 . 0 5 2 - 1 4 . 8 3 6 - 1 1 . 0 5 5 11 .047 2 3 . 9 0 8 10 .099 9 .701 
( - 1 . 9 8 ) ( - 1 . 3 3 ) ( - 1 . 2 7 ) (-I . .36) (1 .02 ) (1 .85 ) (1 .15 ) (1 .18 ) 
In t e r cep l 8 . 5 0 8 * 8 . 3 4 3 10.328 10 .433 10 .793* 12 .244* 10 .703 11 .902 
(2 .00 ) ( 1 . 9 2 ) (1 .89 ) (1 .92) (2 .07 ) (2..37) (1 .82 ) (1 .77 ) 
N 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 
At l j R ' 0 . 7 7 7 7 0 . 7 7 2 1 0 . 7 5 8 0 0 . 7 5 7 3 0 . 7 5 6 3 0 . 7 5 4 6 0 . 7 5 5 4 0 . 7 4 4 5 
B I C 2 1 6 5 6 2 I 7 I I 2 1 8 3 6 21851 2 1 8 5 9 2 1 8 7 5 218.59 219.56 
B I C R a n k 1 2 3 4 5 7 5 8 
• p < 0.05, " p < 0.01, "• p < 0.001 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated witli standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent \ar iables arc 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPH represents the follow ing variables for 
IBES, C O R E , C E and C F models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S & P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CE = Operating cash f lows per share. DIKE represents DIFEl in Model 1 and DIEE2 in Model 2. DIEEl = G A A P l 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P l is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIEE2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. CON = I if markct-to-book (MTB) 
ratio quintile is 5 and 0 if MTB ratio quintile is I. C O N ' B V = Interaction term of M l B ratio with book value of 
common equity per share. C O N ' N o n G A A P E = Interaction term of MTB ratio with the corresponding non-GAAP 
earnings measure of IBES, CORE, CE and CE. CON'DIEE = Interaction term of MTB ratio with the corresponding 
DIEE measure of DIEEl and DIEF2. 
I n c o n t r a s t , w h e n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i s h i g h , i n v e s t o r s p l a c e i n c r e a s e d 
e m p h a s i s o n t h e b o o k v a l u e o f e q u i t y a n d n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . C O N * B V i s s t r o n g l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e i n a l l m o d e l s a n d C O N * N o n G A A P E i s a l s o s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e i n a l l m o d e l s . T h e r e i s s o m e e v i d e n c e t h a t i n v e s t o r s f i n d G A A P 
e a r n i n g s i n c r e m e n t a l l y v a l u e r e l e v a n t w h e n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i s h i g h , b u t 
o n l y i n r e l a t i o n t o C O R E , C E a n d C F . I t a p p e a r s t h a t d u r i n g t h e G F C , i n v e s t o r s a r e 
f o c u s e d o n t h e b o o k v a l u e o f e q u i t y i n v a l u i n g f i r m s . I n v e s t o r s g e n e r a l l y f i n d e a r n i n g s 
m o r e v a l u e r e l e v a n t o n l y w h e n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i s h i g h . B a s e d o n B I C . t h e 
b e s t p e r f o r m i n g m o d e l s a r e C F M o d e l I a n d I B E S M o d e l 1. 
T h e r e i s e v i d e n c e o f a s h i f t i n i n v e s t o r s ' f o c u s o n t h e b o o k v a l u e o f e q u i t y a n d e a r n i n g s 
i n t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d . I n t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , t h e l e v e l o f s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f 
B V i s l o w e r in c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e p r e - G F C a n d G F C p e r i o d s . A l s o , N o n G A A P E i s 
marginal ly significant and positive in all models. D IFF . however, is only marginal ly 
significant and positive in relation to CF . C O N is not statistically significant. These 
results indicate that investors focus on both the book value of equity and n o n - G A A P 
earnings when unconditional conservatism is low in the post-GFC period, which is in 
contrast to the G F C period where investors focus only on the book value o f equity. 
Furthermore, when unconditional conservatism is h igh, investors place increased 
emphasis on the book value of equity but not on non-GAAP earnings. Investors do not 
appear to f ind G A A P earnings generally incrementally value relevant when 
uncondit ional conservatism is high. C O N * D I F F is only marginal ly significant and 
negative in relation to IBES and is not statistically significant in all other models. Using 
B I C to evaluate model performance, IBES models perform best among the models 
tested. 
7.2.1.3.2 Model Estimation by Low and High Uncondit ional Conservatism 
Table 7.10 shows the estimation results by low and high uncondit ional conservatism for 
the S & P 500 sample. In Panel A , all non-GAAP earnings are statistically significant at 
low and high levels of unconditional conservatism. In Panel B , IBES is statistically 
significant at both low and high levels of unconditional conservatism, however, C O R E , 
C E and C F are statistically significant only at the high level o f uncondit ional 
conservatism. The results for D I F F l and D IFF2 are mixed. D I F F I is statistically 
significant at both levels of unconditional conservatism in relation to C E and C F but is 
statistically significant only at the low level of unconditional conservatism in relation to 
C O R E . D IFF I is not significant in relation to IBES . The sign of all statistically 
significant D I F F I is positive. The results for D IFF2 are weaker. D IFF2 is statistically 
significant in relation to C E and C F only at the high level o f uncondit ional 
conservatism. 
Furthermore, D IFF2 is marginally significant and negative in relation to IBES at the 
low level of unconditional conservatism. Simi lar to the financial sector and non-
financial sector sample, the results show investors focus predominantly on the book 
value of equity. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that G A A P earnings are 
incrementally value relevant, particularly at the high level of uncondit ional 
conservatism. 
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Table 7.10: Ohlson Model: S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and High/Low 
Market-to-Book Ratio Quintiles 
Model I: P = a„ + /},fiV + P,NonGAAPE^^ + PPIFFI, , + £„ 
Model 2: P = a„ + + l3,NonGAAPE^, + P-DIFFl,, + 
Panel A: Prc-GFC - Model 1 
CON Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DlFFl Inlercepl N Adj R-
IBfiS Lo«' 1.037'" 9.055" -0.289 2.519 1581 0.9359 
High 2.748"" 18.868' 7.516 17.330"" 1582 0.5338 
CORE Low 1.208'" 4.483" 4.621" 1.142 L581 0.9290 
High 2.826"' 17.694" 15.928 17.623"" 1.582 0.531 1 
CE Low 1.219"' 4.343" 5.162' 1.201 1581 0.9296 
High 2.803"" 18.248" 19.530'" 17.527"" 1582 0.531 1 
CF Low 1.208'" 4 4 6 7 ' 4.481' 1.178 1,581 0.9290 
High 2.773"' 17.760" 18.335" 17.482""" 1582 0.5330 
Panel B Pre-GFC - Model 2 
CON Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFF2 Inlercepl N Adj R-
IBES Losv 1.030"" 9.262"" -0.884" 2 4 1 6 1581 0.9365 
High 2.784""' 18.521" 3.702 17.377"" 1582 0.5350 
CORE Low 1.331"" 1.394 -1.208 0.316 1581 0.9248 
High 3.211"' 12.073" 7.957 18.497"" 1.582 0.5143 
CE I ,ow 1.374""" 0.839 3.935 0.725 1581 0.9256 
High 3.275"' 12.2.58' 16..303" 18.504"' 1582 0.5154 
CF Low 1.348"" 0.995 1.016 0.000 1581 0.9238 
High 3.214'" 11.534" 11.788" 18.444"' 1582 0.5138 
Panel C: GFC - Model 1 
CON Quintilc BV NonGAAPE DIFFI Inlercepl N Adj R-
IBES Low 0.964"' -0.076 -0.441 3.229 438 0.8816 
High 3.518'" 23.619"" -3.829 8.939" 439 0.6652 
CORE Low 0.971"" -0.274 -0.114 3.091 438 0.8815 
High 3.586"'" 21.242"' 18.866'" 11.061" 439 0.6516 
CE Low 0.960""" -0.246 -0.995 3.387 438 0.8823 
High 3.586""" 21.794'" 25.358""" 10.945'" 439 0.6538 
CF Low- 0.993"" -0.060 0.225 2.802 438 0.8881 
High 3.559'" 20.890"' 22.278"" 10.637" 439 0.6598 
Panel D : GFC - Model 2 
CON Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFF2 Inlercepl N Adi R-
IBES Low 0.979""" -0.076 -0.030 2.868 438 0.8814 
High 3.5(U""" 2 3 . 6 6 4 " -0.271 9.105" 439 0.6649 
CORE Low- 0.984""" -0.300 0.304 2.836 438 0.8817 
High 4.129"" 13.598" -5.453 13.061"" 439 0.6241 
CE Low 0.953""" -0.068 -2.367 2.450 438 0.8826 
High 4.290"' 9417" 9.872 14.095"" 439 0.6011 
CF Low 0.995"' -0.022 0.266 2.853 438 0.8883 
High 4.297'"" 8.792 9.725" 13.942"' 439 0.6052 
P a n e l E : P o s t - G F C - M o d e l I 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D I F F I I n t e r c e p t N A d j R -
I B E S L o w 0.57.3" 17.769" 2.5.30 8 .508" 1106 0 . 5 6 8 4 
H i g h 4.. ' i69'"" 2 0 . 6 8 0 " " - 4 8 . 2 6 9 2 . 1 6 0 1106 0 . 8 3 1 1 
C O R E L o w 0 . 6 2 4 " 15.064" 3 . 2 5 9 10 .328 1 1 0 6 0 . 5 3 5 1 
H i g h 4 . 6 7 0 " " 1 9 . 6 4 5 " - I I . . 5 7 8 5.6.38 1106 0 . 8 1 4 3 
C E L o w 0 .521" 13.025* 5 . 6 8 4 10.793" 1106 0 . 5 5 0 3 
H i g h 4 . 7 1 2 " " 1 8 . 7 4 6 " 16.731 4 . 3 1 3 1 106 0 . 8 0 6 7 
C E L o w 0 . 6 6 1 " 12.046" 1 2 . 0 9 3 ' 10 .703 1106 0 . 5 1 4 3 
H i g h 4 . 6 2 2 " " 19.387"" 22 .193"" 2.9.54 1 1 0 6 0 . 8 1 7 8 
P a n e l F: P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 I n t e r c e p t N A d j R-
I B E S Low 0 .567" I8. .54I" 3 . 2 7 4 8 . 3 4 3 1 106 0 . 5 7 4 0 
High 4.384""" 2 2 . 8 8 9 " " - 1 1 . 7 7 8 2 .801 1 1 0 6 0 . 8 2 1 1 
C O R E L o u 0 . 6 1 7 " 15.4.36" 0 . 2 2 7 10 .433 1106 0 . 5 3 2 8 
High 4 . 5 9 1 " " 2 0 . 4 8 4 " " - 1 0 . 8 2 8 5 . 2 4 2 1106 0 . 8 1 4 1 
C E Low 0 . 3 9 4 10.2.36" - 5 . 3 1 6 12.244" 1106 0 . 5 3 9 4 
High 4 . 7 7 5 " " I8.4(W"'" 18 .592 5 . 3 1 2 1 106 0 . 8 0 8 0 
C F L o u 0.660"" 10.838" 10.708" 1 1 .902 1 1 0 6 0 . 4 7 0 5 
High 4.769""" 1 7 . 9 0 5 " 20 .409"" 3 . 8 7 7 1 1 0 6 0 . 8 1 7 2 
• p < 0 . 0 5 . " p < O . O I , • " p < 0.001 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent \a r iab le . P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent \a r iab les are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. N o n G A A P E represents the fol lowing variables for 
IBES, C O R E . CE and C F models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S&P Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation e.xpenses. 
CF = Operating cash f lows per share. DIFFI = G A A P I minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P l is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under G A A P . DIFF2 = 
G A A P 2 minus the re le \ant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under G A A P . C O N quintile is Low if market-to-book (MTB) ratio quintile is 1 and High if MTB ratio 
quintile is 5. Low and High indicate low unconditional conser \a t i sm and high unconditional conser\ 'a t ism. 
respectively. 
D u r i n g t h e G F C . C O R E . C E a n d C F a r e s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n M o d e l I ( P a n e l C ) w h e n 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i s h i g h . I n P a n e l B . I o b s e r v e s i m i l a r , b u t w e a k e r , r e s u l t s f o r 
I B E S , C O R E a n d C E i n M o d e l 2 , h o w e v e r , C F i s n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . D I F F I i s 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a t t h e h i g h l e v e l o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i n r e l a t i o n t o 
C O R E , C E a n d C F . D I F F 2 , h o w e v e r , i s o n l y m a r g i n a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a t t h e h i g h l e v e l o f 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i n r e l a t i o n t o C F . 
T h e s e r e s u l t s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h a t i n v e s t o r s f i n d n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s v a l u e r e l e v a n t 
w h e n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i s h i g h b u t n o t w h e n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i s 
l o w . G e n e r a l l y , G A A P e a r n i n g s h a v e i n c r e m e n t a l v a l u e r e l e v a n c e d u r i n g t h e G F C a t t h e 
h i g h l e v e l o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m . W h i l e t h e r e i s s o m e e v i d e n c e o f a c h a n g e i n 
i n v e s t o r s ' f o c u s d u r i n g t h e G F C , t h e r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e t h a t i n v e s t o r s r e m a i n f o c u s e d 
p r i m a r i l y o n t h e b o o k v a l u e o f e q u i t y . I n t h e p o s t - G F C p e r i o d , h o w e v e r , t h e s h i f t i n 
i n v e s t o r s ' f o c u s t o n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s i s m o r e e v i d e n t . 
Panel E and Panel F show that n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t at both 
low and high leve ls of uncondi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . D I F F l and D I F F 2 , h o w e v e r , a re 
no tab ly s ign i f i can t on ly in relat ion to C F at both leve ls of uncond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . 
D I F F l and D I F F 2 are not s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t in re la t ion to I B E S , C O R E and C E . 
T h e r e d o e s not a p p e a r to be e v i d e n c e of a sh i f t to G A A P ea rn ings . 
N o t e that uncond i t iona l conse rva t i sm is measu red us ing the M T B ratio. G iven that 
inves to r s are f o c u s e d p r edominan t ly on the book value of equ i ty , it appea r s that 
inves to r s genera l ly d o not f i nd G A A P ea rn ings inc rementa l ly va lue re levant at g iven 
leve ls of uncond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . An exp lana t ion is that f i r m s in the S & P 5 0 0 index 
are genera l ly sound and viable f i r m s , par t icular ly as they r ema ined sound and viable 
t h rough the peak of the G F C . Add i t i ona l l y , the uncondi t iona l conse rva t i sm m e a s u r e 
a l r eady cap tu res s o m e of the f inanc ia l i n fo rma t ion in G A A P ea rn ings th rough the book 
va lue of net asse t s . 
7.2.1.4 Non-S&P 500 Sample 
7.2 .1 .4 .1 M o d e l Es t imat ion with Main E f f ec t s and Interact ion T e r m s 
T a b l e 7.11 p resen t s the es t imat ion resul ts of the uncondi t iona l conse rva t i sm mode l s 
wi th ma in e f f e c t s and interact ion var iab les fo r f i r m s not in the S & P 5 0 0 index. All 
m o d e l s are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f ican t ac ross all per iod w i n d o w s . 
In the p r e - G F C per iod , BV is s t rongly s igni f icant in all m o d e l s . N o n G A A P E and C O N 
are not s ign i f i can t in all mode l s . D I F F is modera te ly s ign i f ican t and posi t ive only in 
re la t ion to C O R E Mode l I . It appea r s that inves tors are f o c u s e d only on the book value 
of equi ty w h e n uncondi t iona l conse rva t i sm is l ow. W h e n uncondi t iona l conse rva t i sm is 
h igh , inves to r s p lace increased e m p h a s i s on the book value of equ i ty . H o w e v e r , it doe s 
not a p p e a r that the level of uncondi t iona l conse rva t i sm impac t s on the e m p h a s i s 
inves to r s genera l ly p lace on both G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings ; C O N * N o n G A A P E 
is no t s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and C O N * D I F F is a l so not stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t excep t 
in re la t ion to C O R E M o d e l 2 , where it is on ly marg ina l ly s ign i f ican t . Based on B I C , C F 
o u t p e r f o r m s all o ther n o n - G A A P m o d e l s . 
2.37 
Table 7.11: Ohison Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
at Earnings Announcement Date by Models with Market-to-Book 
Ratio Dummy and Interaction Terms as Controls 
Model 1: P = a„ + p^BV, + P,NonGAAPE^^ + PfilFFl., + Pfon-, 
+P,Co>i * BV^, + Pfon * NonGAAPE^, + pXon * DIFFl,, + £„ 
Model 2: P=a, + P,BV, + P.NonGAAPE^ + pfilFFI-, + Pfon-^, 
+Pf<m * BV., + Pfon * NiinGAAPE., + Pfon * DIFFl,, + £„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
CORE 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 
C E 
1 Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0.679" ' • 0 .680" ' ' 0 .662" ' ' 0 .692" ' ' 0 .687" ' 0 .692" ' ' 0 .683" ' 0.688"" 
(5.53) (5.50) (5.50) (5.64) (5.68) (5.66) (5.52) (5.51) 
NonGAAPE 1.123 1.103 0.792 0.040 1.038 0.856 0.905 0.706 
(0.58) (071) (0.43) (0.02) (0.55) (0.63) (0.48) (0.49) 
DIFF 0.191 0.167 5.987"" 1.881 -0.498 -2.230 0.838 0.627 
(0.10) (0.12) (2.58) (0.98) (-0.24) (-0.90) (0.43) (0.43) 
CON -1.839 -2.100 -2.784 -2.727 -2.734 -2.438 -3.454 -3.485 
(-0.53) (-0.65) (-0.91) (-0.94) (-0.90) (-0.83) (-1.31) (-1.38) 
CON'BV 4.288 '" • 4.303"" ' 4.475"" ' 4 .329" ' ' 4 .563 '" ' 4.559"" 4 .686" ' • 4 . 6 8 1 ' " 
(6.57) (6.98) (8.58) (8.13) (8.26) (8.59) (10.25) (10.46) 
CON'NonGAAPF -1.593 -1..382 -2.364 -1.289 -3.055 -2.759 -4.493 -4..301 
(-0.31) (-0.28) (-0.46) (-0.27) (-0.59) (-0.58) (-0.81) (-0.82) 
C O N D I F F -9.689 -9.400 2.823 16.186' -4.207 -3.374 -1.842 -1.630 
(-1.51) (-1.60) (0..39) (2.03) (-0.63) (-0.52) (-0.41) (-0.40) 
Intercept 8.350"" • 8.357"" 8 .095 '" ' 8 .277 '" 7.995" ' ' 7 .482 ' " 8.3.38"' 8 .349" ' 
(4.91) (4.93) (4.95) (5.00) (4.77) (4.46) (4.90) (4.93) 
N 12560 12560 12560 12560 12560 12560 12560 12560 
Adj 0.8318 0.8316 0.8282 0.8294 0.8258 0.8262 0.8331 0.8331 
BIC 113525 113.547 113783 113694 113948 113920 1 1.3403 113403 
BIC Rank 3 4 6 5 8 7 1 1 
Panel B: GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0 .587" ' 0.590"" 0.589""" 0 .597" ' 0.604"" 0.605"" 0.619"" 0.620"" 
(9.06) (8.75) (9.55) (9.24) (8.41) (7.79) (9..37) (9.27) 
NonGAAPE 1.793"' 1.971"" 0.631 0.891" 0.313 0.531' -0.495 -0.313 
(3.49) (4.17) (1.73) (2.43) (0.87) (2.36) (-0.92) (-0.72) 
DIFF -0.520" -0.087 -1.162" -0.186 -0.585 -0.068 0.283 0.442 
(-2.72) (-0.45) (-2.41) (-0.98) (-1.32) (-0.07) (0.81) (1.87) 
CON 1.677 1.652 1.495 1.603 1.991 1.851 2.083 1.964 
(1.22) (1.19) (1.08) (1.13) (1.33) (1.29) (l..'>2) (1 ..34) 
CON'BV 4 .010 ' " 4.006""" 4.007"" 3.999"" 4 .015 ' " 3 .985" ' 3.952""" 3.951"" 
(10.70) (10.66) (10.72) (10.99) (10.92) (10.54) (10.67) (11.15) 
CON'NonCiAAPE -4.014 -4.232 - 2 7 3 2 -2.895 -2.482 -2.705 -1.961 -2.272 
(-1.07) (-1.19) (-0.74) (-0.80) (-0.69) (-1.06) (-0.54) (-0.90) 
C O N D I F F -0.632 -1.852 -1.475 -2.842 -0.245 -2.313 -2.136 -2.419 
(-0.28) (-1.11) (-0.42) (-0.69) (-0.04) (-0.72) (-0.55) (-0.93) 
Intercept 4 .052" 4.033"" 4 .187" ' 4 .016" 3.789"" 3 .790" 3.751"" 3 .861" 
(3.19) (3.10) (3.41) (3.17) (2.82) (3.03) (3.03) (3.08) 
N 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 
Adj 0.6913 0.6916 0.6892 0.6891 0.6882 0.6882 0.6901 0.6912 
BIC 27146 27128 27161 271.54 27180 27179 27160 27148 
BIC Rank 2 1 6 4 8 7 5 3 
Panel C: Post-GFC Period 
IBES 




BV 0.715" ' 0 .703 '" 0720"" 0.711"" 0.720"' 0 .707 '" 0.724"" 0.714"" 
(6.55) (6.39) (6.85) (7.12) (6.70) (643) (6.78) (6.75) 
NonGAAPE 1.021 1.532 -0.917 -1.0.50 -0.928 -0.309 -0.369 0.193 
(0.68) (1.06) (-0.62) (-0.91) (-0.63) (-0.25) (-0.27) (0.18) 
DIFF -1.899 -1.097 0.580 3.074 -1.986 -1.453 -0.738 -0.195 
(-1.49) (-0.91) (0.62) (1.94) (-I..30) (-1.02) (-0.52) (-0.17) 
CON .3.858' 3.749 3.680 3.452 3.824' 3.186 3.701 3.503 
(2.00) (1.93) (1.87) (1.75) (2.05) (1.72) (1.88) (1.75) 
CON'BV 2.916"" 2.935"" 3.041" ' 3.173"' 3.061"' 3.1.30"" 3.032'"' 3 .155'" 
(10.96) (11.04) (10.49) (11.32) (9.32) (11.22) (9.97) (1 1.72) 
CON'NonCiAAPE 5.067 4.424 4.989 2.929 4.666 2.0.54 3.772 1.231 
(1.43) (1.22) (1.60) (1.08) (1..38) (0.85) (1.01) (0.44) 
CON'DIFF 1.644 0.590 7.650" -1.9.30 5.574' -1.129 4.918 2.289 
(0.,38) (0.27) (2.18) (-0.89) (2..34) (-0.40) (1.51) (0.96) 
Intercept 3.871' 3.964" 3.929" 4.104" 3.801' 3.844" 3.961" 4.066" 
(2.44) (2.47) (2.50) (2.70) (2.57) (2.66) (2.51) (2.55) 
N 7134 71.34 71.34 7134 7134 71.34 71.34 7I.M 
Adj R= 0.7505 0.7492 0.7436 0.7428 0.7433 0.7411 0.7433 0.7400 
BIC 58731 58769 ,58916 58958 589-U 58997 58926 .59017 
BIC Rank 1 2 3 6 5 7 4 8 
• p < 0.05, " p < 0 . 0 1 , < 0 . 0 0 1 
I statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters) . 
T h e dependent \ a r i ab l e . P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. T h e independent variables are 
def ined as fol lows: BV = Book value of c o m m o n equity per share. NonGAAPF. represents the follow ing variables for 
IBES, C O R E , C E and C F models: IBES = l /B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per share, af ter adding back depreciat ion and amortisat ion expenses . 
C F = Opera t ing cash f lows per share. DIFF represents DIFFI in Model 1 and DIFF2 in Model 2. I3IFKI = G A A P I 
minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings, where G A A P I is earnings per share f rom operations adjusted to exclude the 
e f fec ts of special i tems reported under G A A P . DIFF2 = G A A P 2 minus the rele\ 'ant n o n - G A A P earnings, where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary i tems per share reported under G A A P . C O N = I if market- to-book (MTB) 
ratio quinti le is 5 and 0 if M T B ratio quintile is I. C O N ' B V = Interaction term of M T B ratio with book value of 
c o m m o n equity per share. C O N ' N o n G A A P E = Interaction term of M T B ratio with the corresponding n o n - G A A P 
earnings measure of IBES, C O R E , C E and CF. C O N ' D I F F = Interaction term of M T B ratio with the corresponding 
D I F F measure of DIFFI and DIFF2. 
D u r i n g the G F C , it a p p e a r s tha t i n v e s t o r s p l ace c o m p a r a t i v e l y s t r o n g e r e m p h a s i s on 
b o t h G A A P a n d n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s re l a t ive to the p r e - G F C p e r i o d . I B E S ( M o d e l I 
a n d M o d e l 2 ) , C O R E ( M o d e l 2 ) a n d C E ( M o d e l 2) a re s t a t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t a n d 
p o s i t i v e . D I F F I is a l s o s t a t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t , bu t n e g a t i v e in r e l a t ion to I B E S a n d 
C O R E . C O N is no t s t a t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t . T h e r e su l t s i n d i c a t e G A A P e a r n i n g s a re 
i n c r e m e n t a l l y v a l u e r e l e v a n t , bu t n e g a t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th s h a r e p r ice w h e n 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m is l o w . N e v e r t h e l e s s , it a p p e a r s tha t i n v e s t o r s f o c u s e d 
p r e d o m i n a n t l y on the b o o k v a l u e of e q u i t y . W h e n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m is h i g h , 
h o w e v e r , b o t h G A A P a n d n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s a re no t v a l u e r e l e v a n t ; 
C O N * N o n G A A P E a n d C O N * D l F F are no t s ta t i s t i ca l ly s i g n i f i c a n t . In t e r m s of m o d e l 
p e r f o r m a n c e , I B E S m o d e l s r a n k h i g h e s t b a s e d o n B I C . 
In the p o s t - G F C pe r iod , the re is an o b s e r v a b l e sh i f t in i nves to r s ' f o c u s . Inves to r s re turn 
thei r f o c u s to the book va lue of equ i ty . It d o e s not a p p e a r that inves to r s p lace s i gn i f i c an t 
e m p h a s i s on both G A A P and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s at both low and high l eve l s of 
uncond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . T h e on ly excep t ion is C O N * D I F F in re la t ion t o C O R E 
M o d e l I and C E M o d e l 2 , where it is marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive . I B E S m o d e l s 
o u t p e r f o r m all o the r m o d e l s tes ted based on B I C . 
7 .2 .1 .4 .2 M o d e l Es t imat ion by Low and High U n c o n d i t i o n a l C o n s e r v a t i s m 
T a b l e 7 . 1 2 s h o w s the es t imat ion resul ts by low and high uncond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m f o r 
the n o n - S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e . In the p r e - G F C pe r iod , Panel A and Panel B s h o w all non-
G A A P e a r n i n g s are not s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t at both low and high leve ls of 
uncond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . D I F F I and D I F F 2 are a l so genera l ly not s ta t is t ical ly 
s ign i f i can t at both low and high levels of uncondi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . T w o e x c e p t i o n s 
are D I F F I , wh ich is marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t and posi t ive in relat ion to C O R E at low level 
of uncond i t iona l conse rva t i sm and D I F F 2 , wh ich is a l so m o d e r a t e l y s ign i f i can t and 
pos i t ive in relat ion to C O R E at high level of uncond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . T h e resul t s 
s h o w that inves tors are p r edominan t ly f o c u s e d on the book va lue of equ i ty . 
D u r i n g the G F C , there is s o m e indicat ion of a sh i f t in inves to r s ' f o c u s but the resul t s are 
w e a k . In Panel C , only I B E S is s t rongly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive w h e n uncond i t i ona l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m is l ow. In Panel D , I B E S , C O R E and C E are s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t w h e n 
uncond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is l ow. T h e r e is s o m e w e a k e v i d e n c e that G A A P e a r n i n g s 
are i nc remen ta l ly va lue re levant . D I F F I is marg ina l ly to m o d e r a t e l y s ign i f i can t and 
nega t ive w h e n uncond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is l ow. T h e resul t s s h o w a sh i f t in i nves to r s ' 
f o c u s w h e n uncond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is low - G A A P e a r n i n g s have inc rementa l va lue 
r e l evance but inves tors a p p e a r to p lace grea te r e m p h a s i s on G A A P e a r n i n g s , w h i c h are 
c lo se r to , or l ower t h a n . n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . 
In the p o s t - G F C pe r iod , h o w e v e r , the resul t s s h o w ano the r sh i f t w h e r e i nves to r s ' f o c u s 
a p p e a r s s imi la r to the p r e - G F C per iod f o r both M o d e l 1 and M o d e l 2 . All n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s are not s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t at both low and high levels of uncond i t i ona l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m . D I F F I is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive only in re la t ion to C O R E at 
h igh level of uncond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . D I F F 2 is not s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t in all 
m o d e l s . 
Table 7.12: Ohlson Model: Non-S&P 500 Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and 
Model 1: P = «O + P,BV,+p,NonGAAPE^^ + pfilFFI. T 
Model 2: P = a„ + l},BV^ + P,NonGMPE + £„ 
Pane l A P r e - G F C - Mode l 1 
CON Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFFl Intercept N A d j R -
IBES Low 0.679" 1.123 0.191 8.350""" 6280 0.5895 
High 4.968" -0.470 -9.497 6.512" 6280 0.8690 
C O K E Low 0.662" 0.792 5.987"" 8.095""" 6280 0.5952 
High 5.137" -1.571 8.810 5.310' 6280 0.8638 
T E Low 0.687" 1.038 -0.498 7.995""" 6280 0.5913 
High 5.250" -2.017 -4.705 5.262" 6280 0.8616 
C F Low 0.683" 0.905 0.838 8.338""" 6280 0.5874 
High 5.369" -3.588 -1.003 4.885" 6280 0.8708 
Pane l B P r e - G F C - Mode l 2 
CON Quinlile BV NonGAAPE D1FF2 Intercept N Adi 
IBES Low 0.680" 1.103 0.167 8.357""" 6280 0.5895 
High 4.984" -0.279 -9.233 6.2.57" 6280 0.8686 
C O R E Lou 0.692" 0.040 1.881 8.277""" 6280 0.5894 
High 5.020" -1.249 18.067" 5.550" 6280 0.8662 
CE Low 0.692" 0.856 -2.230 7.482""" 6280 0.5944 
High 5.251" -1.903 -5.604 5.044" 6280 0.8616 
C F Low 0.688" 0.706 0.627 8.349""" 6280 0.5873 
High 5.369* -3.595 -1.003 4.865" 6280 0.8708 
Pane l C : G F C - Mode l 1 
CON Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFFl Intercept N Adj R-
IBES LOH 0.587 1.793""" -0 .520" 4.052"" 1626 0.7322 
High 4.597 -2.222 -1.152 5.730"'" 1626 0.6177 
C O R E Low 0.589 0.631 -1.162" 4.187"" 1626 0.7239 
High 4.596 -2.101 -2.637 5.682""" 1626 0.6176 
CE Low 0.604 0.313 -0.585 3.789"' 1626 0.7185 
High 4.618 -2.169 -0.829 5.780""" 1626 0.6182 
C F Low 0.619 -0.495 0.283 3 7 5 1 " 1626 0.7249 
High 4.571 -2.456 -1.852 5.8.34"' 1626 0.6187 
Pane l D; G F C - Mode l 2 
CON Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFF2 Intercept N Adj R-
IBES Low 0.590 1.971""" -0.087 4 .033" 1626 0.7308 
High 4.596 -2.260 -1.939 5.685""" 1626 0.6187 
C O R E Low 0.597 0.891" -0.186 4 .016" 1626 0.7206 
High 4.596 -2.004 -3.028 5.620"" 1626 0.6188 
CE Low 0.605 0.531" -0.068 3.790"" 1626 0.7176 
High 4.590 -2.174 -2.381 5.641"" 1626 0.6187 
C F Low 0.620 -0.313 0.442 3 .861" 1626 0.7265 
High 4.572 -2.585 -1.977 5.826"" 1626 0.6198 
P a n e l E : P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 1 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D I F F l In t e rcep t N A d j R -
IBE.S L o w 0 . 7 1 5 " ' 1.021 - 1 . 8 9 9 3 . 8 7 1 ' 3 5 6 7 0 . 7 9 4 2 
Hif ih .3.6.^1'" 6 . 0 8 7 - 0 . 2 5 5 7 . 7 2 9 " ' 3 5 6 7 0 . 6 7 3 9 
C O R K Low 0 7 2 0 " " - 0 . 9 1 7 0 . 5 8 0 3 . 9 2 9 ' 3 5 6 7 0 . 7 8 9 8 
High 3 . 7 6 1 ' " 4 . 0 7 2 8 . 2 3 0 ' 7 . 6 0 9 ' " 3 5 6 7 0 . 6 6 3 8 
C E L o w 0 7 2 0 ' " - 0 . 9 2 8 - 1 . 9 8 6 3 . 8 0 1 ' 3 5 6 7 0 . 7 9 2 5 
H i g h .3 .781"" 3 . 7 3 8 3.-588 7 . 6 2 5 " ' 3 5 6 7 0 . 6 6 0 6 
C F Low 0 . 7 2 4 ' " - 0 . 3 6 9 - 0 7 3 8 3 . 9 6 1 ' 3 5 6 7 0 7 8 9 6 
H i g h 3 . 7 5 6 ' " 3 . 4 0 3 4 . 1 8 0 7 . 6 6 2 ' " 3 5 6 7 0 . 6 6 3 2 
P a n e l F : P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 In te rcep t N A d j R= 
I B E S Low 0 . 7 0 3 " " 1 .532 - 1 . 0 9 7 3 . 9 6 4 ' 3 5 6 7 0 . 7 9 1 1 
H i g h 3 . 6 3 8 " " 5 . 9 5 6 - 0 . 5 0 7 7 . 7 1 2 ' " 3 5 6 7 0 . 6 7 4 0 
C O R E Low 0 7 1 1 " " -1.0.50 3 . 0 7 4 4 . 1 0 4 " 3 5 6 7 0 . 7 9 6 8 
H i g h 3 . 8 8 4 " " 1.879 1 .144 7 . 5 5 6 " ' 3 5 6 7 0 . 6 5 5 7 
C E L o w 0 . 7 0 7 ' " - 0 . 3 0 9 - 1 . 4 5 3 3 . 8 4 4 " 3 5 6 7 0 . 7 9 0 2 
High 3.8.37"" 1.745 - 2 . 5 8 2 7 . 0 3 0 " " 3 5 6 7 0 . 6 5 8 1 
C F Low 0 7 1 4 ' " 0 . 1 9 3 - 0 . 1 9 5 4 .066" 3 5 6 7 0 . 7 8 8 5 
High 3 . 8 6 9 " " 1 .424 2 . 0 9 3 7 . 5 6 9 " " 3 5 6 7 0 . 6 5 7 5 
' p < 0.05, " p < 0.01, ••• p < 0.001 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable. P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES, C O R E , C E and CE models: IBES = I/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation e.xpenses. 
CE = Operating cash flows per share. DlEEl = G A A P l minus the rele\ant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P l is 
earnings per share f rom operations adjusted to e.xclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. D1EE2 = 
GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under G A A P . CON quintile is Low if market-to-book (MTB) ratio quintile is 1 and High if MTB ratio 
quintile is .5. Low and High indicate low unconditional conservatism and high unconditional conser \a t i sm, 
respectively. 
For f i r m s not inc luded in the S & P 5 0 0 index , the resul ts s h o w that G A A P e a r n i n g s have 
incrementa l va lue r e l evance . H o w e v e r , the resul ts of the impac t of the G F C and a 
c h a n g e in i nves t o r ' s f o c u s are w e a k . Gene ra l l y , inves tors a p p e a r to f o c u s p r imar i ly on 
the book value of equi ty in both the pre- and p o s t - G F C pe r iods . D u r i n g the G F C . 
inves tors a p p e a r to f ind I B E S . C O R E and C E value re levant w h e n uncond i t iona l 
conse rva t i sm is low but not in the pre- and p o s t - G F C per iods . 
7.2.2 Conditional Conservatism - Asymmetric Timeliness Measure 
7.2.2.1 Financial Sector Sample 
7.2.2 .1 .1 Mode l Es t ima t ion with Main E f f ec t s and Interact ion T e r m s 
T a b l e 7 .13 presen ts the es t imat ion resul ts of the condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m m o d e l s wi th 
ma in e f f e c t s and in teract ion var iab les fo r f i r m s in the f inanc ia l sec tor . All m o d e l s are 
s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t ac ros s all per iod w i n d o w s . 
Table 7.13: Ohison Model: Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression at Earnings Announcement Date by Models with 
Asymmetric Timeliness Measure Dummy and Interaction Terms as 
Controls 
Model I: f , = a„ + /J, BV + p,NonGAAPE^^ + P.DIFFI.^ + /J,Con,., 
+l}^C(m * BV„ + p con * NonGAAPE-, + pXoii • DIFFI^, + 
Model 2: P, = a„ + P^BV^ + p,NonGAAPE^^ + P P I F F I - , + P fon^ , 
+Pfon * BV., + pcon * No'iiGAAPE^, + pXon * DIFF2., + e„ 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model I Model 2 
CORE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model I Model 2 
BV 1.513"' 1.528"' 1.496'" 1.557"' 1.556" • 1.567"' 1.564'" 
(20.26) (21..55) (30.65) (32.99) (26.04) (23.46) (23.40) (24.98) 
NonGAAPE 2.289 1.837 1.844' 0.828 1.408 0.855 1.357 0.482 
(1.24) (1.01) (2.33) (0.81) (1.81) (1.09) (1.29) (0.45) 
DIFF 0.525 -0.650 12.813 1.220 4 .998" 2.956 1.577 0.701 
(0.61) (-0.68) (1.18) (0.24) (3.1 1) (0.96) (1.58) (0.73) 
CON 12.077" 12.069" 12.131" 11.928" 11.467" 11.626' 12.642" 12.408" 
(2.71) (2.75) (2.63) (2.62) (2.-58) (2..57) (3.12) (3.00) 
CON'BV -1.02.3"' -1.025"" -0.987" ' -1 .037" ' -1.056'" • -1 .056 '" -1.046"" • -1.0.58'" 
(-10.80) (-11.-55) (-11.91) (-12.69) (-12.89) (-12.06) (-12.55) (-12.83) 
CON'NonGAAPF 5.726 5.849 5.989 6.673 5.810 5.957 4.903 5.771 
(1.07) (1.10) (1.29) (1.49) (1.46) (1.61) (1.40) (1.65) 
CON'DIFF 3.395' 4.953 -9.1 13 2.730 -3.010 -2.467 5.322 6.252 
(2.07) (1 -72) (-0.82) (0.45) (-1.48) (-0.69) (1.46) (1.71) 
Intercept 8 .944" 8.836" 8 .630" 8.778" 9.051" 8.81 1" 8.873" 8 .705" 
(2.91) (2.91) (2.58) (2.68) (2.89) (2.83) (2.80) (2.76) 
N 1232 1232 1232 1232 12.32 12.32 12.32 1232 
Adj R- 0.9401 0.9401 0.9417 0.9393 0.9405 0.9395 0.9405 0.9403 
BIC 11998 12013 11972 12014 12004 12024 11996 12007 
BIC Rank 3 6 1 7 4 8 2 5 
Panel B: GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0.965" ' 0 .966" ' 1.144'" 1.145"' 1 . 0 6 8 ' 1.072'" 1.089'" 1.088""' 
(26.63) (26.53) (29.31) (28.39) (37.90) (43.94) (29.95) (.30.30) 
NonGAAPF 7 .656 ' " 7 .642 '" 0.647 0.622 1.361 1.436 1.786 1.829 
(4.27) (4.27) (0.48) (0.46) (0.94) (0.96) (1.22) (1.24) 
DIFF 0.091 0.163 3.848" ' 3 .992" ' -9.663 -9.109 1.585 1.630 
(0.10) (0.17) (9.86) (6.61) (-1.69) (-1.44) (1.03) (1.06) 
CON -5.580 -5.463 -6.854 -6.764 -4.808 -5.488 -5.750 -5.616 
(-1.45) (-1.43) (-1.39) (-1.42) (-1.07) (-1.24) (-1.11) (-1.09) 
CON'BV 0.173" 0.182" 0.049 0.075 0.049 0.074 0.046 0.051 
(2.23) (2..W) (0.50) (0.83) (0.57) (0.73) (0.48) (0.-54) 
CON'NonGAAPE -6 .913 '" -6.908"" -0.008 0.005 -0.481 -0.536 -1.296 -1.271 
(-3.97) (-4.00) (-0.01) (0.00) (-0.31) (-0.34) (-0.78) (-0.76) 
CON'DIFF 1.003 1.207' -0 .820" -0.11 1 8.078 11.619 -0.641 -0.619 
(1.83) (2.28) (-2.68) (•) (1.34) (1.41) (-0.38) (-0.37) 
Intercept 10.014"' 10.019"" 9 .715" 9 .598" 9.774" 9 .973" 10.824" 10.79.3" 
(3.41) (3.40) (2.77) (2.73) (3.17) (3.19) (3.23) (3.22) 
N 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 
Adj 0.8998 0.9005 0.8983 0.9009 0.8975 0.8971 0.9004 0.9010 
BIC 4780 4777 4794 4788 4804 4800 4784 4781 
BIC Rank 2 1 6 5 8 7 4 3 
Panel C: Post-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
C O R E 
Model I Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
C F 
Model I Model 2 
BV 0 . 8 . W ' 0 . 8 2 4 " ' 0 . 8 2 7 " ' 0 . 8 2 2 " ' 0 .824"" 0.820"'" 0 .825"" 0 . 8 2 1 " ' 
Oirr,) (31.00) (36.11) (30.74) (33.02) (30.26) (33.40) (30.40) 
NonGAAPH 1.222 1.264 0.811 0.928 0.242 0.483 0.291 0.512 
(0.78) (0.80) (0.68) (0.74) (0.25) (0.43) (0.30) (0.46) 
DIFF -1.475 -0.717 -0.919 -0.319 0.065 0.367 0.293 0.515 
(-0.95) (-0.47) (-0.90) (-0.26) (0.07) (0.31) (0.30) (0.46) 
CON -10.788' -10.988" -11.018" -11.040 ' -11.515" -11.019 ' -11.297" -11.431* 
(-2.44) (-2.43) (-2.46) (-2.44) (-2.55) (-2.48) (-2.47) (-2.46) 
C O N ' B V 0.121 0.127 0.127 0.131 0.1.38 0.157 0.144 0.149 
(I..50) (1.25) (1.34) (1..W) (1.39) (1.51) (1.48) (1.39) 
C O N ' N o n G A A P F 5.617' 5.277' 5.855'" 5 .616" 5 . 6 7 8 " ' 4 . 4 3 3 " 5.247""" 4 . 4 7 6 " 
(2.37) (2.20) (2.71) (2..58) (3.88) (2.76) (4.24) (2.78) 
C O N D I F F 5..39.V" 3 .677" 4.054' 1 .616" 4.,541" 9.873' 5 . 2 7 8 " ' 4 . 5 7 9 " 
(2.60) (3.20) (2.41) (3.24) (2.22) (2.40) (4.05) (2.70) 
Intercept 10 .813 '" 10 .947" ' 11 .128" ' 1 1.182"" 11.393"" 11.370"" 11.350"" 1 1 . . M l ' " 
(4.24) (4.16) (4.28) (4.24) (4.29) (4.32) (4.27) (4.29) 
N 1158 11.58 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 11.58 
Ad j R- 0.8697 0.8665 0.8692 0.8670 0.8672 0.8636 0 .8666 0.8628 
BIC 10517 10544 10521 10533 105.18 10569 10529 10562 
BIC Rank 1 6 2 4 5 8 3 7 
• p < 0.05, • • p < 0.01, ••• p < 0.001 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable. P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPH represents the following variables for 
IBES, CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash fiows per share. DIFF represents DIFFl in Model 1 and DIFF2 in Model 2. DIFFI = GAAPI 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPI is earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. CON = I if asymmetric timeliness 
(AT) measure quintile is 5 and 0 if AT measure quintile is I. CON'BV = Interaction term of AT measure with book 
value of common equity per share. CON'NonGAAPE = Interaction term of AT measure with the corresponding non-
GAAP earnings measure of IBES, CORE, CE and CF. CONT:)IFF = Interaction term of AT measure with the 
correspondmg DIFF measure of DIFTl and D1FF2. 
In t h e p r e - G F C p e r i o d , B V is s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t in al l m o d e l s . N o n G A A P E is 
g e n e r a l l y n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . A n e x c e p t i o n i s C O R E , w h i c h is m a r g i n a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e in M o d e l I . D I F F i s o n l y m o d e r a t e l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e in 
r e l a t i o n t o C E M o d e l 1. C O N is m o d e r a t e l y s i g n i f i c a n t in al l m o d e l s . 
T h e s e r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e t h a t w h e n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i s l o w , i n v e s t o r s f o c u s 
p r e d o m i n a n t l y o n t h e b o o k v a l u e o f e q u i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , a h i g h l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m is p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s h a r e p r i c e . In c o n t r a s t , w h e n c o n d i t i o n a l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m is h i g h , i n v e s t o r s p l a c e d e c r e a s e d e m p h a s i s o n t h e b o o k v a l u e o f e q u i t y ; 
t h e c o e f f i c i e n t o f C O N * B V is n e g a t i v e . H o w e v e r , a h i g h l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m a p p e a r s t o h a v e l i t t l e i m p a c t o n t h e e m p h a s i s i n v e s t o r s p l a c e o n b o t h 
G A A P a n d n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . T h e i n t e r a c t i o n t e r m s , C O N * D I F F a n d 
C O N * N o n G A A P E a r e g e n e r a l l y n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t in a l l m o d e l s e x c e p t 
C O N * D I F F in relation to IBES Model 1, where it is marginally significant and positive. 
Based on B IC , C O R E Model 1 and C F Model 1 perform best among the models tested. 
During the G F C , there is an observable shift in investors' focus. Investors maintain their 
focus predominantly on the book value of equity. When conditional conservatism is 
low, IBES is strongly significant and positive, but C O R E , C E and C F are not 
statistically significant. G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant only in relation 
to C O R E when conditional conservatism is low, C O N is not statistically significant. 
High conditional conservatism appears to have little impact on the value relevance of 
C E and CF ; all interaction terms are not statistically significant in relation to these non-
G A A P earnings. C O N * B V is marginally significant and positive while 
C O N * N o n G A A P E is strongly significant and negative only in relation to IBES . 
C O N * D I F F is marginally significant and positive in relation to IBES Model 1, but is 
moderately significant and negative in relation to C O R E Model 1 O v e r a l l , investors 
are focused predominantly on the book value of equity during the G F C . However, there 
is some evidence that IBES and C O R E are value relevant and that G A A P earnings are 
incrementally value relevant in relation to these non-GAAP earnings. In terms of model 
performance, IBES models perform best among the models tested. 
In the post-GFC period, BV is strongly significant in all models. N o n G A A P E and D IFF 
are not statistically significant in all models. C O N is marginally significant and negative 
in all models. The results for N o n G A A P E and D IFF when conditional conservatism is 
low in the post-GFC period are generally similar to the corresponding results in the pre-
G F C period. Interestingly, the negative sign for C O N indicate that conditional 
conservatism is negatively related to share price. An explanation is that financial firms 
experienced a significant negative impact as a result of the GFC . Investors may perceive 
financial f irms to be overestimating their losses. 
The results also indicate both G A A P and non-GAAP earnings are value relevant when 
conditional conservatism is high. C O N * N o n G A A P E and C O N * D I F F are statistically 
significant and positive in all models. However, the high level of conditional 
conservatism does not appear to have an impact on the emphasis investors place on the 
book value of equity. Overal l , there is evidence of a shift in investors" focus on G A A P 
I estimate clustered robust standard errors in my models, clustering on both firm and time. However, in 
the case of financial firms in the G F C period, the estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions is 
not of full rank and the robust covariance matri.x could not be calculated. I re-estimated my models for 
firms in the financial sector in the G F C period clustering only on a single dimension, f irm. In untabulated 
results, the inferences are substantially the saine. 
and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s ac ros s t i m e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the resul t s s t rong ly s h o w tha t 
inves to r s f o c u s p r e d o m i n a n t l y on the b o o k va lue of equ i ty in va lu ing f inanc ia l f i r m s . 
7 .2 .2 .1 .2 M o d e l Es t ima t ion by L o w and High Cond i t i ona l C o n s e r v a t i s m 
T h e e s t ima t ion resul t s by low and high cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m f o r the f inanc ia l sec to r 
s a m p l e is p resen ted in T a b l e 7 . 1 4 . All n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s are not s ta t is t ica l ly 
s ign i f i can t at both low and high leve ls of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m e x c e p t fo r C O R E , 
w h i c h is marg ina l ly s ign i f i can t at the low level of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m in M o d e l 1. 
Bo th D I F F I and D I F F 2 are a l so not s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t at both leve ls of cond i t iona l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m excep t D I F F I , w h i c h is m o d e r a t e l y s ign i f i can t w h e n cond i t i ona l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m is low in re la t ion to C E . In con t ras t to the resul t s of uncond i t i ona l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m , inves to r s do not a p p e a r to f ind n o n - G A A P or G A A P e a r n i n g s va lue 
re levan t w h e n condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is low or h igh . In te res t ing ly , the m a g n i t u d e of 
BV is cons i s t en t ly h igher w h e n condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is low in c o m p a r i s o n to w h e n 
cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is h igh in relat ion to all n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . 
D u r i n g the G F C , only I B E S is s t rong ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive w h e n cond i t iona l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m is low f o r both Mode l 1 and Mode l 2 . All o the r n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s are 
not s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t . D I F F I and D I F F 2 are only s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and 
pos i t ive in re la t ion to C O R E at both low and high leve ls of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . 
In the p o s t - G F C per iod , there is a d i sce rn ib le sh i f t in i nves to r s ' f o c u s . All n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s are s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive at h igh level of cond i t iona l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m . S imi l a r l y . D I F F I and D I F F 2 are a l so s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive 
at m o d e r a t e h igh level of condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m , excep t f o r D I F F 2 in re la t ion to 
C O R E . 
T h e resul t s f o r f inanc ia l f i r m s s h o w a sh i f t in inves to r s ' e m p h a s i s b e t w e e n the G F C and 
p o s t - G F C pe r iod . In the p o s t - G F C pe r iod , inves tors f i nd n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s va lue 
re levan t w h e n cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is re la t ive ly h igh . F u r t h e r m o r e , G A A P e a r n i n g s 
a l so h a v e inc rementa l va lue r e l evance at high level of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . 
Table 7.14: Ohison Model: Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and 
High/Low Asymmetric Timeliness Measure Quintiles 
Model I: P = a^ + + p,NonGAAPE^^ + p f i l F F I - , + 
Model 2: P = a„ + + p^NoiiGAAPE^, + /5 ,DW2, . , + e,, 
Panel A; P r e - G F C - Mode l I 
C O N Quinl i le BV N o n G A A P E DIFEl Inlercepl N A d j R-
IBKS Low 1 . 5 1 3 ' " 2 .289 0 .526 8 . 9 6 8 " 615 0 .9495 
High 0 . 4 9 0 " " 8 .014 3.920 2 1 . 0 2 0 ' " 6 1 6 0.7.391 
C O K E Lou- 1 . 4 9 6 ' 1.844" 12.811 8 .653 ' 615 0 .9512 
High 0. .510" ' 7 .833 3.700 2 0 . 7 6 0 ' " 6 1 6 0 .7398 
C E I .o\\ l..<;56"' 1.409 4 . 9 9 9 " 9 . 0 7 6 " 615 0 .9498 
High 0 . 5 0 0 " ' 7 .218 1.988 20 .518"" 6 1 6 0 .7425 
C E Low 1 . 5 3 6 ' " 1.357 1.577 8 . 8 9 7 " 615 0 .9497 
High 0 . 4 9 1 ' " 6 .259 6 .899 2 1 . 5 1 5 ' " 6 1 6 0 .7458 
Panel B: P r e - G F C - Mode l 2 
C O N Quinl i le BV N o n G A A P E D1FF2 Inlercepl N A d j R ' 
IBES L o u 1 . 5 2 8 ' " 1.837 -0 .650 8 . 8 6 0 " 615 0 .9496 
High 0 . 5 0 3 " " 7 .686 4 .303 20 .905"" 6 1 6 0 .7387 
C O R E L o u 1.557"" 0 .828 1.218 8 . 8 0 2 " 615 0 .9487 
High 0 . 5 2 0 ' " 7 .502 3.951 2 0 . 7 0 6 ' " 6 1 6 0 .7390 
C E L o u 1 . 5 6 7 ' " 0 .855 2 .957 8.8.35" 615 0 .9488 
High 0 . 5 1 1 " " 6 .812 0 .489 20.437'"" 6 1 6 0 .7417 
C F Low 1.564""" 0 .483 0.701 8 . 7 2 9 " 615 0 .9493 
High 0 . 5 0 6 ' " 6 .253 6 .953 2 1 . 1 1 2 ' " 6 1 6 0 .7495 
Panel C : G F C - M o d e l 1 
C O N Quinl i le BV N o n G A A P E D l F F l Inlercepl N A d j R= 
IBES Low 0 .965"" 7 .656"" 0.091 10.014"" 246 0 .9328 
High 1 . 1 3 8 ' " 0 .744 1.095 4 .434 246 0 .8724 
C O R E Low 1 . 1 4 4 ' " 0 .647 3 . 8 4 8 ' " 9 . 7 1 5 " 246 0 .9239 
High 1 . 1 9 3 ' " 0 .638 3 . 0 2 8 " ' 2.861 246 0 .8772 
C E Low 1 . 0 6 8 ' " 1.361 -9 .663 9 . 7 7 4 " 246 0 .9266 
High 1 . 1 1 7 ' " 0 .879 -1.585 4 .966 246 0 .8733 
C F Low 1.089'"" 1.786 1.585 10.824"" 246 0 .9222 
High 1 . 1 3 5 ' " 0.491 0 .943 5 .073 246 0 .8825 
Panel D : G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Quinl i le BV N o n G A A P E D1FF2 Inlercepl N A d j R-
IBES Low 0 .966 ' " ' 7 . 6 4 2 " " 0 .163 1 0 . 0 1 9 ' " 246 0 .9328 
High 1 . 1 4 7 ' " 0 .733 1.370 4 .556 246 0 .8737 
C O R E Low 1.145"" 0 .622 3.992""" 9 . 5 9 8 " 246 0 .9244 
High 1 . 2 2 0 ' " 0 .627 3 . 8 8 2 ' " 2.8.34 246 0 .8814 
C E L o u 1 . 0 7 2 ' " 1.436 -9 .109 9 . 9 7 3 " 2 4 6 0 .9258 
High 1 . 1 4 6 " ' 0 .900 2.510 4 .485 246 0 .8732 
C F L o u 1 . 0 8 8 ' " 1.829 1.630 10 .793" 246 0 .9224 
High 1 .139"" 0 .558 1.011 5 .177 246 0.88.34 
P a n e l E: P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 1 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D l F F l I n t e r c e p t N A d j R-
I B E S L o u 0 , 8 3 0 " " 1 .222 - 1 . 4 7 5 1 0 . 8 1 3 ' " 5 7 9 0 . 8 7 1 8 
H i g h 0 ,9 ,51"" 6 . 8 3 9 " " 3 . 9 1 9 " " 0 . 0 2 4 .579 0 . 8 6 7 4 
C O R E Low 0 . 8 2 7 " " 0 .811 - 0 . 9 1 9 1 1 . 1 2 8 ' " 5 7 9 0 . 8 7 1 4 
H i g h 0 . 9 . 5 4 " ' 6.666""" 3 . 1 3 5 ' O . I I O 5 7 9 0 . 8 6 6 8 
C E L o w 0 . 8 2 4 " ' 0 . 2 4 2 0 . 0 6 5 1 1 . 3 9 3 ' " 5 7 9 0 . 8 7 0 8 
H i g h 0 . 9 6 2 " ' 5 . 9 2 1 " ' 4 . 6 0 5 " - 0 . 1 2 2 5 7 9 0 . 8 6 3 3 
C F Low 0 . 8 2 5 " " 0 .291 0 . 2 9 3 11 . .350 ' " 5 7 9 0 . 8 7 0 7 
H i g h 0 . 9 6 9 " " 5 . 5 3 7 " ' 5 . 5 7 1 " ' 0 , 0 5 2 5 7 9 0 . 8 6 2 2 
P a n e l F; P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Q u i n t i l e B V N o n G A A P E D I E E 2 In t e r cep t N A d i R= 
I B E S Low 0 .824" ' " 1 .264 - 0 . 7 1 7 1 0 , 9 4 7 " " 5 7 9 0 . 8 7 1 5 
H i g h 0 . 9 5 0 " " 6 . . 5 4 r " 2 . 9 6 0 " - 0 , 0 4 1 5 7 9 0 . 8 6 1 2 
C O R E L o u 0.822""" 0 . 9 2 8 - 0 . 3 1 9 1 1 , 1 8 2 ' " 5 7 9 0 . 8 7 1 2 
H i g h 0 .95 .V" ' 6 . 5 4 3 " " 1 .297 0 . 1 4 1 5 7 9 0 . 8 6 2 4 
C E L o u 0.820""" 0 . 4 8 3 0 . 3 6 7 1 1 . 3 7 0 " ' 5 7 9 0 . 8 7 0 9 
High 0 . 9 7 7 ' " 4 . 9 1 6 ' " 1 0 . 2 3 9 " 0.3.50 5 7 9 0 . 8 5 5 7 
C F L o u 0 . 8 2 1 " " 0 . 5 1 2 0 . 5 1 5 11 . . 341 ' " 5 7 9 0 . 8 7 0 8 
H i g h 0 . 9 7 0 " " 4 . 9 8 7 " ' 5 . 0 9 4 " " - 0 . 0 9 0 5 7 9 0 . 8 5 4 1 
• p < 0 . 0 5 , " p < O . O I , " ' p < 0.001 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable. F, is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent \ar iables are 
defined as follows; BV = Book value of common equity per share. N o n G A A P E represents the fol lowing variables for 
IBES, C O R E , C E and CE models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CE = Operating cash f lows per share, DIFFI - G A A P l minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A F l is 
earnings per share f rom operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under G A A P , DIFF2 -
G A A P 2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under G A A P . CON quintile is Low if asymmetric timeliness (AT) measure quintile is 1 and High if AT 
measure quintile is ,5. Low and High indicate low conditional conservatism and high conditional conservat ism, 
respectively. 
7,2,2.2 Non-Financial Sector Sample 
7,2,2.2,1 Model Estimation with Main Effects and Interaction Terms 
Table 7.15 presents the estimation results of the conditional conservat ism models with 
main effects and interaction variables for f i rms not in the financial sector. All models 
are statistically significant across all period windows. 
In the pre-GFC period, BV is strongly significant in all models , N o n G A A P E is strongly 
significant in relation to IBES (Models 1 and 2), C O R E (Model 1), C E (Model I) and 
C F (Model 1), DIFF is statistically significant in relation to C O R E (Model 1), C E 
(Models I and 2) and C F (Model 1), 
Table 7.15: Ohlson Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression at Earnings Announcement Date by Models with 
Asymmetric Timeliness Measure Dummy and Interaction Terms as 
Controls 
Model I: = 0„ + /3,/VonGA4P£ + /J,D/FF/„ + /J,Co;!,., 
* BV., + p Con * NonGAAPE-, +'/3,COH * D/FF/,, + E,, 
Model 2: P, = 0„ + /J,eV, + P^NonGAAPE^^ + P f l lFF l . , + P f o n , , 
+P^Con * BV., + pCun * NonGAAPE., + p^Con * DIFF2^, + £„ 
Panel A: Pre -GFC Period 
IBES C O R E CE CP 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 1 Model 2 
BV 1.188"' 1.180"' 1.315'" 1.527""' 1 .296 ' ' 1,667"" 1.307"" • 1.617'" 
(5.89) (5.76) (6.80) (5.77) (6.69) (5.47) (6.84) (5.69) 
NonGAAPE 14.395"' 14.424"' 12.115'" 7.699 12.320'"" 5.551 1 1.321"' " 5.051 
(3.91) (3.88) (3.36) (1.79) (3.32) (1.84) (3.43) (1.91) 
DIFF 3.610 0.271 12.477" 0.897 11.724""" 7.213" 12.376" 5.917 
(1.30) (0.29) (3.24) (0.85) (3.44) (2.30) (3.23) (1.87) 
CON -6.445 -7.208" -7.098" -6.349' -6.935"" -5.180 -7.081"" -5.661" 
(-1.88) (-2.37) (-2.81) (-2.40) (-2.69) (-1.62) (-2.73) (-1.98) 
CON'BV 0.672 0.713" 0.997"'" 0.817" 1.046""' 0.727" 1.009" • 0.720" 
(1.91) (2.20) (3.72) (2.80) (3.92) (2.35) (3.69) (2.30) 
CON'NonGAAPH 2.044 2.191 -5.285 -1.865 -5.252 -0.040 -4.249 0.533 
(0.81) (0.87) (-0.97) (-0.34) (-0.97) (-0.01) (-0.86) (0.15) 
C O N D I F F -13.404' -6.844 -4.019 1.588 -2.694 2.188 -5.548 -0.595 
(-2.33) (-1.84) (-0.68) (0.68) (-0.46) (0.40) (-1.03) (-0.16) 
Inlercept 9.808'" 9.887"" 9.191"" 8.924""" 9.242'" 8.412'" 9.236" " 8.377" 
(4.69) (4.69) (4.03) (3.31) (4.09) (2.79) (4.11) (2.83) 
N 9988 9988 9988 9988 9988 9988 9988 9988 
Adj 0.7777 0.7749 0.7321 0.7142 0.7327 0.7098 0.7346 0.7102 
BIC 89737 89859 91600 92244 91577 92396 91497 92376 
BIC Rank 1 2 5 6 4 8 3 7 
Panel B: G F C Period 
IBES C O R E CE CE 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.367"' 1.360'" 1.526" " 1.539 " 1.510"' 1.619'"" 1.518'" 1.586'"" 
(3.78) (3.72) (4.57) (4.70) (4.49) (4.54) (443) (4.65) 
NonGAAPF 10.706"' 10.810"' 5.822 5.577" 5.835 4.840" 5.572 4.173" 
(4.01) (3.96) (1.82) (2.04) (1.76) (2.39) (1.79) (2.06) 
DIFF -2.666 0.174 0.608 2.036 5.600 10.469" 6.260' 4.778" 
(-1.75) (0.19) (0.12) (1.66) (1.22) (2.05) (2.00) (2.31) 
CON 1.957 2.485 1.788 2.484 2.239 1 754 1.929 3.170 
(0.40) (0.51) (0.37) (0.51) (0.47) (0.44) (0.38) (0.62) 
CON'BV -0.054 -0.024 -0.171 -0.145 -0.198 -0.224 -0.167 -0.171 
(-0.14) (-0.06) (-0.47) (-0.41) (-0.55) (-0.58) (-0.46) (-0.47) 
CON'NonGAAPF -1.421 -2.206 1.611 0.922 1.513 -0.473 1.153 -0.411 
(-1.01) (-1.29) (0.59) (0.39) (0.56) (-0.26) (0.45) (-0.24) 
CON'DIFF 6.241" 1.977 4.398 -0.309 -0.012 -6.533 1.137 -0.474 
(2.38) (1.85) (1.03) (-0.27) (-0.00) (-1.21) (0.43) (-0.25) 
Intercept 6.627 6.683 7.300 7.231 7.068 8.438" 7.008 7.026 
(1.37) (1.39) (1.57) (1.55) (1.53) (2.29) (1.43) (1.46) 
N 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 
Adj 0.6681 0.6682 0.6468 0.6468 0.6477 0.6422 0.6483 0.6422 
BIC 33318 33326 33552 33569 33560 33608 33545 33608 
BIC Rank 1 2 4 6 5 7 3 7 
Panel C; Post-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
CORE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CE 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1 1.319'" 1.735'" 1.755"' 1.786"' 1.876"" 1.740""" 1.765""' 
(4.43) (4.37) (5.25) (5.60) (5.36) (5.59) (5.29) (5.66) 
NonGAAPK 20.786'" 21.084'" 3.473 3.026 3.633 2.233 3.669 2.796 
(6.96) (7.10) (0.68) (0.61) (0.70) (0.58) (0.73) (0.75) 
DIFF -5.847'" -4.492" 4.403 -1.079 8.591 11.500 3.423 2.5.37 
(-3.75) (-2.49) (1.13) (-0.60) (1.61) (1.64) (0.65) (0.65) 
CON 5.857 5.847 4.450 5.111 3.594 1.906 4.499 4.830 
(1.27) (1.27) (0.91) (1.02) (0.85) (0.60) (0.90) (0.96) 
CON'BV -0.647 -0.630 -0.909" -0.755" -0.995" -0.910" -0.916' -0.666 
(-1.87) (-1.81) (-2.47) (-2.14) (-2.61) (-2.14) (-2.49) (-1.95) 
CON'NonGAAPF: 4.464 4.038 15.826" 9.469 15.691" 7.349 15.444" 6.906 
(0.60) (0.54) (2.02) (1.31) (2.01) (1..M) (2.00) (1.29) 
CON'DIFF 8.882" 4.670 16.565 2.801 8.889 -8.088 16.159" 6.840 
(3.07) (1.74) (1.84) (0.75) (1.06) (-0.80) (2.04) (1.23) 
Intercept 3.427 3.268 6.105 6.157 6.882 8.220" 6.101 6.250 
(0.80) (0.76) (I ..34) (I..34) (1.77) (2.94) (1.31) (1.35) 
N 8192 8192 8192 8192 8192 8192 8192 8192 
Adj R- 0.6912 0.6899 0.6252 0.5982 0.6285 0.5945 0.6255 0.5883 
BIC 77292 77327 78880 79450 78806 79523 78863 79639 
BIC Rank 1 2 5 6 3 7 4 8 
• p < 0.05, •• p < 0.01, ••• p < 0.001 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on f i rm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
def ined as fol lows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. N o n G A A P E represents the fo l lowing variables for 
IBES, C O R E . C E and C F models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysis. C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per share, af ter adding back depreciation and amortisat ion expenses . 
C F = Operat ing cash flows per share. DIFF represents DlFF l in Model 1 and D1FF2 in Model 2. D l F F l = G A A I ' l 
minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings, where G A A P l is earnings per share f rom operat ions adjusted to exclude the 
e f fec ts of special i tems reported under G A A P . DIFF2 = G A A P 2 minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings , where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary i tems per share reported under G A A P . C O N = 1 if asymmetr ic t imeliness 
(AT) measure quintile is 5 and 0 if AT measure quintile is 1. C O N ' B V = Interaction term of A T measure with book 
value of c o m m o n equity per share. C O N ' N o n G A A P E = interaction term of A T measure with the corresponding non-
G A A P earnings measure of IBES, C O R E , C E and CF. C O N ' D I F F = Interaction term of A T measure with the 
corresponding DIFF measure of DIFFl and D1FF2. 
T h e s e results s h o w n o n - G A A P earnings are general ly va lue relevant w h e n condit ional 
conservat i sm is l o w . Furthermore, G A A P earnings are incremental ly value relevant 
w h e n condit ional conservat i sm is l o w . Genera l ly , C O N is marginal ly to moderate ly 
s ign i f i cant and negat ive , indicat ing condit ional conservat i sm is nega t ive ly related to 
share price. 
A s noted prev ious ly , condit ional conservat i sm may be negat ive ly related to 
uncondit ional conserva t i sm. M y results o f a negat ive c o e f f i c i e n t for C O N are cons i s t en t 
with this propos i t ion. Furthermore, the general ly s ign i f i cant and pos i t ive C O N * B V 
indicates that investors place increased f o c u s on the book va lue of equity w h e n 
condit ional conservat i sm is h igh. Investors appear to f o c u s predominant ly on the book 
va lue o f equ i ty , c o m m o n l y used in measur ing uncondit ional c o n s e r v a t i s m , w h i c h m a y 
expla in the negat ive assoc ia t ion wi th condit ional c o n s e r v a t i s m . A high level o f 
conditional conservatism does not appear to have an impact on the emphasis investors 
place on both G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. In terms of model performance, IBES 
outperform all other models tested. 
Dur ing the G F C , BV remains strongly significant. N o n G A A P E is generally statistically 
significant and positive, indicating non-GAAP earnings are generally value relevant 
when conditional conservatism is low. In contrast, D IFF is only marginally significant 
in relation to C E and CF . C O N is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the 
interaction terms are generally not statistically significant in all models. The results 
suggests that the level of conditional conservatism has no impact on the emphasis 
investors place on the book value of equity and both G A A P and non-GAAP earnings in 
valuing a f irm not in the financial sector during the G F C . 
In the post-GFC period, there is a shift in investors' focus on earnings. Investors 
continue to focus predominantly on the book value of equity when conditional 
conservatism is low. However, when conditional conservatism is high, investors appear 
to place decreased emphasis on the book value of equity. C O N * B V is marginally 
significant and negative in relation to C O R E , C E and CF. In contrast, a high level of 
conditional conservatism does not appear to have an impact on non-GAAP earnings in 
relation to IBES . Furthermore, the results for IBES show G A A P earnings are 
incrementally value relevant and negatively associated with share price when 
conditional conservatism is low. It appears investors place greater emphasis on G A A P 
earnings, which are generally closer to, or lower than, non-GAAP earnings when 
conditional conservatism is low. However, when conditional conservatism is high, 
G A A P earnings is also incrementally value relevant but positively associated with share 
price. Based on B IC , IBES models perform best among the models tested. 
7.2.2.2.2 Model Estimation by Low and High Conditional Conservatism 
Table 7.16 show the results for the non-financial sector sample. All non-GAAP earnings 
are significant at low to moderate levels of conditional conservatism in both Model 1 
and Model 2. 
Table 7.16: Ohlson Model: Non-Financial Sector Sample - Multivariate OLS 
Regression Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and 
High/Low Asymmetric Timeliness Measure Quintiles 
Model 1: P = a„ + + p,NonGAAPE^^ + fi^DIFFl., + 
Model 2: P = a„ + P,BV, + p^NonGAAPE^, + PPIFFI^, + 
Panel A: Pre-GFC - Model 1 
CON Quinlile BV NonGAAPE DIFFl Intercept N Ad | R-
IBES Low 1.188"" 14.396""" 3.609 9 . 8 1 6 ' " 4989 0.6757 
High 1.860'" 16.439""" -9.797" 3.364 4986 0.8087 
CORK Low 1.315" ' 12.116" ' 12.477" 9.198"" 4989 0.6554 
High 2 .312" ' 6.833 8.419 2.089 4986 0.7550 
CE Low 1.296"' 12.320'" 11.724'" 9.249"" 4989 0.6560 
High 2 .342 ' " 7.069 9.021 2.302 4986 0.7556 
CF Lou 1.307"' 11.322"* 12.376" 9.243""' 4989 0.6660 
High 2 .316 ' " 7.076 6.831 2.149 4986 0.7550 
Panel B Pre-GFC - Model 2 
CON Quintilc BV NonGAAPE DIFF2 Intercept N Adj R-
IBES Lon 1.180'" 14.425'" 0.271 9 .895" ' 4989 0.6729 
High 1.893"" 16.620"' -6.592" 2.684 4986 0.8060 
CORE Low 1.527"' 7.699 0.897 8 . 9 3 1 ' " 4989 0.5932 
High 2 .344" ' 5.855 2.451 2.561 4986 0.7510 
CE Low 1.666'" 5.551 7.214" 8 .418" 4989 0.5725 
High 2 .394" ' 5.523 9.417 3.223 4986 0.7517 
CF Low 1.616"" 5.052 5.917 8 .383" 4989 0.5777 
High 2.337"" 5.596 5.333 2.706 4986 0.7505 
Panel C: GFC - Model 1 
CON Quintile BV NonGAAPE DlFFl Intercept N Adj R-
IBES Lou 1.366*" 10.713'" -2.665 6.644 1814 0.6072 
High 1.313"" 9 .285 ' " 3 .575" 8.585"" 1817 0.7220 
CORK Lou' 1.526""" 5.825 0.605 7.313 1814 0.5787 
High 1.355 '" 7 .433 ' " 5.006 9 .088" ' 1817 0.7071 
CE L o u 1.510"' 5.838 5.605 7.081 1814 0.5760 
High 1.313"' 7 .347 ' " 5.588" 9 .307" ' 1817 0.7111 
CF Lou 1.518'" 5.575 6.262" 7.020 1814 0.5802 
High 1.351 '" 6 .725" 7 . 3 9 7 ' " 8 .935 ' " 1817 0.7085 
Panel D : GFC - Model 2 
CON Quintile BV NonGAAPE D1FF2 Intercept N Adj R-
IBES Lou 1.360'" 10.816'" 0.174 6.699 1814 0.6054 
High 1.3.36'" 8 .604" ' 2 .151 ' " 9 . 1 7 0 ' " 1817 0.7237 
CORE Low 1.539"' 5.580' 2.035 7.244 1814 0.5797 
High 1.394"' 6 .499" ' 1.727" 9 . 7 1 7 ' " 1817 0.7061 
CE Lou 1.619'" 4.842' 10.479' 8.452" 1814 0.5824 
High 1.395"' 4 .367" ' 3.936 10.193" ' 1817 0.6948 
CF Lou 1.586""" 4.175' 4.779" 7.037 1814 0.5808 
High 1.415"" 3 .762" 4.304"" 10.197" ' 1817 0.6964 
P a n e l E : P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 1 
C O N Quin t i le B V N o n G A A P H : D l F F l Intercept N AdJ R-
I B K S Low 1.332"" 2 0 . 787 " ' -5.847""" 3.424 4095 0.71.55 
H igh 0 . 6 8 5 " ' 25 .248" " 3.034 9 .280 " " 4095 0 .6440 
C O R E Low 1.735"" 3.474 4 4 0 5 6.102 4095 0.6397 
High 0 . 8 2 7 " ' 19.297"' 20.966"' 10 .551 ' " 4095 0.5895 
C E t^ow 1 .786" ' 3.6.34 8 .594 6.879 4095 0.6444 
High 0 .792"* I9 . .323" 17.480" 10 .471" ' 4095 0.5911 
CE Low 1 .740 ' " 3.669 3.424 6.098 4095 0.6400 
H igh 0 . 8 2 4 " ' 19 .110" 19.581"' 10 .594" ' 4095 0.5900 
Pane l F : P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Quin t i le BV NonC iAAP f i D1FE2 Intercept N Ad i R-
I B E S Low 1 .319" ' 21 .085" " -4.492" 3.264 4095 0.7141 
H igh 0 . 6 8 9 " ' 25 . 120 ' " 0.178 9 .111" " 4095 0.6427 
C O R K Low 1 .755" ' 3.027 -1.079 6 .154 4095 0.6392 
High 0 . 9 9 9 " ' 12.494" 1.722 11.262"" 4095 0.5229 
C E L.OW 1.877"" 2.2.M 1 1.505 8.217"' 4095 0.6459 
High 0 .967" " 9.581 • 3.420 10.123"" 4095 0.5042 
C F Low 1 .765 ' " 2.796 2.537 6.248 4095 0.6385 
High 1.099"" 9.700" 9.376" 11.074""' 4095 0.4995 
' p < 0 . 0 5 , " p < O . O I . " ' p < 0.001 
t slatisUcs are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPH represents the following variables for 
IBES, C O R E , CE and CF models: IBES = l/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CE = Operating cash Hows per share. DIEFl = G A A P I minus the rele\'ant non-GAAP earnings, where G A A P l is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to e.xclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIEE2 = 
GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under GAAP . CON quintile is Low if asymmetric timeliness (AT) measure quintile is I and High if AT 
measure quintile is .S. Low and High indicate low conditional conscr\'atism and high conditional conser\atism. 
respectively. 
I B E S is s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a t b o t h l o w a n d h i g h l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m in 
b o t h m o d e l s . H o w e v e r , C O R E , C E a n d C F a r e o n l y s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a t t h e l o w 
l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i n M o d e l I . D I F F l i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d 
p o s i t i v e a t t h e l o w l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i n r e l a t i o n t o C O R E , C E a n d C F 
b u t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d n e g a t i v e a t t h e h i g h l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m 
i n r e l a t i o n t o I B E S . D I F F 2 , h o w e v e r , i s o n l y m a r g i n a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d n e g a t i v e i n 
r e l a t i o n t o I B E S a t t h e h i g h l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m a n d m a r g i n a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
a n d p o s i t i v e at t h e l o w l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m in r e l a t i o n t o C E . 
T h e r e is s o m e e v i d e n c e t h a t n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s a r e v a l u e r e l e v a n t . T h e r e is a l s o s o m e 
e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e i n c r e m e n t a l v a l u e r e l e v a n c e o f G A A P e a r n i n g s is i n c o n t r a s t w h e n 
c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m is l o w in c o m p a r i s o n t o w h e n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m is 
h i g h . H o w e v e r , it a p p e a r s t h a t i n v e s t o r s a re f o c u s e d p r e d o m i n a n t l y o n t h e b o o k v a l u e o f 
e q u i t y . 
In Pane l s C and D , the resu l t s f o r the G F C per iod are m i x e d . All n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s 
are s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t a c r o s s bo th low and h igh leve l s of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m 
in re la t ion to M o d e l 2 . In M o d e l 1, h o w e v e r , I B E S is s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t at bo th low 
and high leve ls of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m but C O R E , C E and C P are on ly s ta t i s t ica l ly 
s i gn i f i c an t at the h igh level of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . G A A P e a r n i n g s g e n e r a l l y h a v e 
inc remen ta l i n f o r m a t i o n con ten t in re la t ion n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . 
T h e resul t s f o r the p o s t - G F C per iod s h o w s o m e e v i d e n c e of a sh i f t in i n v e s t o r s ' f o c u s . 
In both M o d e l I and M o d e l 2 . I B E S is s t rong ly s ign i f i can t at bo th h igh and low leve l s 
of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . C O R E , C E and C P are s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t at the h igh 
level of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m in both M o d e l 1 and M o d e l 2 . D I P F I is s ta t i s t ica l ly 
s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive at the h igh level of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m in re la t ion to 
C O R E , C E and C P but is s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and nega t ive at the low level of 
cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m in re la t ion to I B E S . T h e resul ts of D I F P 2 in re la t ion to I B E S 
and C P are genera l ly s imi la r to D I P P l . D I P P 2 is not s ign i f i can t in re la t ion to C O R E and 
C E . 
T h e resul t s f o r the p o s t - G P C per iod s h o w that G A A P e a r n i n g s are i n c r e m e n t a l l y va lue 
r e l evan t . T h e y a l so s h o w a sh i f t in inves to r s ' f o c u s f r o m the ear l ie r p e r i o d s and are 
cons i s t en t wi th h igher leve ls of c o n s e r v a t i s m be ing a s soc ia t ed wi th h ighe r f i r m va lue . 
W h e n cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is l o w , inves tors a p p e a r to p lace g rea te r e m p h a s i s on 
G A A P e a r n i n g s . 
7.2.2.3 S&P 500 Sample 
7.2 .2 .3 .1 M o d e l Es t ima t ion wi th Main E f f e c t s and In terac t ion T e r m s 
T h e e s t ima t ion resul t s of the cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m m o d e l s wi th m a i n e f f e c t s and 
in te rac t ion va r i ab les fo r f i r m s in the S & P 5 0 0 index are p re sen t ed in T a b l e 7 . 1 7 . All 
m o d e l s are s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t ac ros s all per iod w i n d o w s . 
In the p r e - G P C pe r iod , B V is s t rong ly s ign i f i can t in all m o d e l s . N o n G A A P E and C O N , 
h o w e v e r , a re not s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t . D I P P is on ly s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t in re la t ion 
to C O R E ( M o d e l s 1 and 2) and C E ( M o d e l 2) . T h e s e resu l t s ind ica te i nves to r s f o c u s 
p r e d o m i n a n t l y on the book va lue of equ i ty . H igh cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m d o e s not 
a p p e a r to h a v e an impac t on the e m p h a s i s inves tors p lace on the book va lue of e q u i t y . 
Table 7.17: Ohison Model: S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression at 
Earnings Announcement Date by Models with Asymmetric Timeliness 
Measure Dummy and Interaction Terms as Controls 
Model 1: P = a , + + jS,N<mGAAPE^^ + P.DIFFI., + P^Con-, 
+P^Con * + p^Con * NonGAAPE., +'P^Con * DIFFl^, + 
Model 2: P, = a„ + P^BV^ + p.NonGAAPE^^ + p,DIFF2., + Pfon., 
+Pfon * BV., + pcon * NonGAAPE-, + p.Con * DIFF2., + e, 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model I Model 2 
CORE 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 
CE 
1 Model 2 
CF 
Model I Model 2 
BV 1.543"" 1.557"" 1.547'" 1.619'"" 1.546"" 1.614""" 1.543""" 1.595'" 
(10.58) (10.29) (1 1.92) (23.74) (12.39) (29.78) (12.23) (29.59) 
NonGAAPK 1.412 1.042 1.287 -0..547 1.449 -0.017 1.409 -0.034 
(0.40) (0.27) (0.44) (-0.40) (0.53) (-0.02) (0.51) (-0.03) 
DIFF 1.382 -0.524 3 .008 ' " 10.062" 2.472 3.941' 1.409 -0.023 
(0.55) (-0.71) (7.33) (2.10) (1.00) (2.24) (0.50) (-0.02) 
CON -2.864 -3.040 -2.400 -1.309 -2.466 -2.039 -2.545 -1.773 
(-0.77) (-0.81) (-0.63) (-0.32) (-0.69) (-0.48) (-0.67) (-0.42) 
C O N B V -0.518 - 0 4 9 9 -0.480 -0.243 -0.456 -0.030 -0.474 -0.094 
(-1.87) (-1.76) (-1.87) (-0.98) (-1.82) (-0.13) (-1.87) (-0.39) 
CON'NonGAAPB 15.447" 15.238" 14.287" 9.631"" 14.844"' 4 .965" 13.972"" 4.936" 
(2.79) (2.64) (3.22) (3.18) (3.41) (2.69) (3.26) (2.57) 
C O N D I F H 6.870"" 0.178 I3..542'" -17.124"" 17.720'" 7.497 14.085"" 5 .039" 
(3.41) (0.21) (4.19) (-3.10) (3.38) (1.60) (3.28) (2.69) 
Interccpl 15.467"" 15.482""" 15.202"' 15.051'"" 15.655""" 16.737"" 15.466"" 15.549'"" 
(7.99) (7.70) (7.72) (7.24) (7.70) (7.55) (7.76) (7.82) 
N 2242 2242 2242 2242 2242 2242 2242 2242 
Adj 0.9340 0.9335 0.9.H40 0.9330 0.9347 0.9302 0.9338 0.9291 
BIC 20463 20477 20453 20494 20436 20585 20461 20614 
BIC Rank 4 5 2 6 1 7 3 8 
Panel B: G F C Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 0 .513" ' 0.513'"" 0.816"" 0.827"'" 0 .862 ' " 0.958'"" 0 .873" ' 0.927""" 
(5.47) (5.88) (4.99) (5.93) (4.88) (9.15) (4.76) (8.72) 
NonGAAPE 18.643""' 19.128"" 9.619 9.600' 9.647 8.076' 9.524 7.696" 
(5.93) (6.12) (1.55) (2.07) (1.62) (2.49) (1.54) (2.12) 
DIFF -5 .661 ' " -0.470 0.373 2.629 9.817 14.505""" 9.632 7.792" 
(-13.35) (-0.14) (0.04) (0.81) (1.71) (3.70) (1.-59) (2.21) 
CON -9 .545 ' " -7 .541" -12.291" ' -9 .577" -9.575"" -11.176"" -9 .811" -8.461" 
(-4.36) (-3.06) (-3.58) (-3.19) (-3.09) (-3.40) (-2.92) (-2.37) 
CON'BV 0.831"" 0 .832" ' 0.544' 0.526"" 0.477" 0..38I" 0.502' 0.438' 
(5.41) (5.54) (2.52) (2.63) (2.13) (2.23) (2.15) (2.55) 
C O N ' N o n G A A P E -12 .747 ' " -13 .223" ' -5.032 -5.338 -5.157 -3.960 -5.249 -3.906 
(-5.04) (-5.19) (-0.85) (-1.18) (-0.93) (-1.31) (-0.92) (-1.17) 
CON'DIFF 8 . 5 1 8 " ' 3.093 4.095 1.342 -7.139 -1 1.425" -4.726 -3.403 
(5.83) (1.20) (0.44) (0.55) ( - I . I I ) (-2.56) (-0.84) (-1.03) 
Inlercept 23 .186" ' 22.513"" 26.506""" 26.167"" 24.331""" 27.610"" 24 .107 ' " 2 5 4 1 4 " ' 
(9.09) (8.45) (8.67) (9.44) (8.98) (9.21) (8.45) (8.30) 
N 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 
Adj R- 0.8467 0.8471 0.8350 0.8354 0.8352 0.8354 0.8444 0.8440 
BIC 8401 8405 8472 8490 8477 8476 8413 8423 
BIC Rank 1 2 5 8 7 6 3 4 
Panel C: Pos t -GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Mode! 2 
C O R E 
Model 1 Model 2 
C E 
Model 1 Model 2 
CF 
Model 1 Mode l 2 
BV 0,606 ' 0 ,607 ' 0 , 5 9 6 " 0,705"" 0 ,461 ' 0 ,582 ' 0,543"" 0 , 7 8 3 " ' 
(2,51) (2,19) (2.92) (3,24) (2,42) (2,57) (2,72) (3,47) 
N o n G A A P E 1,597'"' 31 ,605"" 2 6 , 4 0 8 " ' 24 ,800"" 26 ,623"" 19,633"" 2 6 , 2 5 7 ' " 1 8 , 4 3 2 " ' 
( .^98) (3,80) (3,81) (3,75) (3,92) (3,68) (3,82) (3 ,35) 
DIFF -0 ,306 -1 ,690 15,415 -3 ,202 22,044" 10,799 27 ,199"" 18 ,863" 
(-0,03) (-0,.54) (1..37) (-0,99) (2,56) (1.21) (3,75) (3,25) 
C O N -1,996 -1 ,606 -5,155 -4 ,609 -5,731 -5 ,956 -5 ,576 -6 ,377 
(-0,27) (-0.22) (-0.89) (-0,79) (-0,99) (-1,05) (-0,93) ( -1 .09) 
C O N ' B V 0,021 0.016 0 .127 0,001 0 ,250 0 ,074 0,282 0 .044 
(0,07) (0.05) (0.50) (0,01) (0,79) (0,21) (0,97) (0.17) 
C O N ' N o n G A A P H -3,714 -3.161 -2 .584 -0,822 -6,221 -2 ,299 -6 ,504 -0 ,942 
(-0,32) (-0.27) (-0.26) (-0,09) (-0,60) (-0,28) ( -0 ,62) ( -0 ,11) 
C O N ' D I F F 2,107 6.073 -11.112 1,583 -6,921 -2 ,574 -7,317 -1 ,466 
(0,22) (1..30) (-0,82) (0,34) (-0,63) (-0,20) (-0,69) ( -0 ,17) 
Intercept 12,356 12.156 19.249"" 19 ,194" ' 19,.370"' 2 2 , 0 7 8 " ' 19,029""" 2 2 , 7 3 9 " ' 
(1,94) (1,89) (4,35) (3,98) (4,81) (5,15) (4,30) (4,70) 
N 2214 2214 2214 2214 2214 2214 2214 2 2 1 4 
Ad j 0,5832 0,5882 0,-5462 0 ,5433 0,5248 0 ,4767 0,5191 0,4681 
BIC 225.36 22509 22724 22739 22826 23040 22845 23076 
BIC Rank 2 1 3 4 5 7 6 8 
• p < 0.05, •• p < 0.01, ••• p < 0.001 
t statistics itl parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable. P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows; BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES, CORE, CE and CF models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash flows per share. fJlFF represents DlFFl in Model I and D1FF2 in Model 2. DlFFl = GAAPl 
minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPl is earnings per share from operations adjusted to excludc the 
effects of special items reported under GAAP, D1FF2 = GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where 
GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share reported under GAAP. CON = 1 if asymmetric timeliness 
(AT) measure quintile is .5 and 0 if AT measure quintile is 1. CON'BV = Interaction term of AT measure with book 
value of common equity per share. CON'NonGAAPE = Interaction term of AT measure with the corresponding non-
GAAP earnings measure of IBES, CORE, CE and CF. CON'DIFF - Interaction term of AT measure with the 
corresponding DIFF measure of DlFFl and DIFF2. 
H o w e v e r , w h e n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m is h i g h , n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s a r e v a l u e 
r e l e v a n t in a l l m o d e l s . F u r t h e r m o r e . G A A P e a r n i n g s a r e i n c r e m e n t a l l y v a l u e r e l e v a n t 
w h e n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i s h i g h . In t e r m s o f m o d e l p e r f o r m a n c e , C E M o d e l I a n d 
C O R E M o d e l 1 p e r f o r m b e s t a m o n g t h e m o d e l s t e s t e d . 
D u r i n g t h e G F C , t h e r e is a n o b s e r v a b l e s h i f t in i n v e s t o r s ' f o c u s in r e l a t i o n t o n o n -
G A A P e a r n i n g s . B V r e m a i n s s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t in al l m o d e l s . G e n e r a l l y , n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e , i n d i c a t i n g i n v e s t o r s f i n d n o n - G A A P 
e a r n i n g s v a l u e r e l e v a n t w h e n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i s l o w . D I F F is s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t a n d n e g a t i v e in r e l a t i o n t o I B E S M o d e l I . b u t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d 
p o s i t i v e in r e l a t i o n t o C E M o d e l 2 a n d C F M o d e l 2 , T h e r e s u l t s p r o v i d e s o m e e v i d e n c e 
t h a t G A A P e a r n i n g s a r e i n c r e m e n t a l l y v a l u e r e l e v a n t in r e l a t i o n t o I B E S , C E a n d C F . 
C O N is s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d n e g a t i v e in a l l m o d e l s , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t c o n d i t i o n a l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m is nega t ive ly assoc ia ted witii share pr ice . W h e n condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m 
is h igh , inves tors a p p e a r to p lace increased e m p h a s i s on the book value of equi ty -
C O N * B V is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and posi t ive in all mode l s . C O N * N o n G A A P E is 
on ly s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and nega t ive in relation to I B E S . It appea r s that w h e n 
condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is h igh , inves tors appea r to dec rease the e m p h a s i s they place 
on I B E S in c o m p a r i s o n to w h e n condi t iona l conse rva t i sm is l ow. T h e r e is weak 
e v i d e n c e that G A A P e a r n i n g s are incrementa l ly va lue re levant w h e n condi t iona l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m is high in relat ion to I B E S and C E . Based on B I C . IBES m o d e l s 
o u t p e r f o r m all o the r m o d e l s t es ted . 
In the p o s t - G F C pe r iod , there is a sh i f t in inves tors ' f o c u s on the book value of equi ty 
and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . Whi l e BV is stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t in all m o d e l s , the level of 
s i gn i f i cance is genera l ly lower in compar i son to the level of s ign i f i cance in both the 
p r e - G F C and G F C per iods . In con t ras t . N o n G A A P E is s t rongly s ign i f ican t in all 
m o d e l s . T h e s e resul ts indicate a shif t in inves tors ' f o c u s be tween the p r e - G F C per iod 
and the p o s t - G F C per iod . In the p o s t - G F C per iod , investors p lace grea ter e m p h a s i s on 
n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s in c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C per iod. D I F F is only stat ist ical ly 
s ign i f i can t in relat ion to C E and C F . G A A P ea rn ings d o not appea r to be incrementa l ly 
va lue re levant in relat ion to I B E S and C O R E . Fur the rmore , C O N and all in teract ion 
t e r m s are not stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t in all mode l s . T h e s e results indicate that high 
cond i t iona l conse rva t i sm does not have any impac t on the value re levance of book value 
of equi ty and both G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings to inves tors . In t e rms of model 
p e r f o r m a n c e , I B E S m o d e l s p e r f o r m best a m o n g the mode l s tes ted . 
7 .2 .2 .3 .2 Mode l Es t imat ion by Low and High Condi t iona l Conse r va t i sm 
T a b l e 7 . 1 8 s h o w s the es t imat ion resul ts by low and high condi t ional conse rva t i sm fo r 
the S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e . All n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t ac ross all 
l eve ls of condi t iona l conse rva t i sm excep t at low level f o r both Model 1 and Mode l 2. 
T h e resul ts s h o w that G A A P ea rn ings are genera l ly incrementa l ly va lue re levan t . D I F F I 
is s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and posi t ive at high level of condi t ional conse rva t i sm in 
re la t ion to all n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s . D I F F I is a l so s igni f icant and posi t ive at the low 
level of condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m in relat ion to C O R E . 
Table 7.18: Ohison Model: S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and High/Low 
Asymmetric Timeliness Measure Quintiles 
Model 1: = a „ + l),BV + p,NonGAAPE^^ + P,DIFFI„ + e„ 
Model 2: P = a„ + + P^NonGAAPE^, + P,DIFF2^, + e , 
Panel A: P r e - G F C - M o d e l 1 
C O N Quinl i le BV N o n G A A P E D l F F l Intercept N A d j 
IBES Low 1 .543"" 1.412 1.382 1 5 . 4 6 7 " ' 1121 0 . 9 5 2 9 
High 1 . 0 2 5 ' " 1 6 . 8 6 0 " ' 8 . 2 5 2 " ' 1 2 . 6 0 3 ' " 1121 0 .8088 
C O R E Low 1 . 5 4 7 " ' 1.287 3 . 0 0 8 " ' 15 .202"" 1121 0 . 9 5 3 5 
High 1.068*" 15 .574"" 16..549"" 1 2 . 8 0 1 ' " 1121 0 .8058 
C E Low 1 . 5 4 6 " ' 1.449 2 .472 15.655""' 1121 0 .9531 
High 1 . 0 9 0 " ' 1 6 . 2 9 3 ' " 2 0 . 1 9 2 ' " 13 .189"" 1121 0 .8135 
C F Low 1.54.V" 1.409 1.409 15 .466"" 1121 0 . 9 5 2 9 
High 1 .069"" 15.-381'" 1 5 . 4 9 3 ' " 12 .921"" 1121 0 . 8 0 7 5 
Panel B; P r e - G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Quint i le BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 Intercept N A d j R-
IBES Low 1.557"" 1.042 -0 .524 15 .482"" 1121 0 . 9 5 2 9 
High 1 . 0 5 8 ' " 16 .280"" -0..346 12 .442"" 1121 0 . 8 0 5 7 
C O R E Low 1 . 6 1 9 ' " -0 .547 10.062" 1 5 . 0 5 1 ' " 1121 0 . 9 5 5 0 
High 1.376""" 9 . 0 8 4 " " - 7 . 0 6 3 " 13 .742"" 1121 0 .7878 
C E Low 1.614"" -0 .017 3.941" 16 .737"" 1121 0 . 9 5 3 2 
High 1 .584"" 4 . 9 4 8 ' 11.438" 14.699""" 1121 0 .7792 
C F Low 1.595""" -0.0.34 -0 .023 15 .549"" 1121 0 .9528 
High 1 .501"" 4.902" 5.016" 1 3 . 7 7 5 ' " 1 121 0 . 7 7 3 0 
Panel C : G F C - M o d e l 1 
C O N Quint i le BV N o n G A A P E D I F F l Intercept N A d j 
I B E S Low 0 . 5 1 3 " " 18.643""" - 5 . 6 6 1 " " 2 3 . 1 8 6 ' " 4 3 9 0 .7642 
High 1.344""" 5 .896 2.857""" 13 .642"" 4 3 9 0 .8803 
C O R E Low 0 . 8 1 6 " " 9 .619 0 .373 26.506""" 4 3 9 0 . 7 3 0 9 
High 1.360""" 4.588""" 4.468""" 14 .215"" 4 3 9 0 .8773 
C E L o u 0.862""" 9 .647 9 .817 2 4 . 3 3 1 " " 4 3 9 0 . 7 2 6 9 
High 1.3.39"" 4.490""" 2 . 6 7 9 " 14 .757"" 4 3 9 0 . 8 7 9 3 
C F Low 0.873""" 9 .524 9 .632 2 4 . 1 0 7 " " 4 3 9 0 . 7 2 7 0 
High 1.375""" 4.275""" 4 . 9 0 6 " " 14 .296"" 4 3 9 0 . 8 9 2 2 
Panel D ; G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Quint i le BV N o n G A A P E D1FF2 Intercept N A d j R-
I B E S Low 0 . 5 1 3 " " 19 .128"" -0 .470 2 2 . 5 1 3 " " 4 3 9 0 . 7 6 1 3 
High 1.345""" 5 .905 2 . 6 2 3 " " 14 .971"" 4 3 9 0 . 8 8 2 0 
C O R E Low 0.827""" 9 .600 ' 2 .629 2 6 . 1 6 7 " " 4 3 9 0 . 7 3 1 6 
High 1.353""" 4.262""' 3 .971 ' 16 .590"" 4 3 9 0 . 8 7 7 6 
C E Low 0 . 9 5 8 ' " 8.076" 14.,505"" 2 7 . 6 1 0 " ' 4 3 9 0 . 7 3 1 4 
High 1 . 3 3 9 ' " 4 . 1 1 6 " " 3 .080 1 6 . 4 3 4 " ' 4 3 9 0 .8778 
C F Low 0 . 9 2 7 " ' 7.696" 7 . 7 9 2 ' 2 5 . 4 1 4 " ' 4 3 9 0 . 7 2 8 2 
High 1 .365"" 3 . 7 8 9 " " 4 . 3 8 9 " " 1 6 . 9 5 3 " ' 4 3 9 0 .891 1 
P a n e l E P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 1 
C O N Q u i n t i l e BV N o n G A A P E D I E F i In te rcept N A d j R= 
I B E S Low 0 .606" 31.597""" - 0 . 3 0 6 12..356 1107 0 . 4 0 6 6 
H i g h 0 . 6 2 7 " 27.883"" 1.801 1 0 . 3 5 9 " " 1107 0 . 6 4 5 4 
C O R E L o w 0.596"" 2 6 . 4 0 8 " " 15 .415 19.249""" 1107 0..3615 
H i g h amy" 2 3 . 8 2 4 " 4 . 3 0 3 14.094'"" 1107 0.61 12 
C E L o w 0 .461" 2 6 . 6 2 3 " " 2 2 . 0 4 4 ' I 9 . 3 7 0 ' " 1107 0 . 3 6 1 5 
High 0 . 7 1 1 " 20 .402" 15 .123 ' 1 3 . 6 3 9 ' " 1107 0 . 5 8 2 0 
C F L o w 0 . 5 4 3 " 26.257""" 2 7 . 1 9 9 ' " 1 9 . 0 2 9 ' " 1107 0 . 3 6 3 2 
H i g h 0 . 8 2 5 " ' 19.753" 19.882" 1 3 . 4 5 3 " " 1107 0 . 5 7 3 6 
P a n e l F : P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Q u i n t i l e BV N o n C i A A P E D I F F 2 In te rcep t N A d j R-
I B E S L o u 0 .607" 31.605""" - 1 . 6 9 0 12 .156 1107 0 . 4 0 7 0 
High 0 . 6 2 . r " 28 .444" ' 4 . 3 8 3 1 0 . 5 5 0 ' " 1107 0 . 6 5 2 2 
C O R E I ,ow 0 .705" ' 2 4 . 8 0 0 " ' - 3 . 2 0 2 1 9 . 1 9 4 " " 1107 0.3.558 
H i g h 0.706""" 23.978"" - 1 . 6 1 9 I4 . .585"" 1107 0 . 6 0 9 3 
C E L o w 0 .582" 1 9 . 6 3 3 " " 10 .799 22.078""" 1107 0 . 3 2 0 0 
High 0 . 6 5 6 ' 17.3.34" 8 . 2 2 5 1 6 . 1 2 2 " " 1107 0 . 5 3 1 3 
C E Low 0.783""" 18.432""" 1 8 . 8 6 3 " 22.739""" 1107 0 . 3 1 2 7 
H i g h 0 . 8 2 6 " " 17 .490 ' 1 7 . 3 9 7 " 16.362""" 1107 0 . 5 2 2 2 
• p < 0 . 0 5 . " p < 0 . 0 1 , " > < 0 . 0 0 1 
t statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time (fiscal quarters). 
The dependent \ar iable . P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPH represents the following variables for 
IBES, C O R E . CE and CF models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
St&P Core earnings per share. CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses. 
CF = Operating cash f lows per share. f^lFFl = G A A P l minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPI is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to exclude the effects of special items reported under GAAP. DIFF2 = 
GAAP2 minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under G A A P . CON quintile is Low if asymmetric timeliness (AT) measure quintile is I and High if AT 
measure quintile is 5. Low and High indicate low conditional conservatism and high conditional conservatism, 
respectively. 
D I F F 2 i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a t b o t h l o w a n d h i g h l e v e l s o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m 
i n r e l a t i o n t o C O R E a n d C E . D I F F 2 i s a l s o s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t in r e l a t i o n t o C F a t 
t h e h i g h l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m . A l l n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e a t t h e h i g h l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m b u t a r e n o t 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a t t h e l o w l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m in b o t h M o d e l 1 a n d 
M o d e l 2 
I n t h e G F C p e r i o d , C O R E , C E a n d C F a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a t t h e h i g h l e v e l o f 
c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m a n d I B E S i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a t t h e l o w l e v e l o f 
c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i n M o d e l 1. I n M o d e l 2 , C O R E , C E a n d C F a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e a t b o t h l e v e l s o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m b u t I B E S i s o n l y 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a t t h e l o w l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m . D I F F I i s 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d p o s i t i v e i n r e l a t i o n t o a l l n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s a t t h e h i g h 
l e v e l o f c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m b u t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a n d n e g a t i v e i n r e l a t i o n 
t o I B E S . D I F F 2 , h o w e v e r , i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t w h e n c o n d i t i o n a l c o n s e r v a t i s m i s 
high is re la t ion to I B E S , C O R E and C P but is s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t and pos i t i ve at the 
low level of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m in re la t ion to C E . T h e resu l t s s h o w that G A A P 
e a r n i n g s gene ra l ly have inc remen ta l va lue r e l e v a n c e at both l eve l s of c o n d i t i o n a l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m , but the resul t s are w e a k e r at the low level of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . 
In the p o s t - G F C pe r iod , all n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s are s ta t i s t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t and pos i t ive 
at bo th low and high levels of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m fo r M o d e l I and M o d e l 2 . 
D I F F I is not s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t in re la t ion to I B E S and C O R E but it is s ta t i s t ica l ly 
s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive in re la t ion to C E and C F f o r both l eve l s of c o n d i t i o n a l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m . D I F F 2 is s ta t is t ical ly s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive on ly in re la t ion to C F . 
G e n e r a l l y , the resul t s s h o w a sh i f t in i nves to r s ' f o c u s to B V in the p o s t - G F C per iod in 
c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C and G F C pe r iods . T h e resul ts f o r n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s a l so 
s h o w an increased e m p h a s i s on these e a r n i n g s in the p o s t - G F C per iod in c o m p a r i s o n to 
the p r e - G F C and G F C pe r iod . G A A P e a r n i n g s have inc remen ta l va lue r e l e v a n c e in 
re la t ion to C O R E , C E and C F . but not in re la t ion to I B E S in the p o s t - G F C pe r iod . 
C o n s i s t e n t wi th my resul t s in T a b l e 7 . 1 7 Panel C , the m a g n i t u d e of BV and its level of 
s tat is t ical s i g n i f i c a n c e in both M o d e l 1 and M o d e l 2 are genera l ly s m a l l e r in the pos t -
G F C per iod in c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C and G F C pe r iods . In t e re s t ing ly , in Pane l s E 
and F, the m a g n i t u d e of s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t BV is genera l ly la rger at the h i g h , in 
c o m p a r i s o n to the l o w , level of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . In con t r a s t , s ta t i s t ica l ly 
s ign i f i can t N o n G A A P E , D I F F I and D I F F 2 are genera l ly lower at the h igh l eve l , in 
c o m p a r i s o n to the l o w . level of cond i t i on c o n s e r v a t i s m . It a p p e a r s i nves to r s t r ade of f the 
e m p h a s i s they place on the book va lue of equi ty and e a r n i n g s . T h i s is a l so c o n s i s t e n t 
wi th the a r g u m e n t that cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m m a y be nega t ive ly re la ted to 
uncond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . 
7.2.2.4 Non-S&P 500 Sample 
7.2 .2 .4 .1 M o d e l Es t ima t ion wi th Ma in E f f e c t s and In terac t ion T e r m s 
T a b l e 7 . 1 9 p resen t s the e s t ima t ion resul t s of the cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m m o d e l s wi th 
m a i n e f f e c t s and in terac t ion va r i ab l e s f o r the N o n - S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e . All m o d e l s are 
s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t ac ros s all per iod w i n d o w s . 
Table 7.19: Ohison Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
at Earnings Announcement Date by Models with Asymmetric 
Timeliness Measure Dummy and Interaction Terms as Controls 
Model 1: P = a„ + + /j./VonC/MPf + P OIFFI-^ + ppin.^ 
+p£<m * BV., + p con * NonGAAPE., * DIFFI-, + 
Model 2: = a „ + P^BV^ + P,NUNGAAPE^^ + P,DIFF2., + PFON^, 
+PFON * "BV., + P^Con * NonGAAPE-, +'pXon * dW2„ + 
Panel A: Pre-GFC Period 
IBES 
Model 1 Model 2 
CORE 
Model I Model 2 Model 
CE 
1 Model 2 
CF 
Model I Model 2 
BV 1.322"" 1.327"" 1.377'" 1.432"' 1.370"" • 1.442""' 1.376"" • 1.438"" 
(14.38) (13.60) (19.29) (24.91) (16.85) (18.98) (18.84) (20.20) 
NonGAAI'H 10.868" 10.601" 8.764" 8.214' 8.822" 5.931 8.438" 5.730" 
(2.52) (2.40) (2..30) (2.23) (2.23) (1.78) (241) (2.03) 
DIFF 3.752 1787 8.001' 0.124 8.568" 6.530'" 8.795" 5.998 
(1.56) (1.30) (2..39) (0.14) (2.57) (2.74) (2.30) (1.89) 
CON 1.435 0.791 1.593 1.731 -0.376 -2.629 1.615 1.394 
(0.32) (0.17) (0.27) (0.29) (-0.07) (-0.51) (0.27) (0.24) 
CON'BV -0.308 -0.348 -0.005 -0.044 -0.031 -0.157 -0.004 -0.051 
(-0.73) (-0.79) (-0.01) (-0.08) (-0.06) (-0.31) (-0.01) (-0.09) 
CON'NonGAAPH 8.774 10.230' -3.194 -3.128 -3.985 -1.420 -2.632 -0.474 
(1.87) (2.16) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.43) (-0.19) (-0.29) (-0.06) 
CON'DIFF -22.585"' • -17.509" -2.700 4.515 -15.652 -22.608 -3.202 -0.946 
(-3.45) (-2.72) (-0.32) (1.04) (-1.38) (-1.79) (-0.35) (-0.13) 
Intercept 8.333"' 8.418'" 8.478"' • 8.498'" 8.455"' • 8.959"" 8.440"" 8.834"" 
(9.83) (10.02) (9.05) (9.71) (8.81) (8.64) (9.03) (8.90) 
N 8978 8978 8978 8978 8978 8978 8978 8978 
Adj 0.7478 0.7433 0.6550 0.6536 0.6689 0.6693 0.6558 0.6479 
BIC 85542 85703 88356 88392 87987 87978 88328 88530 
BIC Rank 1 2 6 7 4 3 5 8 
Panel B: GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.099""" 1.101"' 1.250"' 1.257""" 1.240""' 1.245""" 1.245""" 1.251"' 
(6.35) (6.33) (6.40) (6.34) (6.42) (6.22) (6.45) (6.23) 
NOHGAAPF; 10.506" 10.459" 3.533 3.084 3.642 3.343 3.518 3.148" 
(2.63) (2.60) (1.52) (1.36) (1.53) (1.79) (1.93) (2.46) 
DIFF 0.317 0.501 4.541 4.055"" 1.896 1 901 3.846 3.445 
(0.31) (0..56) (1.85) (3.30) (0.60) (0.63) (1-54) (1.74) 
CON 1.761 2.196 0.790 1.347 1.445 0.803 0.819 1.245 
(0.45) (0.60) (0.19) (0.35) (0.39) (0.22) (0.22) (0.34) 
CON'BV -0.058 -0.051 -0.187 -0.187 -0.198 -0.205 -0.180 -0.187 
(-0.19) (-0.17) (-0.59) (-0.59) (-0.68) (-0.70) (-0.65) (-0.66) 
CON'NonGAAPF -8.475" -8.444' -1.814 -1.488 -1.926 -1.488 -2.136 -1.655 
(-2.00) (-2.00) (-0.70) (-0.58) (-0.74) (-0.73) (-1.14) (-1.21) 
CON'DIFF 0.742 1.041 -2.280 -1.250 -2.778 -3.478 -2.106 -1.631 
(0.81) (1.42) (-0.80) (-0.67) (-0.73) (-0.71) (-0.79) (-0.78) 
Intercept 7.351" 7.358' 8.097" 8.280" 7.776" 7.958"" 8.18.r 8.3.38" 
(2.42) (2.44) (2.33) (2.41) (2.33) (2.63) (2.39) (2.46) 
N 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 
Adj R- 0.6638 0.6662 0.6459 0.6495 0.6506 0.6502 0.6465 0.6493 
BIC 30002 29979 .30171 30138 .30144 30148 30166 30140 
BIC Rank 2 1 8 3 5 6 7 4 
Panel C: Post-GFC Period 
IBES CORE CE CF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
BV 1.067"" 1.057"" 1.212"" 1.213""" 1.194"" 1.205"" 1.187"" 1.197"" 
(4.33) (4.32) (3.72) (3,82) (3.65) (3.63) (3.72) (3.74) 
NonGAAPE 10.92.V 11.290" 1.368 1.987 1.398 0.848 1.342 0.863 
(2.55) (2.-59) (0.37) (0.52) (041) (0.33) (0.43) (0.37) 
DIFF -4.428 -3.-503 -4.344 -6.042 2.317 1.707 1.306 0.827 
(-1.74) (-1.57) (-0.98) ( -141) (0.59) (0.50) (0.39) (0.32) 
CON -0.086 0.025 -1.168 -0.785 -2.065 -4.067 -1.342 -1..361 
(-0.02) (0.01) (-0.24) (-0.16) (-0.44) (-0.88) (-0.27) (-0.28) 
CON'BV -0.085 -0.074 -0.204 -0.171 -0.187 -0.180 -0.175 -0.153 
(-0.33) (-0.29) (-0.60) (-0.52) (-0.55) (-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.46) 
CON'NonGAAPH -5.171 -5.593 2.305 0.296 2.348 1,446 2.549 1.714 
(-1.07) (-1.16) (0.59) (0.07) (0.66) (0.52) (0.79) (0.68) 
CON'DIFF 4.636 3.696 7.840 8.246 -1.0.58 -8.205 2.204 1.338 
(1.82) (1.48) (1.58) (1.76) (-0.25) (-1.86) (0.61) (0.48) 
Intercept 7.837 7.733 9.235' 8.843 9.511' 9.570" 9410" 9.428" 
(1.79) (1.75) (1.96) (1.83) (2.08) (2.12) (1.98) (1.98) 
N 71.36 71.36 7136 71.^6 71.36 71.^6 71.^6 71.36 
Adj R" 0.7168 0.7162 0.6828 0.6845 0.6823 0.6837 0.6800 0.6793 
BIC 65735 65748 66544 66506 66554 66522 66588 66603 
BIC Rank 1 2 5 3 6 4 7 8 
• p < 0 .05 , " p < 0.01, ••• p < 0.001 
t statistics in parentheses and calculated with standard errors clustered on f i rm and t ime (fiscal quarters) . 
T h e dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
def ined as fol lows: BV = Book value of c o m m o n equity per share. N o n G A A P E represents the fo l lowing variables for 
IBES, C O R E , C E and C F models: IBES = 1/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts . C O R E = 
S & P Core earnings per share. C E = Net income per share, af ter adding back depreciat ion and amort isat ion expenses . 
C F = Operat ing cash f lows per share. DIFF represents D l F F l in Model 1 and D1FF2 in Model 2. D I F F l = G A A P l 
minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings, where G A A P l is earnings per share f r o m operat ions adjusted to exclude the 
e f fec ts of special i tems reported under G A A P . D1FF2 = G A A P 2 minus the relevant n o n - G A A P earnings , where 
G A A P 2 is income before extraordinary i tems per share reported under G A A P . C O N = 1 if asymmetr ic t imel iness 
(AT) measure quintile is 5 and 0 if A T measure quintile is 1. C O N ' B V = Interaction term of A T measure with book 
value of common equity per share. C O N ' N o n G A A P E = Interaction term of A T measure with the corresponding non-
G A A P earnings measure of IBES, C O R E , C E and CF. C O N ' D I F F = Interaction term of A T measure with the 
corresponding DIFF measure of D l F F l and DIFF2 . 
In the pre -GFC period. B V is strongly s ign i f i cant in all m o d e l s . N o n G A A P E is 
marginal ly s ign i f i cant and pos i t ive in all m o d e l s e x c e p t C E M o d e l 2 . D I F F is o n l y 
statist ical ly s igni f icant and pos i t ive in relation to C O R E Mode l I , C E M o d e l s 1 and 2 , 
and C F Mode l I. C O N is not statistically s ign i f i cant . T h e s e results s h o w that inves tors 
f ind n o n - G A A P earnings value relevant at the l ow level o f condi t ional c o n s e r v a t i s m . 
There is s o m e e v i d e n c e that G A A P earnings are incrementa l ly va lue re levant , but o n l y 
in relation to C O R E , C E and CF, A high level o f condit ional c o n s e r v a t i s m appears to 
impact o n l y on investors ' e m p h a s i s on G A A P and n o n - G A A P in relation to I B E S . 
Interest ingly . C O N * D I F F is statist ical ly s ign i f i cant and n e g a t i v e , w h i c h indicates that 
investors decrease the e m p h a s i s they place on G A A P earnings w h e n condi t iona l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m is high. I B E S m o d e l s perform best a m o n g the m o d e l s tested based on 
BIC. 
During the G F C , investors continue to focus on the book value of equity, which does 
not appear to be impacted by the level of conditional conservatism. When conditional 
conservatism is low, only IBES and C F are statistically significant and positive. 
However, when conditional conservatism is high, IBES is marginally significant and 
negative. This indicates IBES is positively associated with share price when conditional 
conservatism is low but is negatively associated with share price when conditional 
conservatism is high. C O N and C O N * B V are not statistically significant. 
The results for the post-GFC period are generally similar to the results of the G F C 
period. BV is strongly significant in all models. N o n G A A P E is only significant and 
positive in relation to IBES . All other variables are not statistically significant. These 
results show that investors are focused predominantly on the book value of equity. 
There is some evidence investors shift focus away from C O R E , CE , C F and G A A P 
earnings in the G F C and post-GFC period in comparison to the pre-GFC period. In 
terms of model performance, IBES models perform best among all models tested based 
on B IC . 
7.2.2.4.2 Model Estimation by Low and High Conditional Conservatism 
Table 7.20 show the estimation results by low and high conditional conservatism for the 
non-S&P 500 sample. BV is statistically significant in both Model I and Model 2 in 
relation to all non-GAAP earnings. In Panel A , C O R E , C E and C F are marginally 
significant and positive when conditional conservatism is low. IBES , however, is 
statistically significant at both low and high levels of conditional conservatism. D l F F l 
is marginally significant and positive when conditional conservatism is low in relation 
to C O R E , C E and C F but is moderately significant and negative at the high level of 
conditional conservatism in relation to IBES. The results for Model 2 in Panel B are 
generally similar to Model 1 in Panel A . 
In the G F C period, BV is strongly significant in both Model 1 and Model 2 in relation 
to all non-GAAP earnings. IBES is moderately significant and positive at the low level 
of conditional conservatism for both Model 1 and Model 2. C O R E , C E and C F are not 
significant in Model 1. However, in Model 2 (Panel D ) , C E is marginally significant at 
the high level of conditional conservatism and C F is marginally significant at the low 
level of conditional conservatism. 
26.1 
Table 7.20: Ohlson Model: Non-S&P 500 Sample - Multivariate OLS Regression 
Results at Earnings Announcement Date by Models and High/Low 
Asymmetric Timeliness Measure Quintiles 
Model 1: P = a„ + + l},NonGAAPE, + PM/FFI,, + 
Model 2: P = a„ + + p,NonGAAPE^, + P,D1FF2„ + 
Panel A: Pre-GFC - Model I 
C O N Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFFl Inlereepl N A d j 
IBES Low 1.322"" 10.868" 3.752 8 .341"" 4483 0.8201 
High 1.014" 19.642""" -18.842"" 9 .772 ' 4481 0 .6996 
C O R E Low 1 .ill'" 8.764" 7.999" 8 . 4 8 6 ' " 4483 0 .8074 
High 1.372* 5.577 5.245 10.060 4481 0 .5535 
C E Low 1.369"" 8.822" 8.569" 8 . 4 6 3 " ' 4483 0 .8074 
High 1.339" 4.842 -7 .130 8 .050 4481 0.5768 
C F Low 1.376""" 8.438" 8.795" 8 . 4 4 8 ' " 4483 0 .8089 
High 1.372" 5.809 5.597 10.044 4481 0 .5537 
Panel B : P r e - G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIFF2 Intercept N A d j R-
IBES Low 1 321"' 10.601" 1.787 8.426""" 4483 0 .8179 
High 0.979" 20.842""" - 1 5 . 7 8 5 " 9.221" 4481 0 .6937 
C O R E Low 1.432""" 8.214" 0.125 8.506""" 4483 0.8041 
High 1.388" 5.104 4.616 10.212 4481 0 .5534 
C E Lou 1.441"" 5.931 6 . 5 3 2 " 8.968""" 4483 0.7888 
High 1.285"' 4 .523 -16.065 6.313 4481 0 .5897 
CE Low 1.438"" 5.730" 5.998 8 .843"" 4483 0.7895 
High 1.387" 5.269 5.065 10.214 4481 0 .5536 
Panel C : GFC - Model 1 
C O N Quinti le BV N o n G A A P E DIFFI Intercept N A d j 
IBES Low 1.099""" 10.509" 0.317 7 .360 ' 1623 0.7295 
High 1.041"" 2.031 1.060 9.119"" 1622 0 .5554 
C O R E Low 1.250"" 3.534 4.541 8.101" 1623 0 .7012 
High 1.063""" 1.719 2.263 8.892"" 1622 0 .5538 
C E Lou 1.240"" 3.642 1.897 7.780" 1623 0.7021 
High 1.042"" 1.716 -0.881 9 . 2 2 9 " 1622 0 .5647 
C F Low 1.245"" 3.519 3.846 8 .188 ' 1623 0.7018 
High 1.064""" 1.382 1.740 9.008"" 1622 0.5545 
Panel D: GFC - Model 2 
C O N Quintile BV N o n G A A P E DIKF2 Intercept N A d j 
IBES Low 1.101"" 10.462" 0.501 7 .366 ' 1623 0 .7297 
High 1.050"" 2.015 1.543 9 .563"" 1622 0 .5613 
C O R E Low 1.257"" 3.084 4 . 0 5 5 " 8.284" 1623 0 .7016 
High 1.071"" 1.595 2 . 8 0 6 " 9.636""' 1622 0 .5629 
C E Lou 1.245""" 3.343 1.902 7.962"" 1623 0 .7016 
High 1.039"" 1.855" -1.572 8.768""" 1622 0.5645 
C F Low 1.251"" 3.149" 3.445 8 .342 ' 1623 0 .7020 
High 1.064"" 1.493 1.814" 9 . 5 9 1 ' " 1622 0 .5616 
P a n e l E : P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 1 
C O N Q u i n t i l e BV N o n G A A P E D I F F I In te rcep t N A d j R-
I B E S L o w 
H i o h 
1 mt" 
0 , 9 8 2 " ' 
10,92,1" 
5 ,746" ' 
- 4 , 4 2 8 
0 , 2 0 5 
7 , 8 3 3 
7 , 7 4 2 ' " ' 
3 5 6 7 
3 5 6 7 
0 , 7 0 1 9 
0 , 7 4 5 3 
C O R E L o u 
H i g h 
1 , 2 1 2 ' " 
1 , 0 0 9 " " 
1 ,368 
3 , 6 6 8 ' 
- 4 , 3 4 4 
3 ,491 
9 , 2 3 1 ' 
8 , 0 5 8 " " 
3 5 6 7 
3 5 6 7 
0 , 6 6 0 9 
0 , 7 3 1 4 
C E t^ow 
High 
1 , 1 9 4 ' " 
1 , 0 0 8 " " 
1 ,399 
3 , 7 4 2 ' 
2 , 3 1 8 
1,257 
9 , 5 0 7 ' 
7 4 3 8 ' " 
3 5 6 7 
3 5 6 7 
0 , 6 5 7 6 
0 , 7 4 0 0 





3 , 8 8 5 " 
1,306 
3 , 5 0 7 ' 
9 4 0 6 ' 
8 , 0 6 0 " " 
3 5 6 7 
3 5 6 7 
0 , 6 5 6 8 
0 , 7 3 2 6 
P a n e l F : P o s t - G F C - M o d e l 2 
C O N Q u i n t i l e BV N o n G A A P E D I F F 2 In te rcept N A d j R-




1 1 , 2 9 0 " 
5 , 6 9 2 " 
- 3 , 5 0 3 
0 , 1 9 2 
7 , 7 2 9 
7,750""" 
3 5 6 7 
3 5 6 7 
0 , 7 0 1 2 
0 , 7 4 5 3 
C O R E L o w 
High 
1 , 2 1 3 " ' 
1 , 042"" 
1,987 
2 , 2 8 0 
- 6 , 0 4 2 
2 , 2 0 2 
8 , 8 4 0 
8 , 0 5 0 ' " 
3 5 6 7 
3 5 6 7 
0 , 6 6 3 7 
0 , 7 2 9 8 




0 , 8 4 8 
2 , 2 9 3 
1,708 
- 6 , 4 8 6 " 
9 ,567" 
5,499""" 
3 5 6 7 
3 5 6 7 
0 , 6 5 7 0 
0 ,7481 




0 , 8 6 3 
2 , 5 7 3 
0 , 8 2 7 
2 , 1 6 4 
9 , 4 2 4 ' 
8 , 0 5 8 " " 
3 5 6 7 
3 5 6 7 
0 , 6 5 6 4 
0 , 7 3 1 3 
• p < ( ) . 0 5 , " p < 0 . 0 1 , ' " p < 0.001 
I statistics are calculated with standard errors clustered on firm and time {fiscal quarters). 
The dependent variable, P. is closing share price at earnings announcement date. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: BV = Book value of common equity per share. NonGAAPE represents the following variables for 
IBES, C O R E , C E and CF models: IBES = I/B/E/S earnings per share as computed by security analysts. CORE = 
S & P Core earnings per share, CE = Net income per share, after adding back depreciation and amortisation expenses, 
C F = Operating cash flows per share. DlFFl = G A A P l minus the relevant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAPl is 
earnings per share from operations adjusted to e.xcludc the effects of special items reported under GAAP. D1FF2 = 
G A A P 2 minus the rele\ant non-GAAP earnings, where GAAP2 is income before extraordinary items per share 
reported under GAAP, CON quintile is Low if asymmetric timeliness (AT) measure quintile is I and High if AT 
measure quintile is 5. Low and High indicate low conditional conservatism and high conditional conservatism, 
respectively. 
T h e resul ts f o r DIFFI and D I F F 2 are m i x e d . D I F F l is not stat ist ical ly s igni f icant , 
D I F F 2 is s tat is t ical ly s ign i f ican t and posi t ive in relation to C O R E at both levels of 
condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . H o w e v e r . D I F F 2 is s igni f icant and posi t ive in relat ion to C F 
at the h igh level of condi t ional conse rva t i sm . 
T h e resul t s f o r the G F C per iod show inves tors became more focused on the book value 
of equi ty at the high level of condi t ional conse rva t i sm in c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C 
pe r iod . T h e r e is s o m e e v i d e n c e that n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are va lue re levant and that 
G A A P e a r n i n g s are inc rementa l ly value re levant . H o w e v e r , the resul ts genera l ly 
sugges t that inves tors sh i f t ed their f o c u s a w a y f r o m earn ings to the book value of equi ty 
d u r i n g the G F C . 
In the p o s t - G F C pe r iod . BV is s t rongly s igni f icant in all mode l s . Panel E s h o w s I B E S , 
C O R E . C E and C F are s tat is t ical ly s igni f icant and posi t ive at the high level of 
cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . A l s o , I B E S is stat ist ical ly s igni f icant and posi t ive at the low 
level of condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . D I F F I is only marg ina l ly s igni f icant and posi t ive in 
re la t ion to C F at the h igh level of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . In Panel F , I B E S is 
m o d e r a t e l y s ign i f i can t and pos i t ive at bo th l eve l s of cond i t i ona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . 
H o w e v e r . C O R E , C E and C F are no t s ta t is t ica l ly s ign i f i can t . D I F F 2 is m o d e r a t e l y 
s i gn i f i c an t and nega t i ve in re la t ion to C E at the h igh level of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m . 
H o w e v e r , D1FF2 is not s ta t is t ica l ly s i gn i f i c an t in re la t ion to I B E S , C O R E and C F . 
G e n e r a l l y , the resul t s of the p o s t - G F C per iod s h o w that n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s are va lue 
re levant in M o d e l 1. T h e resul t s are w e a k e r in M o d e l 2 . T h e r e is s o m e e v i d e n c e that 
G A A P e a r n i n g s are i nc r emen ta l l y va lue re levan t in the p r e - G F C per iod but less so in 
the p o s t - G F C pe r iod . T h e r e a p p e a r s to be a sh i f t in investors" f o c u s on G A A P e a r n i n g s 
b e t w e e n the pre- and p o s t - G F C pe r iods . It a p p e a r s that in the G F C and p o s t - G F C 
p e r i o d , i nves to r s p lace grea te r e m p h a s i s on the book va lue of e q u i t y , pa r t i cu la r ly at the 
h igh level of cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m , in c o m p a r i s o n to the p r e - G F C p e r i o d . 
7.3 DISCUSSION 
T h e resul t s of the t w o a l te rna t ive a n a l y s e s - e x a m i n i n g the ma in e f f e c t s and in te rac t ion 
t e r m s and e x a m i n i n g the base m o d e l s by low and high level of c o n s e r v a t i s m - p r o v i d e 
c o m p l e m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e . In s u m m a r y , there is s t rong e v i d e n c e inves to r s p r e d o m i n a n t l y 
f o c u s on the book va lue of equ i ty in va lu ing f i r m s . W h i l e the re is e v i d e n c e that G A A P 
and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s are va lue r e l evan t , it a p p e a r s that share pr ice is d r i ven 
p r e d o m i n a n t l y by the book value of equ i ty . T h i s resul t ho lds gene ra l ly a c r o s s all 
s a m p l e s . In con t r a s t , i nves to r s ' f o c u s on G A A P and n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s are not 
cons i s t en t ac ros s s a m p l e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , I f i nd e v i d e n c e of a t rade o f f in the re la t ive 
e m p h a s i s inves to r s p lace on the b o o k va lue of equi ty and e a r n i n g s at the h igh level of 
c o n s e r v a t i s m in c o m p a r i s o n to the low level of c o n s e r v a t i s m . T h e resul t s a l so s h o w the 
G F C has an i m p a c t and that the re is an o b s e r v a b l e sh i f t in inves to r s f o c u s on the b o o k 
value of equ i ty and e a r n i n g s due to the G F C . T h e a n a l y s e s in th is c h a p t e r p r o v i d e 
add i t iona l ins igh ts in to the spec i f i c i m p a c t that c o n s e r v a t i s m has on the va lue r e l e v a n c e 
of n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s and the inc rementa l va lue r e l e v a n c e of G A A P e a r n i n g s . 
7.3.] Unconditional Conservatism - Market-to-Book Ratio 
T h e resu l t s f o r the f inanc ia l sec to r s a m p l e u n d e r uncond i t i ona l c o n s e r v a t i s m s h o w 
inves to r s p r e d o m i n a n t l y f o c u s on the book va lue of equ i ty . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I f i nd G A A P 
e a r n i n g s h a v e inc remen ta l va lue r e l e v a n c e . A l s o , the resul t s s h o w a sh i f t in i n v e s t o r s ' 
f o c u s as a resul t of the G F C . In the p r e - G F C p e r i o d , i n v e s t o r s ' f o c u s a p p e a r s to be on 
non-GAAP earnings and G A A P earnings at tiie high level of unconditional 
conservatism. However, after the G F C , investors' focus appears to be on G A A P and 
non-GAAP earnings when unconditional conservatism is low. Both G A A P and non-
G A A P earnings are statistically significant in Model I in the post-GFC period only at 
the low level of unconditional conservatism. Similarly, D IFF I and D IFF2 are generally 
more significant when unconditional conservatism is low. 
The G F C had a profound impact on financial firms. Prior to the G F C , the book value of 
assets of financial f irms may be overstated and there was a correction during and after 
the G F C that resulted in the book value of assets of financial firms being closer to the 
average. Table 3.1 Panel A in Chapter 3 show that the average book value of equity 
decreased from the pre-GFC period through to the post-GFC period for financial sector 
f irms. In Chapter 3 ,1 find evidence consistent with this argument over the three period 
windows. In relation to the M T B ratio, the measure of unconditional conservatism 
already incorporates the effects of changes to the value of assets. Therefore, when 
unconditional conservatism is low, investors find G A A P earnings, which are generally 
closer to, or lower than, non-GAAP earnings incrementally value relevant. This may 
explain the significant and negative coefficient of D lFF l and DIFF2 in the G F C period. 
In the post-GFC period, D IFFI and DIFF2 are significant and positive when 
unconditional conservatism is low. These contrasting results suggest that investors find 
G A A P earnings incrementally value relevant. An explanation is that investors find 
G A A P earnings more credible and reliable when unconditional conservatism is low. 
In the non-financial sector and non-S&P 500 samples, it is more evident that investors 
focus predominantly on BV and place comparatively lower emphasis on both G A A P 
and non-GAAP earnings in the pre- and post-GFC period. During the G F C , however, 
there is some evidence of a shift in investors' focus back to non-GAAP earnings for 
firms not in the financial sector. Whi le there is also some evidence G A A P earnings have 
incremental value relevance, they are not consistent across the levels of unconditional 
conservatism or in relation to all non-GAAP earnings. There is evidence, however, that 
the share price of non-financial firms is discounted by investors when unconditional 
conservatism is low in the post-GFC period. Investors find G A A P earnings 
incrementally value relevant but the sign is negative, i.e., D IFF I and D IFF2 are 
negative and significant. It seems that after the G F C , investors may be concerned with 
overstatement of the book value of net assets. In contrast, the results for financial firms 
show similar evidence of a discount for low unconditional conservatism in the G F C 
period. However , in the pos t -GFC period, both DIFFl and DIFF2 are generally 
significant and positive in relation to n o n - G A A P earnings for f inancial f i rms . An 
explanation is investors may be less concerned with overstatement of the book value of 
net assets in financial f i rms due to the severe impact and correction in book value that 
occurred during the G F C . 
For f i rms in the S & P 500 index. I also f ind investors ' focus is predominantly on the 
book value of equity in the pre-GFC, G F C and pos t -GFC periods. However , n o n - G A A P 
earnings are mainly value relevant in the pre- and pos t -GFC periods across the levels of 
unconditional conservat ism. During the G F C , n o n - G A A P earnings are generally value 
relevant when unconditional conservatism is high. While G A A P earnings have 
incremental value relevance, they are generally in relation to C O R E , C E and C F but not 
in relation to IBES. The results suggest that after the G F C , investors ' focus on G A A P 
earnings decreased. An explanation for this is the emphasis investors place on the book 
value of equity, which already incorporates the financial information regarding 
unconditional conservatism as measured by the M T B ratio. Another explanation is that 
large f i rms are generally stable and able to survive the G F C . Therefore , G A A P earnings 
may not be as value relevant as the value of net assets of a large f i rm. 
The results across all samples show the magnitude of statistically significant BV to be 
larger at high level of unconditional conservatism in comparison to low level of 
unconditional conservat ism. I observe this positive association between unconditional 
conservat ism and BV in all my samples for the pre-GFC, G F C and pos t -GFC periods. 
This f inding is consistent with prior studies that show that unconditional conservat ism is 
positively related to f i rm value (Francis et al., 2013). More interestingly, however , is 
the result for N o n G A A P E , DIFFl and DIFF2 where they are statistically significant at 
both low and high levels of unconditional conservatism for a given measure of non-
G A A P earnings. Where this occurs, for example , in Table 7.6 Panels A and C . and 
Table 7 .10 Panels A and E. the magnitude of the coeff icient is consistently larger at the 
high level of unconditional conservatism relative to the low level of unconditional 
conservat ism. This result suggests investors may trade off the relative emphasis they 
place on earnings when unconditional conservat ism is low in comparison top when it is 
high. 
In t e r m s of mode l p e r f o r m a n c e , it appea r s that I B E S m o d e l s genera l ly p e r f o r m best 
a m o n g the m o d e l s tes ted in the non- f inanc ia l sec tor , S & P 5 0 0 and n o n - S & P 5 0 0 
s a m p l e s . T h e resul ts are mixed in the f inanc ia l sector s a m p l e . 
7.3.2 Conditional Conservatism - Asymmetric Timeliness Measure 
In con t r a s t , the resul ts f o r condi t iona l conse rva t i sm are mixed in relat ion to inves to r s ' 
f o c u s on G A A P and n o n - G A A A P ea rn ings and the impac t of the G F C . Neve r the l e s s , 
the resul ts show ev idence that inves tors are focused p redominan t ly on the book value of 
equ i ty . T h e resul ts a lso show the impac t of the G F C on inves tors ' f o c u s is mos t ev iden t 
in the f inanc ia l sec tor and non S & P 5 0 0 sample s . 
In the f inanc ia l sec tor s a m p l e , the shif t in in inves tors ' f o c u s is more ev iden t f r o m the 
G F C to the p o s t - G F C per iod . In the p o s t - G F C per iod , inves tors appea r to place grea te r 
e m p h a s i s on G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings when condi t ional conse rva t i sm is h igh . 
T h e resul ts indicate that inves tors f ind G A A P earn ings incrementa l ly value re levant 
w h e n condi t iona l conse rva t i sm is high but not when it is low. Fu r the rmore , the posi t ive 
s ign i f i can t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r D I F F I and D I F F 2 are cons is tent with inves tors f i n d i n g 
G A A P ea rn ings more credib le and re l iable . 
T h e resul ts f o r the n o n - S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e a l so show a shif t in inves tors ' f o c u s a f t e r the 
G F C . In the p r e - G F C per iod , I f ind ev idence that n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are genera l ly 
va lue re levant at low level of condi t ional conse rva t i sm and s o m e ev idence that G A A P 
e a r n i n g s are inc rementa l ly value re levant . In cont ras t , n o n - G A A P ea rn ings and D I F F I 
are genera l ly not stat ist ical ly s ign i f ican t in Model 1 in the G F C per iod . H o w e v e r , non-
G A A P ea rn ings are genera l ly va lue re levant when condi t ional conse rva t i sm is h igh in 
the p o s t - G F C per iod . T h e s e resul ts sugges t that inves tors place grea ter e m p h a s i s on 
n o n - G A A P ea rn ings be fo re and a f t e r the G F C but not dur ing the G F C . A n exp lana t ion 
is inves to r s m a y be conce rned abou t the viabil i ty of small f i r m s dur ing the G F C and 
f o c u s on the book value of equi ty relat ive to ea rn ings . 
T h e resul ts f o r the non- f inanc ia l s a m p l e show that G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings are 
va lue re levant b e f o r e , du r ing and a f t e r the G F C . H o w e v e r , there is weak e v i d e n c e in the 
p r e - G F C per iod ind ica t ing that inves tors place greater e m p h a s i s on G A A P ea rn ings , 
w h i c h are c lose r to , or l ower t han , IBES when condi t ional conse rva t i sm is h igh . It 
a p p e a r s that inves tors m a y perce ive n o n - G A A P ea rn ings to be overs ta ted w h e n 
cond i t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is re la t ively low. H o w e v e r , inves tors c h a n g e d their e m p h a s i s 
in the G F C and p o s t - G F C pe r iods , w h e r e stat is t ical ly s ign i f i can t D I F F I and D1FF2 are 
genera l ly pos i t ive . T h e e v i d e n c e sugges t s that inves tors f i nd G A A P e a r n i n g s 
inc rementa l ly va lue re levant even w h e n condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m is h igh in the pos t -
G F C per iod , wh ich is cons i s ten t wi th inves tors f i n d i n g G A A P ea rn ings m o r e re l iab le 
and c red ib le . H o w e v e r , there is a l so s o m e e v i d e n c e that w h e n condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m 
is l ow , inves tors place grea ter e m p h a s i s on G A A P ea rn ings , wh ich are c lose r to , o r 
l ower than . I B E S . 
In the S & P 5 0 0 s a m p l e , the resul ts s h o w that G A A P e a r n i n g s genera l ly have 
incrementa l va lue re levance in relat ion to n o n - G A A P ea rn ings in the p r e - G F C and G F C 
per iods . A f t e r the G F C , h o w e v e r , G A A P ea rn ings are not inc remen ta l ly va lue re levan t 
in relat ion to I B E S and C O R E . G A A P ea rn ings genera l ly remain inc remen ta l ly va lue 
re levant in relat ion to C E and C F at both low and high levels of condi t iona l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m . T h e s e resul ts are s imi lar to those in the tests of the s a m e s a m p l e unde r 
uncondi t iona l conse rva t i sm . Add i t i ona l l y , these resul ts are not o b s e r v e d in the n o n - S & P 
5 0 0 s a m p l e in relat ion to C O R E , C E and C F . T h e ev idence s h o w that the resul ts m a y be 
due to the f i r m size. 
In t e rms of mode l p e r f o r m a n c e , I B E S m o d e l s appea r to p e r f o r m cons i s ten t ly bet ter than 
the o ther m o d e l s tes ted . T h i s result genera l ly holds ac ross all s a m p l e s . O v e r a l l , my 
resul t s , in t e rms of model p e r f o r m a n c e are genera l ly cons i s ten t wi th pr ior s tud ies . 
7.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In C h a p t e r 3 , my resul ts indicate that the e m p h a s i s inves tors p lace on a l t e rna t ive 
ea rn ings m e a s u r e is f lu id and that the G F C had an impac t on the va lue r e l evance of 
G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . Add i t i ona l l y , in C h a p t e r 5 , 1 f ind s o m e e v i d e n c e of a 
sys temat ic assoc ia t ion be tween inves to r s ' f o c u s on c o m p a r a t i v e l y l o w e r va lues of 
G A A P ea rn ings and in fo rma t ion a s y m m e t r y . In this c h a p t e r , I inves t iga te w h e t h e r 
c o n s e r v a t i s m , uncondi t iona l and cond i t iona l , has an impac t on the resul ts in C h a p t e r 3 
and C h a p t e r 5 . Ove ra l l . I f ind there is a sys t ema t i c assoc ia t ion b e t w e e n c o n s e r v a t i s m 
and the e m p h a s i s inves tors p lace on the book value of equi ty and both G A A P and non-
G A A P ea rn ings . F u r t h e r m o r e , the sys temat ic assoc ia t ion is sub jec t to the m e a s u r e of 
conse rva t i sm and s a m p l e se lec t ion . 
In the ana lyses unde r both uncondi t iona l and condi t iona l c o n s e r v a t i s m , the resul ts 
genera l ly s h o w that G A A P e a r n i n g s have inc rementa l va lue r e l evance o v e r n o n - G A A P 
earnings. However, both the measure of conservatism and sample selection have an 
impact on the results. Under unconditional conservatism, there is evidence G A A P 
earnings are incrementally value relevant in the financial sector and Sc&P 5000 samples. 
However, there is little evidence that G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant 
in the non-financial sector and non S&P 500 samples. In contrast, under conditional 
conservatism, there is evidence that G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant in 
the non-financial sector sample in all three period windows. 
I also find evidence that the GFC had an impact on investors' focus on book value of 
equity and earnings. Specifically, I find investors are predominantly focused on the 
book values of net asset in the pre-GFC period. However, after the GFC, there is greater 
emphasis placed on earnings, particularly non-GAAP earnings. This is generally more 
evident under conditional conservatism than under unconditional conservatism. 
Furthermore, under unconditional conservatism, I find evidence of a trade off in 
investors' focus on earnings between low and high levels of unconditional 
conservatism. 
I find that size is a factor in my results for the S&P 500 sample under unconditional 
conservatism. The results from the sample of large firms are in contrast to the results 
from the non-S&P 500 sample. Investors place greater emphasis on book values of 
equity and non-GAAP earnings in large firms in comparison to small firms. 
In relation to RQ4, I find the differences in the results between the pre- and post-GFC 
period show that the GFC had an impact on the value relevance of GAAP and non-
G A A P earnings. Additionally, 1 find a systematic association between the level of 
conservatism and G A A P earnings, where GAAP earnings are positively related with the 
level of conservatism. That is, relatively higher G A A P earnings result with relatively 
higher DIFFI and DIFF2, which are significant and positive in my results. I find this 
consistent with the argument that investors find GAAP earnings incrementally value 
relevant because G A A P earnings are more credible and reliable. If investors favour 
lower values (i.e., more conservative) of GAAP earnings in comparison to non-GAAP 
earnings, I expect to observe a negative relationship between my DIFF variable and 





This chapter concludes my thesis. In this chapter, 1 provide a general overview of my 
study and the preceding chapters, discuss the significant research findings and research 
contributions, and identify the limitations of my study. I also offer suggestions for 
future research. 
8.2 G E N E R A L OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
I begin this study with an overview of the current literature on the value relevance and 
information content of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings in Chapter 1. 1 also highlight the 
role of information professionals, such as security analysts and credit rating agencies, as 
alternative sources of earnings information. The role of credit rating agencies and the 
alternative earnings information they provide have not received as much attention in the 
literature as those of security analysts. I identify gaps in the literature and how my study 
contributes to the literature and addresses these gaps. I conclude Chapter 1 with an 
overview of the chapters in my study. 
I discuss the background and review the literature relevant to my study in Chapter 2. 
Much of the research use samples with data from before 2010 (Albring et al., 2010; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2003: Bradshaw and Sloan. 2002; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003). In 
the period between 2008 to 2010, the financial markets experienced a global financial 
crisis (GFC). Consequently, prior research on the value relevance of GAAP and non-
G A A P earnings do not address the impact this event has on the value relevance of 
G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. The GFC offers a unique opportunity to examine the 
impact of such an event on investors. Specifically, whether this event impacts on the 
financial information in earnings that investors find relevant to their valuation of a firm. 
Furthermore, prior studies have identified that information risk is priced by the market 
(Easley and O 'Hara , 1992) Therefore, factors that affect information risk, such as 
information asymmetry, earnings quality and conservatism have an impact on firm 
value (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Easley and O'Hara , 2004; Bhattacharya et al., 
2013; Francis et al., 2013). This leads to the following research questions: 
RQ!: What is the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the value 
relevance of GAAP and Non-GAAP earnings? 
RQla: What is the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the information 
content of GAAP and Non-GAAP earnings? 
RQ2: What is the impact of information asymmetry on the comparative value 
relevance of GAAP and Non-GAAP earnings? 
RQ3: What is the impact of earnings quality- on the comparative value 
relevance of GAAP and Non-GAAP earnings? 
RQ4: What is the impact of conservatism on the comparative value relevance 
of GAAP and Non-GAAP earnings? 
In turn. 1 review and discuss the literature relating to the value relevance and 
information content of G A A P and non -GAAP earnings. I review the literature on 
information asymmetry , earnings quality and conservatism, including their measures, 
and how these may impact on the value relevance of G A A P and non -GAAP earnings. I 
also present my research design and the empirical models I use for my study. I use the 
valuation of model of Ohison (1995; 1999) to address RQI and a CAR model to address 
RQla. 
The Ohison (1995; 1999) model also serves as my base valuation model to examine the 
impact of information asymmetry, earnings quality and conservatism on the value 
relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. I adopt the measure of information 
asymmetry in Maskara and Mullineaux (2011), the measure of earnings quality in Ecker 
et al. (2006), the measure of unconditional conservatism in Roychowdhury and Watts 
(2007), and the measure of conditional conservatism in Basu (1997). I use two 
alternative approaches to address RQ2, RQ3 and RQ4. In the first approach, I include 
additional control variables in my base valuation model , which examine the main 
effects and interactions of my test variables with the relevant factor , i.e., information 
asymmetry , earnings quality and conservatism, under consideration. In the second 
approach. I use a sub-sample of f i rms in the extreme quintiles, i.e., quintile 1 and 
quintile 5, of the factor under consideration and re-estimate my base valuation model 
for the f i rms in these quintiles. Both of these approaches provide complementary and 
additional insigiits into tiie impact of the factors on tiie value relevance of GAAP and 
non-GAAP earnings. 
Finally, I identify the period windows for study to partition my sample, address issues 
in relation to the panel data set of my sample and correct for firm and time dependence 
(Cow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2010), discuss the method of evaluating 
my model based on BIC, and describe my sample selection. 
The next five chapters present my analyses and results. Chapter 3 reports my findings 
on the value relevance of GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. Chapter 4 reports my 
findings on the information content of GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. Chapter 5 
through to Chapter 7 examine the impact of information asymmetry, earnings quality 
and conservatism, respectively, on the value relevance of GAAP and non-GAAP 
earnings. 
Finally, I conclude my study in this chapter. Chapter 8. Section 8.3 presents the 
significant research findings of my study. Section 8.5 identifies the limitations of my 
study and Section 8.6 offers suggestions for future research. 
8.3 SIGNIFICANT RESEARCH FINDINGS 
8.3.1 Partial Support of Prior Studies 
Prior studies consistently find non-GAAP earnings, e.g., I/B/E/S and S&P Core 
earnings, to be more value relevant than GAAP earnings (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 
2002; Albring et al., 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003). 
Many of these studies are unequivocal in finding GAAP earnings to be inferior to non-
G A A P earnings. My study, however, shows that the results are generally sensitive to 
sample and statistical method. In this section, I focus on my results from the pre-GFC 
period as it excludes the effects of the GFC and are more comparable to prior studies 
cited above. 
First, 1 find that I/B/E/S and S&P core earnings are not consistently the best performing 
model and that GAAP earnings have incremental value relevance. My results show that 
G A A P earnings are generally incrementally value relevant in the financial sector sample 
but not in the non-financial sector and non-S&P 500 samples in relation to the non-
G A A P earnings tested. Also, GAAP earnings are not incrementally value relevant in 
relation to I/B/E/S earnings in the S&P 500 sample. My results show the value 
relevance of G A A P earnings is sensitive to industry. Nevertiieiess, where I/B/E/S 
earnings models are ranked highest in my tests, G A A P earnings are generally not 
incrementally value relevant and, in this regard, my f indings support prior studies. 
Second, using a more comprehensive approach than prior studies, 1 test two different 
measures of G A A P earnings - G A A P earnings f rom operations adjusted to exclude 
special items and G A A P income before extraordinary items. As the former is more 
closely aligned with I/B/E/S and S & P Core earnings, it will bias against f inding 
statistical significance. However , I generally find stronger results with G A A P earnings 
f rom operations adjusted to exclude special items than with G A A P income before 
extraordinary items. My results indicate investors are focused on G A A P measures of 
recurring earnings. Furthermore, the incremental value relevance of a G A A P earnings 
measure that is more closely aligned with I/B/E/S and S & P Core earnings is consistent 
with investors f inding these G A A P earnings more credible and reliable. 
Third, I find that f irm size and industry impact on the value relevance of n o n - G A A P 
earnings. In the non-financial sector and non-S&P 500 samples, my results show all 
non -GAAP earnings are not value relevant in my base models in the pre-GFC period. I 
find that investors are focused predominantly on the book value of net assets. In 
contrast, all non-GAAP earnings are value relevant in the financial sector and S & P 500 
samples in the same period. 
Finally, I partially replicate Albring et al. (2010) using my sample and find similar 
results. Therefore , my reported results in this study are partially explained by my 
statistical technique. Gow el al. (2010) Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2010) 
demonstrate that not correcting for f irm and time dependence in a panel data sample 
yields biased results that are more likely to reject the null. Consistent with these studies, 
my statistical analyses cluster the standard errors on both f irm and time to obtain 
consistent and robust results. 
8.3.2 Impact of the GFC 
My results show that the GFC had an impact the value relevance of G A A P and non-
G A A P earnings to investors. I find that investors ' relative emphasis on G A A P and non-
G A A P earnings is f luid. In the non-financial sector results of my base models , 
investors" focus is predominantly on the book value of net assets in the pre-GFC period, 
and n o n - G A A P earnings are not value relevant. During the G F C , investors find I/B/E/S 
earn ings value relevant . In the pos t -GFC per iod, investors f ind all n o n - G A A P earn ings 
tested value relevant . I f ind similar results of increased value re levance fo r n o n - G A A P 
earn ings in the S & P 500 sample in the p re -GFC period in compar ison to the pos t -GFC 
per iod . In the n o n - S & P 5 0 0 sample , however , I f ind increased value relevance only in 
relat ion to l /B/E/S earnings . 
Subsequen t ana lyses of the impact of informat ion a s y m m e t r y , earnings quality and 
conse rva t i sm yield similar results that show investors change their focus on the value 
re levance of al ternative earnings measures as a consequence of the G F C . Interest ingly, 
the ev idence shows investors ' f ocus in the pos t -GFC period does not revert to a s imilar 
f o c u s as in the p re -GFC period. It appears that investors may have adjusted their relative 
emphas i s on G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings . 
8.3.3 Impact of Information Asymmetry 
I f ind ev idence of a systematic associat ion between the level of information asymmet ry 
and value relevance of G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings and fur ther evidence of a 
change in investors ' f ocus f rom the p re -GFC period to the pos t -GFC period. A 
compar i son of Table 3.3 and Table 3 .4 in Chapter 3 with Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 in 
Chap te r 5 , respect ively , clearly shows the impact of the G F C and informat ion 
a s y m m e t r y on the value relevance of G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings. 
The results f r o m the f inancial sector sample show both G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings 
are general ly value relevant when informat ion asymmet ry is high before the G F C , 
H o w e v e r , dur ing the G F C , I f ind evidence of investors placing greater focus on book 
value of net assets when informat ion asymmet ry is high. In the pos t -GFC per iod, 
investors return their f o c u s to G A A P and n o n - G A A P earnings when informat ion 
a symmet ry is h igh. Notably , in the case of I /B/E/S and S & P Core earnings , I f ind a 
posi t ive re la t ionship between G A A P earnings and share price when informat ion 
a s y m m e t r y is high. Th is indicates G A A P earnings are incremental ly value relevant 
when informat ion a symmet ry is high but not when it is low. An explanat ion is that 
investors f ind G A A P earnings credible and reliable and that G A A P earnings mitigate 
in format ion risk. 
My results f r o m the non-f inancial sector and n o n - S & P 500 samples also show 
observable shi f ts in inves tors ' emphas i s when compar ing the pos t -GFC period with the 
p r e - G F C and G F C per iods . In both these samples , n o n - G A A P and G A A P earnings are 
significantly and negatively related with share price only when information asymmetry 
is high in the pre-GFC period. In contrast. non -GAAP and G A A P earnings are 
significantly and positively related with share price at both low and high levels of 
information asymmetry in the post -GFC period. The evidence f rom my samples is 
consistent with investors seeking more reliable and credible information after the G F C . 
8.3.4 Impact of Earnings Quality 
In examining the impact of earnings quali ty. I use the e-loading measure of Ecker et al. 
(2006), which measures investors" exposure to low quality earnings. I f ind fur ther 
evidence of a change in investors ' focus over time and that earnings quality is a factor . 
As with my discussion of information asymmetry above, a similar comparison of Table 
3.3 and Table 3.4 in Chapter 3 with Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 in Chapter 6, respectively, 
clearly shows the impact of the G F C and exposure to low quality earnings on the value 
relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. 
In the non-financial and non-S&P-500 samples, I find both G A A P and n o n - G A A P 
earnings are generally negatively related to share price when exposure to low quality 
earnings is high in the pre-GFC period. My results indicate that investors price down 
shares when exposure to low quality earnings is high in the pre-GFC period. I find 
similar results during the GFC, including a positive relationship between share price 
and G A A P and non -GAAP earnings when exposure to low quality earnings is low in 
the non-financial sector sample. However , in the post-GFC period, investors do not 
generally find G A A P earnings value relevant when exposure to poor quality earnings is 
high. In contrast, investors place greater emphasis on non -GAAP earnings when 
exposure to poor quality earnings is high. I do not find similar results for financial f i rms 
and large f i rms. Nevertheless, my results f rom the financial f i rms and large f i rms 
samples do provide evidence of a shift in investors ' emphasis on non -GAAP earnings in 
the post -GFC period in comparison to the pre-GFC and G F C periods. 
8.3.5 Impact of Con.servatism 
I f ind evidence of a systematic relationship between the level of conservat ism, under 
both unconditional and conditional conservatism, and investors ' emphasis on G A A P 
and non -GAAP earnings. A comparison of Table 3.3 in Chapter 3 with Table 7.1 and 
Table 7.3 in Chapter 7 show the impact of unconditional conservatism and the G F C on 
the results. Similarly, a comparison of Table 3.4 in Chapter 3 with Table 7.2 and Table 
7 . 4 in C h a p t e r 7 s h o w s the impac t of condi t ional conse rva t i sm and the G F C on the 
resul ts . 1 a l so f ind e v i d e n c e of a sh i f t in inves to r s ' e m p h a s i s be tween the p r e - G F C and 
p o s t - G F C pe r iods unde r both uncondi t iona l and condi t ional c o n s e r v a t i s m . In te res t ing ly , 
I a l so f ind e v i d e n c e cons i s t en t with inves tors t rading off the re la t ive e m p h a s i s they 
p lace on ea rn ings w h e n uncondi t iona l conse rva t i sm is low in c o m p a r i s o n to when it is 
h igh . 
In the non- f inanc ia l sec tor s a m p l e , inves tors f o c u s p redominan t ly on the book value of 
net asse ts in the p r e - G F C per iod at both low and high levels of uncondi t iona l 
c o n s e r v a t i s m . H o w e v e r , in the p o s t - G F C per iod , inves tors increase their f o c u s on non-
G A A P ea rn ings w h e n uncondi t iona l conse rva t i sm is low. T h e marke t - to -book rat io, 
w h i c h m e a s u r e s uncondi t iona l conse rva t i sm , cap tu res some of the f inancia l i n fo rma t ion 
in cur ren t e a r n i n g s and exp la ins the weak f i nd ing of an associa t ion be tween G A A P 
e a r n i n g s and share pr ice . 
M y resul ts under condi t iona l conse rva t i sm are mixed . T h e r e is some ev idence of a shif t 
in inves to r s ' f o c u s o v e r t i m e , h o w e v e r , the resul ts show inves tors f o c u s more s t rongly 
on the book value of net asse ts . Gene ra l l y , I f ind a posi t ive re la t ionship be tween G A A P 
e a r n i n g s and the level of conse rva t i sm in the p r e - G F C per iod . 
8.3.6 Summary 
T h e resul t s of the tests a b o v e , w h e n cons idered toge the r , show s t rong ev idence that the 
G F C a f f ec t ed the e m p h a s i s inves tors place on G A A P and n o n - G A A P earn ings . The re is 
a l so e v i d e n c e cons i s ten t wi th inves tors f ind ing G A A P ea rn ings more credib le and 
re l iab le . In te res t ing ly , inves tors do not appear to cons is tent ly f o c u s on ea rn ings 
i n fo rma t ion and p lace relat ively s t ronger and cons is tent e m p h a s i s on the book value of 
net asse t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , cont rary to prior research , inves tors ' e m p h a s i s on ea rn ings is 
f lu id and sh i f t s ove r t i m e , and that G A A P ea rn ings do have incrementa l va lue 
r e l evance . O v e r a l l , I f ind f ac to r s that impact on in fo rmat ion risk a f f ec t s the relat ive 
e m p h a s i s that i nves to r s ' p lace on G A A P and n o n - G A A P ea rn ings . Final ly , I f ind 
indus t ry , size and the stat ist ical tests used have an impac t on the resul ts . 
8.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
T h e G F C o f f e r s a un ique oppor tun i ty to e x a m i n e the value re levance of both G A A P and 
n o n - G A A P e a r n i n g s that is p rev ious ly unavai lab le to researchers . M y s tudy con t r ibu tes 
to the literature and provides evidence of the shift in investors' focus on the value 
relevance of earnings as a result of a tumultuous economic event. I also adopt a more 
comprehensive approach to examine the comparative value relevance of G A A P and 
non-GAAP earnings, using two alternative G A A P earnings measures and four 
alternative non-GAAP earnings measures. M y study provides greater insights on the 
relative importance of different earnings measures to investors. My f inding indicates 
that G A A P earnings are value relevant to investors, however, alternative earnings 
models perform differently over time. Wh i le investors appear to prefer I/B/E/S earnings, 
this is not consistent over time. Furthermore, I find different results for financial f irms 
in comparison to non-financial f irms. 
My study also controls for low and high levels of information asymmetry, earnings 
quality and conservatism to examine their impact on the value relevance of alternative 
earnings measures. My results fill a gap in the literature as prior studies do not address 
these factors when examining the value relevance of G A A P and non-GAAP earnings. 
Finally, prior studies generally use a pooled data approach and do not control for both 
firm and time dependencies. My results provide further evidence of a bias from not 
correcting for these dependencies in the statistical approach. 
8.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
M y study is primarily focused on the value relevance of alternative earnings measures 
using quarterly earnings data. Using quarterly data allows a more timely examination of 
the effects of the G F C . which is the primary aim of my study. However, it also imposes 
certain limitations on the study. 
Wh i le reported quarterly earnings have to comply with G A A P when announced by 
f irms, they are generally unaudited, unlike annual earnings. Consequently, reported 
quarterly earnings are also more likely to be restated subsequent to the initial earnings 
announcement. Investors may rely more on information professionals, such as security 
analysts and credit rating agencies, for earnings information that are more relevant and 
less likely to be subjected to restatements. A lso , investors may anticipate restatements 
of G A A P earnings. Therefore, investors may find as-first-reported earnings less 
relevant. Consequently, this may biased against f inding results in relation to G A A P 
earnings. 
C u r r e n t l y , there is no c lear re l iable m e a s u r e of condi t ional c o n s e r v a t i s m , par t icu lar ly f o r 
m e a s u r i n g it at a f i r m spec i f i c level . W h i l e several m e a s u r e s have been p roposed in the 
l i te ra ture , none are ideal . M y cho ice of the a s y m m e t r i c t ime l iness m e a s u r e in Basu 
( 1 9 9 7 ) is based on its w idesp read use in the l i terature. Whi l e 1 use the m e a s u r e to ass ign 
f i r m s into qu in t i l es , and not as a predic tor in my m o d e l , the risk of misc lass i f i ca t ion 
r e m a i n s . S imi la r ly , th is l imitat ion equal ly appl ies to my m e a s u r e s of i n fo rma t ion 
a s y m m e t r y and ea rn ings qua l i ty . In the latter t w o cases , the l imitat ion is mi t iga ted to 
s o m e ex ten t t h rough the use of an index that ave rages several measu re s of i n fo rma t ion 
a s y m m e t r y and a m e a s u r e ea rn ings qual i ty (i .e. , e - load ing) that has been tested fo r 
cons t ruc t va l id i ty . 
In m y mode l spec i f i ca t ion , I use n o n - G A A P earn ings as the pr imary test var iab le . T h i s 
b iases the resul ts in f i nd ing s ign i f i cance fo r n o n - G A A P ea rn ings and m a y bias aga ins t 
f i n d i n g s ign i f i cance in G A A P ea rn ings . 
F ina l ly , I separa te ly test the impac t of three fac to r s that a f fec t in fo rmat ion risk or m a y 
impac t on the va lue re levance of a l ternat ive earn ings measu re s , which are in fo rma t ion 
a s y m m e t r y , ea rn ings qual i ty and conse rva t i sm . These fac to rs , h o w e v e r , are interrelated 
and I have not e x a m i n e d the jo in t e f fec t s of these f ac to r s . 
8.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
M y f i n d i n g s indicate that the h o m o g e n o u s nature of my f inancia l sector and S & P 5 0 0 
s a m p l e s m a y be a f ac to r in my resul ts . Fu r the rmore , my resul ts indicate inves tors f o c u s 
m o r e s t rongly on book value of equi ty relat ive to ea rn ings and that inves tors ' f o c u s on 
e a r n i n g s is f lu id . T h e s e f i nd ing provide several potential oppor tun i t i es fo r f u t u r e 
r e sea rch . A m o r e re f ined app roach that better cont ro ls fo r f i r m size and indust ry m a y 
iden t i fy m o r e spec i f ic f ac to r s that expla in the f luid nature of inves tors ' f o c u s on va lue 
re levant e a r n i n g s i n f o r m a t i o n . 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , the e v i d e n c e of a c h a n g e in inves tors ' f o c u s war ran t s f u r t he r inves t iga t ion . 
Spec i f i c a l l y , the resul ts of the p o s t - G F C period show a d iscernible d i f f e r ence in 
inves to r s ' f o c u s re la t ive to the resul ts of the p r e - G F C per iod . T h i s m a y indicate 
inves tors m a y have not f u l l y apprec ia ted the va lue re levance of ea rn ings in fo rma t ion in 
the p r e - G F C per iod . It m a y a l so indicate poss ible mis-va lua t ion of share price and that , 
d u e to the G F C , a cor rec t ion o c c u r s in the G F C period and con t inues in the p o s t - G F C 
pe r iod . 
Future research can also address the limitations identified above. This includes 
examining the joint effects of information asymmetry, earnings quality and 
conservatism on the value relevance of alternative earnings measures. Such studies 
could provide more insights into how investors manage and trade off between 
information risk, relevance and reliability in relation to alternative earnings measures. 
Future studies may also examine the effects of restatements of G A A P earnings. This 
may provide insights into the extent to which restatements cause investors to revise their 
valuation of share price. The extent to which investors anticipate restatement of 
quarterly G A A P earnings may impact on the emphasis investors place on the initial 
earnings announcement. Furthermore, this may have implications on how investors 
perceive the credibility and reliability of G A A P earnings in relation to non-GAAP 
earnings. 
8.7 SUMMARY 
My study highlights the impact of the G F C on the value relevance of G A A P and non-
G A A P earnings. G A A P earnings are incrementally value relevant, however, this varies 
with factors such as firm size and industry. Furthermore, factors such information 
asymmetry, earnings quality and conservatism affect the relative level of emphasis 
investors place on alternative measures of earnings. 
Investors" emphasis on both G A A P and non-GAAP earnings are f luid; it varies with the 
economic conditions. The results from examining the impact of the G F C shows 
investors change the emphasis they place on alternative earnings measures over time. 
This includes pricing shares to compensate for risk factors. Nevertheless, the evidence 
suggests investors are strongly focused on the book value of net assets in their valuation 
decision. 
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